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PUBLICATION SERIES PREFACE 
This Series is the result of a rather unique endeavour of HiiL: to research 
the law of the future. Driven by research results that were coming from 
HiiL and from the small but growing engagements of others (Anne Marie 
Slaughter’s New World Order stands out as an early pioneering work), we 
had a clear sense that the global legal environment was changing, and that 
legal and justice actors were both shaping those changes and were con-
stantly working to adapt to them. 
To understand law’s futures, we started a process in which we 
asked 52 thought leaders in different legal areas to reflect on law in their 
field two decades away. Their think pieces became The Law of the Future 
and the Future of Law, volume one. One thing led to another, and with the 
tremendous support of our hugely innovative publisher, the Law of the 
Future Series was set up. 
The Series is meant as a focal point for publications that reflect on 
the challenges connected with law’s futures and what we can do to deal 
with them. It is perhaps a forum for a new discipline, legal futurology, 
although the Series is not meant for Jules Verne or George Lucas fantasies 
(however much we admire and enjoy them). It is a place for serious and 
thorough thinking about the future place in our lives of a commodity the 
future badly needs: good rule systems that support stability, prosperity 
and human dignity. 
We welcome your ideas and submissions. 
Sam Muller 
Director, HiiL 
Stavros Zouridis  
Professor of Public Administration, Tilburg University 
Larry Catá Backer 
 Professor of Law and International Affairs, Penn State University 
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LAW OF THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE OF LAW 
This is the second volume of The Law of the Future and the Future of 
Law, and a reflection of our continuing efforts to map trends in the global 
legal environment. In this volume, we focus on areas that received less at-
tention in the 2011 volume. There is, for example, less on criminal law, 
and more on intellectual property and trade law. We start the volume with 
an introduction in which we set the stage. The volume ends with some 
concluding thoughts by Professor Jan Smits, who was amongst the earliest 
of law of the future thinkers. He reflects on common threads in the think 
pieces. We extend our appreciation to him for his willingness to take the 
time to do this. 
Once again, it has been a very inspiring endeavour to work with 
outstanding thought leaders from very different fields. It was at times a 
tight process, which asked a lot from the authors. We thank them for their 
patience and commitment. 
We would also like to thank our copy editing team, Wendy Bre-
mang, Kaitlyn Jones, Sarah-Louise Todd, Lisa-Felicia Akorli, Tsvetelina 
Mihaylova, Lara Schaefer and Kate Elliot, led by the indefatigable and 
ever meticulous Alexander Orona. We thank Alf Butenschøn Skre and 
Morten Bergsmo from Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, for their pa-
tience, and endurance with our inability to stick to deadlines. We are 
humbled by your continuing belief in us and treasure our cooperation. 
Lastly, a special word of thanks to Dessy Velikova, who managed the 
whole process with both softness and determination. 
Sam Muller, Stavros Zouridis,  
Morly Frishman and Laura Kistemaker 
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______ 
Introduction: 
The Law of the Future Continues 
Sam Muller*, Stavros Zouridis**, Morly Frishman*** 
and Laura Kistemaker 
1. Why and How 
In June of this year, the world convened in the Rio+20 Conference to 
tackle huge global environmental challenges, and the leaders of the G20 
met in Los Cabos, Mexico to deal with the global economic crisis. What 
can these events tell us about the future? An obvious conclusion is that 
there continue to be global challenges for which global approaches are 
clearly needed. We also see different approaches to these challenges. 
Rio+20 was a conference under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), 
a formally structured international organisation. Los Cabos was host to 
the meeting of an informal leaders network; reviews of both conferences 
were generally of ‘the glass is half empty’ type. Not enough real progress, 
not enough real change. Looking deeper, however, the two events also re-
veal an ‘iceberg’ effect with most media reviews focussing on the top of 
the iceberg (the States and leaders that met). Underneath that top, howev-
er, a huge swathe of non-State Parties met, interacted, committed, and 
participated. This lower part of the iceberg is more difficult to see and un-
derstand, and is more chaotic. What does jump at you, however, is that 
there is a lot of organisation of interconnectedness around challenges hap-
pening in smaller, more local networks. Both events also show the inter-
connectedness of things: the conclusions of both conferences do not only 
relate to ‘the environment’ and ‘the economy’, but include many other ar-
eas and challenges, such as social exclusion, rule of law, equality, and so 
on. The events also reveal different uses of law: Rio+20 is largely 
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grounded in the language and mechanisms from the more formally organ-
ised UN system of organisations and treaties. The Los Cabos language 
and approach seems less formal and legalistic.  
All this is the law of the future at our doorstep: using law as a tool 
to deal with societal challenges and to organise stability and prosperity. 
Law’s future should mobilise at least as much scholarly attention as law’s 
past and present. This conviction inspired us to develop a Law of the Fu-
ture network that aims to provoke future research and debate on law and 
legal institutions. As we soon found out, however, researching and debat-
ing something that does not yet exist cannot be done with familiar meth-
ods. Mapping the highly uncertain future of law requires specific method-
ologies and strategies derived from the field of foresight studies. Because 
of the specific nature of law, these methodologies and strategies cannot be 
mechanically transplanted to the legal realm. Gradually, we have thus de-
veloped a research strategy for legal futurism. It builds on in-depth expert 
knowledge of lawyers and legal scholars; the trends and developments ob-
served in different areas of law; the imagination of leading thinkers, re-
searchers, and practitioners; and, most of all, critical reflection and debate. 
This volume is an expression of this strategy.  
As said, the future of law does not exist yet and we assume that it is 
highly uncertain and complex. This should, however, not withhold us 
from systematically analysing and scrutinising it. In our view, ignoring or 
merely speculating is not an option. Ignoring the future opens the door to 
law becoming irrelevant, unstable, and dysfunctional because it cannot 
keep up with societal developments and is not constructed systematically 
enough. It also bereaves the world of fully using a tool, which if used 
well, can contribute tremendously to stability. But how to systematically 
analyse and scrutinise something as complex as law that is not even there?  
A first step requires mapping of what is there: major trends ob-
served in different areas of law. Together with the first edited volume of 
The Law of the Future and the Future of Law (published in 2011), this 
volume aims to provide a contribution to such a map. Both volumes com-
prise of think pieces, written by leading thinkers and doers in the field of 
law. In these think pieces, the authors address a set of questions based on 
their expertise on specific areas of law or legal issues. The questions we 
have posed to the authors are: 
What legal trends are we likely to see in your field in the 
coming two to three decades? How do these trends relate to 
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the grand societal challenges that the world faces? In light of 
these trends, what do you see as the most significant chal-
lenges for the development of the law? And, which recom-
mendations would you have in terms of (i) strate-
gies/policies; (ii) research agendas; (iii) training/education 
for the lawyer of the future? 
Thus, the authors were asked to reflect on what they think will hap-
pen in the coming decades. The think pieces are not meant to be elaborate 
academic papers, but short essays in which the authors can freely share 
their thoughts on the future. Therefore, the authors were asked to mini-
mise the use of footnotes when making references. “Sources and Further 
Reading” sections included at the end of think pieces list sources provided 
by the authors and additional literature for further reading. We think this 
may strengthen the ability of the book to serve as a catalyst at this stage of 
development of this new field. 
Mapping legal trends and challenges provides some clues on the fu-
ture of law, but whether these trends will continue or reverse is highly un-
certain. Rather than work on predictions (impossible), we work on prepar-
edness. We therefore used the think pieces that we collected in The Law of 
the Future and the Future of Law volumes to build scenarios. What will 
happen if the trends stop or even reverse? What will be the impact on the 
future of law? A second edition of the Law Scenarios to 2030 was pub-
lished in June 2012 (http://www.hiil.org/publication/law-scenarios-to-
2030).  
But mapping legal trends and building scenarios once is not enough, 
because new trends may evolve. Any serious attempt to grasp the future 
of law should therefore continuously include new trends, new ideas, and 
new imagination. This understanding has led to this second volume on 
The Law of the Future and the Future of Law.  
Again, the volume has been built upon three assumptions. First, it is 
impossible to predict the future – there is too much uncertainty and com-
plexity for that. However, we can face the future better by mapping ma-
crotrends and microsignals and preparing for plausible scenarios. Second, 
the future of law can only be understood by deploying a multi-disciplinary 
approach – law is not something that can be separated from life. Lawyers 
and legal scholars have written many think pieces in this volume but we 
have also included think pieces by scholars from adjacent academic disci-
plines. Third, law’s future can only be understood if a variety of ap-
proaches, areas of law, and ideas are taken into account. As Surowiecki 
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has convincingly argued, the wisdom of crowds is largely based on diver-
sity, different ideas, observations and opinions.1 
The final step of our research methodology consists of exchange 
and debate. What the thought and practice leaders have written here and 
what we have deduced from that in this introduction and in the Law Sce-
narios to 2030 should be subject to constant discussion and exchange. 
Earlier this year, for example, we engaged justice leaders from Tunisia 
with the Law Scenarios, trying to work out what some of the trends that 
emerge mean for national strategies to reform the legal system. We also 
continue with the Law of the Future conferences, bringing people together 
around future challenges. The 2012 conference will focus on rule-making.  
2. Previous Findings 
The internationalisation of law and the rise of private legal regimes were 
the main legal trends observed in the first volume. The internationalisa-
tion of law, understood as both the rise of international law and growing 
interconnection between national legal systems as a result of international 
interdependencies (economic, social, political, technological, and so on), 
appeared to be a predominant trend in many different areas of law. Na-
tional legal systems are also increasingly confronted with private rule re-
gimes. These regimes sometimes pose either soft or hard rules and stand-
ards that compete with national legislation. If these regimes engage in set-
tling disputes, they compete with national courts. As argued in the first 
volume, both internationalisation and the rise of private legal regimes are 
complex phenomena that can easily be misunderstood. We can also not be 
sure whether these trends will continue the next decades, as they have to 
date. Internationalisation and the rise of private legal regimes do appear to 
be the key design parameters of the law of the future, but these trends may 
as well reverse. Instead of extrapolating these trends, we have therefore 
used them as contingencies. With that, we developed four different sce-
narios that picture possible futures of the global legal environment. 
 
 
                                                   
1
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bleday, New York, 2004. 
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Mixed or private  
legal regime 
Predominantly public  
legal regime 
Continued internationalisa-
tion of law 
Legal Internet Global Constitution 
Reversed internationalisation 
of law 
Legal Tribes Legal Borders 
If the expansion of international rules and institutions continues, 
and most of the heavy lifting is done by States and public actors, we may 
expect that the global legal environment will slowly develop as the Euro-
pean Union has been developing: into a robust legal order of its own that 
is highly integrated with national legal systems. We have referred to this 
scenario as Global Constitution. International rules and institutions can al-
so further expand as part of a process of shifting emphasis from law creat-
ed and enforced by State-connected institutions to private governance 
mechanisms and private legal regimes. If this happens, the Legal Internet 
scenario will evolve. The combination of a reverse process of internation-
alisation with simultaneous strengthening of law created and enforced by 
public authorities will result in the Legal Borders scenario. Finally, there 
is a theoretical possibility that the process of internationalisation will re-
verse as private legal and governance mechanisms grow. The global legal 
environment will then become dispersed, highly chaotic, and have dimin-
ishing importance. Because of the lack of State power, communities will 
depend on local and private legal and governance regimes. We have re-
ferred to this scenario as Legal Tribes. In each of these scenarios we have 
dealt with four questions: (1) what is the main ordering?; (2) who makes 
the rules?; (3) how are rules enforced?; and (4) how are conflicts re-
solved? It will come as no surprise that the answers to these questions are 
very different in each scenario.  
We see aspects of these four scenarios and answers to these four 
questions in all think pieces contained in this volume.  
3. Outline and Structure 
Like the previous volume, we maintained a thematic structure, rather than, 
for example, a more traditional division in accordance with the field of 
doctrinal law. We believe such a thematic division offers a more 
interesting read, as it is better suited to help exploring issues ‘out of the 
box’, thereby promoting critical thinking about the inter-linkages of 
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different areas of law with each other and with other realms such as 
politics, technology, and economics. Each ordering of the book is to a 
certain extent arbitrary, because most of the think pieces address several 
issues. Moreover, the trends and challenges signalled in the think pieces 
are connected. For example, globalisation is at least accommodated by 
revolutionary communication technologies. But new communication 
technologies also cause severe enforcement problems in some areas (for 
example, the enforcement of intellectual property law).  
We have divided the think pieces into six sections, each with 
different perspectives. There is no claim that any of these perspectives are 
dealt with exhaustively. Rather, aspects are highlighted, connected with 
trends and challenges percieved by the author. Below, we discuss these 
sections, providing a short summary of the think pieces. After that, we 
will draw some general conclusions.  
3.1. The Global Law Perspective: To What Extent  
are We Moving towards a Global Legal System?  
Some authors emphasise the impact of processes of internationalisation 
and the consequences of these processes for law and the legal field. Wil-
liam Twining’s think piece is an excellent opener for this section, and the 
volume as a whole, as it nails to the door ten theses about ways in which a 
global perspective about law and its evolution challenges some wide-
spread assumptions underlying Western traditions of academic law and 
legal discourse. Twining suggests that when thinking about the future of 
law from a global perspective, we need to try to break free of simplicities 
like depicting our world in terms of concentric circles neatly organised in 
a single hierarchy, or assuming that the centre of the universe is where 
one happens to be. His first thesis cautions against the temptation to gen-
eralise about law beyond our capacity, as, in fact, we (still) lack concepts, 
well-constructed hypotheses, and reliable data to make many evidence-
based generalisations about law in the world as a whole. The second the-
sis is that a picture of law cannot sensibly be confined to the Westphalian 
duo of municipal State law and classical international law, as one must 
acknowledge the place of many forms of non-State law, such as religious 
law, customary law, transnational commercial law, new forms of regional 
and supranational ordering, and various forms of ‘soft law’ at different 
levels. The remaining eight theses relate to issues such as sub-global pat-
terns of law, the diffusion of law, legal and belief pluralism, secularism, 
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and ethnocentrism. On the whole, for Twining, a ‘global perspective’ on 
law must aspire to be the recognition of views from almost everywhere, 
rather than a view from nowhere. Accordingly, a global perspective can 
help us to recognise the diversity and complexity of systems of ordering 
human relations in the world and to realise that nobody is located unique-
ly at its centre.  
In her think piece, Elisa Morgera illustrates much of the complexi-
ty of law and globalisation as described by Twining, with respect to the 
particular field of environmental law. Using international biodiversity law 
as a testing ground, Morgera argues that ‘global environmental law’ rep-
resents the future of law in the environmental arena. Global environmen-
tal law is a concept emerging from the promotion of environmental pro-
tection as a global public good through a plurality of legal mechanisms re-
lying on a plurality of legal orders. It emphasises the functional role of 
States as protectors of the environment as a common interest of humanity 
and the considerable role of global institutions in international law-
making and compliance monitoring. Global environmental law further 
underscores how international environmental law increasingly affects in-
dividuals and groups in society, and private operators, within and across 
national boundaries. It also points to the growing role of international pri-
vate law in the environmental arena.  
Frank Vibert offers a critical account regarding the role played by 
international institutions in multilevel governance. According to Vibert, it 
is widely acknowledged that international rule making is undemocratic, 
and there is also increasing awareness that these rule makers are far from 
infallible. As examples, he mentions the International Monetary Fund’s 
(IMF) acknowledgement of its failure in the 2008 international financial 
crisis; the World Health Organisation (WHO), which has been criticized 
for its handling of avian and swine flu; and the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), which has been attacked for its handling of the 
evidence behind its analysis of the human contribution to global warming. 
Given these shortcomings of international organisations, Vibert’s think 
piece focuses on the potential contribution of judicial review to combating 
both the democratic deficit and the problem of functional failures – real or 
alleged. Whereas at present, no coherent system exists for the judicial re-
view of international bodies and most operate without the possibility of 
judicial challenge to their decisions, this think piece sketches alternative 
approaches to help constructing such a system of judicial review.  
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It should be mentioned that Vibert rejects what he describes as the 
conventional analysis, according to which the democratic deficit can best 
be diagnosed through theories of multi-level governance and/or princi-
pal/agent theory. The reason for rejection is that both theories involve 
normative bottom-up constructions (what should happen), while Vibert 
urges us to acknowledge the empirical reality that international rule mak-
ing is top-down.  
The top-down or bottom-up dilemma is also central to the think 
piece by Colin Scott, though in a different sense and context. Scott begins 
by stating that one of the central challenges of contemporary governance 
is the steering of organisational and individual behaviour. His main argu-
ment is that highly prescriptive approaches to regulation are frequently in-
effective or even counterproductive. One reason for this is that we show 
considerable ingenuity in turning demands to change our behaviour to suit 
our own interests rather than meeting the public interest. Other reasons in-
clude the limited knowledge about the behaviours to be steered and lim-
ited capacity for monitoring and enforcement held by governments. He 
therefore suggests an alternative way to think about the problem of steer-
ing behaviour. The alternative is to reduce the emphasis on top-down con-
trol and instead seek to exploit the capacity of targeted individuals and or-
ganisations alike to regulate them, to monitor each other, and to learn how 
they may benefit from pursuing more public-oriented objectives. Corpo-
rate social responsibility initiatives provide only one example of such a 
process at play. His piece evaluates the potential as well as the known 
shortcomings of this meta-regulatory approach to governance, as a basis 
for developing regulation that is both more effective and more efficient. 
Ellen Lawton’s think piece illustrates some of the arguments put forward 
by Colin Scott. In her think piece, she makes the case for learning from 
experiences gained within the health sector as a way to innovate the legal 
field. The legal field should use the knowledge and experience of the 
health sector to measure impact and quality, to use trend data, and to in-
vest in interventions with a focus on prevention. 
3.2. The Perspective of Connections: 
What Connections with Global Issues are Emerging?  
According to some think piece authors, law is or will be confronted with 
some new and persistent challenges. Whether law will prove to be the 
solution is seriously questioned, but in order to become a solution for 
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these challenges law has to meet some new requirements. Hassane Cisse, 
Christina Biebesheimer and Richard Nash discuss the connection be-
tween law or justice, and development. Many around the world, they ex-
plain, no longer view development equated solely with ‘growth’ at all 
costs as the optimal means for a country’s path towards prosperity. In-
deed, all these terms – development, growth and prosperity – have over 
the years become expanded to become broader and generally more inclu-
sive. More and more indications seem to point towards a more vocal and 
powerful demand for more equitable and inclusive growth at the macro-, 
meso- and micro-levels. Development organisations, including the World 
Bank, will have to adapt to this new trend and be able to respond to it ad-
equately if they are to provide the services that countries and people de-
mand. A key element of this is likely to be more support for social justice 
interventions through a variety of stakeholders, which will have to inform 
a new global development pact more aligned with the needs and demands 
expressed by the people. 
Claudia Dumas discusses the large and increasing number of legal 
initiatives to curb corruption and bribery and comes to the conclusion that 
the situation is actually worsening rather than improving. Dumas also ex-
plores the rise of soft law initiatives and takes the indications that corrup-
tion is not declining globally as a starting point to call for (i) an analysis 
of the assumed causal relationship between hard and soft law mandates 
and new understandings of how soft law instruments affect each other, (ii) 
an identification of gaps in increasingly fluid and disaggregated legal re-
gimes, and (iii) research regarding the impact of specific anti-corruption 
measures. 
International Criminal Court (ICC) President Sang-Hyun Song also 
discusses connections between law and development, but his think piece 
focuses on international criminal law. According to Judge Song, whereas 
references to social justice in the domain of development are not new, a 
more recent trend has emerged which increasingly recognises the interre-
lation between the rule of law and criminal justice on the one hand, and 
sustainable peace and development, on the other. International criminal 
justice supports peace and development through preventing mass vio-
lence, re-instating confidence in socio-political structures, and empower-
ing victims to rebuild their lives. In turn, development supports interna-
tional criminal justice since effective and capable national systems are 
crucial for the success of the Rome Statute system as a whole. Judge Song 
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calls for more to be done to strengthen national jurisdictions to respond 
adequately to international crimes and he sees a key role to be played by 
the development community in this regard. 
Multi-level challenges require a concerted effort of both national 
and international law. Sometimes these challenges are triggered by inci-
dents and crises, as Himamauli Das illustrates in his think piece. He de-
scribes the unprecedented increase in the size of the financial backstop 
provided by the international financial institutions (IFIs), governance and 
institutional changes at the IFIs and other multilateral groupings, and an 
evolution in the political and institutional mechanisms of the international 
financial architecture. As efforts continue to support the global recovery 
and the implementation of reforms to the financial system, countries will 
need to resolve to what extent they wish to further elaborate on existing 
mechanisms. Decisions need to be made as to whether new, enforceable 
rules need to be developed, instead of standards. Countries also need to 
assess compliance mechanisms, such as peer reviews, assessments and 
sanctions. 
Multi-level challenges are caused by multi-layered legal orders. 
These layers are not restricted to law created by States and public authori-
ties. In his think piece, Rik Torfs shares the future trends he discerns in 
the relation between law and religion. He signals, for example, the dis-
connect between the ideas of the religious groups and the overall dis-
course in society. The role law plays in this development is that it further 
marginalises religion. While freedom of expression gains importance, the 
notion of religious freedom is narrowed to its individual form. Also, he 
sees a trend towards religion no longer being excluded from non-
discrimination legislation, as discrimination of women is more and more 
qualified as a crime. 
3.3. The Perspective of Technology:  
How is Technology Affecting Law? 
Many think piece authors emphasise technological development as a main 
driver of legal change. Because of new technologies, rules sometimes be-
come obsolete. But the impact of new technologies goes beyond rules and 
statutory legislation. Just as internationalisation raises some serious ques-
tions regarding basic legal principles and basic legal concepts, new tech-
nologies can render legal concepts that have been used for ages obsolete. 
Jacqueline Lipton and Rolf H. Weber both see the need of restructuring 
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cyberlaw. Jacqueline Lipton points out that on the Internet everything is 
dependent on the intermediaries at work. The ‘blackout protest’, of among 
others Wikipedia and Google, against the Stop Online Piracy Act in Janu-
ary 2012, showed very clearly the power of online service providers, often 
missed in the discussions about the nature of cyber law. Therefore, there 
is the necessity of a law of the ‘intermediated information exchange’. Un-
like the case of many physical world interactions, the victims of online 
wrongs are more immediately attracted to legal action against an interme-
diary than against the primary wrongdoer (because of the anonymous 
global nature of the Internet and the interest of the intermediaries to be 
seen as safe). The cyber law of the future will therefore need to focus on 
the legal liability of online intermediaries. This has not been the case in 
past conceptions of cyber law. In the other think piece that deals with 
cyber law, that of Rolf H. Weber, informal law is presented as the best 
mode for regulation. An evolutionary approach should mainly encompass 
procedural models being better suited to comply with an uncertain future 
and allowing a reconciliation of conflicting interests. Key elements in this 
concept are organisation, governance, and dispute settlement. Thereby, 
civil society must be adequately positioned through a multi-stakeholder 
approach to determine what social impacts law should cause.  
David Eagleman and Sarah Isgur Flores also find that a lot of 
work needs to be done to align law and policy with the current state of 
science – this time modern neuroscience. After showing how ineffective 
and inefficient current criminal justice policies are in terms of preventing 
new crimes, they propose a way to no longer base these policies on 
blameworthiness, but on biology. Currently, law does a very poor job in 
taking the genetics and the environment of the perpetrator into account, 
while these are exactly the reasons why someone committed the crime. 
This is very hard to do right, anyway. So that is why Eagleman and Isgur 
urge to shift the emphasis away from blameworthiness to a more forward-
looking approach, based on a better understanding of the brain. This ap-
proach is the neuro-compatibility index, comprised of seven criteria to 
quantify how well a system of criminal law is compatible with the lessons 
of modern science.  
While Eagleman and Isgur are making the case for bringing tested 
techniques of biology into the realm of law, Albert Lin discusses the 
largely untested method of geo-engineering. But there is good chance that 
it will materialise at some point, as it is gaining attention as a possible tool 
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for ameliorating climate change. He uses the metaphor of a thermostat 
that will enable humans to fine-tune the Earth’s climate. This highlights 
the dilemma that comes with the nature of this form of engineering: who 
should be in charge of this thermostat? Only States, or also other actors? 
How to incorporate the interests of future generations? And how to organ-
ise the compliance mechanisms needed?  
Autonomous robots are dealt with in Surya Deva’s think piece. 
Robots are considered autonomous when they are capable of perceiving 
information delivered as language or, otherwise, are able to learn, reason 
and make decisions based on their experience, without direct human in-
tervention or instruction. Deva zooms in on the implication of the pres-
ence of such robots for human rights. He asserts that robots can be ‘hold-
ers’ of human rights as much as human beings or corporations can be. 
What then needs to be done when autonomous robots violate these rights? 
This needs a new regulatory framework at international level in which 
(trustees of) robots should have a say as well. Deva concludes that robots 
should and could be hold accountable for their actions and that sanctions 
would be appropriate if they violate human rights. Robots could compen-
sate their victims or pay fines, they could be confined, and ultimately be 
destroyed.  
Madeleine de Cock Buning, Lucky Belder and Roeland de Bruin 
discuss a broader spectrum of legal consequences of the rise of autono-
mous robots. In six scenarios, they introduce a whole array of problems 
that might arise in terms of intellectual property, legal capacity, liability, 
and privacy. But differently from Deva, these authors stress that it would 
be wise to demonstrate restraint in developing a specific legal framework 
regarding robots. Many of the potential legal issues are already addressed 
in existing legislation. For instance, regulations surrounding corporate en-
tities, ICT systems, motor vehicles, or even domestic animals could be 
relevant to evaluating the legal status of autonomous robots. 
Finally, Jim Dator’s think piece focuses on the impact of commu-
nication (and communication technology) on the nature of legal and gov-
ernmental structures. Dator’s starting point is that in order to forecast al-
ternative futures of law, lawyers, courts, and judges, it is necessary to un-
derstand their alternative pasts and presents, and to determine what as-
pects of the pasts and presents might continue to influence their futures, 
and what novelties might arise creating new conditions. Looking at the 
way judicial systems have been shaped by communication technologies in 
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the pasts and might be shaped by current and emerging communication 
technologies in the futures, this think piece takes us on a fascinating and 
visionary journey that starts thousands of years ago and ends decades (or 
more) into the future. 
3.4. The Perspective of States:  
What is Changing or Needs to Change?  
In order to deal with the challenges of internationalisation, new technolo-
gies, and a multi-layered legal order, both law and justice systems have to 
innovate. Some think pieces focus on the way these innovations should be 
designed, whereas other think piece authors draw on previous experiences 
with innovating law and the justice system. According to the latter, legal 
pluralism affects both the chances to innovate and the way innovations 
should be designed. Maurits Barendrecht opts for a sweeping, but in-
cremental change of State institutions. Dissatisfaction with the function-
ing of core organisations is widespread. What if we create a board of trus-
tees for the State and have them start taking responsibility for the perfor-
mance of its institutions? Most surely, they would come to the conclusion 
that the habits that Barendrecht lists should be rooted out one by one. Bad 
habits – such as trading with jobs in high government positions instead of 
letting the best person be selected or making agreements between parties 
forming a coalition government in secret negotiations limiting the issues 
that will be tackled by the government – should be replaced by good hab-
its that make it possible to integrate innovative instruments for collective 
decision making and governing communities in a variety of State institu-
tions. 
Ji Weidong strongly argues against one such innovation in the case 
of the Chinese judiciary: excessive mediation. Ji sees the complexity that 
China faces in these times of transformation, globalisation, and financial 
crisis as a danger to society. Practices like ‘big mediation’ and ‘active ju-
diciary’ lead to elasticity of rules. But that is the opposite of what is need-
ed to steer China away from the uncertainties it sees itself challenged 
with. The judiciary should concentrate on the coordination function of law 
instead. Rule of law is more important than ever to ensure that money is 
earned and social wealth is distributed. And thus, more important than 
preoccupying oneself with people’s satisfaction levels of court perfor-
mance.  
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Dacian Dragos discusses another part of the world in which the 
State has undergone and is still undergoing major transformation: Central 
and Eastern Europe. He focuses on transparency. How has this, relatively 
recent, concept taken root in the public administration of these countries? 
Dragos concludes that regulating and implementing transparency laws is 
hard for many reasons. But again, innovations such as e-government tools 
can help. Institutionally, the preeminence of Ombudsman-type institutions 
will be the trend, and they will act both as mediators and enforcers of 
transparency. 
In his think piece, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross makes the case to not 
have the controversies that surround the preventive detention of violent 
non-State actors (VNSAs) prevent States from making the right decisions. 
As it seems, the need for States to protect itself against VNSAs is here to 
stay and with it, the need for preventive detention policy. A more mature 
discussion is needed to acknowledge the values that have driven preven-
tive detention, and seek to determine when detention is justified as com-
pared to other options: prosecution in military or civilian courts, kinetic 
military action, or simple release of the individuals in question. If preven-
tive detention is seen as an option that truly must be avoided, we must ask 
whether that will incentivise killing over capturing the opponent. Garten-
stein-Ross is, however, not overly confident that this discussion will actu-
ally materialise: “The shame that Western countries feel about detention 
policy will probably shunt these questions to the side as everyone rushes 
to cleanse their hands of the matter—and, in so doing, most likely allows 
an even worse system to remain”.  
Finally, Benjamin Odoki shares in his think piece several trends 
that, from his perspective as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Uganda, he sees influencing States, and particularly the administration of 
justice. The trends are 1) geo-political changes and the increasing regional 
integration; 2) legal pluralism; 3) the impact of technology on law and 
courts; and 4) specialised courts. These trends impact each other. The re-
sult will be even stronger regional networks in a world where the power 
shifts away from the West. Legal pluralism will be a distinctive feature of 
these networks, but with less emphasis on customary law, which will be 
deemed out of touch with modern society. As Barendrecht and Dragos, 
Odoki sees an important role for technology, both in terms of substance 
and process, in reshaping State institutions, most notably the judiciary. 
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3.5. The Perspective of Trade and Private Actors: 
How Are Trade and Commerce Driving the Future? 
International trade and the behaviour of private actors make up the final 
theme addressed in the think pieces in this volume. The dramatic expan-
sion of international trade may have been a major driver of the interna-
tionalisation of law but the regulation of international trade appears to still 
show some serious defects. Again, legal pluralism may hamper taking the 
next step towards true international trade law. Whereas legal pluralism is 
sometimes used to refer to different sets of values, it also appears that real 
interests are at stake. A next step toward international law thus requires 
that the old big powers (US and Europe) also compromise on their inter-
ests. Gabrielle Marceau, in her account of the future of international 
trade law, is asking the question: how best to deal with new trade and 
non-trade concerns? Marceau departs from the premise that while the 
rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) essentially intend to pro-
mote trade, these rules do not promote trade above all else, as trade inter-
acts with issues other than trade. Marceau’s piece offers a conceptual 
framework for categorising the different manners in which non-trade con-
cerns are addressed in the WTO agreements. Employing this framework, 
she analyses how various non-trade concerns of contemporary and future 
significance for the WTO (which either impact or are impacted by the 
trade matters) might be addressed in international trade. Marceau demon-
strates that where WTO rules have been introduced to regulate interac-
tions between trade and non-trade concerns, they have generally been 
framed to promote trade. She also argues, however, that existing WTO 
rules do not fail to acknowledge the need for non-trade concerns (NTCs) 
to circumscribe trade on occasion, as evidenced in broadly interpreted ex-
ceptions. 
Imelda Maher’s think piece is concerned with competition law. 
She argues that despite the globalisation of international trade, efforts to 
create an international competition law under the aegis of the WTO have 
failed, and to date, international competition law still does not exist as 
such. Instead, competition law is characterised by a proliferation of na-
tional regimes forming part of the web of rules, agencies, networks, 
agreements and institutions, with some shared sense of purpose predicated 
on the dominance of an economics-approach in this field in relation to 
private market behaviour. States have entered into enforcement agree-
ments and enforcement networks have grown especially since the turn of 
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the century, primarily with the aim of improving enforcement through 
policy learning, technical assistance, and provision of examples of best 
practice. According to Maher, with this focus on enforcement, there is 
limited debate as to the nature of competition policy and the question that 
finds less common purpose – that is, the extent to which States are subject 
to competition rules. In short, the relationship between competition and 
regulation is under-developed. The introduction of competition laws in 
Brazil, India, China and South Africa suggests that this question will be-
come more significant in the next decade and beyond, with a re-
calibration of the balance between international trade law and internation-
al competition law. 
In their contribution, Mary Footer and Andrew Forbes draw at-
tention to the challenge of China for international trade law. Acknowledg-
ing that the continued economic rise of China presents a range of chal-
lenges for international trade law, they argue that the only real certainty 
for the future of China is that its development will continue on a unique 
trajectory, influenced by ancient Confucian tradition and modern authori-
tarian ideology. This, in turn, presents a challenge for the multilateral 
trading system, as previously it had dealt with a largely ideologically ho-
mogenous group of States that take a similar approach to the rule of law. 
The authors discuss this changing reality and mention a number of areas 
where Chinese ideology is already affecting the way in which China in-
teracts with the rest of the world. As they expect the coming decades to 
witness new interpretations of international trade law and new directions 
in trade governance, Footer and Forbes provide a number of suggestions 
as to how actors in the multilateral trading system may need to adapt to 
the changing ideologies in trade, technology, and development that Chi-
na’s rise is bringing about. Readers familiar with the first volume of The 
Law of the Future and the Future of Law will easily recognise many 
points of resemblance between Footer and Forbes’ think piece and Randal 
Peerenboom’s think piece from last year’s volume.  
Two think pieces in this section – one by Severin de Wit and the 
other by David S. Levine – provide a critical perspective on intellectual 
property law and its future. If future thinking about law is generally not 
quite common, intellectual property law is notably absent from such ex-
plorations. Daring to look forward, de Wit discusses challenges in the 
public and private domains that will shape the future of intellectual prop-
erty law. After mentioning current disparaging themes around intellectual 
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property (examples mentioned are: market failures; troubled access to 
medicine; impediments to free flow of information; copyright overexten-
sion; digital right protection; overkill and patents stifling rather than stim-
ulating innovation), de Wit explores the main drives of such critique and 
how the law can change so as to restore confidence both in the public as 
well as in the private domain. He does not expect a major international 
treaty to solve all difficulties, but rather sees that change will come from 
domestic law (and case law), local legal initiatives, and common practic-
es. 
David S. Levine’s think piece is a call for intellectual property law 
without secrets. In a world where secrecy is on the wane, so he argues, ar-
chaic forms of law-making must similarly be reconsidered and discarded. 
He posits that international negotiations regarding intellectual property 
(IP) laws like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and 
Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), and any future international 
IP law-making procedures, lessen the adherence to a theory of secret ne-
gotiations and embrace the inevitable and desirable need for the public to 
ask questions and offer meaningful input. Whether or not attempting to 
continue on the current course would be futile, the risk of doing so, Lev-
ine warns us, is erosion in the relevance of and confidence in IP law as a 
legitimate and effective form of regulation. On the other hand, the benefit 
of adopting a more open and participatory processes will be better, more 
balanced, and thoughtful law, for all concerned. 
The issue of data protection is closely linked to intellectual property 
and the rise of new communication technologies. Lokke Moerel’s think 
piece is about data protection and how to best regulate and enforce it. 
Bearing some similarity to what was said above regarding competition 
law and intellectual property law, this provides yet another example for an 
issue that transcends borders and yet is regulated mostly at the national 
level (and only in a minority of States). As Moerel puts it, the digital era 
is characterised by an unprecedented continuous worldwide flow of data 
both within multinational companies as well as with their external service 
providers, but while large corporations operate internationally, State gov-
ernments legislate nationally. Moerel explains that besides leaving gaps in 
the patchwork of national data protection regulations, this situation also 
leads to overlaps in applicable national rules that often deviate or outright 
conflict. This legal landscape provides a challenging background to test 
whether transnational private regulation of data protection can provide so-
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lutions where legislation fails to. Moerel evaluates a remarkable example 
of the emergence in the EU of a complex hybrid system of self-regulation 
(global corporate privacy policies) with public arrangements (the data 
protection authority of the EU headquarters of the multinationals validat-
ing such corporate privacy policies and providing support in the area of 
supervision and enforcement).  
Next to international trade and intellectual property, some think 
pieces focus on the regulation of private actors and corporate social re-
sponsibility. Christopher Bovis writes about the regulation of public-
private partnerships. He describes such partnerships as complex forms of 
cooperation between the State and private actors, which exceed the remit 
of traditional contractual interface, moving into a strategic sphere of pub-
lic sector management. Public-Private Partnerships aim at delivering both 
infrastructure facilities and public services and are regarded as attractive 
and credible solutions to the infrastructure deficit of many developed and 
developing States. Bovis’ think piece provides a conceptual forecast of 
the legal and regulatory mapping of Public-Private Partnerships. Bovis 
elaborates on the current and future legal trends within which the regula-
tion of Public-Private Partnerships will be developed. Furthermore, and in 
conjunction to the emergence of legal trends, he reflects on societal needs 
which need calibrating in terms of expectations, but mostly perception, 
when faced with the modality of Public-Private Partnerships for the deliv-
ery of public services. Finally, he provides a conceptual map of the chal-
lenges for the development of the law in relation to Public-Private Part-
nerships, by depicting their interface as public services instruments, as in-
vestment instruments, and as growth instruments. Bovis concludes with 
recommendations for law and policy makers in relation to the law of the 
future for Public-Private Partnerships. 
Two of the think pieces in this section deal with corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR). Austin Onuoha looks at the relation between legisla-
tion and CSR and reflects on some of the areas law could be used in the 
future to ensure better and more impactful CSR. Focusing in particular on 
the situation in Nigeria, he examines the tension between the use of na-
tional legislation and the application of international law against the back-
ground of the push for soft law by the international community. Onuoha 
suggests that, whereas the debate around CSR is concerned with voluntary 
and mandatory initiatives, there are areas where law could in future be 
used to streamline the practice of CSR, and manage relationships between 
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companies and communities. CSR aspects that are discussed in this think 
piece include community consultation/engagement, FIPC (Free Prior and 
Informed Consent by communities who own land), criteria for allocation 
and sharing of funds for CSR initiatives, professionalisation of CSR func-
tion, monitoring and evaluation, and the streamlining and strengthening of 
community governance structures. Onuoha concludes with the recom-
mendation that in the future, law, on the one hand, and voluntary initia-
tives, on the other, should complement each other rather than compete. 
According to Martijn Scheltema, a further increase in (internation-
al) private regulation in the area of CSR may be expected. He calls for a 
more profound assessment of the effectiveness of the plethora of private 
regulation that already exists. Assessing the effectiveness requires an in-
tegrated approach involving legal, economic, sociological, and psycholog-
ical insights. He argues that additional research is required on hybrid en-
forcement systems and on the question in which cases public or private 
enforcement is effective. Regarding conflict resolution and prevention, he 
suggests that non-judicial mechanisms seem preferable, though stakehold-
ers experience difficulties in finding the proper ones. More research and a 
global facility are needed to assist stakeholders in this respect. Scheltema 
further suggests that this trend has implications for the legal profession, 
and recommends future lawyers in this area to acquire additional skills: 
for example, on assessing effectiveness of international private regulation 
and its enforcement and on non-judicial dispute management mecha-
nisms. 
S.I. Strong’s think piece does not focus on any particular area of 
substantive law, rather on a procedural matter which has gained im-
portance in recent years: alternative forms of collective redress in the 
cross border context. Her departure point is that despite the creation of a 
single global marketplace, most types of legal injuries are compensable 
only in national courts constrained by territorial boundaries. This is true 
even in the increasing number of cases involving large-scale injuries in 
the cross-border context. Rather than resolving the dispute at one time, in 
one forum, defendants are forced to proceed simultaneously in several dif-
ferent jurisdictions, with all the costs and risks associated with parallel lit-
igation, while plaintiffs who are similarly situated in all other regards of-
ten hold different legal rights and remedies simply by virtue of their place 
of residence. Strong asserts that this situation seems neither fair nor desir-
able. Accordingly, in her think piece she considers whether any alterna-
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tives to litigation exist (for example, arbitration and settlement), and 
whether any of these other options offer a superior means of addressing 
injuries of this nature.  
3.6. The Perspective of Law in its Context: 
Law as a Concept in the Past, in the Present and in the Future 
As many think pieces show, the law of the future requires new rules and 
principles, new and improved legal institutions, and sometimes a re-
definition of familiar legal concepts. As some think piece authors argue, 
the law of the future also requires re-thinking law, legal scholarship, and 
legal education. The think piece by Edward Rubin addresses certain as-
sumptions about law (and the rule of law) which, so he argues, are rooted 
in a specific history rather than expressing truths about law per se. Ac-
cording to Rubin, when legal scholars and others speak about the law, par-
ticularly when they claim that the rule of law is violated in the modern 
regulatory State, they are relying on the idea that law should prescribe 
modes of action, should constitute a coherent system, should be generally 
stated, and should be generally applied. Rubin argues that these are not 
necessary features of law, as they only reflect the particular way that law 
was used as an instrumentality of governance in pre-modern Europe. The 
advent of the administrative State and democratic government renders that 
approach obsolete. According to Rubin, the new approach that is develop-
ing, and will constitute the law of the future, is that law should prescribe 
results, not procedures; that it need not possess any internal coherence; 
that it should address each policy issue on its own terms; and that it 
should treat firms and natural persons on an individualised basis. Those 
features enable it to serve as an instrumentality of governance for a mod-
ern State. 
Mauro Zamboni’s think piece concerns the relations of law to 
politics, which he considers to be one of the major difficulties confronting 
today’s practitioners and scholars of law. While legal actors are educated 
in the belief that law and politics are two distinct worlds, when faced with 
real issues, so he argues, they are forced to deal with the very responsibil-
ity of choosing a political course for an entire community. Seeing the 
transformational space of law-making as the space in which the values or 
ideas produced inside the political arena are transformed into legal catego-
ries and concepts, the primary purpose of this think piece is to look at the 
way forward with respect to the relations between law and policy.  
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The law of the future does not only require new concepts, it may al-
so require new ways of teaching. Clark Cunningham would like to see 
legal education follow the same development that medicine went through 
some decades ago in terms of a powerful new model of education: the 
teaching hospital staffed by physician-scientists. But as Miguel Poiares 
Maduro points out in the last think piece, this looking beyond the borders 
of one’s own field will not come naturally to legal science and education. 
According to him, on the one hand, the legal field does not ‘authorise’ any 
other social scientists to research the study of law (the presumption being 
that legal education cannot be understood or questioned by non-lawyers); 
on the other hand, there is a tendency to focus exclusively on what law it-
self is, and consider issues of education as unworthy the attention of law-
yers. 
4. An Outlook 
So what does this eclectic collection of think pieces teach us about trends 
and challenges for the law of the future? This is a question that we must 
subject to a lot of exchange and debate – and we will, – so we cannot fully 
answer it. We can, however, venture a few, first conclusions.  
A first trend, which will not come as a surprise, is internationalisa-
tion. Nowadays, it is a cliché to argue that internationalisation is a major 
trend, but the think pieces that address these processes show both the sig-
nificant consequences of internationalisation and the fundamental nature 
of this trend. If a global law perspective is deployed, such as the perspec-
tive Twining advocates, law cannot be practiced and taught as it has been 
practiced and taught in the past. We see from this and the previous vol-
ume of The Law of the Future of the Future of Law that internationalisa-
tion touches upon many areas of law. This volume adds some quite fun-
damental questions and perspectives to processes of internationalisation.  
The rise of new connections between different layers and sectors 
within the legal order should be mentioned as a second trend. A few ex-
amples: whereas Cisse, Biebesheimer and Nash observe new connections 
between security, justice, and development, Dumas, Scott, and Lawton 
emphasise connections between official law created by public authorities 
and processes of self-regulation. Trade law and intellectual property law 
are also increasingly affected by other issues than just trade and intellec-
tual property, respectively.  
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The latter also point to a third trend. After a period of exponential 
expansion of international law, we are increasingly confronted with the 
limitations of international law. It appears difficult to change the behav-
iour of legal actors with international law only. The international and the 
local need to be linked. Citizens, large corporations, public organisations, 
and even governments may be confronted with international law, but this 
does not mean that they comply with it. Social, cultural, political, and 
economic incentive structures appear persistent and not apt to change.  
A fourth related trend that should be mentioned is connected with 
the limitations of international law. As international law further evolves, it 
appears to be confronted with legal pluralism that does not automatically 
converge. The case of China is mentioned in several think pieces, but the 
think piece of Dragos shows that even convergence of legislation does not 
mean that legal practices have also converged. 
A fifth pervasive trend concerns new technologies. The internet, au-
tonomous robots, geo-engineering, and connected bio-, neuro-, and nano-
technologies do not only compel governments to create new regulation 
but these technologies also question some of the basic principles on which 
law has been built (for example, property and intellectual property).  
To those who have heralded internationalisation and the rise of in-
ternational law, these trends may seem rather pessimistic. It appears that 
we have left the frontier phase of internationalisation (through the creation 
of international law) behind, a phase in which everything seemed possi-
ble. Instead, a more realistic picture of internationalisation emerges in 
which we observe a number of challenges.  
A first challenge can be referred to as a true internationalisation of 
law. Even in highly internationalised areas of law such as competition 
law, it appears that national or regional law prevails. True internationali-
sation also means that more justice is being done to the needs of regions, 
countries, and actors outside the US and Europe. If their interests are bet-
ter taken into account, the face of international law may change quite sub-
stantially.  
A second challenge is related to the increasingly multi-level and 
multi-layered character of the legal order. This challenge may be referred 
to as creating connected law. The law of the future requires well-
developed and sometimes surprising connections between different layers 
and areas of law and different levels of rule-making and law enforcement.  
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The third challenge is a largely conceptual challenge. In many areas 
of law, familiar legal concepts are increasingly out-dated or lacking: data 
protection, autonomous robots, geo-engineering, and the internet. Refer-
ring to this challenge as purely conceptual may be misleading. This chal-
lenge is not a mere theoretical or academic challenge. If new concepts are 
not created soon, the regulation of technologies worldwide will be under-
mined. 
A fourth challenge for the law of the future relates to change man-
agement. Both ambitious and realistic strategies are needed to innovate 
legal and justice systems. A well-balanced strategy of ambition and real-
ism takes both future challenges and trends, and the context in which im-
plementation takes place into account. We must learn more about how to 
do this well.  
Connected with this is a fifth challenge we see: the urgent need for 
mechanisms to cope with legal pluralism in a global context. If legal sys-
tems are not well understood within their social, cultural, political, and 
economic contexts, we run the risk of developing the wrong solutions for 
regulatory or legal problems. The think pieces in this volume demonstrate 
some of the confusion and misunderstanding that result from ignoring le-
gal pluralism.  
The trends we have derived from the think pieces may cause some 
pessimism among the pioneers of international law and internationalisa-
tion. In the realm of legal internationalisation, the discourse of utopianism 
or outright rejection is being replaced by a discourse of messy processes, 
long-term perseverance, and realistic strategies. This is not pessimism. It 
appears that both practices of legal internationalisation and the study of 
these processes are maturing. And that is a ground for optimism.  
There is no doubt that more trends, challenges, and questions, can 
be deduced from the think pieces in this second volume of The Law of the 
Future and the Future of Law. We welcome you to the debate.  
 
  
CHAPTER I 
THE GLOBAL LAW PERSPECTIVE: 
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE WE MOVING TOWARDS 
A GLOBAL LEGAL SYSTEM? 
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1.1. 
______ 
2Globalisation and Law: Ten Theses 
William Twining*
 
This paper nails to the door ten theses about ways in which a global 
perspective challenges some widespread, but not universal, assump-
tions underlying Western traditions of academic law and legal dis-
course. 
1. Introduction 
William Twining, 
“The Ship”, 
Station Rd, 
Nr. Vacoas, 
Mauritius, 
Indian Ocean, 
The Southern Hemisphere, 
The World, 
The Universe, 
et cetera, et cetera. 
In our youth, many of us will have indulged in this childish conceit. It 
suggests two things about how we think. Firstly, that it is easy to depict 
our world in terms of concentric circles neatly organised in a single hier-
archy: global, regional, national, provincial, local, and so on. Secondly, a 
child may think that the centre of the universe is where one happens to be. 
However, maybe there is no centre for the phenomena and the issues we 
are discussing. This paper suggests that when thinking about the future of 
law from a global perspective, we need to try to break free of such sim-
plicities. In order to be succinct and mildly provocative, I shall advance 
ten theses that challenge some widespread assumptions in Western dis-
course and scholarship about law. Much recent literature about globalisa-
tion and law, including the “think pieces” produced for the Hague Insti-
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tute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL) conference in The Hague 
2011, suggest that we are starting to move away from such assumptions, 
but that our leading thinkers have not yet liberated themselves from all of 
them.  
 
Ten Theses 
1. On the whole, we lack concepts, well-constructed hypotheses and reliable da-
ta to make many reliable evidence-based generalisations about law in the 
world as a whole. 
2. We need usable conceptions of non-State law that enable us to make some 
differentiations, appropriate to context, between the legal and the non-legal, 
and we should not expect such concepts to carry much intellectual weight. 
3. Many of the most significant patterns relating to law are sub-global.  
4. Accepting a conception of non-State law leads to recognising legal pluralism 
as a social fact. 
5. There is a danger in romanticising legal pluralism: many non-State orders are 
oppressive, unjust, inefficient, corrupt, et cetera, and incompatible with the 
ideal of the Rule of Law. 
6. Patterns of diffusion of law are more complex than is commonly supposed. 
7. Insofar as talk and claims about diffusion, harmonisation and convergence of 
laws tend to be text-oriented, they mainly tell us about surface phenomena. 
8. From a global perspective, we live in an age of religious revival and plural-
ism of beliefs. To talk of this as “a secular age” is misleading and dangerous. 
9. One of the main challenges facing the human race in a situation of increasing 
interdependence is how to construct institutions, processes and rules that 
promote co-existence and co-operation between peoples and groups with 
very different cosmologies and values. 
10. Western traditions of academic law are vulnerable to charges of ethnocen-
trism. 
Box 1: Ten theses. 
Let me begin with a word on so-called “globalisation”. Let us iso-
late two usages, a broad one and a narrow one. Firstly, economic globali-
sation is typically depicted in terms of the increasing domination of a pu-
tative single global economy by the forces, institutions, and ideology of 
free market capitalism. This domination is now under challenge. Globali-
sation in this narrow sense is what the “anti-globalisation movement” has 
been against. A second, broader view is that “globalisation” refers to 
complex processes of increased interaction and interdependence in rela-
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tion to all kinds of human relations and conditions: climate, communica-
tion, transport, disease, war, security, migration, crime, governance, and 
entertainment. In this broader view, “globalisation” is not necessarily re-
stricted to processes that are genuinely worldwide, but is extended to in-
clude many examples of increased transnational interaction or interde-
pendence that are quite limited geographically. For example, the practice 
of Muslims in Britain seeking fatwas by e-mail, the attacks on cruise ships 
by pirates, or the Wikileaks episode have been loosely attributed to “glob-
alisation”. Here I shall adopt the broader view, but I shall be cautious 
about using the word “global” in relation to phenomena that are less than 
worldwide. For example, I shall not talk of global lawyers, global law 
firms, global legal education, the global legal order, and only very hesi-
tantly about global law.  
All legal scholars, practitioners and reformers need to consider the 
implications of globalisation for their own work, both now and in the fu-
ture. Adopting a global perspective can be useful not only in considering 
genuinely world-wide problems but also for constructing broad overviews 
and setting a context for more particular enquiries. However, a global per-
spective has definite limitations in dealing with immediate practical prob-
lems. 
Elsewhere, I have identified some assumptions underlying main-
stream discourse of Western traditions of academic law that are chal-
lenged by adopting a genuinely global perspective. These assumptions are 
widespread, but not universal. The ten theses advanced here deal selec-
tively with five of these that are especially relevant in the present context.  
Western traditions of academic law: some simplistic assumptions; 
(a) That law consists of two principal kinds of ordering: municipal State 
law and public international law (classically conceived as ordering the 
relations between States) (“the Westphalian duo”); 
(b) That nation-States, societies, and legal systems are very largely closed, 
self-contained entities that can be studied in isolation; 
(c) That modern law and modern jurisprudence are secular, now largely 
independent of their historical-cultural roots in the Judaeo-Christian 
traditions; 
(d) That modern State law is primarily rational-bureaucratic and instru-
mental, performing certain functions and serving as a means for achiev-
ing particular social ends; 
(e) That law is best understood through “top-down” perspectives of rulers, 
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officials, legislators, and elites, with the points of view of users, con-
sumers, victims, and other subjects being at best marginal;  
(f) That the main subject-matters of the discipline of law are ideas and 
norms rather than the empirical study of social facts;  
(g) That modern State law is almost exclusively a Northern (Europe-
an/Anglo-American) creation, diffused through most of the world via 
colonialism, imperialism, trade, and latter-day post-colonial influences; 
(h) That the study of non-Western legal traditions is a marginal and unim-
portant part of Western academic law; and 
(i) That the fundamental values underlying modern law are universal, alt-
hough the philosophical foundations are diverse. 
In short, during the twentieth century and before, Western academic legal 
culture has tended to be State-oriented, locally focused, secular, positivist, 
“top-down”, Northo-centric, unempirical, and universalist in respect of mor-
als. Of course, all of these generalisations are crude and subject to excep-
tions – indeed, none has gone unchallenged within the Western legal tradi-
tion – and issues surrounding nearly all of them constitute a high proportion 
of the contested agenda of modern Western jurisprudence. However, at a 
general level this bald ‘ideal type’ highlights some crucial points at which 
such ideas and assumptions are being increasingly challenged.  
Box 2:.  Assumptions in Western traditions of academic law.
1
  
2. Ten Theses 
2.1. Thesis One: Global Generalisations about Law 
Thinking about globalisation encourages us to adopt a broad global per-
spective in order to think in terms of broad overviews and total pictures. 
However, it also tempts us to generalise about law beyond our capacity. 
On the whole, we lack concepts, well-constructed hypotheses, and reliable 
data to make many evidence-based generalisations about law in the world 
as a whole. A central theme of my recent writing has been: beware of 
false, misleading, exaggerated, and superficial, as well as illusory, mean-
ingless, reductionist, and biased or ethnocentric comparisons and general-
isations about legal phenomena or a combination of these.  
There is a simple explanation, and part-justification, for our limited 
ability to generalise about law in the world as a whole. We lack concepts, 
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  Source: William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 5–6. 
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hypotheses, data and other requisite tools because – with only a few ex-
ceptions – for the last two centuries or so, our Western traditions of legal 
practice and academic law have focused almost exclusively on the domes-
tic or municipal law of particular industrialised or industrialising sover-
eign nation States. For example, until recently, almost all lawyers were 
qualified to practice in a single country, sometimes only a part of that 
country, such as England or California. I am told that the Florida Bar ex-
aminations are still exclusively focused on Florida and Federal law, with-
out a single element of foreign or transnational law, even though Miami is 
an extraordinarily cosmopolitan city and aspires to be not only “the capi-
tal of Latin America”, but also a leading centre of transnational and re-
gional commercial and financial activity. Similarly, nearly all “main-
stream” Western legal theorists – Bentham, Weber, Kelsen, Hart, Raz, 
Rawls, Dworkin, including sceptics such as Legrand and Duncan Kenne-
dy – have focused almost exclusively on municipal or State legal systems. 
The major exceptions have been uneasy attempts to accommodate public 
international law narrowly conceived and some leading theorists of legal 
pluralism, such as Santi Romano, Ehrlich and Harold Berman.  
The “think pieces” for the 2011 conference provided ample evi-
dence of how rapidly things have changed in legal scholarship and theory 
over the last 15 years or so: amongst the salient themes are the erosion of 
sovereignty, human rights, multinational corporations, and regional as 
well as multi-layered governance, comparative and supranational constitu-
tionalism, the fragmentation of international law, and the appearance of 
new actors on the world stage. 
2.2. Thesis Two: Non-State Law 
My second thesis is that if one adopts a global perspective, a picture of 
law cannot sensibly be confined to the Westphalian duo of municipal 
State law and classical international law concerned with relations between 
sovereign States. This is far too narrow. A picture of law in the world that 
leaves out religious law, customary law, transnational commercial law, 
new forms of regional and supranational ordering, and various forms of 
“soft law” at different levels simply leaves out too much. We need usable 
conception(s) of non-State law that enable us to make some differentia-
tions, appropriate to context, between the legal and the non-legal. The late 
Neil MacCormick’s conception of law as normative institutionalised or-
der, Brian Tamanaha’s radical pruning of Hart’s concept of law, and my 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 32 
own modification of Karl Llewellyn’s law jobs theory in terms of ‘thin 
functionalism’, all claim to do this job. However, we should not expect 
any conception of law to do much work.  
2.3. Thesis Three: Sub-Global Patterns of Law  
Some of the most significant patterns relating to law are sub-global. These 
do not fit neatly into geometrical or geological metaphors: concentric cir-
cles, vertical hierarchies, horizontals or diagonals. Our heritage of law is 
much messier than that. Many of our inherited patterns of law in the world 
are related to empires, diasporas, alliances, language spread, trading blocs, 
trade routes, and legal traditions. Think of the Islamic world, the British 
Empire (and its surprising survival, the Commonwealth), North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
and the civil law world. All of these are sub-global. Some are geograph-
ically contiguous, some not. Their internal and external relations are com-
plex. They coincide, overlap or disaggregate in many different ways. We 
talk of English as a global language or the Arab world or the Islamic 
world in much the same way as we talk about the Cricket World Cup or 
the Baseball World Series. This is just hype. None of these are genuinely 
worldwide and they are decentralised in many ways. These historical leg-
acies will strongly influence the development of State law and other forms 
of law in the next 30 years. 
2.4. Thesis Four: Legal Pluralism 
Accepting a conception of non-State law leads to accepting legal plural-
ism as a social fact, not only in far-away places, but in every country in 
Europe and the West. Legal and normative pluralism occurs at all levels 
of ordering, not just within particular countries – transnational, suprana-
tional, national, regional, networked, diasporic, et cetera. Legal pluralism 
raises an agenda of issues conceptually, empirically and normatively, in-
cluding difficult policy questions about recognition, jurisdiction and inte-
gration. 
2.5. Thesis Five: Legal Pluralism and the Rule of Law 
Socio-legal writers on legal pluralism launched a powerful attack on 
“State centralism” – the tendency to assume that the sovereign (“nation”) 
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State is the only legitimate source of legal authority and the most power-
ful, most efficient, technically superior, and just form of ordering. Many 
of the think pieces and the Law of the Future documents explicitly focus 
on municipal law and the national lawmaker. Even scholars of legal plu-
ralism find it difficult to break away from (often subtle) forms of State-
centric thinking. There is, however, a danger in romanticising legal plural-
ism: legal pluralism is an important social fact, but many non-State orders 
are oppressive, unjust, inefficient, corrupt, et cetera. Some people believe 
that the best, perhaps the only, hope for achieving and preserving demo-
cratic values, the rule of law, good governance, human rights, and distrib-
utive justice rests with strong liberal democratic States. What are the pro-
spects for the rule of law in situations where the State is no longer the on-
ly or even the main form of governance?  
2.6. Thesis Six: Diffusion of Law 
Adopting a global perspective highlights the pervasiveness and the com-
plexity of diffusion of legal ideas – sometimes referred to as reception or 
transplantation. Throughout history, legal traditions and legal and norma-
tive orders have interacted with and influenced each other – sometimes 
unidirectionally, sometimes reciprocally, or in more complex patterns. 
Sometimes it has been assumed that the main agents of reception are ei-
ther governments and officials or legal elites – for example, a colonial 
ruler imposing its municipal law and institutions on subject peoples or 
Turkey, Ethiopia or Japan “voluntarily” importing legal models and ideas. 
However, it is now recognised that the processes of diffusion are more 
varied and more complex than such naïve models of reception suggest. 
Religious legal traditions have interacted for centuries; a human rights 
case in Germany can affect human rights in the United Kingdom either 
via Strasbourg or the writings of jurists, or transnational human rights da-
tabases; indigenous peoples struggling for recognition in their traditional 
homes in New Zealand, Canada and Australia are now in direct touch 
with each other, sometimes networking by e-mail, as are many kinds of 
social movements. Perhaps most significant is the recognition that gov-
ernment officials are not the only, or even the most important, agents of 
legal change: migrants, merchants, and missionaries have carried their law 
with them; law travels with armies and aid workers; legal ideas are spread 
transnationally by legal education and scholarly writings; and, law is dif-
fused as much by literature as by legislation. 
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2.7. Thesis Seven: Surface Law 
The pervasiveness and complexity of processes of diffusion highlight 
some other points. Bruno Latour’s striking phrase “no transportation 
without transformation” may be an overstatement, but we can never be 
sure that what has travelled has remained the same – that what was im-
ported was identical to what was exported. It may superficially look the 
same, but is that only a surface similarity? That is one reason why we 
have to be cautious of talk about convergence, harmonisation, and unifica-
tion of laws. There are questions about when and why homogenisation of 
law is desirable; but in addition we have to be able to assess whether 
claims to convergence or unity only refer to surface phenomena. The issue 
is mainly about information. Formal legislative texts or agreements or ex-
positions of doctrine tend to be very uninformative. Western traditions of 
legal scholarship have been largely text-and-doctrine oriented; they main-
ly tell us about surface phenomena. Typically they tell us little or nothing 
about how or whether a given principle, rule or law is or will be interpret-
ed, adapted, applied and implemented, enforced, used, manipulated, or ig-
nored. In short, from information provided merely by legal texts and ex-
positions of doctrine, we do not know to what extent they make any dif-
ference in practice, let alone transform economic, social or other relations 
and behaviour. Surface law is not law that is merely on the surface; rather 
it is that aspect of law that is only visible on the surface, and with that in-
formation we are unlikely to be able to tell how it interacts with its imme-
diate context and how it operates, if at all, in practice.  
2.8. Thesis Eight: Belief Pluralism 
Closely related to sub-global legal patterns is the social fact of belief plu-
ralism. There are strong strains of universalism in the Western traditions 
of ethics – as exemplified by natural law, Kantianism, utilitarianism, and 
some versions of human rights theory – which have to confront the social 
facts of differing belief systems, cosmologies, cultural values, ideologies, 
et cetera. This is not the place to enter into profound philosophical issues 
about universalism and relativism, and complex issues about the relation-
ship of beliefs to identity. It is important, however, to be aware of our bi-
ases. Continental European and Anglo-American traditions of academic 
law may be quite confident about the nature and problems of legal phe-
nomena in their own geographical spheres, but when they venture out to 
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other places, or the world as a whole, they are vulnerable to charges of pa-
rochialism or ethnocentrism. One of the main challenges facing the hu-
man race in a situation of increasing interdependence is how to construct 
institutions, processes and rules that promote co-existence and coopera-
tion between peoples and groups with very different cosmologies and val-
ues.  
2.9. Thesis Nine: A Secular Age?  
We must be wary of talk of “a secular age” – for example, the suggestion 
that human rights are now a sort of irreligious, even atheistic, substitute 
for liberation theology. “Secular”, of course, is sharply ambiguous: it can 
mean non-religious or even anti-religious; or it can mean independent of 
or transcending religion, for example, in relation to tolerance and freedom 
of religion. Demographers of religion (for example, Philip Jenkins) tell us 
that from a global point of view, we are experiencing a period of religious 
revival – illustrated by non-Christian immigrants in Europe, Christianity 
in Uganda, or the spread of the Yoruba religion in the Americas. It is 
mainly in some parts of the West that we have experienced religious de-
cline, and it is quite parochial, even ethnocentric, to think that this reflects 
global patterns. On the other hand, the idea of the secular State as a basti-
on of religious tolerance, holding the ring for people with different belief 
systems, is a crucial idea in a period of greater interdependence and mi-
gration. Being clear about this is, for example, crucial for human rights 
theory. As Abdullahi an-Naim has eloquently argued, it is a mistake to try 
to promote ideas of human rights solely or even mainly as a non-religious 
doctrine. If Muslims are to be persuaded that the international human 
rights regime is for them, they have to find its justification and support in 
Islamic premises. Insofar as different belief systems, including religions, 
have doctrines that support tolerance, although in different ways, we may 
still hope for workable solutions to problems of co-existence and coopera-
tion, but these solutions cannot be based solely or even mainly on non-
religious ideas of secularism associated with our Enlightenment. 
2.10. Thesis Ten: Ethnocentrism  
Ethnocentrism is the projection of ideas derived from one’s own culture 
and background onto others – because these ideas are assumed to be uni-
versal, or essentially the same as, or more advanced than, or superior to 
those of others. Ethnocentrism may often be based more on ignorance 
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than arrogance. Our Western traditions of academic law and legal prac-
tice, parochially focused on the municipal laws of our own societies, have 
exhibited very little interest in non-Western legal traditions and cultures. 
The few legal scholars who have taken an interest in Hindu law, African 
law or Islamic law – at least before 9/11 – have been treated as marginal, 
esoteric, even eccentric. Also they have, of course, been open to accusa-
tions of one form of ethnocentrism, viz. “orientalism”. Sometimes these 
charges are unfair. Collectively we – Western legal scholars – have been 
largely indifferent to, unaware of, and fundamentally ignorant about non-
Western legal ideas and practices, and the concerns and interests underly-
ing them or the languages in which they are expressed. We should not as-
sume that we have nothing to learn from other traditions and cultures – Is-
lamic ideas on commercial morality, Confucian ideas on harmony and 
probity of leaders, and Chthonic ideas on ecology. So are we qualified to 
prescribe global solutions? 
3. Conclusion  
Adopting a global perspective highlights a number of challenges to some 
widespread assumptions in our Western traditions of legal scholarship and 
legal practice. A global perspective can help us to recognise the diversity 
and complexity of systems of ordering human relations in the world and 
to realise that we are not uniquely at its centre. The Hague is not the cen-
tre of the world and “we” – mainly a bunch of Western jurists – cannot on 
our own prescribe solutions for the world’s problems. Although we can 
and should think about how the complex processes of globalisation bear 
upon our own situations and ideas and what we can bring to the table to 
negotiate stable and acceptable responses to transnational, supranational, 
and genuinely global issues. A global perspective is not a view from no-
where; rather it aspires to be the recognition of views from almost every-
where. 
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3The Future of Law and the Enviroment: 
The Emergence of Global Enviromental Law 
Elisa Morgera* 
Using international biodiversity law as a testing ground, this think 
piece will argue that “global environmental law” represents the fu-
ture of law in the environmental arena. Global environmental law is 
a concept emerging from the promotion of environmental protec-
tion as a global public good through a plurality of legal mechanisms 
relying on a plurality of legal orders. It emphasises the functional 
role of States as protectors of the environment, as a common inter-
est of humanity, and with respect to the considerable role of global 
institutions in international law-making and compliance monitor-
ing. Global environmental law further underscores how internation-
al environmental law increasingly affects individuals and groups in 
society, and private operators, within and across national bounda-
ries. It also points to the growing role of international private law in 
the environmental arena. Global environmental law emphasises the 
inter-relations and mutual influences between international, region-
al, national, sub-national, and transnational law for the protection of 
the environment, thus pointing to the increasing usefulness of com-
parative legal methods to understand environmental law. 
1. Introduction 
Environmental law is a fast developing, pioneering and increasingly so-
phisticated area of regulation. As Neil Gunningham aptly summarised:  
Environmental law is characterised by a creative combina-
tion of pluralism and pragmatism: it presents different com-
binations of traditional regulation, market-based instruments, 
incentive-based approaches, risk management, voluntary in-
struments and procedural approaches, while enabling local or 
indigenous communities, NGOs and the private sector to col-
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laborate with authorities in, or even relieve them of, envi-
ronmental management tasks. 
Against such a rich and relatively recent past, environmental law in 
the likely future will be characterised by more recent trends: specialisa-
tion, globalisation, and the return to bilateralism. Private actors and in-
struments will also be of ever increasing relevance. This piece will discuss 
in turn how these trends contribute to the character of ‘global’ environ-
mental law, with a view to suggesting how lawyers should prepare them-
selves to fully understand the environmental law of the future. 
2. Increasing Specialisation 
There are currently over 500 international treaties and other agreements 
relating to the environment. Within many of these multilateral environ-
mental agreements, law-making is continuously undertaken, and on aver-
age 300 days per year are spent in intergovernmental negotiations to fur-
ther develop and enhance the implementation of international environ-
mental law. As a result, international regimes have become increasingly 
specialised. A growing number of soft law instruments and, exceptionally, 
of new treaties (mostly in the forms of protocols) are adopted, while the 
practice of monitoring or managing subsidiary institutions is increased. 
The ultimate goal is to see to the development of more targeted approach-
es to global environmental challenges, and identifying new and emerging 
environmental threats. Notwithstanding the form and legal force of these 
developments, they all contribute to more sophisticated and unprecedent-
ed legal and quasi-legal approaches to environmental protection and man-
agement.  
Consequently, there remain fewer and fewer generalist international 
environmental lawyers, while the number of specialists is on the rise: in-
ternational climate lawyers, international biodiversity lawyers, and inter-
national chemicals lawyers, to name but a few examples. And within each 
category, further specialisations are developing: in the case of climate 
law, lawyers specialising in emission trading, the Clean Development 
Mechanism, or Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation; 
or in the case of international biodiversity law, lawyers specialising in 
conservation, biosafety, or access and benefit-sharing. The need for a 
broader understanding and a comparison of different international envi-
ronmental regimes, and their mutual interactions, is, however, not dimin-
ished. But it has become a team effort rather than a task for an individual 
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expert, in order to garner and build upon in-depth understanding of the 
specificities of, and specialist legal solutions within, each international 
environmental (sub)regime.  
“Global” environmental law is thus a concept that can capture the 
increasing interactions and reciprocal influences between different re-
gimes of international regulation, which have in common the focus on is-
sues of common interest to humanity as a whole. This common trait led to 
a shift from a discretionary to a functional role of States (as protectors of 
the common interest of humanity) that is visible, but emerges in different 
forms, across multilateral environmental agreements. As a result, individ-
uals and groups are identified as “beneficiaries” (not as “addressees”) of 
international environmental law: that is, international environmental law 
“formally addresses States” but it assumes a global dimension in crucially 
“affect[ing] States and individuals and groups in society”.1 For instance, 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), institutional prolif-
eration has resulted in a continuous and evolving interpretation of the 
Convention text, through the development of thematic and crosscutting 
programmes of work, and the adoption of guidelines and principles aimed 
not only at affecting national implementation, often through reforms of 
national laws and administrative practices, but also at influencing the 
conduct of private operators, particularly in their relationships with indig-
enous and local communities.  
“Global” environmental law also calls attention to the increasing 
role of international organisations in the making and implementing of in-
ternational environmental law. International institutions have become 
more and more significant players in setting the international agenda, in-
fluencing intergovernmental negotiations with expertise and administra-
tive services, monitoring and guiding the conduct of States in implement-
ing and complying with international instruments, and interacting with 
non-State actors and occasionally directly influencing private behaviour. 
A glaring example is provided by the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species (CITES) and its National Legislation Project, 
which has enabled the CITES Secretariat in the absence of an explicit ba-
sis in the Convention to determine whether State Parties’ national legisla-
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tion adequately implements CITES. The project has increased the CITES 
Secretariat’s work in assisting countries in developing or revising their 
implementing legislation, both at the international level through the in-
volvement of CITES parties in the Convention’s relevant subsidiary bod-
ies, but also through on-the-ground workshops, projects, and expert mis-
sions. As highlighted by Ellen Hey, among the questions that emerge in 
connection with this dimension of global environmental law is that of the 
accountability of international organisations. 
3. Globalisation 
These on-going and increasingly specialised developments at the interna-
tional level are paralleled by continuous efforts in the development and 
implementation of environmental law at the European, regional, national 
and sub-national levels. This leads to the creation of complex interactions 
and cross-fertilisation between different levels of environmental regula-
tion, and between different specialised areas of environmental law. These 
multi-directional interactions are also captured by global environmental 
law, which refers to the promotion of environmental protection as a global 
public good through a multitude of legal mechanisms, relying on a plu-
rality of legal orders. 
Global environmental law thus places international environmental 
law in the context of interactions between a plurality of legal orders and 
creative patterns of interplay between international, national and local 
regulation. In that regard, global environmental law reflects the contem-
porary presence of international, national and transnational traits of envi-
ronmental law and the contributions of a variety of international, transla-
tional, national and sub-national actors to environmental regulatory sys-
tems. It underscores the increasing regulatory influences exercised not on-
ly by international organisations, but also by transnational networks of 
experts providing legislative advice in the context of development aid, 
and other forms of international technical cooperation provided by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), and involving indigenous and local 
communities and private actors. 
As Young and Percival illustrate, global environmental law can be 
seen as the result of transplantation: the borrowing of legal principles and 
tools from the national by the international level, in addition to the adapta-
tion of legal principles and tools from one country to another. It can also 
result from convergence, that is, the spontaneous similarities in legal re-
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sponses between different countries to similar external pressures and the 
linking of national systems. This can be explained by the growing con-
straints imposed upon States by international environmental law and the 
expectations international environmental law creates in terms of imple-
mentation by private entities. 
Innovative instruments that quintessentially embody global envi-
ronmental law are the ‘biocultural community protocols’, developed 
through a bottom-up approach. Through such protocols, indigenous or lo-
cal communities articulate their values and customary laws, relating to its 
traditional knowledge and natural resources, against the background of in-
ternational environmental law. These protocols therefore are an attempt to 
use international law in a national context, in order to support the local 
manifestation of the right to self-determination. Community protocols are 
the product of international and transnational networks of experts com-
prising State and non-State entities: they have already been developed 
through the involvement of networks of NGOs, intergovernmental organi-
sations (the UN Environment Programme), and bilateral donors, with a 
view to prepare communities before engaging in contractual negotiations 
with private entities. A recent international environmental treaty, the 2010 
Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing under the CBD, specifi-
cally recognises this innovative instrument and requires State Parties to 
support the development of such protocols by indigenous and local com-
munities. This is quite significant, as parties to the Nagoya Protocol are 
specifically called upon to respect the customary laws of indigenous and 
local communities at all levels of implementation of their international ob-
ligations. The Nagoya Protocol also provides for other avenues for bot-
tom-up inputs into the international legal regime on access and benefit-
sharing. For instance, it encourages the use of model contracts and codes 
of conduct to allow different groups of stakeholders and different sectors 
to experiment with more specific approaches to the implementation of in-
ternational law. As a complement, it calls upon the protocol governing 
body to take stock of these stakeholder-led developments, thereby creat-
ing a formal opportunity for the international community to learn from 
experiences on the ground, and possibly insert some of the lessons learned 
and successful ideas into the international regulatory system. 
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4. Return to Bilateralism 
While multilateralism takes the lion’s share of international environmental 
law-making and compliance monitoring, bilateralism has recently been re-
turned to and put to service for the realisation of the international commu-
nity’s environmental objectives, with implications for different levels of 
environmental regulation. Notably, this recent phenomenon is not aimed 
at circumventing or supplanting multilateral environmental initiatives, but 
rather at complementing them. It can either provide additional tools to en-
sure compliance with multilateral environmental agreements, or it can 
provide impetus and new ideas where the development of international 
environmental law, at the multilateral level, experiences delays or is un-
certain. 
While being undertaken outside a multilateral environmental 
framework (in the context of bilateral trade agreements or bilateral coop-
eration treaties), bilateral initiatives are thus increasingly utilised so that 
these may contribute to reaching multilateral environmental objectives: 
bilateral initiatives aimed at supporting the implementation of multilateral 
environmental agreements in partner countries. In addition, bilateral ini-
tiatives are also used to encourage regulatory convergence in other coun-
tries or build common ground or even joint positions in the context of on-
going multilateral negotiations. Notably, the European Union and the 
United States have created unprecedented links between their bilateral 
agreements and the implementation of CITES – and to a lesser extent also 
of the CBD – combined with trade incentives or trade sanctions, capacity-
building support, and joint monitoring bodies that allow for multi-
stakeholder inputs. 
While these bilateral legal instruments may provide targeted coop-
eration and specific means to support compliance with multilateral envi-
ronmental agreements according to a partnership approach, bilateral ini-
tiatives may still be largely and particularly dominated by one party, 
which imposes its interpretation of international agreements and of the 
findings of multilateral compliance mechanisms. The distinct United 
States and European Union approaches – the one sanction-based, the other 
incentive-based –to bilateral initiatives and their different selections of 
relevant multilateral environmental agreements certainly speak of their de 
facto dominant position in their partnership with other States, based on 
the partner countries’ dependence on market access to the EU or US. The-
se initiatives may thus lead, as Gregory Shaffer and Daniel Bodansky as-
The Future of Law and the Enviroment: 
The Emergence of Global Enviromental Law 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 45 
sert, to the ‘migration’ of legal norms from powerful States to other coun-
tries. Competitive interests, or the desire to realise one country’s priorities 
in on-going multilateral negotiations, are also important drivers in this 
new wave of bilateral initiatives. 
Once again, global environmental law provides an apt lens for fully 
appreciating this recent development. The implications of these bilateral 
agreements should be analysed not only in terms of black-letter compati-
bility between different international agreements, but also in terms of 
practice resulting at the multilateral level; the implications of national le-
gal developments driven by bilateral agreements on the outcomes of mul-
tilateral compliance procedures; or bilateral efforts’ influence on the out-
comes of multilateral negotiations. Equally, these initiatives should be ap-
preciated vis-à-vis their impacts at the national and local levels in terms of 
the adoption of domestic legislation, practices and approaches for the pro-
tection of the environment, and their impacts on the customary laws and 
claims of indigenous and local communities. 
5. An Increasing Role for Private Actors and Instruments 
As pointed out above, global environmental law also emphasises the role 
of the private sector in environmental regulation at different levels. Inter-
national environmental instruments, such as the CBD guidelines, increas-
ingly address private companies. In addition, the private sector has be-
come an increasingly active player in the development and implementa-
tion of international environmental law by providing views and lessons 
learned in on-going intergovernmental negotiations. In addition, multilat-
eral environmental agreements’ secretariats directly engage in standard-
setting or pioneering implementation with private companies. The CBD 
Secretariat and the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, for in-
stance, have partnered with an association of private enterprises to elabo-
rate guidance to the aromatic, perfume and cosmetics industry interacting 
with indigenous peoples. Another example concerns the BioTrade Initia-
tive that was initiated under the aegis of the UN Commission on Trade 
and Development
 
to engage private companies to develop a verification 
framework formally to recognise their efforts towards conservation, sus-
tainability and benefit-sharing. In that context, the CBD signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding with the Union for Ethical BioTrade (UEBT), a 
non-profit-making entity, the private-company members of which commit 
to gradually ensuring that their sourcing practices promote the conserva-
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tion of biodiversity, respect traditional knowledge, and assure the equita-
ble sharing of benefits along the supply chain, with a view to raising the 
awareness of cosmetic and food companies on access and benefit-sharing 
principles. 
Meanwhile, outside multilateral environmental frameworks, other 
international organisations are increasingly relying on the objectives of 
multilateral environmental agreements and international environmental 
law principles in setting standards directly applicable to the private sector. 
This is the notable case of the International Finance Corporation, the pri-
vate arm of the World Bank, which has developed Sustainability Perfor-
mance Standards for private entities operating in developing countries, 
and is directly based on multilateral environmental agreements and nota-
bly on the CBD. Similarly, international bodies engaging in the monitor-
ing of private companies’ conduct have made recourse to certain CBD 
guidelines, particularly those on fair and sustainable interactions with in-
digenous and local communities, to promote environmentally responsible 
corporate conduct. This is the case of the implementation structure of the 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of the Organisation for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development, and also for the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. These initiatives therefore signifi-
cantly amplify the impact of international environmental law on private 
operators.  
Another trend concerns the increasing use of private law instru-
ments for the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. 
International climate change law in particular has seen a rapid and expo-
nential growth in the use of contracts, mostly through its market-based 
mechanisms. As Kati Kulovesi explains,  
Contractual obligations under the Clean Development Mech-
anism are regulated both at the international level, through 
the procedures and (formally) non-binding guidance elabo-
rated under the Kyoto Protocol and by private international 
law.  
These developments at the multilateral level have also engendered 
parallel initiatives at the regional (in the case of the European Union) or 
sub-national (in the case of individual states within the US) market-based 
initiatives, which may also be linked through private international law. A 
similar evolution is bound to happen in the context of the international bi-
odiversity regime, where the recent Nagoya Protocol on Access and Bene-
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fit-Sharing establishes international obligations for countries to ensure 
that “mutually agreed terms” – that is, private contracts – are established 
before access is granted to genetic resources from another State and the 
associated traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities. 
The Protocol, as Claudio Chiarolla notes, may thus have a variety of im-
plications relating to private international law, such as questions relating 
to the national law applicable to an ABS transaction and recognition of 
foreign judgments that are going to be critical for the Protocol’s effective 
implementation. 
6. Conclusions: Teaching and Researching Global Environmental 
Law 
The concept of global environmental law can serve to pull together the 
above-described trends, by highlighting how the increasing specialisation 
of environmental law is thriving on the interactions between different lev-
els of regulation; between different actors and between unilateral, bilateral 
and multilateral initiatives; as well as between public and private tools. 
So, what do these trends mean for future research and for the training of 
the lawyers of the future?  
Global environmental law is a concept that can also be useful as a 
methodological framework and as a research and teaching agenda: it 
prompts the study of environmental law at the international, regional, na-
tional, and sub-national levels as inter-related and mutually influencing 
systems. It encourages the use of comparative methods in that endeavour, 
although this necessitates further reflection in order to define and over-
come specific methodological challenges in that respect. Finally, global 
environmental law calls for systematic and multi-level analyses of the 
practice of non-State actors, particularly international organisations, inter-
national networks of experts providing advice on environmental legisla-
tion across the globe, international civil society, and the private sector, 
with a view to fully understanding their contribution to the making and 
implementation of environmental law at all levels. 
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4Judicial Review and International Rule-Making 
Frank Vibert* 
It is widely acknowledged that international rule-making is undem-
ocratic. An increasing awareness has also grown that rule makers 
are far from infallible. At present there is no coherent system for 
the judicial review of the rule-making of international bodies and 
most operate without the possibility of judicial challenge to their 
policy-making decisions.  
This think piece considers the contribution that judicial review 
at the international level might make in order to combat both the 
democratic deficit and the problem of functional failures – real or 
alleged. 
The think piece outlines alternative approaches to constructing a 
system of judicial review at the international level and places such 
efforts within the broader context of global constitutionalism. 
1. Introduction 
This think piece looks at the absence of judicial review of the rule-making 
and policy-making activities of international institutions. It defines inter-
national rule-making institutions broadly so as to include not only bodies 
such as the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) that 
have important regulatory tasks covering financial markets and account-
ing standards, but also the Bretton Woods organisations that attach policy 
conditions to their loans, the World Health Organisation (WHO) that ad-
vises and stipulates how members are to report, monitor and address 
health conditions, the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that 
guides international policy-making in respect of climate change, as well 
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as bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Egmont 
Group that establish practices relating to money laundering.  
The think piece considers the contribution that judicial review 
might, in the future, make towards addressing the two fundamental prob-
lems of international bodies – that their procedures are undemocratic and 
that their activities are prone to functional failure. It looks at what is in-
volved in moving from judicial review in a national context to an interna-
tional level and to the practical steps that might be involved. Finally, it 
places judicial review within the broader context of constitutionalising the 
international order. 
2. Two Fundamental Problems 
International rule-making, broadly defined, suffers from two fundamental 
problems. First, it is undemocratic in the way in which it is carried out. 
Secondly, the rule makers make mistakes of commission or omission that 
are more widespread than commonly realised. The democratic deficit has 
long been acknowledged – although views differ as to how severe the 
problem is. The problem of functional failure has come to attention more 
recently as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) failed to foresee the 
2008 international financial crisis, the WHO has been accused of mishan-
dling the outbreaks of avian and swine flu, and the IPCC has come under 
attack for its handling of the evidence on the human contribution to global 
warming. 
The diagnosis of the democratic deficit is not straightforward. The 
conventional view has a strongly normative point of departure. In demo-
cratic theory, the voters are the principals in the system, and governments 
and official bodies, including international organisations, are their agents. 
The conventional view sees a kind of democratic ‘two-step’ taking place. 
Governments aggregate the views of their people and then reflect them at 
the international level in establishing the policies and rule-making activi-
ties of international bodies and in making international agreements. Under 
principal/agent theory, the democratic deficit arises because agents spring 
free of the control of the principals because of their superior knowledge 
and information and the influence of other incentives. This means that 
governments have a good deal of latitude in what they do, allegedly on 
behalf of their people and in turn international bodies acquire additional 
latitude in what they do as they interpret the wishes of governments. The 
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end result is that the people are distanced from rule-making outputs that 
may no longer reflect their preferences. 
An alternative diagnosis rejects this largely normative starting point 
that places people at the beginning of the chain. Instead, international 
rule-making is seen in reality as world dominated by professionals and 
experts who diagnose the ‘problems’ and propose ‘solutions’ to govern-
ments or government bodies. It is a top-down process where voters are 
largely unaware of what international organisations do, where rules are 
made, who makes them, and at the same time, have highly limited oppor-
tunities to influence them even if they did understand what was being 
done. Instead of the supposed democratic ‘two-step’ that rests on a large 
number of simplifying assumptions that are rarely spelt out in full, the 
top-down process is seen as one where experts and professionals in their 
field propose the content of rules, governments take a decision on expert 
advice, and the people are at the receiving end. To give a practical exam-
ple, an individual asked for personal details when opening a bank account 
is unlikely to be aware of the recommendations of FATF which may un-
derlie the request, or even to have heard of FATF.  
Following this approach, the production of new rules and regula-
tions at the international level can be modelled along the lines of models 
of other forms of diffusion of innovation where the recipients, the people, 
are takers of innovation and not the source. This model recognises that 
while States and their agencies may be the addressees of international 
rules and regulations, the targets are increasingly businesses and individu-
als within States, and the democratic deficit arises because people have no 
means of influencing decisions that affect them. 
The diagnosis of functional ‘failure’ suffers from a multitude of 
possible explanations – from those offered by political science that focus, 
for example, on the mismatching of the scale of government structures to 
the scale of the problem and policy ‘translation’ problems in moving be-
tween different levels of government; to those offered by sociologists who 
look at cultural or organisational failure; and to those put forward by be-
havioural psychologists and economists who look at the behavioural and 
cognitive processes of those trying to understand the workings of complex 
social systems and to make the rules. 
One well-established strand of theorising concerns ‘epistemic 
elites’. This focuses on the key role of experts and professionals in rule-
making – their shared principled beliefs, common views on causalities, 
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and similar knowledge gained from practical experience in similar posi-
tions of responsibility. These characteristics provide professional groups 
with great strength in diagnosing policy problems and in devising re-
sponses. Those same strengths, however, also contain cognitive biases 
and sources of error that need to be guarded against. When failure is at-
tributed to cognitive weaknesses, it is because the need for procedures to 
guard against the biases of professional groups and organisations is simp-
ly not recognised and the necessary safeguards are not in place. The IMF 
has attributed its own failure to foresee and respond to the 2008 interna-
tional financial crisis to cognitive failure of this sort.  
There has been very little empirical work done on the cognitive dis-
positions and biases of international rule-making groups, but in many 
ways, a diagnosis of cognitive failure fits the facts of the financial crisis 
and other alleged failures in international rule-making better rather than 
other possible explanations. The dispositions associated with cognitive 
failure, a tendency to over-generalise, to be unresponsive to new infor-
mation, and to be over-ambitious, can all be recognised at the internation-
al level. 
It has been fashionable to suggest that networks are the answer to 
weaknesses in international rule-making. They are not. Networks have 
many strengths. They are flexible and can introduce competing ideas and 
approaches. However, they can also be collusive and reject those they 
consider to be outsiders. They are composed of the same experts that con-
tribute to top down rule-making and subject to the same professional 
sources of cognitive weakness. WHO and IPCC both make extensive use 
of networks of experts and professionals, as do many other international 
organisations. It has not shielded them from allegations of failure in what 
they do. Nor has it stopped the reality of top-down rule-making. How 
many employees facing the end of defined benefit pension schemes are 
aware that this may owe much to the ‘mark to market’ principles promul-
gated by IASB - a private networked international organisation - or are 
even aware of its existence?  
3. The Relevance of Judicial Review As a ‘Challenge System’ 
In the context of national regulatory systems, the practice of the judicial 
review of regulatory and policy-making decisions by agencies is well es-
tablished, particularly in the US, Germany and the UK. What is immedi-
ately apparent at the international level is its virtual absence. However, 
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the disputes settlement regime of the WTO might be seen as a partial ex-
ception to this.  
There are dangers in assuming that practices at one level of gov-
ernment can and should be transposed to another. The settings are often 
different and the parallels misleading. What has been termed policy-
making accountability at the national level takes place in democracies 
within a general setting where all those with authority, legislatures, execu-
tives, and executive agencies, can in theory be held to account and judici-
aries play a key role in ensuring that this happens. At the international 
level, the branches of government familiar at the national level are miss-
ing and it is agencies that proliferate. It remains difficult to define the es-
sence of this international rule-making space, characterise its institutions, 
and account for the huge variety of instruments and procedures through 
which rules are conveyed. Nevertheless, despite differences in the rule-
making settings, the key question remains as to what judicial review at an 
international level might bring to help reduce both the top-down nature of 
international rule-making and to help strengthen procedural defences 
against the cognitive weaknesses of experts and professional groups.  
The principles of judicial review in a national context are not entire-
ly settled, but there appears to be a growing body of accepted practice that 
is common to many judiciaries despite other differences they might have 
in judicial doctrine, structure, tradition, or practice. Generally speaking, 
courts do not try to reopen the substance of a decision by a regulatory or 
rule-making body. Often, they do not possess the expertise to do so. They 
may rule on the legal basis for an agency’s action, but they are likely to be 
cautious in so doing because law makers often provide for regulatory dis-
cretion when framing statutory terms of reference. 
The key pillars for review are, first, a procedural requirement for 
regulatory bodies to show that they have allowed for all those who wanted 
to comment on a proposed rule the opportunity to do so, including the 
right to receive a reply to their comment. Secondly, there is a burden of 
proof requirement that requires the rule-making bodies to show that they 
have not omitted evidence that is material to the decision. Thirdly, courts 
may be under an obligation to check that the decisions of the rule makers 
are proportionate to the problem being addressed. 
Leaving aside the unsettled or grey areas in the principles of judicial 
review, these three pillars are relevant both to top-down international rule-
making and to the cognitive weaknesses of the expert rule makers. Allow-
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ing all those with an interest in commenting the opportunity to do so and 
the right to a robust reply, would present an opportunity for a voice at the 
international level. Yet, it would not be the voice of the people. Rather, it 
would be the voice of those affected by a rule and those who, for other 
reasons, may have an interest in it.  
An insistence on the opportunity for comment would also require 
international bodies to consider alternative views on the way they have 
framed a problem and alternative ways of going about the analysis. In so 
far as the rule makers have to guard against accusations of material omis-
sions in their analysis, they may also be encouraged to assess the reliabil-
ity of the evidence they rely on, to trace their analytic steps and processes 
methodically, and to attach confidence weightings to their data, their 
models and their final assessments. A need to show courts that their ac-
tions are ‘proportionate’ would also work in the same direction as proce-
dural and evidentiary standards by encouraging care when expert bodies 
draw inferences from the evidence.  
In short, the pillars of judicial review translated to the international 
level could help reduce the democratic deficit by mitigating top-down 
rule-making and, at the same time, help bolster defences against weak-
nesses in the cognitive dispositions of expert bodies. Judicial review 
would put in place a ‘challenge system’ helpful for mitigating both the 
democratic deficit and epistemic weaknesses.  
4. What Is Required and How to Achieve It 
Practical arrangements to put in place a system of judicial review at the 
international level have to sidestep all questions to do with fundamental 
judicial philosophy and principles of organisation. It has long been 
acknowledged that there is no coherent hierarchy and structure of courts 
at the international level and little prospect for it any time soon. Setting in 
place a system of judicial review thus needs to acknowledge that there is 
no ready-made structure into which courts or tribunals could fit in the way 
(for example, in the UK, the Competition Appeals Tribunal could be slot-
ted between the Competition Commission and an appeal to the High 
Court) and no prospect of an overall agreement that would govern rela-
tionships between courts. Similarly, while global administrative law has 
been recognised as emergent, there is no practical prospect in the short 
term of agreement on the principles and practices that would need to un-
derpin the development of an internationally coherent doctrine of review, 
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and the best that can be hoped for is the recognition of minimum stand-
ards of review.  
Within these fundamental constraints, any practical step towards ju-
dicial review would have to decide whether judicial review across all bod-
ies could be entrusted to a single general court or tribunal of review, or 
whether individual organisations would each have their own tribunal es-
tablished under international law or would accept the jurisdiction in which 
they were headquartered.  
Simplicity would suggest either accepting local jurisdiction or that 
of a single international court including the possibility of a special tribu-
nal attached to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The de-
velopment of local jurisprudence would risk the emergence of varied and 
possibly conflicting approaches. On the other hand, international organi-
sations guard their own turf and would be the first to complain that a sin-
gle international court would not understand the specificities of their own 
environment. In Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has come under criticism for accepting too many referrals and for arriv-
ing at judgments that fail to take into account national specificities. In the 
case of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, any specially in-
stituted panel or tribunal would also need to be able to accept suits 
brought by non-State actors instead of being limited to actions brought by 
States.  
Against this background, there appears to be four main options for 
establishing a system of review, in descending order of practicality. 
4.1. Internal Virtual Review 
One option for establishing a system of judicial review would be for the 
legal departments of the international institutions themselves to act as vir-
tual courts – that is to say they would place themselves in the position of a 
hypothetical court of review and advise management and boards whenev-
er a proposed action would be vulnerable to be overthrown by a court re-
view, if there were one, on the grounds of either procedural or material 
defects. The weakness in this approach is that the voice of legal depart-
ments is not always strong within their own organisation. They would 
need to define their own standards for any review and would be seen by 
the external world to be judges in their own cause.  
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4.2. Agreement on Principles by the OECD  
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
taken the lead among international organisations in establishing interna-
tional regulatory and governance principles, and its latest set of Recom-
mendations was issued in early 2012. Their practical force is not confined 
to the 34 members of OECD itself but have a world-wide impact. It would 
be consistent with this role for OECD to set out minimum principles for 
the international judicial review of international rules while leaving it to 
the organisations themselves as to how to put them into practice. In set-
ting out the principles, OECD could also benchmark the procedural stand-
ards to which international organisations should work. The weakness in 
this approach is that the recommendations would need to gain world-wide 
acceptance after adoption by OECD. OECD would itself be an interested 
party. 
4.3. Administrative Procedures Resolution by the UN 
Another alternative would be for the United Nations (UN) to take action 
itself. An organ such as Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) could. 
for example. pass a resolution along the lines of the US Administrative 
Procedure Act that would set out what is expected of international bodies 
and of courts of review, and would also propose how such courts (or a 
general court) would be established or recognised. The weakness in such 
an approach is the difficulty of getting agreement among all UN members 
on a system that would reduce their discretionary policy making powers. 
The difficulties would include getting agreement on setting up any new 
international court or recognising existing courts in local jurisdictions. 
4.4. Addendum to the UN Declaration of Fundamental Human 
Rights 
A fourth option would be to amend the UN Declaration of Fundamental 
Human Rights so as to include the principles of rule-making and judicial 
review within a wider perspective under an additional section on rights to 
administrative justice. The weakness in any such option is the fear of reo-
pening the content of the Declaration more generally, as well as contami-
nating the principles and practice of judicial review of policy-making with 
the hypocrisy and power politics that surround the implementation of the 
Declaration. 
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5. The Global Constitutional Perspective 
Any practical steps towards the judicial review of international rule-
making would have to be pluralistic in the sense discussed above, of 
avoiding fundamental questions about a coherent international judicial 
structure or philosophy, or system of relationship between jurisdictions. 
The avenues identified above all represent, to varying degrees, partial ap-
proaches. Nevertheless, even working within the practical limitations of 
what can be achieved would still represent a large step for individual in-
ternational organisations that in many cases have relied on their interna-
tional privileges and immunities to shield them from legal action (except 
in the case of administrative tribunals that look at personnel actions). In 
addition, it would also constitute a small but significant step towards con-
stitutionalising the international order.  
The grand vision of a global constitutional order has been stalled for 
some time. It does not seem practical to think in terms of a global parlia-
ment and global government. The UN Declaration of Fundamental Hu-
man Rights represents one rights-based approach to constitutionalism that 
is common to modern national constitutional frameworks. Unfortunately, 
in the context of the UN, the Charter is a deeply flawed instrument – un-
dermined by big power politics in the UN itself, and failing to recognise 
in its provisions that in a pluralist world there can be many different and 
opposing interpretations of basic rights, particularly in cases where rights 
have to be weighed against each other. The principle of judicial review of 
rule-making decisions would establish an important component of the rule 
of law in a less controversial and less highly politicised area. Even in a 
pluralist setting, it would make its own contribution to this longer term 
objective of a constitutionalised global order. 
6. Conclusion 
In future years, an increasing amount of policy-making and rule-making 
should take place at an international level in order to tackle the many 
problems that cross international borders. At present, such a movement 
can be resisted by democracies as well as by undemocratic States. The 
reasons are that the rule-making takes place in an undemocratic setting, 
accountability is lacking, and professional elites have shown themselves 
all too vulnerable to failure in their diagnoses and prescriptions. Judicial 
review at the international level could make a modest contribution to re-
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dressing this situation and provide a different path towards building a 
global constitutional framework. None of the possible approaches to judi-
cial review outlined above will be easy for international organisations to 
accept. However, they are beginning to review their procedures. In addi-
tion, they have a reputation for evidence-based rule-making that they 
have to protect if their activities are to be seen as legitimate. They are also 
important proponents of principles of good governance worldwide. In or-
der to maintain their credibility, they must not only talk the talk to others, 
but also walk the walk and apply the principles of good governance to 
themselves. 
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5A Meta-Regulatory Turn? Control and Learning 
in Regulatory Governance  
Colin Scott* 
The steering of organisational and individual behaviour is a central 
challenge of contemporary governance. This is important not only 
for regulation of matters such as the environment, employment re-
lations, and financial markets, but also for issues of fundamental 
rights concerning the behaviour not only of businesses, but also of 
government. Long experience suggests that highly prescriptive ap-
proaches to regulation are frequently ineffective or even counter-
productive. One reason for this is that we show considerable inge-
nuity in turning demands to change our behaviour to suit our own 
interests rather than meeting the public interest. Other reasons in-
clude the limited knowledge about the behaviours to be steered and 
a limited capacity for governmental monitoring and enforcement. 
An alternative way to think about the problem of steering behaviour 
is to reduce the emphasis on top-down control and seek to exploit 
the capabilities of targeted individuals and organisations both to 
regulate themselves, to monitor each other, and to learn about how 
they may benefit from pursuing more public-oriented objectives. 
Corporate social responsibility initiatives provide only one example 
of such a process at play. This piece will evaluate this meta-
regulatory approach to governance – both its potential and known 
shortcomings – as a basis for developing regulation which is both 
more effective and more efficient. It addresses also the legitimacy 
issues associated with a ‘meta-regulatory turn’ in governance. 
1. Introduction 
The financial crises which have enveloped much of the industrialised 
world since 2008 are only the latest incidents to cause policy makers and 
academics to question the effectiveness and desirability of dominant mod-
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els of regulatory governance. Whilst there is widespread disenchantment, 
there is little consensus on either the causes of problems with regulation, 
nor on the possible solutions. It is more or less inevitable that in a crisis, 
vulnerable governments should assert the need for more stringent regula-
tion and, at least implicitly, attribute responsibility for failures to weak-
nesses in control. This is not the only way to think about the problem. A 
precisely converse position would be that market actors deferred too much 
to the normative content of regulation to guide their behaviour (“unless it 
is prohibited, I can do it”), taking insufficient responsibility for knowing 
what they should do.  
An alternative to more stringent regulation is to think about the 
problem of steering behaviour so as to reduce the emphasis on top-down 
control, and seek to exploit the capacity of targeted individuals and organ-
isations to regulate themselves, to monitor each other, and to learn about 
how they may benefit from pursuing more public regarding objectives. 
Corporate social responsibility initiatives provide only one example of 
such a process at play. This piece will evaluate the meta-regulatory ap-
proach to governance, both its potential and its known shortcomings. The 
objective is to set out an argument for ways in which this technique might 
further provide a basis for developing regulation which is both more ef-
fective and more efficient, without losing sight of the need for legitimacy. 
2. Regulation and Its Challenges 
2.1. Regulation 
The steering of organisational and individual behaviour is a central chal-
lenge of contemporary governance. Regulation is both a core solution and 
a core problem. As a policy solution, regulation is attractive because it is 
relatively inexpensive and transparent as a means to demonstrate that 
governments are being responsive to policy problems as diverse as envi-
ronmental degradation, anti-competitive behaviour, dangerous products, 
misleading commercial practices, problems of employment rights, risky 
financial behaviour, and even the behaviour of governments themselves 
over matters such as human rights. 
Regulation is a key instrument of contemporary governance involv-
ing the setting of norms, together with mechanisms of feedback and cor-
rection (see Figure 1 below). In the US system, these different elements 
were combined from the late 19th century in independent regulatory agen-
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cies with powers to make rules, to monitor compliance, and to enforce 
where they found breaches. Within Europe and other OECD member 
States, regulation experienced a policy boom from the 1980s, not only 
seeing a surge in the establishment of regulatory agencies, but also as a 
recognition of the significance of regulatory modes of governance which 
deploy monitoring and enforcement of compliance with rules as their core 
mode, with or without specialised oversight agencies. It became apparent 
that governance through rules and oversight was not novel in Europe in 
this period, though its deployment was growing. Rather, long-established 
institutions and practices had become identified as a distinctive regulatory 
mode of governance. 
 
Figure 1:  Key Regulatory Functions. 
2.2. Challenges of Regulation 
A core premise of regulation is that it is possible to steer behaviour in rea-
sonably predictable ways. Long experience suggests that highly prescrip-
tive approaches to regulation are frequently ineffective or even counter-
productive. One reason for this is that we show considerable ingenuity in 
turning demands to change our behaviour to suit our own interests rather 
than meeting the public interest. It is difficult to set down in rules, with 
sufficient specificity, the behaviour or outcome that is required. Or, 
somewhat distinctly, the standard that can be set down in a rule has poor 
congruence to the outcome that is required.  
Norms 
(standard-
setting) 
Feedback 
(information 
gathering) 
Correction 
(behaviour 
modification) 
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A second reason of regulation being ineffective is that governments 
frequently have limited knowledge about the behaviours to be steered and 
limited capacity for monitoring and enforcement. Agencies have ad-
dressed these problems with prioritisation strategies and selective en-
forcement, which call into question the uniformity with which regulatory 
law is enforced. In the case of the global financial crisis, there is a signifi-
cant debate as to whether the regulatory dimension of the failures was a 
product of regulation which was overambitious in the reassurance that it 
could provide as to the risks created in financial markets, or that regula-
tion was insufficiently prescriptive, because it was based on principles ra-
ther than rules. 
3. The Limits of Classic Regulation 
3.1. Diffusion of Formal Regulatory Powers 
A central idea in contemporary regulatory scholarship is that it is unrealis-
tic and unhelpful to conceive of regulatory power being concentrated in 
independent State agencies. Even in those jurisdictions (including most of 
the OECD member States) where there is significant experience in dele-
gating some powers to regulatory agencies, the capacity for action by 
those regulators is often limited. This is true in the first part because for-
mal powers are often shared, with ministers and legislatures frequently re-
taining power to make or call in rules, and with powers to apply formal 
sanctions frequently requiring application to a court through costly pro-
cesses of litigation. The existence of these shared powers, whether or not 
they are frequently deployed, clearly limits the capacity of agencies to act 
alone. The effects of diffusion of formal regulatory capacity are further 
accentuated by the powers to make regulatory norms and to monitor im-
plementation held by supranational organisations, centrally the European 
Union (EU) institutions within the EU, but also within other international 
regimes such as that of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The Euro-
pean Commission, in particular, acknowledges limits in its capacity, and 
seeks to foster engagement and learning in its regimes through the devel-
opment of networks. 
3.2. Diffusion of Informal and Private Power 
The observation that power is commonly shared within regulatory re-
gimes is further strengthened when we consider informal power. Informal 
 A Meta-Regulatory Turn? Control and Learning in Regulatory Governance 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 65 
power in regulatory regimes derives from the possession of key infor-
mation and also financial resources by, amongst others, regulated organi-
sations and also non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
Furthermore, State regulatory capacity is often not the only show in 
town. In many important areas of the modern economies, there is an im-
plicit or explicit delegation to the private or self-regulatory capacity of 
firms, trade associations, standard-setting bodies, and so on. Such private 
regulatory capacity operates both at the national and transnational level. 
Whilst such capacity may be delegated in statute, it may also derive from 
varied forms of contractual arrangements, both bilateral and multilateral. 
3.3. Regulatory Capitalism 
These observations about the diffusion of regulatory capacity, referred to 
by Braithwaite, Levi-Faur and others as constituting ‘regulatory capital-
ism’, do not neglect the important trend towards the growth in the number 
of regulatory agencies across most OECD member States, and also the 
growth in rules in many sectors of the economy. Rather, regulatory capi-
talism locates the growth in regulatory agencies and rules within broader 
phenomena of diffused governance as a means to understand why we 
might expect classic regulation through agencies to be of limited effect, 
and to enable us to consider how it is, in practice, supplemented by other 
institutions and practices. 
3.4. Learning in Regulatory Capitalism 
Regulatory capitalism offers a diffused model of regulatory governance in 
which, for most regimes and policy domains, we should not expect one 
agency or organisation to be very powerful in what it can command others 
to do. Rather, relationships within regulatory regimes are often character-
ised as involving a high degree of interdependence, such that the capacity 
of one organisation to act effectively is dependent on the actions of others. 
Each organisation may feel it has a substantial degree of autonomy, albeit 
constrained by the capacity of others. This is most obviously true in re-
spect of the classic relationship between a regulatory agency and a regu-
latee, where the outcomes of the regime are shaped by the conduct of both 
sets of actors, in response to each other and to varied aspects of the envi-
ronment in which they operate. 
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If the capacity for control is limited for each of the various organi-
sations involved, then they need to orient themselves around some other 
mode of action. I suggest that it is just as useful to orient action around 
learning as control. Learning here includes learning about the power and 
capacity of others, their incentives for action, their preference and motiva-
tions, and how one might key into these in order to stimulate an appropri-
ate response. The imperative for learning applies as much to regulatees 
and third parties as it does to regulators, since each has the capacity to do 
things (such as supplying information) which will affect the others and 
secure a behavioural response. 
4. Applying Meta-Regulation 
4.1. Meta-Regulation and the Role of the State in  
Regulatory Capitalism 
If it is correct that relationships within regulatory regimes are best charac-
terised as interdependent, then this begs the question: what is the appro-
priate role of the State? If it is unrealistic to expect regulation to always 
exert detailed control over organisations targeted for regulation, then what 
role is left? Observations about regulatory capitalism suggest that State 
organisations should be more modest in their expectations as to what they 
can achieve through direct control. But these observations are also sug-
gestive of a significant role for the State in steering or orchestrating activi-
ty within regulatory regimes. In some sectors, it may be possible to en-
courage the emergence or development of forms of self-regulatory or pri-
vate capacity. This kind of activity, the regulation of self-regulation, has 
been termed ‘meta-regulation’ by Parker and others.  
4.2. Meta-Regulatory Regimes 
Private regimes offer the advantage of strong industry knowledge, support 
for the regime from the industry, and reduced cost for the State. The pri-
vate actors might learn more about their preferences for regulation and the 
market advantages flowing from private regulation, such as the reassur-
ance and confidence which it gives to users of their products and services. 
Risks of ‘cartelisation’, and pursuit of self-interest are often likely to be 
present. A key role for the State exists in overseeing private regulation, ei-
ther implicitly, for example, through threats of legislation (‘the shadow of 
hierarchy’), or explicitly through establishing a oversight regulator to 
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oversee the exercise of delegated powers. Such oversight can be achieved 
through empowering the oversight regulator to request changes to private 
rules, or to challenge directly or through the court’s decisions concerning 
the application of sanctions to regulated organisations found to be in 
breach of the rules. 
4.3. Examples of Meta-Regulation 
Numerous examples of regimes which deploy some form of meta-
regulation can be found both at national and supranational level. These 
regimes are characterised by a central role for private organisations, such 
as firms and associations in establishing the regime, and/or setting the 
norms or standards, and/or monitoring and enforcing for compliance. The 
involvement of the State includes implicit encouragement or observation 
and more formal and institutionalised oversight. Examples include corpo-
rate social responsibility (Box 1), professional regulation (Box 2), adver-
tising self-regulation (Box 3), and EU regulation of commercial practices 
(Box 4). 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Moves towards encouraging businesses to engage in practices of corporate so-
cial responsibility (CSR) have engaged the State in the ‘soft’ encouragement to 
businesses towards more responsible business practices in respect of matters 
such as the environment and human rights. A somewhat harder mechanism sees 
States requiring companies to specify what they have done with respect to CSR 
(without necessarily requiring firms to undertake any particular actions). These 
soft and harder measures create an environment which encourages firms to 
learn about market advantages in engaging in CSR and to engage in surveil-
lance and benchmarking against the activities of others in their sector, with the 
potential for laggards to learn from leaders.  
Box 1:  Corporate Social Responsibility. 
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Professional Self-Regulation 
Strong traditions of self-regulation in professions such as healthcare and law 
have increasingly been challenged in many countries, partly in response to 
scandals, and partly as a result of a wider pattern of reduced deference to pro-
fessional judgement. Changes which seek to provide stronger reassurance about 
professional regulation do not necessarily involve sweeping away self-
regulation. A number of Australian states have introduced public regulators 
with a statutory role to oversee aspects of setting and enforcing professional 
codes by professional organisations in the legal sector. The UK has produced a 
meta-regulatory public body to oversee professional codes and complaints prac-
tices administered by professional councils in the health professions. Such de-
velopments retain many of the strengths of self- or professional regulation, 
whilst providing public reassurance 
Box 2:  Professional Self-Regulation. 
Advertising Self-Regulation 
Many industrialised countries incorporate some degree of self-regulation to ad-
dress matters both of taste and accuracy in the practices of the advertising indus-
try. Though regimes are varied they typically involve the setting of codes (often 
based on the Consolidated International Chamber of Commerce Code on Market-
ing and Advertising). The UK regime, administered by the Advertising Standards 
Authority (ASA), originated in market concerns about the reputation of the in-
dustry in the face of concerns about the legitimacy of the techniques deployed to 
sell products. However, successive UK governments have encouraged the ASA 
to develop both the content and processes in respect of codes and complaints so 
as to steer the regime in such a way that public objectives for advertising regula-
tion can be met. Thus, there is an implicit delegation of public power, recognised 
as such by the courts. This confidence in the private regime for advertising was 
attested to by a decision to extend the ASA remit by supplementing its non-
statutory powers over print advertising with the explicit delegation of statutory 
powers over broadcast advertising. Within the EU, the European Commission 
has been willing to engage with self-regulation of advertising and recognise its 
key role in providing reassurance over compliance with advertising standards. 
The legitimacy and effectiveness of self-regulation at national level is signifi-
cantly bolstered by participation in the activities of a network coordinated by the 
European Advertising Standards Alliance. 
Box 3:  Advertising Self-Regulation. 
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EU Regulation of Commercial Practices 
Many businesses within the European Union market their products with a claim 
to be a member of and/or to follow the requirements of a particular code of prac-
tice, typically set by a trade association. The EU Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive includes amongst its listed misleading actions, ‘non-compliance by a 
trader with commitments contained in codes of conduct by which the trader has 
undertaken to be bound’, where the trader has undertaken to be bound by a code 
and its commitments are not simply aspirational (2005/29/EC, art 6(2)(b)). This 
measure requires member States to apply sanctions for such misleading actions. 
This oversight does not set any minimum requirements for self-regulatory codes, 
but rather holds businesses to their own commitments to follow them. For this 
reason, the technique is very much meta-regulatory. 
Box 4:  EU Regulation of Commercial Practices. 
5. Conclusions 
5.1. Policy Implications 
5.1.1. A More Modest Role for the State 
The analysis offered in this brief is suggestive of a more modest role for 
the State in the way it thinks about regulatory control. But, equally, it of-
fers an enhanced role for the State in observing, learning about, and steer-
ing regulatory capacity, which is held by others. It creates a challenge to 
be creative about recognising how the capacity not only of businesses, but 
also NGOs and government organisations can be deployed to achieve 
public objectives, not through direct control, but rather through indirect 
steering. This may be done using formal powers of oversight and delega-
tion, or the informal capacity of government to collect and deploy infor-
mation. Such an approach raises challenges not only in demonstrating ef-
fectiveness, but also ensuring legitimacy of actions that involve both pub-
lic and private action in regulatory regimes.  
5.1.2. Assuring Legitimacy 
Virtually any traditional or remodelled version of regulatory governance 
raises significant problems of legitimacy. In the case of the regulatory 
agency model, it is typically a key characteristic of the regime that it 
should operate at arms-length from elected government, with limited ca-
pacity for ministerial direction. This insulation is designed to permit 
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agencies to implement efficient regulatory strategies without interference, 
which might be driven by short-term political concerns. An alternative 
which emphasises the capacity of regulated actors to set, monitor and en-
force norms over themselves is perhaps even more vulnerable to question-
ing on the democratic grounds that elected government is not even re-
sponsible for such matters as key appointments and oversight. According-
ly, any discussion of ‘meta-regulation’, the steering of self-regulatory ca-
pacity as an alternative to traditional regulation must address the problem 
of democratic governance. The assignment of monitoring and steering ca-
pacity to public agencies or government departments may provide part of 
the answer. A more radical solution is to begin to conceive of regimes as 
creating their own community of stakeholders, within which a form of 
democracy, engaging all those affected, might be effectively developed. 
Examples of such democratic governance at the level of particular regula-
tory regimes are suggestive, but limited to date. 
5.2. Implications for Research 
5.2.1. Effects and Effectiveness 
For researchers, there is much that is not well understood about the effects 
and effectiveness of regulatory regimes. Research should be undertaken to 
compare the effects of well-defined meta-regulatory regimes across sec-
tors and across jurisdictions to better understand the conditions under 
which both primary regulatory activity, and steering and oversight, might 
be expected to be effective. Equally, such research might shed light on the 
kinds of conditions under which meta-regulation is unlikely to be effec-
tive, and where direct control by government through ministries or agen-
cies, ‘mega-regulation’, might be more effective. 
5.2.2. Legitimacy 
A second set of challenges relate to better addressing the issue of legiti-
macy associated with regimes in which a good deal of power is delegated, 
implicitly or explicitly, to private actors. It is also important to understand 
the conditions under which a functional form of democratic governance 
for such regimes might emerge and be recognised as such. The potential 
pay-off for identifying a source of legitimacy for non-State governance at 
the regime level is that this might permit us to think of effective meta-
regulation which does not engage the State in the oversight role, but rather 
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deploys the techniques associated with market or community activity in 
giving regulated actors reasons to be effective in their setting, monitoring 
and enforcing of norms.  
5.3. Implications for Training the Lawyer of the Future 
Lawyers of the future will require fresh approaches to legal doctrine and a 
stronger understanding of the limits to their capacity as lawyers in order to 
better understand their role in this complex, interdependent regulatory en-
vironment.  
5.3.1. Legal Doctrine and Legal Pluralism 
At the level of doctrine, domestic public law must be located alongside 
contractual rules and practices which underpin many private regulatory 
arrangements and their dispute resolution mechanisms, and which are fre-
quently transnational in effects. A key lens for understanding competing 
normative legal orders is offered by legal pluralism, with its questioning 
of the form and sources of law in regulatory governance and beyond. 
Such an approach assists not only in understanding the effects of law in 
regulatory regimes, but also in seeking the sources of legitimacy for regu-
latory governance which deviates significantly from traditional models 
rooted in administrative law. 
5.3.2. The Regulatory Environment and the Sociological Citizen 
It is of great significance that lawyers understand the limits to legal pow-
ers in regulatory governance. The ability to locate oneself and one’s ca-
pacity for action, interdependent with respect to the capacity of others, re-
quires us to stimulate a form of what Silbey and colleagues refer to as ‘so-
ciological citizenship’ in those who are going to be effective at what they 
do. Being effective in an environment where powers are diffused requires 
lawyers to learn about what others can do and how that capacity can be 
harnessed. Tomorrow’s lawyers will frequently deploy skills both of 
analysis and negotiation.  
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6Integrating Healthcare and Legal Services to 
Optimise Health and Justice for Vulnerable 
Populations: The Global Opportunity 
Ellen M. Lawton* 
The impact of social determinants like housing and income on 
health is now well-accepted and documented. Increasingly, the 
health and legal communities see access to civil legal services as a 
key intervention to reduce the effects of negative social determi-
nants, improve health, and prevent disease. But to improve access 
to justice, the legal sector must look to the health sector for guid-
ance on quality and evaluation metrics, capacity-building and sus-
tainability. 
Re-framing civil legal services for vulnerable populations as a 
critical facet of healthcare creates unprecedented opportunities for 
more efficient use of health and legal resources. If health is at the 
core of well-being for all vulnerable clients, then to reduce the dual 
burden of health and legal problems, the legal community – includ-
ing pro bono resources in global corporate and private law firms – 
must closely align its activities and priorities with public health and 
healthcare partners, and invest in leaders who can innovate across 
both sectors and leverage scarce legal resources most effectively. 
1. Introduction  
The world is full of examples where health and law collide. A quick look 
at a local newspaper reveals some of the many connections between the 
health and legal sectors that permeate families and communities – the dis-
abled veteran who needs a wheelchair ramp to get into his apartment 
building, the elderly woman who can no longer make healthcare decisions 
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for herself, and the child exposed to environmental hazards in his com-
munity. Each of these situations implicates legal needs that would benefit 
from legal expertise, rather than being left solely to the province of medi-
cal care. Yet each also has immediate ramifications on the health of the 
individual and the family. For vulnerable populations – sometimes de-
fined in the health community as groups that are not well-integrated into 
the healthcare system because of ethnic, cultural, economic, and geo-
graphical or health characteristics, and whose isolation from care puts 
them at risk – the link between health and legal needs is especially promi-
nent, and grows demonstrably tighter all the time. This tightening link be-
tween health and legal needs must provoke and animate an urgent dia-
logue in the access to justice field about the goals and impacts of the ac-
cess to justice system in relation to health, focusing on questions like who 
should pay for justice? Does justice buy good – or better – health? Can 
society buy better health by paying for justice? The link between health 
and legal needs also creates a meaningful opportunity for the legal com-
munity to absorb and utilise the substantial expertise of the health and 
public health communities regarding measurement, data-driven trend 
analysis and prevention priorities – all of which are notably absent in the 
legal community. 
Early adopters of the medical-legal partnership (MLP) model in the 
United States are experimenting with measuring the impact of legal inter-
ventions on both health and the health systems – studying the return on 
investment for legal interventions for individuals, institutions and com-
munities. MLP is a healthcare delivery model that integrates lawyers into 
the healthcare setting to address civil legal needs for vulnerable popula-
tions and promote system change. MLPs are attempting to answer the fol-
lowing questions: What if access to justice became so important to ensur-
ing good health that the health sector is willing to pay for it? And how 
does the legal sector need to shift to respond to these opportunities? 
2. Connecting Legal and Health Needs 
Decades of research in the health care and public health sectors confirm 
that health status and disparities are deeply connected to social circum-
stances, or the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and 
age. Laws and regulations are important social determinants; they con-
struct the environments in which individuals and populations live, influ-
encing how and when people face disease.  
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Addressing these conditions as they relate to health is considered 
“primary prevention” in the medical context, and a main objective of pub-
lic health practitioners. Using the unique skills and tools of the health sec-
tor, there is a robust capacity to depict – and predict – the health status 
and challenges of a wide range of population groups, including the disa-
bled veteran, elderly woman, and chronically ill child referenced above. 
The legal community, however, is in the earliest stages of thinking about 
how to first collect, then aggregate and analyse data that describe the legal 
needs of vulnerable clients. The vast literature describing the social de-
terminants of health offers a wealth of methods and strategies to help the 
field accomplish this task.  
If public health researchers can correlate health outcomes with spe-
cific social determinants, the legal field should have the capacity to corre-
late health outcomes with specific legal needs and interventions. If health 
is a core part of human well-being, then it should be at the centre of the 
outcomes tracked in the pursuit of justice. Indeed, is it possible that the 
justice community could see health status as a proxy for justice? If so, 
there may come a time when the health sector – in recognition of the tight 
connection between legal needs and health status – tracks legal problems 
as assiduously as it tracks blood pressure and weight gain. 
 
Box 1: Legal Needs: A Working Definition. 
As the public health and health sectors in the United States, Canada 
and Australia begin to arch toward integrating legal services to address 
adverse conditions that impact health, it is clear that the global legal 
community can learn a lot from their peers in medicine and public health. 
For example, one can look to tools, frameworks and studies in medicine 
and public health to help define legal needs, describe the prevalence of le-
gal needs, and design sustainable interventions and systems.  
The legal community can also analogise, wherever possible, be-
tween and among the health, public health, and legal fields, to broaden 
audiences who understand the role and need for civil legal services. For 
Legal Needs: A Working Definition 
A legal need is an adverse social condition with a legal remedy – that is, an un-
met basic need such as housing, food or healthcare – that can be satisfied via the 
application of laws, regulations, and policies. Unmet legal needs, which can lead 
to poor health outcomes, are critical social determinants of health 
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example, is it fair to assume that the prevalence of legal need is similar to 
the prevalence of health risk/need? That, like health problems, the lower 
one’s socioeconomic status, the worse one’s legal problems? And that, 
like health problems, some legal problems can be prevented with “early 
screening and treatment”? What other analogies might help elevate the 
cause of justice such that it is on par with health as a societal value as ex-
pressed through allocation of resources? 
Basic Needs with Legal Remedies,  
for example Legal Needs 
Examples of Legal Needs  
That Affect Health 
Income/Insurance 
 Health Insurance access and benefits 
 Access to Public Benefits (disability, 
Social Security, et cetera) 
Housing and Utilities 
 Shelter access 
 Access to Housing Subsidies and  
Sanitary Housing Conditions 
 Access to Utility Services 
Education/Employment 
 Compliance with legal protections for 
children and adults with special needs, 
including disability or veteran status 
 Protection from Discrimination 
 Education Access for disabled  
children 
Legal Status 
 Clear and fair immigration procedures  
 Help when criminal record issues arise 
 Availability of identification  
(birth certificates, et cetera) 
Personal/Family Stability 
 Effective guardianship, custody and 
divorce procedures 
 Availability of capacity, competency, 
and advance directives 
 Availability of estate planning 
Table 1.  Legal Needs that Affect Health. 
3. More Lessons from the Health Sector  
First and foremost, the legal community – both public and private – needs 
to better understand and honour the unique perspective, role and access 
that healthcare providers traditionally have in a community. Governments 
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and funders tend to prioritise health services over access to justice, and 
hospitals and health centres constitute a vital part of any community. And 
while health services may fail to efficiently meet the healthcare needs of 
vulnerable populations, health services vastly outnumber legal resources. 
As a result, health organisations tend to have infrastructure, leadership, 
and capacity available at the local level to leverage alongside smaller-
scale legal resources.  
At a broader level, one could argue that the legal community ought 
to model all facets of best practices – from dissemination of information, 
to professional training, to the development of evidence-based practices – 
on the healthcare field, for the simple reason that the infrastructure, fi-
nancing and implementation strategies for serving vast populations of 
vulnerable people in healthcare tend to be more advanced than in the legal 
community. Specific domains where the health sector offers important 
experience and frameworks include: 
 how to measure impact and quality; 
 how to anticipate and respond to trends using data; and  
 how to strategically invest in legal interventions with a focus on 
prevention.  
A recent report by the Australian Attorney General that described 
strategic frameworks for access to justice is replete with language tradi-
tionally associated with the healthcare sector, including “triage”, “early 
intervention”, and “resilience”. For the legal community to successfully 
leverage the existing infrastructure of the healthcare system, it would do 
well to adopt the language of healthcare wherever possible. Other exam-
ples of key strategies and tools: 
3.1. The Team Concept 
People do not generally have legal, social, economic, or health problems – 
they just have problems that have multiple impacts on their lives. The 
healthcare sector prioritises training members on how to work as a team, 
understanding their role, and working at the top of their profession. Alas, 
the legal profession is historically ill-equipped to partner with other pro-
fessionals, especially in the public interest sector, and there are few incen-
tives to promote inter-professional team work. But as the legal profession 
begins to contemplate the role of non-lawyers in expanding access to jus-
tice, it will find that the healthcare setting has a ready team of “extenders” 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 78 
to train, and a system of triage and treatment in which to practice newly 
acquired advocacy skills.  
3.2. Investing in Prevention – The Shift from Individual to Systemic 
Solutions 
The health sector is decades ahead of the legal profession in terms of 
thinking about prevention. A helpful analogy likens surgery to litigation – 
both call for the intensive, yet inefficient allocation of resources focused 
on a single individual. Both surgery and litigation will always be neces-
sary in some cases, but prevention can ensure that reliance on surgery or 
litigation is lessened by reallocating resources towards prevention activi-
ties. In the health context, the classic example is cardiac health: a public 
health campaign to improve cardiac health by promoting tobacco cessa-
tion, exercise, and weight loss has, as its ultimate goal, improved health 
and the reduction of cardiac surgery rates.  
While it appears that the legal community is reaching consensus 
that the practice of individual representation for vulnerable populations is 
too intensive, inefficient, and costly, it has not yet coalesced around a set 
of prevention strategies. The public health field holds substantial experi-
ence in documenting the impact of prevention as well as shifting profes-
sional and community culture towards prevention.  
Paediatrician and public health expert Megan Sandel of Boston 
University School of Medicine and the National Center for Medical-Legal 
Partnership describes the opportunity of preventive law as helping to 
move from individual legal interventions to broader systemic impact at 
the institutional and community level, where individual cases identified in 
the health setting act as diagnostic tools for failed policies – which are 
then more effectively addressed together by an integrated health and legal 
team. But it is an axiom of legal service provision that by the time a client 
realises that he has a legal problem, it is likely so far along that prevention 
is impossible. The healthcare setting, above virtually all other community 
settings, can provide the access, expertise, and atmosphere for preventive 
law practice. In order to provide early, preventive legal services, lawyers 
must practice civil law where clients frequently visit and where the idea of 
prevention already carries weight: healthcare sites. Indeed, legal services 
can only be accessed preventively in a setting where clients are seen rou-
tinely and can be screened for legal problems. 
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3.3. Leadership and Innovation 
The health sector routinely makes explicit investments in leadership and 
innovation, celebrating leaders who nurture bold innovations that chal-
lenge the status quo. Health care leaders routinely look to other sectors – 
engineering and business – to invigorate standards and practices, which 
are evaluated using common metrics in the healthcare field. In contrast, 
the legal sector struggles to foster and scale innovations in access to jus-
tice. Why? Both the health and legal sectors confront limits on their re-
sources due in large part to the disproportionate need of vulnerable popu-
lations. What is it about the healthcare field that supports a culture of in-
novation and leadership? 
One possible, albeit simplistic, answer lies in the financing and sus-
tainability mechanisms for healthcare – a complex mingling of private and 
government funds that support the goods and services distributed at the 
local level. Pharmaceutical and other profit-driven healthcare-related enti-
ties participate in the healthcare delivery system, and spark/support inno-
vation for many reasons. In the legal sector, the only real commodity is 
information and advice provided by trained experts.  
4. Medical-Legal Partnership: A New Standard of Care 
As evidence on the impact of social determinants of health builds, an in-
creasing number of healthcare, legal, and public health providers in the 
United States, Canada and Australia are teaming up to address these fac-
tors. Medical-legal partnership is a healthcare delivery model that inte-
grates legal assistance as a vital component of healthcare. The power of 
the MLP model lies in its cross-disciplinary, leveraging nature, which 
aligns the legal community with a range of stakeholders and professions 
that are unified in seeking to improve health conditions and systems for 
vulnerable populations. 
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MLP is built on the understanding that social determinants of health 
often manifest in the form of legal needs; and that attorneys have special 
tools and skills to address these needs. MLPs revolutionise both the legal 
and healthcare settings that they touch, because the integration forces a 
shift in the dominant paradigms in the health and legal sectors.  
 Prevailing Model MLP Model 
Legal  
Assistance 
 Service is crisis-driven 
 Individuals are responsible 
for seeking legal assistance 
at right time 
 Primary pursuit is justice 
 Service is preventive,  
focuses on early identifica-
tion of and response to  
legal needs 
 Healthcare team works with 
patients to identify legal 
needs  
 Aims include improved 
health and well-being 
Healthcare 
 Adverse social conditions 
affect patient health but are 
difficult to address 
 Adverse social conditions 
with legal remedies are 
identified and addressed as 
part of care 
Figure 1: Medical-legal partnerships. 
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 Healthcare team refers pa-
tient to social worker/case 
manager for limited assis-
tance 
 Advocacy skills are valued, 
taught, and deployed in-
consistently 
 Healthcare, social work, 
and legal teams work to-
gether to address legal 
needs, improve health, and 
change systems 
 Advocacy skills are priori-
tised as part of the standard 
of care 
Table 2: Comparison of prevailing model and MLP model.  
MLP practice has multiple impacts for patient-clients and commu-
nities, and for the professions and the legal and health institutions that 
partner together. A key outcome is the improved capacity of both legal 
and health professionals to screen, triage, and resolve problems that over-
lap legal and health domains, resulting in a vastly improved professional 
satisfaction and sense of efficacy. 
5. The Global Opportunity for Medical-Legal Partnership 
Like microenterprise and microloans, which started in Bangladesh and 
spread horizontally across countries around the world, including both de-
veloped and developing countries, the MLP model can apply in a range of 
different policy and legal environments – both resourced and under-
resourced.  
MLP can bridge the demonstrated gaps in the provision of health 
and legal services – providing a dynamic, multi-stakeholder team that 
serves the poor and disadvantaged, and supports justice and better health. 
Nascent international experiences of medical-legal partnership, like 
those supported by Open Society Institute in Kenya, demonstrate both the 
universality of the MLP model, as well as its flexibility. 
Civil legal aid, after all, is first and foremost about promoting the 
enforcement of existing laws that protect vulnerable populations. Thus, 
one can connect the rule of law to the health status of a nation, whereby 
identifying and addressing violations of laws that emanate from human 
rights frameworks will not only promote health, but will promote the rule 
of law. 
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6. Conclusion: Re-Framing Justice as Health 
As the legal community struggles to find and scale solutions to the perva-
sive legal need that exists for vulnerable populations, integrating legal aid 
into the health care rubric makes sense from an implementation, sustaina-
bility, and financing perspective. Indeed, what if the business case for jus-
tice is actually improved health? 
The emergence of medical-legal partnership as a leading innovation 
in the legal community is a positive step towards the twin goals of im-
proved access to justice and improved health. As MLPs shift the dominant 
paradigm of legal aid service delivery and integrate perspectives and prac-
tices from the health care world, the team of trained non-lawyer advocates 
grows in both size and strength. The legal community – historically insu-
lar – will also benefit from the increased transparency and accountability 
that a partnership model demands, thereby hastening the move toward 
more efficient, less siloed access to legal services and expertise. 
Conversely, as the health community begins to understand the per-
vasiveness of legal need, it becomes apparent that unresolved legal needs 
tend to ultimately wash up on the shore of the healthcare system in the 
form of disease sparked by, or exacerbated by, the social determinants of 
health. Health systems will begin to pivot toward integration of legal in-
terventions alongside traditional healthcare and public health activities, 
and become committed to ensuring that health care institutions have the 
training and capacity to understand, screen, triage, and where appropriate, 
treat social determinants that have a legal component. They will realise, in 
fact, that there is a key partner missing from the health care team: the 
lawyer. 
In the United States, the federal department of health is experiment-
ing with funding legal aid lawyers to support their mission of improved 
health; at the same time, the federal departments that serve elders and vet-
erans are considering investments in MLPs, with a goal of improved 
health for their target population. These early investments, matched by 
philanthropic investments from leading health care foundations including 
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and others, signal a new perspec-
tive on the capacity of the legal community to participate in creating and 
ensuring healthy communities. The legal community owes it to our new 
healthcare partners – indeed, champions – to place health front and centre 
in our mission to empower communities, and to demonstrate that com-
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mitment by collecting key data and training legal leaders to make the most 
of our shared priorities. 
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7Toward Greater Justice in Development 
Hassane Cisse*, Christina Biebesheimer**, and Richard Nash*** 
Development equated solely with “growth” at all costs, is no longer 
viewed by many around the world as the optimal means for a country’s 
path towards prosperity. Indeed, all these terms – development, 
growth, and prosperity – have over the years expanded to become 
broader and generally more inclusive. Around the world, more and 
more indications seem to point towards a more vocal and powerful 
demand from various quarters for more equitable and inclusive growth 
at the macro, meso and micro levels. A key element of this is ensuring 
that social injustices are mitigated when they occur in order to avoid 
conflict, but also to ensure that appropriate socially just policies are put 
in place initially. Development organisations, including the World 
Bank, will have to adapt to this new trend and be able to respond to it 
adequately if they are to provide the services that countries and people 
demand. A critical component of this is likely to be more support for 
social justice interventions through a variety of stakeholders, which 
will have to inform a new global development pact more aligned with 
the needs and demands expressed by the people. 
In the World Bank, we notice an incipient trend in development 
projects - in sectors such as health, infrastructure, mining, and natural 
resource management – to embrace justice as a necessary part of the 
development equation. This has created a burgeoning environment of 
different actors bringing multiple perspectives, skills, and insights into 
this field, which is pushing the boundaries of thinking around it. This 
think piece imagines this trend forward, sketching out the challenges it 
is likely to encounter and the potential it holds, and developing some 
recommendations for how the trend might be made most productive. 
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1. Introduction 
Predicting trends several decades forward in the fields of justice reform, 
development, and justice and development represents an exciting oppor-
tunity and a significant challenge. Had we written this essay in 2007 prior 
to the financial crisis, we might have written confidently about an expan-
sion of assistance to develop open markets in support of domestic and 
foreign investment free from overly interventionist measures by the State. 
Had we written this essay prior to 11 September 2001, we would probably 
not have thought about the dramatic impact that global terrorism would 
have on citizens’ relationships with the State, or predicted significant di-
rect military assistance in the field of justice reform and dramatically in-
creased spending on security and law enforcement efforts. Prior to the Ar-
ab Spring of 2011, we might not have dared to imagine the explosive po-
tential of a call for justice, and might not have considered the transforma-
tive and revolutionary effect that social media could have on the process 
of change in public institutions. 
These changes represent a dynamic and challenging continuum that 
impacts on development institutions and justice institutions, and that 
shapes the demands of citizens for justice. This essay looks at some of the 
recent trends in the field of justice reform – as we define it in the World 
Bank, the field that works to strengthen the formal and informal institu-
tions that address breaches of law, and facilitate peaceful contests over 
rights and obligations – and imagines a future in which changing demands 
for justice change the shape of development. 
2. A Changing Demand For Justice 
While predicting the future is difficult, it is reasonable to hope that the fu-
ture will see more countries becoming “middle income” countries. Gov-
ernments may find themselves held accountable by increasingly empow-
ered and articulate middle classes demanding more and better services. 
There is also a trend, particularly in some developed countries, towards 
increasing difference in wealth between the richest in a society and the 
rest. We have seen increasing wealth and power being accumulated by 
global corporations, many of which have significant impact on the lives 
and well-being of people around the world. These trends, too, may lead to 
changing demands for fairness.  
 Toward Greater Justice in Development 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 89 
Around the world, indications point towards a more vocal and pow-
erful demand for more equitable and inclusive growth at the macro inter-
State level. For example, the rise of the BRICs and G20 in international 
decision-making; at the meso level, multi-national companies adopting 
more environmental policies and promoting corporate social responsibil-
ity; and at the micro level, individuals seeking justice from other individ-
uals and vis-à-vis the State and companies to reduce barriers to opportuni-
ty. The global financial crisis and the conditions which gave rise to the 
Arab Spring have brought about an increasingly strong and articulate 
voice for justice. This was conceived of both in the broadest sense en-
compassing the notions of equity and fairness of opportunity for the indi-
vidual in each society, and thus the negation of entrenched societal injus-
tices; and also in the narrower sense of ensuring that fair decisions are ar-
rived at and enforced through legitimate institutions. Development equat-
ed solely with growth at all costs is no longer viewed by many around the 
world as the optimal means for a country's path towards prosperity. The 
“Washington Consensus” model of development from the 1990s onwards 
is well known, as are the criticisms. Indeed, all of these terms – develop-
ment, growth, and prosperity – have expanded to become broader and 
generally more inclusive. Development is viewed not as solely the provi-
sion of financial and technical assistance from richer to poorer countries. 
Rather, it involves a process of change within societies across the eco-
nomic, political, and social spectrums that may be influenced by internal 
factors such as population growth, natural resource development, increas-
ing GNP per capita, or institutional development, as well as external fac-
tors such as climate change, trade flows, and global financial forces in-
cluding financial and technical assistance factors. The early 1990s also 
saw the beginning of the World Bank’s justice reform work, with an ini-
tial focus on reforming institutions to support the development of effec-
tive market economies. As the consensus around the “Washington Con-
sensus” has dissolved, the Bank’s work in engaging with the justice sector 
has expanded in new and innovative ways. There are many government 
institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and donor entities 
participating in the reform processes of justice institutions, directing them, 
carrying out analytical work to support better reform, or providing tech-
nical assistance to guide that work. We lay out here what we perceive as 
some emerging trends in the field of justice and development.  
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2.1. Justice as a Key Component of Development Thinking 
The Bank’s flagship annual publications, the World Development Re-
ports, have increasingly stressed the importance of justice and equity in 
the context of development. The 2011 World Development Report 
(WDR) on “Conflict, Security and Development” points out how justice 
must be a priority if conflict is to ease, identifying justice as one of the 
three pillars, along with security and jobs, to help countries out of conflict 
and violence. The 2012 WDR on “Gender Equality and Development” 
shows that women's access to justice is key to their agency at work, in the 
family, and as members of the polity, and thus important in ensuring gen-
der equality. The essential element of the various human opportunities in-
dices being developed by the Bank and other agencies is that all individu-
als should have the same possibilities and chances, such as getting a job, 
going to school, and accessing health services. In society, an essential el-
ement of the concept of equity was discussed in the WDR 2006 on “Equi-
ty and Development”. The WDR 2011 advanced these themes to recog-
nise that justice is a broad and integrated area of development and thus, in 
order to achieve justice in a society and assist in its development, a holis-
tic approach to a broad range of legal issues including land law, family 
law, and business law is needed.  
In September of this year, the United Nations (UN) General As-
sembly convenes a High Level meeting on the Rule of Law to discuss the 
report of the Secretary-General on “Delivering Justice” (2012). This re-
port, too, focuses on the importance of respect for the rule of law for de-
livering just outcomes in the daily life of all individuals. Just as the WDR 
2011 stipulated that justice must be seen in the wider, rather than narrow-
er, sense, the UN report states that “the equitable and transparent admin-
istration of housing, land and property based on rule of law principles is 
key to economic, social and political stability”. We therefore see a con-
verging trend within the international community with regard to how the 
rule of law and the justice sector can support more inclusive and equitable 
development around the world.  
2.2. More Justice Interventions in Development Operations Across 
Many Fields 
Perhaps partially in response to the trend towards conceiving of justice as 
a requisite for economic and social development, we see a visible upswing 
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in the number of justice reform-related components in Bank development 
projects in fields such as health, mining, education, and natural resource 
governance. Infrastructure projects, for example, include mechanisms for 
grievance redress that build on local- or country-level justice practices and 
institutions, or pay attention to ways in which the project can strengthen 
policies and processes for negotiating investment projects between affect-
ed communities and large investors, or look to strengthen legal actors' 
ability to hold the project accountable for service delivery.  
Private sector investors, too, are becoming increasingly concerned 
with the human and social rights impact of their actions, not only as a re-
sult of the increasing pressures from civil society, but also because it is 
being increasingly recognised as “good business”. Large foreign investors 
are recognising that they need to become effective conflict analysers and 
mitigators, and will increasingly seek the assistance of civil society organ-
isations with effective local expertise in these areas. In the Bank, we are 
engaged in work to support the development of “durable deals” in the 
context of development – that is, agreements based on a locally owned 
sense of equity – in the area of mining concession agreements and large 
scale land sales, to ensure that such deals benefit the local community as 
well as the society as a whole and do not become points of conflict. The 
Bank’s focus on good governance has evolved to include the demand for 
good governance, which supports civil society actors in their efforts to 
hold governments accountable. 
 The growing interest in aspects of justice such as grievance and ac-
countability mechanisms among development actors in fields outside jus-
tice has created a burgeoning environment of different actors bringing 
multiple perspectives, skills, and insights to the field of justice and devel-
opment, which is pushing the boundaries of thinking around it.  
2.3. Greater Focus on the Needs of Those Who Use Justice Services 
A trend is visible in both the developed and developing world towards 
supporting justice systems that focus on users’ needs and problems. Pio-
neered at the end of the 1990s and used with increasing frequency in 
many jurisdictions, legal needs assessments are giving greater insight into 
the strategies that people actually employ to resolve their disputes across 
the spectrum of dispute resolution possibilities that are open for them. The 
majority of individuals faced with a ‘legal problem’ (in the broadest sense 
of the word) may not turn to lawyers and judges for dispute resolution – 
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they are likely to turn first, or instead, to administrative decision-makers, 
to someone who can help mediate the problem, to family, community or 
religious leaders (the broad ‘informal’ or non-State sector of justice ser-
vices). This recognition has encouraged formal justice institutions to pay 
greater attention to understanding and meeting the demands of their users. 
Thus, we see judiciaries beginning to employ interesting mechanisms to 
identify needs of potential users of their services – court user committees, 
user surveys, et cetera. And we see a recent explosion in innovative 
mechanisms of cheaper delivery of legal services to individuals (for ex-
ample, through public access to case information, standard form docu-
ment compilation on websites, websites providing direct access to legal 
advice, increasing use of paralegals, outsourcing documentation analysis 
to cheaper jurisdictions, and alternative funding arrangements for liti-
gants) by courts and lawyers around the world.  
The recognition that people employ myriad strategies to resolve 
disputes and seek justice has also helped to expand development actors’ 
focus beyond courts, police, and prosecutors, broadening it to consider 
many possible centres of dispute resolution within a competitive land-
scape. Donors and countries seeking to respond to the justice needs of 
people are examining ways in which they may support community-level 
organisations that mediate disputes or monitor government services, ad-
ministrative law entities, paralegal organisations, and customary justice 
entities. 
2.4. And a Corollary Focus on Accountability to Those Users 
Much of the discussion regarding rule of law and justice sector interven-
tions has focused on promoting the independence of the judiciary as a 
means to ensure impartiality in judicial decisions and accountability of the 
executive. By the mid-2000s, however, significant consideration started to 
be given to the other, complementary, side of the coin – that of accounta-
bility of the judiciary to the citizens it serves. While the judiciary must be 
sufficiently independent from interference from public and private sector 
actors to be able to consider the cases before it with impartiality, it must 
also, like other government institutions, be able to demonstrate effective 
use of public funds to provide citizens with justice services. The focus on 
the accountability aspect of projects relating to the justice sector has 
grown in recent years, in terms of both an increased focus on the account-
ability of justice institutions to the citizens they serve, and an increased 
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focus on the role of justice institutions in ensuring accountability of the 
government to provide essential public services to its citizens. Thus, while 
early efforts to improve justice institutions sought to measure inputs to 
those institutions (improvements in training, for example, or better IT sys-
tems and infrastructure to support the institutional function), recent justice 
reform projects are more likely to seek to measure outputs likely to affect 
the service rendered to users of the system – and justice institutions are 
encouraging citizens and NGOs to become directly engaged with monitor-
ing their performance. 
3. What Role May Justice Play in a Changing  
Paradigm of Development? 
The World Bank has provided financial resources, technical assistance, 
and other support to assist countries in their development for over 65 
years – though the content, focus and delivery mechanisms of that assis-
tance have changed to reflect changes in the world as well as changing 
concepts of development. What would the development agenda look like 
if it took seriously the calls for justice of the type and nature we have out-
lined above?  
Economic and material development will most likely continue to 
occur through the traditional mechanisms and institutions of countries 
creating competitive industries, moving up the value chain, with the gov-
ernment enabling the provision of relevant factor inputs and infrastructure 
(both hard and soft) (for example, roads, ports, education, health facilities, 
courts, laws and regulations) where necessary and appropriate. What if 
development lending in all of these sectors examined the justice implica-
tions of those projects, and analysed the way in which national and local 
justice institutions might be strengthened to address the most pressing jus-
tice needs of the people affected? In other words, what if the trends to-
ward mainstreaming justice in development were to continue and gain 
strength? Just as environmental concerns and issues relating to gender 
equality are now mainstreamed in development projects, it would be pos-
sible consistently to incorporate justice in development lending. This 
might involve analysis and development of components that look to 
strengthen national and local justice mechanisms that encourage citizen 
participation in, or at least understanding of, the laws and agreements that 
underlie the project, and in monitoring project implementation, and mech-
anisms that ensure a process for hearing grievances. In some projects, this 
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would mean formal State institutions such as courts, prosecutors, police, 
and legal aid offices. In some projects, it might mean non-State justice in-
stitutions, or hybrid institutions incorporating customary systems into a 
State system.  
There would be challenges with mainstreaming justice across the 
development agenda. One area of concern of particular relevance to those 
working for the application of international human rights standards is that 
understandings of what constitutes justice vary across countries and cul-
tures. Yet there are some values relating to justice that seem to be shared 
very widely around the world, and development actors are well placed to 
work on their implementation where large investment projects take place: 
values such as transparency and accountability of rules and rule-makers, 
equal application of rules to all, participation in development of the rules 
by those to whom the rules apply, and the rights of all to have grievances 
addressed when wronged.  
Another area of challenge is that laws and justice institutions often 
reflect the interests of the powerful, protecting the status quo. Working to 
open up a debate about who benefits, who loses under a certain law or an 
agreement surrounding a development project, puts development actors in 
the thick of issues of power, politics, and hegemony. A vision of devel-
opment that places justice at its core would need to seek to ensure that the 
poor have a voice and that social injustices are mitigated when they occur 
in order to avoid conflict.  
4. Future Strategies and Research Agendas 
What might strategies for mainstreaming justice as a necessary part of the 
development equation look like? In Sierra Leone, the government’s bold 
health-care initiative for pregnant and breastfeeding women, and children 
under five, suffered leakage of up to 30 per cent of drugs before they 
reached clinics, and women were being charged improper user fees. In-
corporating inexpensive methods of ensuring accountability of service de-
livery by local monitoring agents who act as investigators and assist indi-
viduals in launching claims, such as paralegals, has been shown to help 
individuals obtain benefits they were unfairly denied, and to create longer 
term deterrence effects and accountability of the State to deliver the ser-
vices it has promised. In projects aimed at formal justice institutions, so-
cial accountability mechanisms such as the users’ committees and user 
surveys discussed earlier could be encouraged and expanded on by courts 
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to make their processes more transparent and accessible, and media and 
civil society organisations could be supported in efforts to ensure that po-
lice and prosecutors are acting diligently in collecting evidence and fol-
lowing up on cases, regardless of who the victim or claimant is.  
An area in which there is a pressing research agenda starts from the 
WDR 2011’s thesis that justice is a central concept to be addressed in 
working in fragile States, alongside jobs and security, to examine what the 
concept of justice means in such diverse contexts and how it interplays 
with the multiplicity of fragile relationships that restrict sustained growth. 
We need to better understand how development actors can address the no-
tion of justice through the institutions and communities in such societies.  
We also need better data regarding what a country stands to gain by 
investing in its justice institutions – in comparison to, say, its health or 
education institutions. Justice certainly has intrinsic value in a society, but 
it would also be useful to be able to measure its economic benefit more 
precisely. There is a good deal that is known about the economic impact 
of justice institutions. Research makes it very clear, for example, that 
crime and violence have a significant negative impact on economies, and 
justice institutions are a necessary part of the effort to address crime and 
violence. A recent study demonstrates that courts through their power of 
judicial review of executive (in)actions can play a powerful role in ensur-
ing that resources devoted to health and education are distributed to those 
who need them most. But how can a middle-income country determine 
when and in what amount to invest scarce resources in justice institutions? 
There is need for a better understanding of the impact of investment in 
justice, as well as understanding of how justice institutions can most ef-
fectively use the resources at their disposal.  
The sort of development assistance needed to help justice institu-
tions respond to the pressing justice needs in their societies may shift in 
response to changing demands for justice. It may be that knowledge – 
knowledge about justice reform methodologies and also about how to ana-
lyse and work within local institutions, processes, and politics – will be 
needed more than financial assistance. Perhaps assistance in connecting 
people and ideas across justice institutions, private sector entities, NGOs, 
development actors, and local communities will take on higher im-
portance. 
The next decades may well present an opportunity for justice sys-
tem institutions and the basic values inherent in those institutions to be-
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come a more mainstream, more explicit part of the development equation. 
Whether that happens will depend in significant part on the strategic de-
mands that people make on their governments – and also upon the ability 
of governments, private sector actors, civil society, academia, and devel-
opment agencies to strategically pool knowledge and respond expertly to 
requests for institutions that ensure accountability, enforce rules fairly, 
and facilitate peaceful contests over rights and obligations. 
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8Combating Corruption in the 21
st
 Century: 
Bringing the Babel of Voices into Harmony 
Claudia J. Dumas 
In this think piece, the law of the future is explored in the context of 
the rapid growth of the anti-corruption field. At the end of the 20
th
 
century, international efforts to constrain corruption started rela-
tively narrowly, with a collective focus on preventing the bribery of 
public officials in transnational business transactions. Since then, 
numerous issues and goals have been grouped under the heading of 
anti-corruption, often with a common underlying assumption that 
greater transparency, accountability, and enforcement of the speci-
fied norms will constrain corruption in the applicable substantive 
arena and enhance the achievement of the broader substantive goal. 
The UN Convention against Corruption has added to the activity, 
with requirements and suggestions that ratifying States take various 
actions to prevent corruption, but with the Convention's articles set-
ting forth its requirements in general terms. Governments, private 
sector, and civil society groups are increasingly promulgating new 
soft law initiatives and standards, which often layer on top of exist-
ing hard and soft law frameworks, rather than being tied to the im-
plementation of specific standards of hard law. 
Current trends – including the complex and transnational nature 
of grand societal challenges, the globalisation of commerce, and 
technological change – will likely cause a continued multiplicity of 
soft initiatives. This think piece suggests that reducing cross-border 
corruption and corruption within individual countries will require 
(i) an analysis of the assumed causal relationship between hard and 
soft law regimes and new understandings of how soft law instru-
ments affect each other, (ii) a focus on both the performance of 
country level justice systems and closing opportunities for interna-
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tional money laundering, and (iii) increased research regarding the 
impact of specific anti-corruption interventions. 
1. Introduction  
Corruption, and legal efforts and mechanisms to constrain it, are not new 
to the 20th and 21st century. Some would assert that the temptation to ben-
efit oneself improperly at the expense of others is part of human nature, 
thus explaining the focus on such areas as the duties and limits of rulers, 
government institutions, and codes of behaviour by philosophers and ear-
ly governments since the earliest conception of nation States.  
There is no uniformly accepted definition of corruption. Indeed, the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) does not at-
tempt to define the phenomenon and some scholars reject a unitary defini-
tion. Discussions around corruption in recent decades include reference to 
a variety of practices and terms, including bribery, solicitation, extortion, 
unfair advantage, nepotism, and embezzlement. A survey of the literature 
regarding definitions of corruption is beyond the scope of this think piece, 
as is a consideration of the circumstances under which varying definitions 
should be utilised and specific practices included. A frequent conceptuali-
sation of the term corruption, however, is the “abuse of public office for 
private gain” with a broadening to “abuse of entrusted office for private 
gain” in order to extend the term to include behaviour by commercial in-
terests and other persons who do not serve in a governmental capacity. 
References to corruption in this essay may generally be understood as re-
ferring to the latter phrase using “entrusted office”.  
While there is no consensus on a unitary definition of corruption, it 
is incontestable that there has been an explosion in the last 50 years, and 
especially in the last several decades, of discourse, conventions, laws, pol-
icies, standards, initiatives, technical assistance, academic research, and 
tools focused on eliminating or constraining corruption and various spe-
cific corrupt practices. It is this development – and particularly the prom-
ulgation of numerous soft law1 standards and other initiatives to which na-
                                                   
1
 The terms ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ as used in this think piece will utilise Abbott and 
Snidal’s formulation. ‘Hard law’ refers to legally binding obligations that are precise 
(or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) 
and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law. ‘Soft law’ be-
gins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of 
obligation, precision, and delegation. 
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tion States and entities within nation States are expected or encouraged to 
adhere – that has prompted this think piece. Is there an organising frame-
work among these standards; is the trend toward an increasing number of 
disaggregated standards likely to continue; and what should be done to 
constrain corruption effectively in the future?  
2. The Emergence of the Anti-Corruption Field  
The United States passed the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
in 1977, following numerous investigations by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) into the making by U.S. companies of 
questionable or illegal payments to foreign government officials, politi-
cians, and political parties. Broadly speaking, the FCPA makes it a crime 
for any U.S. person or company to directly or indirectly pay or promise 
anything of value to any foreign official to obtain or retain business. The 
1998 amendments expanded the FCPA to foreign companies and nation-
als if they cause, directly or through agents, an act in furtherance of the 
corrupt payment to take place within the territory of the United States. 
The FCPA also contains accounting provisions which require companies 
to maintain books and records that accurately and fairly reflect the trans-
actions of the corporation, and to devise and maintain an adequate system 
of internal accounting controls.  
The FCPA became the template for the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
which was adopted in 1997. The Convention, currently with 39 parties, 
requires each State Party to make foreign bribery a crime. The Anti-
Bribery Convention is overseen by the OECD Working Group on Bribery, 
which conducts a monitoring process on each ratifying country, focused 
on implementation and enforcement, and the steps which the country has 
taken to implement the working group’s recommendations from prior re-
views.  
The late 1990’s saw the introduction of numerous international 
conventions addressing corruption. These include: the Inter-American 
Convention against Corruption, the first multilateral anti-bribery initiative 
adopted one year prior to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention; the Con-
vention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the Europe-
an Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union; 
and the Council of Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Cor-
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ruption. This proliferation of conventions continued through the start of 
the 21st century, with the African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption and the UNCAC, which became effective in 2005. 
None of these conventions is self-executing, and each requires or urges 
the parties to take various actions to render illegal and deter various trans-
national and domestic corrupt practices. Progress of countries in imple-
menting their commitments under these conventions is assessed through 
periodic review mechanisms specific to each convention. 
A purely linear focus on multilateral conventions, however, misses 
the multitude of other initiatives and actors working to constrain corrup-
tion from the passage of the U.S. FCPA to where we presently sit in the 
first part of the 21st century. These include the founding in 1993 of Trans-
parency International, the global civil society coalition fighting corrup-
tion. The Agreement on Government Procurement was signed in 1994, 
accompanying the signing of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Multilateral development banks and bilateral assis-
tance providers seized on technical assistance to combat corruption in the 
late 1990’s as a must-do, following the collapse of the Russian economy 
in part due to its informal economy and a growing recognition of the per-
vasiveness of corruption in both developing and formerly communist 
countries. 
As has been noted by various commentators, including Slaughter, 
many issues requiring international cooperation are increasingly being ad-
dressed through more informal law-making efforts and groups. These in-
clude networks of government and non-government actors, such as regu-
lators, professions, private sector businesses, industry associations, and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The anti-corruption field is no 
stranger to this blurring of the roles between formal and informal net-
works and outputs. 
Numerous international working groups and initiatives now exist, 
all with the common belief that decreasing transnational, nation State, and 
private sector corruption is essential to their respective goals. These in-
clude government driven groups, such as the G20 Anti-Corruption Work-
ing Group and the Financial Action Task Force; private sector and civil 
society groups identifying best practices and codes of conduct to support 
private sector compliance with anti-corruption laws; and initiatives dedi-
cated to ensuring that payments for the right to exploit natural resources 
end up in official public revenues. Table 1 provides an illustrative listing 
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of some of the more prominent working groups and initiatives. The result 
is that combating corruption, including with approaches designed to in-
crease transparency and accountability, is now viewed as an essential 
component of accomplishing a wide variety of global and national goals, 
including economic growth, poverty reduction, and re-building failed and 
weak States. Accompanying this is a steady cycle of assessment reports 
and convention reviews, action plans, new standards, and advocacy cam-
paigns setting forth recommendations for an increasing number of areas of 
focus. 
Conventions 
 Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996) 
 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (1997) 
 Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the 
European Communities of Officials of Members States of the EU (1997) 
 Council of Europe: Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999) 
 Council of Europe: Civil Law Convention on Corruption (1999) 
 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2005) 
 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
(2006) 
Government Driven Initiatives 
 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977) 
 U.S. Financial Action Task Force (1989) 
 Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative (2007) 
 G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group (2010)  
 Open Government Partnership (2011) 
Sectoral Initiatives 
 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (2002) 
 Publish What You Pay (2002) 
 International Aid Transparency Initiative (2005) 
 Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (2007) 
 Publish What You Fund (2008) 
Private Sector-Government-Civil Society Initiatives 
 International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conduct to Combat Ex-
tortion and Bribery (1996) 
 United Nations Global Compact (2000) 
 World Economic Forum Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (2003) 
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 Transparency International Business Principles  
for Countering Bribery (2009) 
 Business 20 Anti-Corruption Task Force (2010) 
Trade Initiatives 
 WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement 
(1996) 
 APEC Procurement Transparency Standards (2004) 
 APEC Anti-Corruption Task Force (2004) 
 Trans-Pacific Partnership (2006) 
Table 1: Representative Anti-Corruption Measures 
3. Progress in Combating Corruption?  
Has the promulgation of laws and activity around these laws coincided 
with a decline in corrupt practices? While there have been stellar exam-
ples of anti-corruption reforms and progress in some countries, actual im-
plementation of anti-corruption related reforms remains uneven globally. 
Indeed, concerns about rampant corruption and the absence of implement-
ed standards appear to be fuelling recent initiatives, such as the highlight-
ing by the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group and the B20 Task Force 
on Improving Transparency and Anti-Corruption of steps for G20 coun-
tries to take that correspond to reforms recommended by the UN Conven-
tion against Corruption.  
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
launched in 1995, ranks countries according to the perception of public-
sector corruption. The Index lists countries on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 
being highly corrupt and 10 being very clean. Of 183 countries included 
in the most recent December 2011 report, 132 countries, constituting more 
than 72 percent of those listed, scored below 5. The absence of progress is 
further underscored in considering that 74 percent of the 159 countries 
surveyed in the 2005 CPI report also scored below 5. 
The World Bank Institute’s Control of Corruption data aggregation 
also presents a mixed picture. The aggregation, which utilises expert and 
survey data, is intended to capture perceptions of the extent to which pub-
lic power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption as well as capture of the State by elite and private in-
terests. While some country scores showed a net improvement from 2000 
to 2010, other country scores decreased during the same period. It is also 
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noteworthy that a number of countries had scores which improved from 
2000 to 2005, but were followed by a decline in 2010, indicating that pro-
gress on combating corruption is subject to reversals. 
Data aggregations and these two compilations can be critiqued on 
various grounds, including that broad references to corruption may not 
capture progress on individual reforms, perceptions may not accurately 
capture actual practices, and individual data sources may be from years 
prior to the years ostensibly measured. If one looks at enforcement of the 
15 year old OECD Anti-Bribery Convention as one example of the status 
of a more specific reform, however, the picture also does not show 
marked progress. Transparency International’s Progress Report on the En-
forcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention classifies parties into 
four enforcement categories, based on the number and significance of 
cases and investigations, taking into account the scale of the country’s ex-
ports. The 2011 Report found little or no enforcement in 21 of the 37 
countries surveyed, suggesting a lack of political commitment by gov-
ernment leaders toward enforcement and indicating that the impact of 
OECD monitoring reviews has been uneven. 
4. The Future and Implications for a Disaggregated Regime 
The emergence of numerous international agreements and standards in-
tended to reduce transnational and national corruption has created an or-
nate web of hard law, soft law, and other standards without a clearly de-
fined hierarchy. The vast number of substantive law areas and institutions 
targeted for reform by hard law mandates, hortatory language, and infor-
mal initiatives further complicates efforts to map the anti-corruption legal 
landscape. The landscape includes such varied matters as mechanisms for 
international cooperation in asset recovery investigations, whistle blower 
channels and protections, and public procurement practices. 
This author believes that the recent trend toward the promulgation 
of international agreements and other standards, including by networks of 
governmental and non-governmental actors, is likely to continue for at 
least three reasons.  
First, the globalisation of business, the conduct of international fi-
nancial markets through which trillions of dollars flow daily, and the flow 
of people and natural resources, all cross national boundaries. Their cross-
border characteristics and complex nature create complex challenges that 
require coordinated solutions and actions by public and private actors 
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across national boundaries. Examples of these challenges include the trac-
ing of funds illicitly appropriated by public officials, the ability of com-
panies to conduct international business without being solicited for bribes, 
and minimising environmental damage caused by improperly issued 
emissions permits. It is noteworthy that the private sector has recently 
joined and is likely to step up its participation in anti-corruption standard 
setting. The opportunity costs to business of not participating in the global 
economy are too high to permit companies to focus on purely domestic 
markets and supply chains. The legal and reputational risks to long-term 
growth oriented companies of violating legal standards against corruption, 
however, are propelling business to participate in groupings and initia-
tives intended to facilitate compliance with anti-corruption laws and re-
duce corruption in rapidly growing markets.  
A second reason for this continued trend is that measures that re-
duce corruption are not purely technical solutions, but produce winners 
and losers, and thus mixed incentives for reform. As in the case of the 
UNCAC, countries are frequently reluctant to agree to precise, binding 
anti-corruption undertakings. The existence of generally phrased and non-
mandatory provisions, as well as the introduction of new broad undertak-
ings, are likely to continue to propel the issuance of new standards and in-
itiatives by governments, regulators, the private sector, NGOs, and civil 
society. As in the past, these standards and initiatives will be intended to 
support the implementation of generally phrased and non-binding provi-
sions, including by prioritising specific reforms and adding new specifici-
ty through claimed best practices.  
Third, information technology and social media are providing new 
abilities for those seeking to combat corruption to share information, 
compile data and press for reforms. As societies and upcoming genera-
tions embrace and move toward technology, it can be expected that new 
virtual communities and data will yield new communities of interest and 
approaches to combat corruption. The ability of sites such as India’s 
Ipaidabribe.com to collect aggregate data on bribes paid by individuals, 
and the interest NGOs in other countries have expressed in its approach in 
combating petty bribery, is one example of how technology is facilitating 
new communities and innovations. 
While new initiatives and collective action coalitions have the po-
tential to assist in constraining corruption, the failure of efforts to date to 
reduce corruption on a global scale mandates some reflection. Several 
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recommendations emerge in looking forward at the ability of law and the 
anti-corruption field to reduce cross-border corruption and corruption 
within individual nations.  
4.1. Better Understand the Interaction between Soft Law and Hard 
Law Regimes 
While there is a hope and assumption that new conventions and soft law 
standards will strengthen the anti-corruption playing field by raising na-
tional laws and practices, further research is needed to understand better 
how hard and soft law interact in varying circumstances in practice. States 
and other actors are not limited by a choice of whether or not to enact a 
new standard. Rather, they will often have the ability to choose their terms 
of cooperation, including how they will implement a generally worded 
standard and their choice of which measures to focus on implementing 
first.  
Attention also needs to be paid to understanding the effects of mul-
tiple soft law regimes. For example, anti-corruption reforms espoused by 
a group with a relatively narrow substantive focus may positively alter 
how nations would otherwise implement reforms to constrain the same 
types of corrupt practices in other sectors and arenas by setting forth an 
adaptable, concrete approach. An additional scenario for examination is 
understanding the conditions under which re-bundling existing soft law 
provisions into new high profile initiatives enhance or deter from positive 
progress on the provisions. The inclusion in such an initiative of leaders 
with known limited support for particular reforms has the potential, for 
example, to create a positive drag or, alternatively, to impact negatively 
the country’s longer term progress on the reforms if no significant pro-
gress is made under the initiative.  
4.2. Include a Focus on the Performance of Country Justice Systems 
and Close Opportunities for International Money Laundering 
Successfully combating corruption requires a number of complex laws 
and institutions. As an example, the United States included in its 2011 
self-assessment under UNCAC statutes dealing with foreign bribery, bank 
fraud, mail and wire fraud, nepotism, procurement, whistle-blower protec-
tions, criminal and civil conflicts of interest, and misuse of public proper-
ty. Adding international cooperation, and the roles of regional and interna-
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tional law bodies with lawmaking and adjudicatory functions, rapidly ex-
pands the laws and institutions involved in combating corruption.  
Robust and fair enforcement of civil and criminal laws that combat 
corruption is essential for a meaningful reduction in corruption. Vigorous 
and fair enforcement of appropriate norms sanctions those who act im-
properly and also encourages compliance with law. Initiatives which ad-
vocate specific anti-corruption reforms may inadvertently shift the focus 
away from ensuring that national and sub-national investigatory, prosecu-
torial, defence, and adjudicatory functions have sufficient independence, 
competency, corruption safeguards, and resources to perform their roles 
both individually and as a system. Such initiatives may also adversely im-
pact the provision of international financial and technical assistance need-
ed for such justice system strengthening. All too often, justice system as-
sistance efforts are uncoordinated, focus unevenly on differing parts of the 
justice system without a clear rationale for doing so, and ignore the junc-
tures at which different bodies, such as judges and defence counsel, inter-
act. In addition to strengthening enforcement within an individual coun-
try, stronger country level legal systems can both enhance international 
law enforcement cooperation and contribute to a more level playing field 
in that country to support greater economic growth.  
The ability of political elites and organised crime to launder, con-
ceal and enjoy the proceeds of illicit gains outside their home countries 
must also be curtailed for there to be any meaningful reduction in global 
corruption. In both developed and developing countries, corrupt and crim-
inal interests are able to launder ill-gotten proceeds in financial accounts 
and shell companies without law enforcement being able to obtain infor-
mation on their beneficial interest. In addition, the loophole and secrecy 
ridden regulatory systems of offshore financial centres offer safe haven 
for proceeds of crime and corruption. Until these practices and weak 
“know your customer” due diligence requirements for financial institu-
tions are comprehensively addressed on a global scale, corrupt officials 
will be able to shelter funds and a shadow economy of corrupt payments 
will continue to flourish.  
4.3. Increase Research on the Impact of Anti-Corruption Reforms 
More research is necessary to understand the impact of specific anti-
corruption reforms, the conditions under which they are successful, how 
they hold up over time, and their ability to catalyse further changes down 
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the road. In short, much more study is necessary to understand whether 
various anti-corruption interventions actually alter the corrupt practices 
they are intended to reduce.  
Effective anti-corruption reforms involve breaking down en-
trenched political interests, changing incentives, and transforming long 
standing patterns of behaviour. Recent research, for example, is providing 
a more nuanced picture of transparency’s capacity to improve the perfor-
mance of political institutions. In addition, new small-scale civil society 
initiatives developed in response to local conditions show important 
promise in reducing corruption, but their ability to scale up and long term 
impact are not yet known. This includes not only social media driven in-
terventions, but more boots on the ground approaches such as organising 
village elders to oversee public procurement projects and publicly identify 
those contractors who utilise inferior construction materials. The im-
portance of understanding the impact of specific measures is magnified by 
the ability of corrupt networks and individuals to adapt their behaviour, 
find new openings when one channel or practice is foreclosed, and engage 
in more subtle destructive behaviour. Furthermore, repeating ineffective 
interventions not only wastes resources and allows corruption to flourish, 
but, more destructively, can alienate already frustrated populations.  
5. Final Thought 
The complexity of tackling corruption requires a strong focus and collec-
tive action by governments, business, academics, NGOs, and civil society. 
The strong incentives which corrupt interests have against change, and an 
expectation that the current disaggregated legal regime will continue to 
evolve and grow, suggest that significant, sustained change will take time. 
A key actor in calling attention to the imperative of change, identifying 
priority reforms, and assessing their implementation is civil society. It is 
civil society that experiences corruption and its effects, and which also 
has a vested interest in the societal improvements which flow from clean-
er political and financial systems.  
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9Justice, Peace and Development 
Sang-Hyun Song* 
There is a fundamental connection between international criminal 
justice and sustainable peace. International criminal justice – of 
which the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a small but central 
element – supports peace and development through preventing 
mass violence, re-instating confidence in socio-political structures, 
and empowering victims to rebuild their lives. In turn, development 
supports international criminal justice, since effective and capable 
national systems are crucial for the success of the Rome Statute 
system as a whole. However, more needs to be done to strengthen 
national jurisdictions in order to respond adequately to international 
crimes and the development community has a key role to play in 
this regard. Justice for mass atrocities is a concern common to both 
the development and the international justice communities, and the 
topic must be addressed in a concerted manner. 
1. Introduction 
For a long time, references to justice in the domain of development fo-
cused mainly on social justice. Recently, however, a trend has emerged 
which increasingly recognises the interrelation between the rule of law 
and criminal justice on one hand, and sustainable peace and development 
on the other. This think piece will discuss the potential for synergies be-
tween the two spheres, arguing that they are closely connected and should 
be treated as such by policymakers.  
The sheer scale of the devastating effects of conflicts and large-
scale violence on development has been recently emphasised by the 
World Bank in its landmark 2011 World Development Report. According 
to this Report, a civil war costs, on average, as much as three-decades of 
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GDP growth of a medium-size developing economy and, in addition, two 
decades are usually needed to restore trade levels after major outbreaks of 
violence.  
As tragic as these findings are, they do not surprise me. I have per-
sonally witnessed how wars and mass atrocities tear communities apart, 
inflicting terrible physical and mental suffering, devastating social norms, 
and wrecking public institutions and infrastructure.  
To enable the peaceful development of societies worldwide, the 
global community must enforce unequivocal norms prohibiting the illegal 
and indiscriminate large-scale use of armed force. In the long term, this 
requires both upholding relevant legal norms preventively and enforcing 
them effectively if atrocities do occur. These considerations should be ful-
ly integrated in the planning of international development aid and rule of 
law programmes. 
2. Justice Supports Peace and Development 
2.1. Emergence of the Modern System of International Criminal 
Justice 
International crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression, present one of the greatest threats to 
peace, security, and the well-being of the world. This recognition is re-
flected in the preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which was adopted in 1998 by the majority of the world’s 
nations.  
The adoption of the Rome Statute was a historic achievement, the 
culmination of decades of work and negotiation by lawyers, diplomats, 
civil society groups, and individual citizens worldwide. States from all re-
gions of the world agreed that joint action must be taken, relying on the 
force of international law, to ensure that the gravest crimes known to hu-
mankind will not go unnoticed or unpunished.  
The ICC’s Statute entered into force in July 2002. In its ten years of 
existence, the ICC has turned from a court on paper into a leading actor in 
the enforcement of international justice. As of 1 June 2012, 121 States, 
more than 60 per cent of the world’s sovereign nations, have ratified or 
acceded to the Rome Statute, and the number keeps growing. Eight situa-
tions are currently before the ICC, and the Court issued its first judgement 
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on 14 March 2012 in a case concerning the use of child soldiers in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
One of the most significant features of the ICC and the wider Rome 
Statute system is the contribution it makes to the prevention of mass vio-
lence. No one is immune from accountability, as the ICC’s arrest warrants 
for sitting heads of State demonstrate. The likelihood of punishment has 
increased for dictators, and the new generation of political and military 
leaders will be more cautious before deciding to murder or torture their 
political opponents or fellow citizens. 
2.2. Justice as an Element of Conflict Recovery 
More than a billion people on the planet live in areas of conflict, large-
scale violence, or fragility. Millions of people have been affected by the 
crimes under the ICC scrutiny, among them countless victims of murder, 
rape, torture, forcible deportation, and other horrendous acts. In my capac-
ity as President of the ICC, I have met with former child soldiers and oth-
ers affected by war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is heart-
breaking to sense the trauma that the survivors carry with them and the 
magnitude of the challenges they face in their efforts to restore stability 
and normality. 
Large-scale violence does not only impact the direct victims, but al-
so the surrounding communities. Studies have found that non-victims in 
the context of mass violations often have the sense that after what hap-
pened to the victims, no one can be safe, no one can really know what to 
expect. Furthermore, the fear and the deep sense of injustice caused by 
massive human rights violations can force victims to exclude themselves 
from public life and refrain from engagement with public institutions. 
These are just some of the major obstacles that those who wish to return 
to a semblance of their former lives are facing. 
Consequently, justice and the re-establishment of the rule of law are 
an essential part of recovery and peace-building in post-conflict societies. 
Any efforts to help a society regain health, wealth, and capacity to profit 
from its own resources must include accountability for past atrocities and 
strengthening of the rule of law. Indeed, research suggests that countries 
that have held former leaders accountable for their crimes have, in most 
cases, come away stronger. If impunity is allowed to reign, it leaves a de-
sire for vengeance among populations who have been victims of massive 
crimes, and provides fertile ground for the recurrence of conflicts. Transi-
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 116 
tional justice, including international criminal justice mechanisms, is one 
of the core tools to forestall the cycle of violence.  
2.3. Victim Empowerment in the ICC 
Where atrocities have already taken place, the acknowledgment of the 
suffering of the victims and the individualisation of guilt for the crimes 
helps to stabilise peace. However, attributing guilt to individual perpetra-
tors is not sufficient. Therefore, to enable a more comprehensive process 
of justice, the founders of the ICC decided to introduce two very innova-
tive approaches for the empowerment of victims.  
The ICC is the first international judicial body to allow participation 
of victims in their own right, and not just as witnesses. People who were 
victimised by powerful criminals have now become actors in international 
proceedings designed to prosecute those crimes.  
The second innovative feature of the ICC is the possibility of court-
ordered reparations and the creation of a Trust Fund for Victims, which is 
equally without precedent in international criminal justice. Recognising 
both the rights and the needs of victims and their families, the Fund pro-
vides a restorative element alongside the retributive justice of the criminal 
proceedings. Currently, over 80,000 beneficiaries receive assistance pro-
vided by the Fund and its local and international partners.  
In a sense, the Fund acts as a conduit between the principle of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for the most serious crimes and the com-
mitment of the international community to address the multi-dimensional 
challenges that societies in post-conflict situations are facing. In respond-
ing to the particular needs of victimised individuals and communities in 
their quest for dignity, hope, and sustainable livelihoods, the Trust Fund 
for Victims complements other humanitarian or developmental initiatives 
in situation countries. As such, the Trust Fund is becoming an increasing-
ly visible presence in the nexus between justice and development. 
3. Development Supports Justice 
There is no doubt that, in any society, the prospects of justice grow with 
socio-economic development. Quite simply, delivering justice always re-
quires adequate resources and capabilities, such as courtroom and prison 
facilities, or well-trained legal and other professionals. A well-developed 
society is more likely to be able to secure these important features. 
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This is particularly relevant for the system of the Rome Statute giv-
en its reliance on national judicial systems. Under the principle of com-
plementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute, the national judiciary of each 
State retains the primary duty to investigate and prosecute grave viola-
tions of international humanitarian law. The ICC is a safety net that en-
sures accountability when the national jurisdictions fail in their task. 
Therefore, the domestic justice systems of States should be so well 
equipped to deal with ICC crimes that they can serve as the main deterrent 
worldwide and likewise provide justice for past atrocities, enabling a so-
ciety to move on after large-scale violence. The Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute held in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010, recognised this as one of 
the most burning challenges for the further development of the system of 
international justice. 
In a national setting, this requires a good legal framework and the 
necessary capacity in terms of skills and resources for investigations, 
prosecutions, and trials. This is no simple task to achieve, particularly in a 
post-conflict situation. In his 2011 Rule of Law report, the United Nations 
(UN) Secretary-General pointed out that there is currently no systematic 
way to foster the political will necessary for States to domesticate the 
Rome Statute and to bring those requiring assistance together with inter-
national actors willing to fund or provide such assistance. 
To address this gap, a new movement has emerged under the shared 
leadership of States, civil society, the Assembly of States Parties to the 
Rome Statute, and the UN – bringing justice, development, and rule of 
law actors together to seek more synergies. A landmark event was held in 
October 2010 at the Greentree Estate in New York, which initiated dis-
cussion amongst relevant stakeholders. One of the outcomes of the second 
conference held at Greentree in November 2011 was the decision to form 
a group of actors aimed at developing strategies and country specific 
plans on the practical implementation of the principle of complementarity. 
The group will examine experiences of countries that have undertaken in-
vestigations and prosecutions of atrocity crimes. In order to know what 
kind of assistance States require from the international community to re-
build national infrastructure, it is also necessary to assess what expertise, 
capacity, and resources exist locally. The discussions are thus shifting to 
more tangible actions, aimed at strengthening national capacity to tackle 
atrocious crimes. 
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Another promising initiative is the Global Forum on Law, Justice 
and Development, established recently at the initiative of the Legal Vice-
Presidency of the World Bank. The goal of the Global Forum is to pro-
vide solutions to global, regional, and national development challenges 
and to facilitate discussion and identification of issues related to law and 
development. It aims to promote a better understanding of the role of law 
and justice, and to strengthen legal and judicial institutions in the devel-
opment process. 
It still remains to be seen what precise roles various UN agencies, 
international organisations, NGOs, States and international donors can 
and should take. This will, of course, depend not only on the progress of 
the emerging development–justice alliance but also on the capabilities and 
broader strategies of each of the actors individually. The ICC itself, how-
ever, will have to, at least for the time being, confine its role to being a 
catalyst of different forms and sources of assistance. The ICC is, after all, 
merely a court and it has neither resources nor mandate of a development 
organisation or an implementing agency.  
The role of the development agencies, however, is particularly cru-
cial in this respect. Addressing the legacy of mass violence is currently 
not topping the agenda of development programmes. The World Devel-
opment Report states, for instance, that it is much easier for countries to 
get international assistance to support development of their militaries than 
their police forces and judiciaries.  
Development aid typically involves multiple actors – national, bi-
lateral and multilateral – whose activities are closely related and frequent-
ly overlap. Securing justice for international crimes is politically a par-
ticularly sensitive area, and it is crucial that capacity building occurs in a 
coordinated and sustainable manner.  
The world’s legal systems and cultures are varied, and capacity 
building should always be adjusted to the circumstances and needs of 
each particular situation in a way that supports national ownership and 
empowerment from the very beginning. At the same time, there should be 
no deviation from universally accepted norms: such as the prohibition of 
torture or the prosecution of grave breaches of Geneva Conventions. We 
must persist in our efforts to incorporate these norms into a truly universal 
system of international criminal justice – one that resides locally but 
moves globally.  
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4. Conclusion 
The development community and the international justice community 
share concerns about the impact of violence on human populations, and a 
desire to see nations affected by conflict move into a future where their 
citizens can thrive in safety. Forging new partnerships between these two 
spheres will take them both closer to their shared objectives. Lasting 
peace and prosperity in post-conflict societies can only be achieved if de-
velopment challenges and justice enforcement are addressed in a coordi-
nated manner.  
The potential for synergy is significant. Those responsible for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity are often part of wider networks in-
volved in corruption and organised crime. Helping societies dismantle 
these criminal structures represents a major step forward in the entrench-
ment of a culture of the rule of law. In this way, capacity building for ad-
dressing Rome Statute crimes supports the more general justice reforms 
and vice versa. These considerations are primarily relevant for policy-
makers at national, regional and international levels. Specifically, justice 
for mass atrocities should become an integral part of development and 
rule of law programmes aimed at ensuring sustainable development as 
well as security in post-conflict societies. 
For the individual lawyer engaged in a particular case before a na-
tional tribunal or an international court, the considerations discussed in 
this article bear little immediate significance. Criminal proceedings must 
always be conducted impartially and in strict compliance with fair trial 
norms, and decisions must be based on the applicable law and the availa-
ble evidence – not on secondary considerations of the potential impact on 
development or otherwise. 
However, law is not a stagnant matter restricted to courtrooms; ra-
ther it follows the needs of society, and lawyers participate in the process 
through law-making, diplomacy and treaty negotiations, civil society ad-
vocacy, and international cooperation. In this sense, the engagement of 
legal professionals in the strengthening of the system of international jus-
tice in its broadest meaning is a contribution to the peace and well-being 
of people everywhere. 
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10Financial Markets – How is the Financial Crisis 
Changing the Global Legal Environment? 
Himamauli Das* 
The international community responded to the financial crisis with a 
varying response that sought to reinforce multilateral cooperation, 
broaden representation, and deepen informal cooperative mechanisms. 
The result was an unprecedented increase in the size of the financial 
backstop provided by the international financial institutions (IFIs), 
governance and institutional changes at the IFIs and other multilateral 
groupings, and an evolution in the political and institutional mecha-
nisms of the international financial architecture. As efforts continue to 
support the global recovery and the implementation of reforms of the 
financial system, countries will need to address the extent to which fur-
ther elaboration of existing mechanisms is necessary. Decisions need 
to be made as to whether new, enforceable rules need to be developed, 
instead of general standards. Countries also need to assess compliance 
mechanisms, such as peer review, assessment and sanctions.  
1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis brought to light fundamental weaknesses in the re-
silience and integrity of markets, resulting in a need for a strong, coordinated 
policy response, and the need to develop new foundations for the internation-
al financial architecture. Amid the serious challenges to the world economy 
and financial markets, the United States convened leaders of the world’s in-
dustrial nations to an initial meeting in Washington, DC, of the Group of 20 
(G-20) Leaders on 14–15 November 2008. In its communiqué at the end of 
that meeting, leaders identified five common principles for reform and tasked 
finance ministers to complete a list of near- and medium-term concrete ac-
tions, drawing on the expertise of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
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the then-existing Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and standard setting bod-
ies. These five common principles included:  
 Strengthening financial market transparency and accountability; 
 strengthening national level regulatory regimes, prudential oversight 
and risk management, and, importantly, the transparent assessments of 
national regulatory systems; 
 promoting the integrity of financial markets by bolstering investor and 
consumer protection, protecting against illicit finance risks, and pro-
moting information sharing; 
 enhancing and strengthening international regulatory cooperation and 
coordination across all segments of financial markets; and 
 reforming the international financial institutions to better reflect the 
world economy and to enhance emerging and developing economy 
representation, and an expansion of the membership of the FSF and 
other standard setters. 
By the Leaders’ summit in Pittsburgh a year later, the G-20 leaders had 
designated the G-20 to be ‘the premier forum’ for international economic co-
operation and had established the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as the suc-
cessor to the FSF. The FSB, in particular, was to coordinate and monitor 
progress in strengthening financial regulation, and to act to make financial 
reforms to “rein in the excesses that led to the crisis”. Through subsequent G-
20 meetings, these recommendations and tasks have been elaborated and the 
close multilateral cooperation continues. 
There has been significant progress on reforming the financial regula-
tory framework. From the initial detailed tasking to finance ministers to the 
robust work carried out by the FSB with the significant input of standard set-
ters, the International Monetary Fund, and others, G-20 leaders have put in 
place a broad strategy for financial reform. Significant progress has been 
made regarding key elements, including the development of stronger mini-
mum standards for bank capital and liquidity through the implementation of 
the Basel II, II.5, and III requirements, thus ending ‘too big to fail’ by means 
of strengthened resolution regimes and resolution planning for global sys-
tematic banks reforms, and changes to over-the-counter derivatives markets 
and compensation structures. In large part, the work of the FSB is moving 
from design to implementation by countries and monitoring progress in im-
plementation. Some of the challenges at the national level are to seek con-
vergence and consistency in the implementation of standards and principles 
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across countries, to seek a level playing field and avoid discriminatory treat-
ment, and to minimise unintended cross-border impacts. 
Against the backdrop of reforms to the financial regulatory framework, 
the 2008 financial crisis brought new interest in and focus on the institutions 
and mechanisms of the international financial architecture and the ability of 
these international mechanisms to foster national-level implementation to 
forestall future crises. These efforts of the international community on these 
elements, which will be discussed below, point to an evolution in the global 
legal environment. 
2. Global Financial and Macroeconomic Framework before the Finan-
cial Crisis 
Firstly, some context is needed in order to frame the discussion. Prior to the 
financial crisis, the global financial and macroeconomic framework was 
roughly governed by the following:  
 The Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO); 
 other international organisations, such as the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the regional develop-
ment banks (for example, the Asian Development Bank), with a role in 
economic and financial matters; 
 regulatory standard setters such as the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and the International Organisation of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO); and  
 informal multilateral groupings such as the Group of Seven (G-7) and 
Group of Eight (G-8) – and the Financial Stability Forum. 
One can view the elements of the pre-financial crisis framework 
through the following legal or institutional prisms: 
 Organisations with legally binding commitments and compliance 
mechanisms. The IMF and WTO impose legally binding commitments 
on their members, and, to a varying degree, an assessment and compli-
ance mechanism.  
o Clearly defined rules negotiated between members and dispute 
settlement are central components of the WTO multilateral trading 
system. The institutional role of the WTO secretariat is primarily 
to supply technical and professional support to WTO bodies, pro-
vide technical assistance, to monitor and analyse trade develop-
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ments, and to disseminate information, and to convene WTO con-
ferences.  
o The IMF Articles of Agreement imposes two sets of obligations 
on members – those regarding exchange arrangements under Arti-
cle IV and general obligations of members under Article VIII. 
Two features distinguish the IMF framework from the WTO sys-
tem. Many of the obligations imposed on members are framed in 
aspirational language – ‘endeavour to direct’, ‘seek to avoid’, and 
‘undertakes to collaborate’ – but there are certain defined hard ob-
ligations. Unlike in the WTO, there is no dispute settlement mech-
anism to resolve disputes between members. While the IMF Arti-
cles create a mechanism to resolve ‘any question of interpretation’ 
between any member and the IMF or between members, it is rare-
ly used. Rather, the IMF management (that is, its secretariat) is 
given the responsibility to “oversee the international monetary 
system in order to ensure its effective operation” and to “exercise 
firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members”, 
which the IMF performed through periodic Article IV reviews of 
members. In this context, the IMF performs both soft law and hard 
law functions. 
 Organisations with limited or no binding commitments, but with inter-
national assessments and peer review. A collection of international or-
ganisations provide financing, technical assistance, economic assess-
ments, and a forum for countries to cooperate on economic and finan-
cial matters. These include the multilateral development banks, such as 
the World Bank Group; the various regional development banks, such 
as the Asian Development Bank and African Development Bank; and 
the OECD. While the main focus of the development banks is to pro-
vide financing and technical assistance to developing countries, they 
can perform economic and financial assessments (for example, the 
World Bank jointly with the IMF, conduct Financial Sector Assess-
ment Programme reviews of countries). In serving as a forum for eco-
nomic and financial matters, the OECD conducts peer reviews or as-
sessments through which the performance of countries is monitored by 
peers, and serves as a forum for the negotiation of binding agreements 
(OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in In-
ternational Business Transactions) or non-binding arrangements (for 
example, the Arrangement on Export Credits), as well as standards or 
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models. The OECD also is host to the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) which, although not a formal body, serves as standard setter 
and a compliance mechanism to address money laundering and terror-
ist finance.  
 Formal, but non-binding, standard setters. Regulatory standard setters 
established through various international efforts – including the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the IOSCO, and the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), among others – played an 
important role in enhancing cooperation and the harmonisation of na-
tional-level regulatory standards. Standard setters generally do not pos-
sess any formal supra-national supervisory or regulatory authority, and 
their decisions or conclusions do not have any binding legal effect, nor 
do they have compliance or review mechanisms. Rather, these standard 
setters formulated broad supervisory standards and guidelines and rec-
ommended statements of best practices that, depending on the circum-
stances, national-level regulators were to take into account when de-
veloping national-level regulations. The standard setters also provided 
a forum for cooperation between members on banking, securities, in-
surance, or other such matters.  
 Informal, non-binding, mechanisms with primarily a policy role. Prior 
to the financial crisis, the G-7 major industrial economies (and, later, 
the G-8) was a main economic policy coordination group at the finance 
minister level to monitor developments in the world economy and as-
sess economic policies. The G-7 and G-8 addressed variously the chal-
lenges of a globalised economy, trade, debt, and development issues. 
Key steps were taken to enhance cooperation among the various na-
tional and international supervisory bodies, and international financial 
institutions, so as to promote stability in the international financial sys-
tem, for example, the establishment of the FSF in 1999. Neither the G-
7 nor the FSF had any formal status, secretariat, binding authorities, or 
any enforcement or compliance role. 
3. Governance and Institutional Evolution Post-Crisis 
The G-20 summit in Washington in 2008 initiated a significant effort to mod-
ify and strengthen mechanisms and institutions involved in international 
monetary and financial policy. One component of this effort was to bolster 
the financial capacity of the IMF and the multilateral development banks. 
Countries quickly responded by increasing the resources of the IMF and IMF 
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borrowing facilities such as the New Arrangements to Borrow, and initiated a 
now-concluded and unprecedented round of capital increases at all of the 
multilateral development banks. Beyond enhancing the availability of finan-
cial resources to backstop the financial system, there were three key devel-
opments: to enhance emerging and developing countries’ voices and repre-
sentation, the evolution of the FSB as a key institution for policy coordina-
tion, and the role of the G-20. 
In the Washington summit in 2008, the G-20 committed to advancing 
the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions to more adequately reflect the 
changing world economy, and to give emerging and developing countries 
greater voice and representation. By the Seoul summit in 2010, the G-20 had 
resolved to go further by pursuing additional reforms in the IMF, including 
further shifts in quota shares to dynamically emerging and developing coun-
tries and to under-represented countries of over six per cent, It also agreed on 
a reduction by two in advanced European chairs at the IMF Executive Board 
to facilitate greater emerging market and developing country representation, 
and a move to an all-elected IMF board. 
 The Washington summit also emphasised the need for the FSG to ex-
pand its membership and for standard setters to review their member-
ship as well. By the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, the FSB 
was established as a successor to the FSF, with representation of all G-
20 countries, FSF members, Spain, and the European Commission.  
 The Toronto summit reaffirmed the FSB’s principal role in the elabo-
ration of international supervisory and regulatory policies and stand-
ards, and encouraged the FSB to identify ways to strengthen its capaci-
ty. By the Los Cabos summit in 2012, the G-20 had endorsed a revised 
FSB Charter for placing the FSB on an enduring organisational foot-
ing, with legal personality, strengthened governance, greater financial 
autonomy, and enhanced capacity to coordinate the development and 
implementation of regulatory policy, while maintaining strong links 
with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). 
 Finally, the G-20 was “designated to be the premier forum” for inter-
national economic and financial cooperation. 
An initial Charter endorsed by the G-20 in 2009 established the FSB 
with clearly delineated operational components, a consensus decision-
making process, and a permanent secretariat. The Charter itself was a step 
forward in imbuing the FSB with a more significant role and with a specific 
mandate and tasks. However, it was not a binding legal document and did not 
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create a legal entity – there was no decision to establish either a national-
level corporate form or an institution with international legal personality. As 
a result, the FSB did not have the capacity to enter into agreements or hire 
and fire staff, and had no privileges or immunities.  
A revised Charter, endorsed by the G-20 in Los Cabos, went a step fur-
ther in formalising the operational arrangements of the FSB. There are three 
salient features in the revised Charter. First, it continues to be a non-binding 
document and the FSB continues not to be a legal entity at this stage. The 
FSB report to the G-20, however, recommends creating the FSB as a Swiss 
association to provide it with legal personality, and further recommends that 
privileges and immunities should be conveyed to the secretariat (but not 
members) through an existing headquarters agreement between the BIS and 
the Swiss government. It will be of interest to see how the legal character of 
the FSB changes its operational modalities over time, including through the 
direct recruitment of personnel. While the Charter continues to reflect a con-
sensus decision-making process, the FSB report notes agreement within the 
FSB to formulate rules of procedure to improve internal governance and to 
standardise internal processes. It will likewise be interesting to see if the FSB 
retains its flexible and informal operational arrangements in the context of a 
formal set of rules and expanded membership. Finally, the Charter continues 
the expanded FSB composition, set out in its 2009 iteration: national level 
regulatory and supervisory authorities, central banks, and finance ministries; 
international financial institutions; and international standard setting, regula-
tory, supervisory, and central bank bodies. Participation in decision-making 
by international groupings in their own right – including the IMF and the 
regulatory standard setters – is necessary to ensure coordination and full par-
ticipation by entities with a significant stake in FSB deliberations, but is 
unique in that supranational bodies are viewed as representing their own in-
terests in accordance with their own institutional arrangements distinct from 
those of national-level governments. Finally, the adoption of the G-20 as the 
premier forum for international monetary and financial policy coordination is 
also of note. As it recognised in Los Cabos, G-20 decisions have far reaching 
impact, and the informal and flexible character of the G-20 enables it effec-
tively to facilitate economic and financial cooperation. Since 2008, the G-20 
has considered a wide range of international economic and financial policies, 
including core elements to address the financial crisis – reform of the interna-
tional financial architecture, macroeconomic stability, and financial regulato-
ry reform – but it has also addressed a range of other important issues such as 
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food security and commodity price volatility, fossil fuel subsidies, climate 
change, and the fight against corruption. As it broadens its scope, as it recog-
nised in Los Cabos, the G-20 will have to address concerns about transparen-
cy and effectiveness, questions about formalising its processes and develop-
ment of institutional capacity, and its role vis-à-vis the private sector and ex-
isting international institutions that have to date provided significant input to 
the work of the G-20.  
4. Evolution of Accountability Mechanisms Post-Crisis 
Much of the post-financial crisis effort focused not only on the improvement 
of standards, but also on evolving mechanisms to foster accountability in the 
context of soft law. Initial goals focused on monitoring and reporting on im-
plementation of standards developed by the standard setters and have also 
moved towards greater assessment and peer review. There may be further in-
terest in identifying mechanisms to ensure compliance and enforcement once 
assessment and peer review mechanisms are defined and begin providing re-
sults. Countries may need to consider the tension between a cooperative ap-
proach based on standards and soft law and a greater emphasis on compli-
ance. In this context, countries may need to confront whether more binding 
legal mechanisms are required in the traditionally non-binding frameworks 
of the financial sector standard setters.  
 Starting in London, G-20 leaders began to focus on accountability in 
order to bolster country commitments to refrain from raising new in-
vestment and trade barriers in goods and services. Leaders committed 
to notify the WTO of any such measures, and called on the WTO – to-
gether with other international bodies – to “monitor and report publi-
cally on our adherence to these regulatory undertakings”. The OECD 
and WTO have subsequently produced reports on trade restrictive 
measures imposed by countries. In the financial regulatory reform area, 
finance ministers were instructed to implement the London decisions, 
and the IMF and FSB were asked to “monitor progress, working with 
the Financial Action Task Force and other relevant bodies, and to pro-
vide a report”. 
 Continuing this theme in Pittsburgh, G-20 leaders stressed a commit-
ment to deal with ‘non-cooperative jurisdictions’ in three areas: on 
money laundering and terrorism finance in the context of FATF, in 
dealing with tax havens in the OECD context and expanding the scope 
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of non-cooperative jurisdictions (NCJs) on prudential standards, and 
information exchange in the FSB context.  
 In Toronto, leaders established a ‘fourth pillar’ of the global financial 
reform agenda called “transparent international assessment and peer 
review”. The Toronto communiqué pointed to two core elements of 
this pillar: the IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Process 
and robust and transparent peer review through the FSB, including 
through the “adherence to prudential standards”. In an annex to the 
communiqué, leaders welcomed the implementation of the FSB’s 
evaluation process on adherence to prudential information exchange 
and international cooperation standards in all jurisdictions.  
 Carrying this mandate forward, in a paper from March 2010, the FSB 
laid out a framework to encourage adherence by all countries and ju-
risdictions to international financial standards, including by identifying 
NCJs, which in large part were modelled on the work of the OECD in 
the tax area and FATF for standards on combating money laundering 
and terrorism finance. FSB member jurisdictions were asked to “lead 
by example” by first committing to implement and adhere to interna-
tional cooperation and information exchange standards in the financial 
regulatory and supervisory area. The paper laid out an evaluation 
mechanism through a process of dialogue and evaluation. Lastly, the 
FSB paper noted possible consideration of “a toolbox of possible 
measures” – both positive and negative – to promote adherence. The 
2010 paper holds out the possibility of sanctions, including a list of 
sanctions that potentially include restrictions on financial institutions, 
restrictions on transactions by international financial institutions, and 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions. 
 In November 2011, the FSB made a public statement on the initiative 
to promote adherence and identified three categories of adherence: ju-
risdictions demonstrating sufficiently strong adherence, jurisdictions 
taking the actions recommended or making material progress towards 
demonstrating sufficiently strong adherence, and NCJs.  
Regulatory standard setters in the financial sector have traditionally 
used a model to achieve international goals that departs from the internation-
al law model where an international organisation or group of countries seek 
to define internationally binding standards with possible compliance 
measures or regimes. The efforts of the regulatory standard setters such as 
the Basel Committee and IOSCO have been characterised by the issue of 
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standards or principles with the goal of establishing a harmonised interna-
tional regime through national level implementation of regulatory standards 
as domestic law. The standard setters, with support from participating mem-
bers, have used peer pressure to foster implementation of standards defined 
at the international level. The FSB effort to promote adherence to the princi-
ples and standards laid out by the standard setters (IAIS, Basel Committee, 
and IOSCO) through peer review and assessment is consonant with this ap-
proach. 
The FSB approach, however, also contemplates the possibility of nega-
tive measures. The March 2010 paper notes that if jurisdictions fail to make 
sufficient progress towards adherence, “FSB members would call upon its 
members to take further measures”. It goes on to note that the implementa-
tion of any such measures will be subject to “any legal constraints that mem-
ber jurisdictions might face”, and prudential carve-out provisions included in 
many trade and investment agreements that permit countries to take measures 
in the financial services area for prudential reasons or to ensure the integrity 
and stability of the financial system. In effect, the FSB seeks to mesh its soft 
law approach with a hard law component at the international level. Whilst 
the principles and standards defined by the standard setters do not have legal-
ly binding effect, and neither the FSB nor the standard setters can directly ef-
fectuate compliance, the model proposed by the FSB would indirectly use 
national law regimes to “enforce” compliance. As such, the practical model 
being carved out by the FSB is in some respects distinct from the regimes es-
tablished by the WTO and IMF (hard law compliance) and the soft law ap-
proaches of the standard setters.  
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the FSB and G-20 represent different facets of reforms in the 
legal architecture and their development will continue to be of interest. The 
FSB evinces a trend towards institutional capacity and compliance, necessary 
to design and implement the significant measures sought by countries to sta-
bilise the international financial system. It is, however, premised on a distinct 
legal model and with a compliance mechanism that relies on national-level 
implementation, rather than internationally mandated legal direction. The G-
20 continues the longstanding approach of the G-7, and G-8, by providing di-
rection and guidance to international mechanisms – the international finan-
cial institutions and standard setters – but without significant movement to-
wards an institutional structure or binding mechanisms.  
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2.5. 
______ 
11Law and Religion: 
Likely Trends in the Coming Decade  
Rik Torfs* 
Law and religion issues are confronted with two new trends. First-
ly, certain religious ideas and practices are drifting away from 
mainstream thinking in society. Secondly, religious freedom will be 
exercised in a setting hostile to religion. Both trends may lead to re-
stricting freedom. Moreover, one should not forget that they emerge 
in a global picture, including a more moralistic approach of legal 
principles and an increasing inclination to use religion as a weapon 
in class conflicts. All these elements will influence the degree of re-
ligious freedom individuals and groups enjoy. 
Specific problems at stake are freedom of individuals faithful 
within religious structures, gender and sexuality issues creating new 
fields of tension between religion and State, as well as the legal 
place of upcoming forms of spirituality no longer controlled by tra-
ditional religious groups and their leaders. 
1. Introduction 
My field is double. I am both a secular lawyer dealing with law and reli-
gion, and a canon lawyer focusing on the internal law of the Roman Cath-
olic Church. Although this contribution will concentrate on the first issue, 
a look at the second one facilitates a deeper insight in the upcoming dis-
cussion. 
2. Religion, Truth and the Perception of Religious Freedom 
Thought and ideas within religious groups are increasingly disconnected 
from the overall discourse in society. This can be illustrated by the fol-
lowing paradoxical idea: religions stick to the notion of truth, yet at the 
same time, they deny any scientific or even argumentative technique of 
falsification with regard to their viewpoints. Consequently, the truth they 
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refer to is no longer a metaphysical or ontological truth, as competition 
with science is impossible, but a place offering certainty and stability, an 
alternative house to live in. The content of religion will increasingly influ-
ence the way in which religious freedom is perceived. Two elements 
should be taken into consideration. The first one has a long tradition, 
while the second one is rather new. 
2.1. Religious Freedom, Human Rights and Radicalism 
Human rights, including religious freedom, are truly operational on an in-
termediate level of unusual, but not radically deviant behaviour. They do 
not protect conformist behaviour, as acting the same way all others al-
ready do will be riskless and does not require extra-legal support. Yet 
human rights are also unable to protect strongly deviant behaviour. Here, 
penal norms and the maintenance of public order will set limits to perva-
sive claims for additional legal protection of religious freedom. Given this 
starting point, it cannot be excluded that many religious norms slowly 
move from the intermediate level to the sphere of radically deviant behav-
iour. For instance, penal norms and procedures in internal Roman Catho-
lic canon law traditionally are covered by protection of free internal or-
ganisation that religious groups enjoy as part of religious freedom. How-
ever, this freedom could be controlled or restricted as a consequence of 
sexual abuse cases. Inadequate inner Church action may lead to interven-
tion by secular authorities and thus, to a more restricted religious freedom. 
Another example comes from Islam. Wearing the burqa, and in a previous 
stage wearing headscarves at school, only became an issue after religious 
motives for doing so were partially eclipsed by political ones. To sum up, 
religious freedom as such will remain protected, but will lose force as a 
consequence of the application of a key human rights principle: unusual 
behaviour enjoys protection, radically deviant behaviour most of the time 
does not. 
2.2. Religious Freedom in a Hostile Environment 
Religious freedom weakens in a society hostile to religion. Religious 
freedom was given shape in a religious context. The basic picture used to 
be that a majority religion dominated the scene, while members of reli-
gious minorities were persecuted or hampered in their religious practice. 
The paradigm is clear: the central question concerns the place minority re-
ligions occupy within the overall religious landscape. Conversely, reli-
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gious freedom was not meant to function in a non-religious or anti-
religious context. Nevertheless it did so, at least to some extent. In com-
munist regimes, religion was an official enemy, that is, the enemy of the 
system and not of the majority of the population. In the meantime, the ex-
istence of such a church hostile context is scientifically relevant: religious 
freedom was not guaranteed. The choice religious people were confronted 
with was between collaboration and resistance. Examples are the choice 
between the official and the patriotic Roman Catholic Church in China, or 
the dilemmas in the former German Democratic Republic. Perhaps, in that 
context, there was also a third choice, with the current president of Ger-
many, Joachim Gauck (1940), being an example: churches could offer a 
space for relative freedom. The novelty of the coming decades may be the 
presence and practice of religion in a hostile atmosphere. Of course, the 
latter is not and will not become a world-wide phenomenon. However, in 
certain countries, including several Western European States, such a con-
figuration is already present or is growing quickly. Although research re-
mains elusive as a result of the difficulty to ask the right questions, there 
is a clear trend among the population of certain countries that shows a 
move from faith over to hesitation and indifference to scepticism and hos-
tility. The idea that religion is intellectually inferior to atheism, and is just 
a consolation for human mortality, is gaining field among large groups of 
the population, not only among intellectuals. This phenomenon entails 
some questions, especially the following one: how do concrete human 
rights survive in a hostile context? Unlike religion, freedom of expression 
will most probably remain rather popular in the coming decades. Shall 
this lead to a more generous legal interpretation of free expression, and a 
more restrictive one of religious freedom? I suppose so, as certain indica-
tions of this trend are already present today: some authors advocate nar-
rowing the notion of religious freedom to its individual form, thus omit-
ting deliberate collective and organisational freedom. 
3. The Evolution of Law, Ethics and Guilt 
Law and religion will also be affected by an upcoming trend with regard 
to the evolution of law in general. It is clear that a more formal approach, 
as characterised by the human rights catalogues, will be strongly amended 
by a more emotional method, which will be defined by its followers as a 
more ethical one. Certain longstanding legal notions, such as formal pro-
cedural norms or the principle of prescription, are under pressure. This 
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trend finds itself translated into very concrete points with regard to proce-
dures. Many people ask the question whether crimes should remain un-
punished as a result of technical mistakes during the process. All the 
more, as far as prescription is concerned, the idea that time takes away 
guilt is increasingly challenged. Prescription is seen as unjust. The cleav-
age between law and ethics is no longer taken for granted. Generally 
speaking, I am not in favour of this trend, as a mixing up of law and ethics 
may lead to a celebration of feelings of revenge disturbing equilibrium in 
society. Yet, the evolution seems to be continuing, probably partly as a re-
sult of the sober but technical human rights catalogue, which was often 
seen by the vox populi as a skeleton without content. In any case, the evo-
lution will have consequences in the field of law and religion. This is be-
cause religious groups themselves formulate ethical norms, values and 
guidelines, without still disposing of the moral authority to make them 
universally credible. The result will be that the behaviour of religious 
groups, their leaders, their ministers, as well as faithful claiming to be re-
ligious, will be analysed along the lines of the ethical standards they for-
mulate for others. In that regard, it is far from impossible that in penal 
cases, such as fraud or child abuse, religious people will be punished more 
severely than others. It is imaginable that religion will be seen as a cir-
cumstance aggravating guilt. 
4. Religion as the New Face of Class Conflict 
Law and religion may increasingly become a field in which the class con-
flicts of the past will be dealt with in the future. In the 20th century, the 
idea of class conflict found a translation in political thinking, as brought 
into practice by communist regimes in Europe and post-colonial govern-
ments in other continents. After the defeat of communism, symbolised by 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, new battlegrounds with regard to what 
were formerly known as class conflicts emerged. For instance, in the Bal-
kan wars resulting from the splitting up of former Yugoslavia, religion 
was often used as a cover up for less respectable war motives. In any case, 
Croatia was seen as a Catholic country, whereas Serbia boasted its Ortho-
dox roots. In other words, whereas in previous times social inequality was 
invoked as a reason for struggle, religion partly replaced it as a catalyst of 
grief, enriched by a flavour of dignity. Along the same lines, Islam as un-
derstood and practiced by many, especially young people, does not always 
mean that religious revival is nearby or taking place. It is very well possi-
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ble to explain the success of religion from the perspective of class con-
flict. Very often, and of course abstraction made of the Gulf States, Mus-
lims are not among the winners in our late capitalist world. In that regard, 
Islam can be both a tool to organise the world differently and a consola-
tion for those who are not materially successful. The first goal is more dif-
ficult to achieve than the second one. Capitalism remains the overall 
framework people are living in. Yet the other function of religion contin-
ues to be available: even poor Muslims can argue that whatever the distri-
bution of wealth may be, their God is the best. It will be interesting to see 
how invoking religion in a more global struggle will be used. Judges will 
have a hard time denouncing abuse of fundamental rights. Indeed, where-
as abuse of rights in a private atmosphere, for instance in a real estate con-
flict between neighbours is generally accepted, qualifying certain forms of 
use of fundamental rights as abuse may in itself be a violation of funda-
mental rights. 
5. Rights of the Faithful and Freedom of Religion  
Another trend will be the degree of freedom that the faithful enjoy within 
their religious groups. The emancipation of individuals will probably con-
tinue along with higher overall education achievements in various coun-
tries. This will lead to new types of questions with regard to religious 
freedom. What will the rights of the faithful be vis-à-vis their religious 
leaders? This question will be asked at two different levels, namely at a 
doctrinal and at a practical level. 
5.1. Rights of the Faithful at the Doctrinal Level 
In the field of doctrine, the question is to what extent religious leaders will 
still be able to disqualify faithful as heretics, apostates, and schismatics. In 
the case of an entanglement between religion and State, like for instance 
currently in Iran, traditions can be continued, because religious norms can 
be enforced physically. Yet in more separation oriented systems with reli-
gious leaders only enjoying moral authority, the success of concepts such 
as heresy and apostasy is very doubtful.  
5.2. Rights of the Faithful at the Practical Level 
With regard to the practical level, questions will rise as to labour relation-
ships including compulsory legal protection required by the State, as well 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 136 
as to the possibility of religious leaders and systems aiming at the control 
of the private lives of ministers and faithful. There are more binding State 
norms than in the past. Will religious groups be or remain exempted from 
some of these norms? 
6. Religious Freedom and Discrimination 
Conflicts between religion and the State will increase in the field of gen-
der and sexuality. 
6.1. Gender Discrimination 
Equality between men and women is increasingly seen as a key value in a 
democratic society as governed by the rule of law. This is not always the 
case within traditional religions. One could even argue that the older reli-
gious groups are, the higher the risk will be that hostility vis-à-vis women 
and their position will be included in their tradition. Many religions do not 
only refuse women as ministers, but are also opposed to their equal posi-
tion within civil society. Discrimination of women finds itself more and 
more included as a crime in penal norms. An important question will be 
whether these penal norms will also apply to religious groups. That is a 
matter of balancing. Which right prevails, religious freedom or non-
discrimination? Although today religion remains very often excluded 
from non-discrimination legislation, it is very doubtful that this will re-
main true in the future. 
6.2. Religion, Secularism and Homosexuality 
Also with regard to sexuality, the tension between religious requirements 
and secular standards may increase. In the Roman Catholic Church, the 
official teaching on sexual ethics lost its credibility among Christian faith-
ful as a result of the famous encyclical Humanae Vitae issued by Pope 
Paul VI in 1968, in which the use of non-natural contraception was de-
nounced. Yet, more fields of tension between religious and secular stand-
ards exist, including the debate on homosexuality, although differences 
between religions remain very present in this field. In the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Magisterium still holds that practising homosexuality is a 
grave sin, although many Catholics strongly disagree with this view and 
accept or even foster legal State stipulation improving the situation of 
homosexual unions. Also, some Muslims accept homosexuality, yet here 
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scepticism seems to be more widespread. More extreme Muslims put 
prostitution and homosexuality on the same level. The question is where 
the line will be drawn. My guess is that Western countries, after a short 
moment of hesitation, will nevertheless opt for complete equality between 
homosexual and heterosexual unions. 
7. Spiritual Revival and Scientism  
It is far from impossible that in the coming years, some ‘real’ spiritual re-
vival will take place. By ‘real revival’, I mean a comeback of spiritual and 
religious ideas as such, and not merely as a result of a search for identity 
or as an expression of class conflict. It seems to be hard to live in an ideo-
logical and spiritual vacuum.  
7.1. Institutionalised Religion and Scientism 
Today, we are experiencing in certain countries a true revival of scientism 
in the style of Auguste Comte. The reasons for this phenomenon are hard 
to unravel, but most probably elements such as the decline of institution-
alised religion, play a larger part than an increased credibility of science 
as such. If this hypothesis turns out to be true, the belief in science is more 
a form of belief than a scientific statement about science. Again using the 
same hypothesis, it is likely that this faith will also experience some form 
of decline and may give way at some stage to, sometimes intelligent, 
sometimes less intelligent, forms of faith.  
7.2. Spiritual Revivalism and the Internet 
Another possible cause for spiritual renewal is the information society. As 
a result of the Internet and the modern forms of communication linked up 
with it, people find themselves confronted with an almost unlimited num-
ber of stimuli, open to all forms of reaction. A new selection seems to be 
inevitable. Already today people are choosing for less information, for 
cutting the sources they are confronted with. A more sober information 
pattern may lead to new forms of spirituality, yet not always connected to 
traditional, organised religions. An important question will be about the 
legal protection that will be given to new forms of spirituality. Will it 
come close to the protection of religious freedom today? Or will new legal 
structures be more in line with privacy protection, as spiritual life will be-
come a shelter similar to the house one is living in? 
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8. Conclusion 
With regard to the three main questions that a law of the future approach 
includes, the following answers can be given: 
At the policy level, politicians should refrain from regulating trends 
and tendencies before they clearly emerge. They should stick to the old 
principle that, in case there is no need to issue a law, there is a need not to 
issue one. Indeed, law and religion issues fit in the rather abstract funda-
mental rights debate. The latter leaves enough room for allowing local ac-
cents without betraying the hard core of what human rights really are. 
Case law will be essential when it comes to the protection of religious 
freedom, which also means that international judges, especially, should 
understand the mind of the local legislator without complying too easily 
with his less noble motives. 
Topics for research are numerous. They include human rights with-
in religious groups; the religious status of religion without faith yet ex-
pressing one’s identity; the consequences of a society hostile to religion 
for the content of religious freedom; the question whether religion should 
adapt to modern standards including human rights or, conversely, should 
use human rights to criticise modern standards; and the question about the 
role of the individual within religious traditions, having themselves the 
inclination to highlight the collective dimension and the power position 
the latter entails for its leaders. 
Lawyers of the future will only be good lawyers when they are not 
just lawyers. They should be educated people with a broad cultural back-
ground and a keen interest for underlying philosophical problems. This 
will help them to accept ambivalence in life without becoming relativists, 
because the protection of human rights can never be abandoned. 
  
CHAPTER III 
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12Cyberlaw 2.0 
Jacqueline D. Lipton* 
When Wikipedia, Google and other online service providers staged 
a blackout protest against the Stop Online Piracy Bill in the United 
States in January 2012, their actions inadvertently emphasized a 
fundamental truth that is often missed about the nature of cyberlaw. 
In attempts to address what is unique about the field, commentators 
have failed to appreciate that the field could – and should – be re-
conceptualised as a law of the global intermediated information ex-
change. Such a conception would provide a set of organising prin-
ciples that are lacking in existing scholarship; nothing happens 
online that does not involve one or more intermediaries – for in-
stance, the service providers facilitate all digital commerce and 
communication by providing the hardware and software through 
which all interactions take place. This essay contemplates a future 
reconceptualisation of the cyberlaw field towards a law of the glob-
al intermediated information exchange. The author explains the 
benefits of such an approach in developing a more predictable and 
cohesive body of legal principles to govern cyberspace interactions 
in coming decades. 
1. Introduction: The Nature of Cyberlaw 
In January of 2012, a group of major online services providers – spear-
headed by Wikipedia – staged a blackout protest against the bill in the 
United States for the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). This legislation, 
had it been enacted, would have imposed onerous burdens on online ser-
vice providers based on the liability of their customers for various intel-
lectual property infringements. The outcry over this proposed legislation 
demonstrates what is often missed about the history and the future, of the 
field of law that we have come to know variously as cyberlaw, cyberspace 
law, and Internet law. 
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This area of law developed in the 1990s to reflect the challenges 
posed by the Internet for lawyers in different fields, including defamation 
and privacy law, intellectual property law, the law related to free expres-
sion, antitrust or competition law, and various aspects of corporate and 
commercial law. Since that time, debate has waged about the appropriate 
contours of the field and whether, in fact, cyberlaw is appropriately con-
ceived as a distinct legal field in its own right. The alternative to accepting 
cyberlaw as a legal field is simply to include Internet issues within the ar-
eas of law for which digital networked technology has caused specific 
challenges, such as those listed above. 
What has been missing in the past discourse relating to cyberlaw, 
and what the SOPA debates bring into sharp relief, is the fact that cyber-
law has been, and in coming decades probably should be, conceptualised 
as the law of the globalised intermediated information exchange. In other 
words, the central unifying thread for the field is the role of global online 
intermediaries – such as Wikipedia, Google, Facebook, Yahoo!, America 
Online – and their potential to attract liability for the misdeeds of their us-
ers. 
Online intermediaries face the most unique challenges of any cyber-
space actors. They are generally entities attempting to innovate in aspects 
of online information exchange. Wikipedia, for example, is a collabora-
tive source of information. Google innovates in search engine technology. 
Facebook innovates in terms of online social interactions. Electronic 
payments systems and online businesses innovate in electronic commerce. 
Each of these areas of enterprise attracts customers who may engage in 
questionable as well as legitimate activities. Online actors utilising these 
intermediaries may engage in intellectual property infringement, defama-
tion, privacy incursions, cyberbullying and harassment, electronic theft 
and fraud and the like.  
Unlike the case of many physical world interactions, the victims of 
online wrongs may be more immediately attracted to legal action against 
an intermediary than against the primary wrongdoer for a number of rea-
sons. It is often difficult to identify or locate an online wrongdoer because 
of the anonymous global nature of the Internet. Online wrongdoers are of-
ten impecunious or in foreign jurisdictions so it can be difficult to obtain 
and enforce meaningful legal relief against those actors. Additionally, in-
termediaries have a vested interest in cooperating with law enforcement in 
order to market and promote their services as safe for consumers. Thus, a 
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particularly significant aspect to cyberlaw is the challenge to law- and 
policy-makers of achieving an appropriate balance between encouraging 
innovation in online services while at the same time protecting individuals 
from online harm. The legal liability of online service providers is the key 
to addressing this challenge. Laws focused on primary wrongdoers are 
less likely to have teeth than laws that account for the roles and responsi-
bilities of those providing services through which harms may occur. Thus, 
the cyberlaw of the future needs to focus more clearly on the role of the 
online intermediary in the context of global information exchange. This 
has not been the case in past conceptions of cyberlaw. 
2. Historical Conceptions of the Field 
Cyberlaw teachers and casebook authors have typically struggled to pro-
vide such a unifying thread for the study of the challenges posed by the 
Internet to our current conceptions of the law. Such commentators have 
been plagued by debates surrounding Judge Frank Easterbrook’s now in-
famous dismissal of cyberlaw as nothing more than a cyber ‘law of the 
horse’ that fails to illuminate the entire law in a meaningful way because 
it has no unifying features. A focus on the role of Internet intermediaries 
in the context of global information exchange would allow commentators 
to move the debate about the contours of cyberlaw away from the ‘law of 
the horse’ challenge and into something more meaningful. 
The most often cited challenge to Easterbrook’s categorisation of 
cyberlaw as a law of the horse is Professor Lawrence Lessig’s follow-up 
piece in which he argued that what cyberlaw might in fact demonstrate is 
that law is not the only, or indeed primary, mode of cyberspace regula-
tion. He emphasized that there are a number of regulatory modalities in 
cyberspace, law perhaps not being the most important. Both Lessig and 
Professor Joel Reidenberg argued that software code and system architec-
ture are more important regulators of online interactions than law. This is 
because the code can effectively constrain online behaviours in a way that 
law cannot. Users cannot utilise software in a way that it was not intended 
to be used unless there is a problem with the underlying code or the user 
is a competent computer hacker able to reprogram the code. Law can nev-
er strive to be so effective in constraining behaviour. Outside the code-law 
debate, Lessig and others have additionally identified various other means 
of social regulation outside legal regulation. These additional regulatory 
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modalities include social norms, market forces, and public education 
campaigns. 
The state of cyberlaw today thus revolves around the axis of the de-
bate established in the mid-1990s by commentators such as Easterbrook 
and Lessig. What is missing is a detailed examination of the role of law 
and a recognition that the law may play an important role in the regulation 
of cyberspace in years to come. The SOPA debate, taken in the context of 
recent case law developments about the role of online intermediaries in 
various legal fields, suggests that the cyberlaw of the future needs to focus 
squarely on the role of online intermediaries as its common unifying fo-
cus. 
All online interactions – social, commercial, academic, artistic – are 
exchanges of information facilitated by one or more third party intermedi-
aries. These third parties include search engines, payments systems, Inter-
net service providers (ISPs), gaming platforms, social network operators, 
domain name registrars, and web hosting services. It is impossible for an-
yone to interact online without involving one or more of these intermedi-
aries. Moreover, it is the struggle to address the legal role of these actors 
with respect to online wrongs that causes law and policy developments 
that are unique to cyberspace. It is therefore appropriate to characterise 
cyberlaw as the law of the intermediated information exchange transacted 
on a global stage. In the future, the cyberlaw field should revolve around 
the following issues: (a) delineating the legal rights and responsibilities of 
Internet intermediaries with respect to information exchange facilitated by 
their customers; and (b) investigating the impact of conflicts of law prin-
ciples on the development of substantive legal rules in cyberspace. These 
aspects of the field derive from the two most distinctive features of cyber-
space interactions – the fact that all interactions are intermediated by third 
parties, and the fact that interactions have the potential to cross jurisdic-
tional boundaries. 
3. Jurisdictional Challenges 
With respect to the latter point, some may argue that jurisdictional chal-
lenges imposed on litigants by the Internet are not unique to cyberlaw, 
and are rightly conceived of within the field of conflicts of law or private 
international law. However, existing case law suggests that the there are 
certain ways in which the Internet skews the consideration of jurisdiction-
al problems in ways not previously confronted by experts in the field of 
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conflicts of law. For one thing, jurisdictional concerns are more likely to 
arise in Internet cases than in non-Internet cases because of the global na-
ture of the communications medium. In other words, a greater proportion 
of Internet-related cases than of non-Internet cases will raise issues of ex-
tra-territorial reach of local laws and of the ability of the plaintiff’s court 
to exert jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.  
Because more courts will start by confronting these conflict issues 
in Internet cases than in physical world cases, there is a greater risk in In-
ternet law that procedural determinations on jurisdiction or choice of law 
will effectively resolve an issue before the parties have a chance to argue 
their substantive cases. In other words, Internet cases run a greater risk of 
being resolved at a procedural stage, particularly if a court decides not to 
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. It may be that the cyberlaw 
of the future should call for more predictable ex ante rules on jurisdiction 
and choice of law to avoid an emphasis on procedural issues in Internet 
cases to the detriment of effective development of underlying substantive 
legal rules. 
4. Role of Online Intermediaries 
Jurisdictional issues aside, cyberlaw can easily be reconceptualised to fo-
cus on the role of online intermediaries with respect to liability for infor-
mation exchanges initiated by their customers. Most current cyberlaw 
texts are divided in terms of familiar fields of law – constitutional law, 
conflicts of law, copyright law, trademark law, patent law, defamation and 
privacy law, et cetera. However, textbook authors and other commenta-
tors often miss the fact that so many of the cases over the last decade have 
revolved around common themes of online service provider liability for 
the activities of their users. The liability of online intermediaries for def-
amation is discussed in a chapter on defamation law while the liability of 
online intermediaries for copyright infringement is discussed in a com-
pletely separate chapter.  
However, both questions raise similar issues about balancing the 
need to encourage innovation in the provision of online services with the 
need to protect existing legal rights, such as rights in an individual’s repu-
tation and rights to protect intellectual property. Even legislators are 
guilty of missing some of the major overlaps between questions of inter-
mediary liability in different fields. Some commentators have attempted 
to justify the distinct approaches taken for intermediary liability for gen-
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eral tortious conduct under Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act with the approach taken for copyright infringement under Section 512 
of the copyright legislation in the United States. However, such justifica-
tions are ex post facto rationalisations. Little thought was given at the time 
of the drafting of the respective pieces of legislation to the impact of 
adopting differing legal liability regimes for Internet service providers in 
different contexts. 
More recently, American courts have struggled with the limits of 
secondary liability for copyright infringement with respect to different 
kinds of online service providers. In very similar cases involving the Per-
fect 10 men’s magazine as plaintiff, American courts held that contributo-
ry liability for infringement was a possibility for the Google search en-
gine, while the electronic payments systems were too far removed from 
the causal chain to attract secondary liability. Of course, these cases may 
be effectively reconciled – as the differing approaches to intermediary lia-
bility in the defamation and copyright context legislation may be recon-
ciled. It may be that in the future the appropriate place for discussion of 
these kinds of issues should be within the field of cyberlaw reconceptual-
ised as the law of the global intermediated information exchange. 
One might argue that the key issues about intermediary liability 
have already been addressed by courts and legislators in most jurisdic-
tions. From the mid-1990s to the dawn of the new millennium many 
courts and legislators around the world adopted new legal rules to deal 
with challenges posed by the Internet to existing legal fields. However, 
those rules were adopted in the context of specific fields of law such as 
copyright, trademarks, harmful speech, et cetera. There are few examples 
of laws that focus on the role of those who make the Internet what it is 
across multiple fields of law – the providers of online services. A few 
commentators in recent years have begun to focus their work more specif-
ically on the role of service providers across different fields of law. In the 
future, more work needs to be done with this kind of focus so that the 
cyberlaw field can contribute something meaningful to the future regula-
tion of online conduct outside debates about whether cyberlaw is an ap-
propriate designation for a legal field. 
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5. Emerging Issues 
5.1. Future Cyberspace Trends 
It is important that the cyberlaw of the future take this focus because there 
are constantly new issues emerging online that raise challenges for the ex-
isting legal system. Some obvious examples of these challenges include: 
the future of online intellectual property protection; trademark and free 
speech issues under the newly expanded process for generic top level do-
mains of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers; the 
regulation of online bullying and harassment; the challenges of finding an 
appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the protection of 
privacy and personal reputation online, particularly in the context of 
online social networking. 
5.2. Cyberlaw as a Meta-Field 
Suggesting a reconceptualisation of cyberlaw as a law of the online inter-
mediary is not necessarily to say that distinct legal fields such as copy-
right, trademark, defamation, and antitrust should not continue to address 
Internet issues. Obviously, laws in specific pre-existing legal fields must 
accommodate the Internet such that, for example, digital copyright laws 
should continue to be placed within copyright legislation and not in some 
abstract Internet statute. A reconceptualisation of the kind addressed in 
this discussion is in a sense a meta-conception of a legal field. The cyber-
law of the future would be superimposed over, and at a higher level of ab-
straction than, pre-existing legal fields. This is really no change from what 
takes place in today’s scholarly discourse on cyberlaw which confronts 
challenges from different fields within a more general ‘cyberlaw’ rubric. 
What this discussion is suggesting is that the notion of cyberlaw should 
have a unique central focus on the role of the online intermediary, rather 
than the distinct lack of focus it has maintained previously. 
5.3. Practical Benefits of Reconceptualising Cyberlaw 
An obvious advantage of such a reconceptualisation would be that it 
would allow commentators, judges and legislators to draw parallels across 
different fields of law to develop more cohesive and predictable rules for 
those who provide the backbone of the online experience – the online ser-
vice providers. A focus on intermediaries may also assist in the global 
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harmonisation of rules relating to the Internet if different jurisdictions 
adopted the same approach to reconceptualising cyberlaw. In turn, a more 
harmonised approach to substantive rules of intermediary liability for is-
sues such as defamation, privacy and intellectual property infringement 
might lessen the pressure on jurisdictional questions such as choice of 
law. If global laws were relatively harmonised, choice of law questions 
would diminish in practical significance.  
5.4. Harms and Remedies 
Additional benefits may follow from adopting an intermediary-focused 
conception of cyberlaw in the future. If courts, legislatures and commen-
tators were more focused on what is truly unique about the Internet, they 
could more meaningfully address other aspects of online harm that arise 
specifically from online interactions. For example, harms and remedies 
caused by online interactions tend to differ significantly from those in the 
physical world. Online interactions cannot cause direct physical harm, un-
like, say, assault, battery, property damage and the like in the physical 
world. Online harms tend to fall into two categories – economic loss and 
personal humiliation. These are the kinds of harm that can be caused by 
wrongs based on information exchange as opposed to physical contact. 
Allowing for the development of a cyberlaw field that focuses on what is 
unique about online interactions, rather than spilling ink debating the ‘law 
of the horse’ issue, would create a conceptual space within which to ad-
dress questions of harms and remedies that are unique to cyberspace. 
6. Conclusions 
The cyberlaw of the past has been something of a black sheep in law 
school curricula and in legal debate, never having its own clear bounda-
ries and constantly battling the ‘law of the horse’ criticism. However, the 
cyberlaw of the future can and should move past these limitations. Legal 
developments in cyberspace over the past decade or so have demonstrated 
that there are a number of unique aspects of Internet communications that 
support a cyberlaw field. The key to the field is the role of online inter-
mediaries: in particular, balancing the need to foster innovation in online 
services with the need to impose certain liabilities on intermediaries in or-
der to prevent online harms to Internet users. If the global law and policy 
community can focus more directly on the role of the online intermediary, 
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a more principled, predictable and cohesive set of cyberlaw regulations 
should emerge. 
7. Sources and Further Reading 
Easterbrook, Frank, “Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse”, in University 
of Chicago Legal Forum, 1996, p. 207. 
Grimmelman, James, “The Structure of Search Engine Law”, in Iowa Law 
Review, 2007, vol. 93, no.1. 
Lastowka, Greg, “Google’s Law”, in Brooklyn Law Review, 2008, vol. 73, 
p. 1327. 
Lessig, Lawrence, Code Version 2.0, Basic Books, 2006. 
Lessig, Lawrence, “The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach”, 
in Harvard Law Review, 1999, vol. 113, p. 501.  
Moffat, Viva, “Regulating Search”, in Harvard Journal of Law and Tech-
nology, 2009, vol. 22, p. 475. 
Reidenberg, Joel, “Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Poli-
cy Rules Through Technology”, in Texas Law Review, 1998, vol. 76, p. 
553. 
Cases 
Perfect 10 v Google, 508 F. 3d 1146, 9th Cir. 2007. 
Perfect 10 v Visa International Service Association, 494 F. 3d 788, 9th 
Cir. 2007.
 Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 151 
3.2. 
______ 
13The Future of Cyberlaw 
Rolf H. Weber* 
Early cyberlaw perceptions (as an area without rules or as a code-
dominated area) are not suited to survive in the future. Moreover, 
only information policy rules developed by civil society (in the 
form of soft or informal ‘law’, similar to customary law) meet the 
required legitimacy and design for cyberlaw. Thereby, an angle 
function is played by the information intermediaries; in a world of 
changing technologies, procedural rules must gain importance, in 
particular governance elements (multi-stakeholder approach), or-
ganisational elements (appropriate decision-making structures) and 
dispute settlement elements (imposing disciplinary and enforce-
ment powers). 
1. Early Cyberlaw Perceptions 
1.1. Cyberspace as Area without Rules 
In 1996 John Perry Barlow emphatically pronounced in his manifesto 
Declaration of Independence the belief:  
Governments […] You have neither solicited nor received 
ours. We did not invite you. You do not know us, nor do you 
know our world. Cyberspace does not lie within your borders 
This concept assumes that cyberspace consists of a ‘net nation’, 
based on the analogy that most laws were conceived in and for a world of 
atoms rather than bits. In the meantime, netizens and scholars are less eu-
phoric about the independence of, and particularly the lack of a legal envi-
ronment, in cyberspace. Hectic legislative activity all over the world has 
shown that governments are indeed concerned about the ‘legalisation’ of 
cyberspace. Therefore, the concept of cyberspace as an area without rules 
cannot be a model for the future. 
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Equally, cyberspace law should not be regarded an ephemeral gar-
den such as the law of the horse, having been (partly) controversially dis-
cussed by Judge Frank Easterbrook and Lawrence Lessig. As a result of 
this exchange of arguments, it can be said that cyberspace requires a new 
way of thinking and that law needs to shift its emphasis. In fact, cyberlaw 
seems to have become increasingly all-encompassing as well as a meta-
field function. 
1.2. Cyberspace as Code-Dominated Area 
In the light of a perceived dissatisfaction with the regulatory models dis-
cussed in the early years of the Internet, Lawrence Lessig developed a 
more technically oriented approach, the so-called “code-based regula-
tion”, in 1999. Since technical elements play an important role in cyber-
space, a technology-oriented theoretical approach seems more appropri-
ate. According to Lessig, human behaviour is governed by a complex in-
terrelation between four forces, namely law, markets, social norms and 
architecture. Code solutions, similar to legal rules, principally reflect ‘in-
formation’ that allocates and enforces entitlements. The design of the 
code materially influences human behaviour since architecture is one of 
the four ‘regulators’; depending on the architecture, certain activities will 
be possible or difficult to carry out. Therefore, Lessig arrives at a world in 
which code can do much of the work that the law used to do, and far more 
effectively than the law did. Consequently, effective regulatory power 
shifts from law to code-based on an effective architectural framework. 
However, Lessig’s approach relating the code/architecture to the 
control paradigm has not remained uncontested: the aspect of established 
control structures has political impacts. Furthermore, courts should im-
pose checks on the powers of private regulators where the respective 
regulation threatens important collective values. Consequently, the 
code/architecture model is not suited to replace a legal framework in 
whatever shape it might be developed. 
2. General Foundations for Cyberlaw 
The described legal perceptions show how difficult it might be to foresee 
the future legal environment in cyberspace, which is much more difficult 
than forecasting developments in natural sciences, as for example many 
drawings of Leonardo da Vinci or the science fiction books of Jules Verne 
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show. Indeed William Gibson, who coined the term ‘cyberspace’, said in 
his novel Neuromancer (1984) that the future is always here, just uneven-
ly distributed. 
2.1. Legitimacy and Design of Legal Norms 
Legal norms do not only need formal legitimacy in the sense that the 
norms are ‘codified’ through an acceptable law-making process, but also 
material legitimacy in the sense that people accept the necessity and/or the 
desirability of a given legal framework. In general, individuals and organ-
isations tend to comply with rules and regulations and citizens are usually 
law-abiding. However, this kind of ‘acknowledgement’ might not be easi-
ly achievable in cyberspace. Therefore, lawmakers of whatever nature 
should keep in mind that legal norms will only be applied in reality if the 
addressees of the norms consider their imposition fair and adequate. In 
cyberspace, the concept of the ‘social contract’, leading to rules of behav-
iour through individual conviction and tacit consent, is difficult to realise. 
Furthermore, the rapid technological developments in cyberspace 
do have important political and social consequences: (i) science and new 
technology, if developed in a future-oriented way, can question political 
structures and powers by causing an unsettling effect, as the examples of 
Galileo Galilei and the Arab spring revolutions have shown, and (ii) tech-
nologies need to comply with social expectations, namely their availabil-
ity to the civil society, their social and commercial acceptability as well as 
their implementation in an appropriate way as seen from a cultural per-
spective. 
As far as the design of legal rules is concerned, their creation makes 
sense if the application is likely to be effective. In practice, this legislative 
element means that legal norms should not try to follow a highly compli-
cated path with many variables. A deep-rooted approach to law might be 
sophisticated, but not satisfactory in view of the need to have the legal 
rules accepted and applied in the (real) society. 
2.2. Information Policy Rules  
(i)  In cyberspace, information policy rules designed by technology can 
be developed as lex informatica. Such a concept of lex informatica 
is comparable to the lex mercatoria established by merchants over 
the last few centuries, encompassing a legal body independent of 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 154 
local sovereign rules ensuring commercial participants a basic fair-
ness in their relationships. Often, such a legal source is called soft 
law.  
(ii)  A first concept of lex informatica has been described by Joel R. 
Reidenberg, composed of a set of rules for information flows im-
posed by technology and communication networks which policy 
makers must understand. Reidenberg analyses three substantive top-
ics, namely content, personal information, and ownership rights; 
thereby, the lex informatica follows an open approach as the sys-
tems configurations allow two types of substantive rules, namely 
immutable policies embedded in technology standards and flexible 
policies embedded in the technical architecture.  
The strength of the lex informatica can be seen in the intro-
duction of flexible standards, based upon the technological envi-
ronment, enabling customisation of configurations. The flexibility 
and openness, however, is not without disadvantages: an adequate 
legal framework requires a minimum of predictability in order to 
establish reliable relations between persons; furthermore, the demo-
cratic legitimacy of ‘policy makers’ being in charge of setting the 
framework for technical solutions could be debatable.  
(iii)  In a similar way, Warren Chik analysed the disjuncture between the 
law and practices in cyberspace caused by the information technol-
ogies’ developments including the socio-economic problems and 
proposed the framework of ‘Internet-ional’ legal principles based 
on the history of merchants’ customs as a source of law. This ap-
proach underlines the suitability of customary international rules as 
a template for formulating cyberspace law-making rules by adapt-
ing customary rules to develop a set of determinants for cyberspace 
law.  
(iv)  Taking a social structure perspective Yochai Benkler has sketched a 
theory of social production in the information environment, which 
appears to be marked by collaborative forms of development being 
common-based (relying on a common goal of informational re-
sources) or peer-produced (based on decentralised creative inputs). 
Thereby, Benkler intends to take care of the effects that law can 
have through the way it structures the relationships among people 
with regard to the information environment they occupy. Insofar, 
structural foundations are laid down in his approach optimistically 
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designed as arising organically. According to Benkler the structure 
of the information environment is constitutive of the citizens’ au-
tonomy, not only functionally significant to it, leading to the as-
sumption of trust in the empowerment of the individuals, rather than 
in the political system giving the structural contours of the envi-
ronment.  
(v)  From the described concepts looking at information policy rules, 
the lesson that can be drawn consists in the assessment that the in-
formation intermediaries will play a crucial role in future cyberlaw. 
The intermediaries are the angle of the communication channels 
giving them a control function charged with the corresponding ac-
countability and responsibility obligation. Therefore, the legal rights 
and responsibilities of the information intermediaries are becoming 
an important issue for future cyberlaw. Furthermore, due to the 
global character of the Internet, the impact of conflicts of law prin-
ciples on the regulatory norms in cyberspace merits particular atten-
tion, at least to the extent that internationally accepted customary 
rules are not the prevailing states’ norms.  
3. Structural Elements for Future Cyberlaw 
The description of the different scenarios that could lead to a legal order 
in cyberspace has shown that new approaches are needed for the future. In 
fact, it appears to be uncontested that normativity exists beyond States. 
Therefore, in a future-oriented perspective soft law and informational law 
should have an increased importance. An evolutionary approach needs to 
encompass substantive and procedural elements; in light of the rapidly 
changing technologies, any approach solely relying on substantive ele-
ments risks to loose material grounds within short time intervals. There-
fore, procedural elements seem to be better suited to comply with the 
“needs” of an uncertain future. Three main issues in this respect are sub-
sequently discussed, namely the governance elements, the organisational 
elements and the dispute settlement elements (following Weber, 2012).  
3.1. Governance Elements  
Future cyberlaw is designed on the basis of specific new governance prin-
ciples; as typical assays of a more global governance, the following as-
pects are to be addressed: 
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 Governance should refer to an order, characterised in part by porous 
borders and power sharing amongst State, non-State actors, and ge-
ographic and/or functional entities.  
 Governance must encompass collective efforts enabling the con-
cerned persons to identify, understand and address worldwide prob-
lems going beyond the capacity of individual States to solve.  
Consequently, future cyberlaw problems require by their nature a 
broader and more collective decision-making than in the past; the differ-
ent interests and needs calls for the establishment of multi-level mecha-
nisms ensuring that the voices of all concerned participants are heard and 
appreciated.  
The absence of hierarchical structures and the fact that responses to 
new issues are complex should be acknowledged. Flat structures on dif-
ferent appropriate levels facilitate the decision-making by including the 
relevant persons and organisations at the actual point of their respective 
concern. In the context of Internet governance, the UN-formed Working 
Group on Internet Governance in 2005 identified a number of roles and 
responsibilities various stakeholders (governments, commercial world, 
civil society, academic and technical community) have; this definition still 
remains viable throughout the annual meetings of the Internet Governance 
Forum as well as in the context of the preparation of legal instruments by 
the Council of Europe.  
An adequate governance approach should realise a participatory 
mechanism that reflects the view of the whole society. Therefore, future 
governance must be seen as a broad array of changes in the distribution of 
authority, legitimacy, accountability, decision-making and participation 
by individuals and organisations in ordering human society, in response to 
similarly broad changes to material, social, technological, and economic 
conditions. Consequently, in increased interconnectedness and complexity 
of life must be taken into account, leading to the formation of legitimisa-
tion of these aggregated networks of sub- or cross-State communities as 
rule-producing and rule-enforcing actors. 
3.2. Organisational Elements  
Whatever the quality of law will be in the future, organisational elements 
need to be addressed: a stable order will only be realisable if the degree of 
‘organisation’ of the concerned persons is high, since in such a situation 
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the implementation (and enforcement) of harmonised standards is facili-
tated. As past experience has shown, the implementation of autonomous 
soft law and non-State standards – based on the principle that they are 
considered by the concerned persons as the benchmark for behaviour – 
can lead to a gradual process of institutionalisation.  
Therefore States, international organisations and inter-governmental 
bodies have increasingly recognised that soft law released by private per-
sons is usually modern and dynamic; it also allows the implementation of 
appropriate decision-making structures. Sufficient coverage with adequate 
reputational and retaliatory tools can generate an acceptable degree of 
compliance. Reputational constraints are usually derived from the fact that 
illegitimacy itself creates ‘costs’, that is, members in standard-setting bod-
ies must keep reputational discipline by refraining from overtly biased or 
self-serving decision-making.  
If reputation is seen as an important factor in social life, civil socie-
ty will act according to (aligned) incentives with the public interest; this is 
even more the case with market participants in business matters. In fact, 
neither regimes nor States have a fixed nature or self-evident objectives. 
This means that the degree to which rules are binding should not be con-
flated with whether they imply a formal legislative obligation; insofar, 
hard law and soft law are not dichotomous or qualitatively different forms 
of regulatory control. Lack in confidence in the organisational law and 
scepticism about the legal system is detrimental, and cannot be helpful in 
relation to the institution that provides a framework within which the civil 
society and commercial world should operate. Looking at the future of 
cyberlaw, it also seems to be unavoidable that new dimensions of global 
administrative law are to be explored, covering aspects of accountability, 
institutional differentiation and elaborated procedural techniques.  
3.3. Dispute Settlement Elements  
The establishment of an effective dispute settlement mechanism with the 
objective to complement and ‘enforce’ soft law is of major importance in 
order to attribute higher reputation to the respective new rules. Basic 
questions are: how should ‘norms’ be enforced? How can conflicts be re-
solved? As experience shows the possibility of invoking a dispute settle-
ment mechanism tends to lead to better voluntary compliance with the 
rules. The term dispute settlement mechanism should be understood in a 
broad way, encompassing not only juridical ‘proceedings’ in a traditional 
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form (such as state court procedures and arbitration), but also all thinkable 
forms of mediation. During the last two decades, different forms of alter-
native dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms have been developed (such 
as the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy of ICANN/WIPO); these mod-
els apply different forms of binding effects and range from negotiated so-
lutions to clear recommendations and finally to enforceable judgments. 
The suitability of the manifold approaches depends on the given circum-
stances.  
Dispute settlement mechanisms can equally be necessary to clarify 
which legal obligations are eventually incomplete or inadequate; insofar, 
the dispute settlement is able to establish the predicate for, and limit the 
scope of, retaliation. The availability of dispute settlement mechanisms 
also is a pre-condition for the introduction of (reputational or monetary) 
sanctions; examples could be the imposition of some sort of disciplinary 
and enforcement powers, attaching costs to the failure of complying with 
applicable rules. However, such a ‘sanctioning’ is only possible if ade-
quate mechanisms allow the business world and the civil society to get 
hold of the relevant information constituting the basis for achieving re-
dress.  
4. Outlook 
When designing future cyberlaw, legal scholars must take into account the 
function of law: what social impacts should be caused by law? The an-
swer is that it should be founded on the expectations of civil society. For 
people to live together it is necessary to have meta-institutional structures 
that allow wide-spread participation by way of a multi-stakeholder model. 
Furthermore, governance elements are to be implemented, which encom-
pass collective efforts enabling proper identification and understanding of 
worldwide problems needed for global solutions. In addition, organisa-
tional elements can provide for adequate procedural frameworks and dis-
pute settlement mechanisms that are in a position to strengthen the ac-
countability of all involved members of States’ powers, commercial busi-
nesses and civil society. 
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14Defining A Neurocompatibility Index for  
Criminal Justice Systems: A Framework to  
Align Social Policy with Modern Brain Science 
David M. Eagleman* and Sarah Isgur Flores** 
Criminal jurisprudence is often driven more by intuition and politi-
cal needs than by evidence-based science. As a result, criminal laws 
frequently prove sub-optimal and inefficacious. As a guideline for 
improvement, we here define a neurocompatibility index: seven cri-
teria to measure the degree to which a system of criminal justice is 
compatible with the lessons of modern science. These include: (1) 
understanding of mental illness, (2) methods of rehabilitation, (3) 
individualised sentencing based on risk assessment, (4) eyewitness 
identification standards, (5) specialised court systems, (6) incentive 
structuring based on psychology, and (7) a minimum standard of 
science education for policy-makers. As demonstrated in the ideas 
outlined here, a brain-compatible system prizes fairness and long-
term crime prevention over harsh yet inconsequential punishment. 
1. Introduction 
While systems of criminal law have traditionally rested on intuitions 
about blameworthiness and punishment, the resulting policies sometimes 
result in low efficacy and high cost. Jails have become a prime recruit-
ment point for gangs, and long prison sentences often leave the newly re-
leased with little ability to re-enter as productive members of society. 
These factors, along with many others associated with current norms in 
criminal justice, lead to high recidivism rates and increasingly high social 
and monetary costs to the communities in which they operate. 
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To improve this situation, criminal justice systems could draw great 
benefit from a deeper engagement with the lessons of modern science. In 
a biologically-informed, evidence-based system of law, criminals would 
continue to be taken off the streets – but with customised sentencing, new 
opportunities for rehabilitation, and more realistic incentives for pro-
social behaviour. Alignment with the lessons of brain science suggests a 
new way forward for law and order – one that will lead to a more cost-
effective, humane, and flexible system, benefiting both the convicted and 
the communities into which they are eventually released.  
A basic starting point – one that is obvious in biology but not usual-
ly broached in legal or political circles – is the fact that individual brains 
are quite different. Along any axis we measure such as aggression, empa-
thy, impulse-control, capacity to simulate possible futures, and risk aver-
sion, we find that brains are distributed along a spectrum. While it is char-
itable to imagine that all adults possess the same capacity to make sound 
choices, it is a demonstrably incorrect assumption. In truth, brains are as 
individualised as fingerprints. We are each constructed from a genetic 
blueprint, and then born into a world of circumstances that we cannot con-
trol in our most formative years. The complex intertwining of genes and 
environment means that all citizens – equal before the law – possess dif-
ferent perspectives, varied personalities, and dissimilar styles of decision-
making.  
By allowing criminal laws to account for the deeply embedded neu-
ral programmes that steer our perceptions and behaviours, we can imagine 
a transition from blameworthiness to biology. This is because the assign-
ment of blameworthiness demands the impossible task of untangling the 
hopelessly complex web of genetics and environment that constructs the 
trajectory of a human life. In place of this, we suggest that the assignment 
of blameworthiness is sometimes less important and should be subsumed 
by the larger assessment of what to do, moving forward. How likely are 
criminal actions to be repeated? Can this person be helped towards pro-
social behaviour? How can incentives be realistically structured to deter 
crime? 
There is no reason why social policy should not be designed as rig-
orously as any science experiment, leveraging a dispassionate view of the 
available data to optimise the utility of our money and efforts. The price 
of ignoring the science is over- and under-inclusive prison systems at high 
social costs to the larger communities they are designed to serve. Not all 
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crime can be prevented, but when it happens, the perpetrators can be 
treated in a way that maximises their chance for re-integration into society 
instead of a process of enduring exclusion.  
Before diving into the main argument, it is crucial to clarify one 
point: an improved biological understanding of human behaviour will not 
exculpate anyone; we will still remove from the streets lawbreakers who 
prove unable to conform their behaviours to the societal norms. In other 
words, an evidence-based system will not lead to excuses for anti-social 
behaviour or remove all the retributive elements that underlie criminal 
justice systems. It will instead place ideas of punishment and retribution 
in their larger biological context, improving the customisation with which 
we can respond to the vast range of criminal acts.  
 In the following section we will outline a neurocompatibility index. 
This measure comprises seven criteria to quantify how well a system of 
criminal law is compatible with the lessons of modern science. Measured 
against this neurocompatibility index, most countries in the world today 
fall short of a satisfactory score. Our future work will seek to rank all na-
tions on this index. 
2. A Neurocompatibility Index for Systems of Criminal Law around 
the World 
2.1. Understanding Mental Illness 
A criminal justice system informed by neuroscience will allow us to move 
beyond treating prison as a one-size-fits-all solution. To be clear, the au-
thors of this paper are not opposed to incarceration. For many people, it 
provides both warehousing and future deterrence, to themselves and oth-
ers. In some sense, prison is the original rewire-the-brain rehabilitation 
strategy.  
But behavioural adjustment based on this sort of punishment works 
only for individuals whose brains are functioning in such a way as to ap-
preciate the nature of the punishment as an effect of their actions. For 
those with various kinds of mental illnesses, exacting punishment has no 
utility because there is no way to tie it to their actions. Their brains are in-
capable of modifying accordingly. 
Unfortunately, in many countries prisons have become de facto 
mental health care facilities. In America, for example, current estimates 
place the percentage of mentally ill at 35 per cent. This staggering number 
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leads to an enormous strain on a prison system that has little to no hope of 
serving any kind of deterrence role in their future behaviour. 
Despite recognition of mental illnesses going back to the Romans 
and Greeks, all modern societies have struggled with how best to deal 
with those guilty of a criminal act but unable to appreciate the conse-
quences of their actions or conform those actions to societal norms. Many 
western countries still use an insanity defence that dates back to the mid-
19th century. At the same time, studies have shown that of the less than 
one per cent of defendants who plead insanity in the United States, fewer 
than one in four are successful, and of those that are, 90 per cent have 
been previously diagnosed with a mental illness.  
 In large part, the United States’ struggle to define mental illness in 
the 20th century highlights the difficulty inherent in this question, but also 
the need for such standards. And it exemplifies the need for all societies to 
understand mental illness, its causes, and what can be done to treat it or 
control its effects to be able to promulgate effective rules and standards in 
criminal proceedings. This translates into a need for the de-stigmatisation 
of mental illness and, resultingly, a meaningful insanity defence in every 
jurisdiction in the world.  
A better understanding of mental illness comes with improved re-
habilitative strategies for dealing with it, which leads to our next prong. 
2.2. Methods of Rehabilitation 
Worldwide, the most common method of dealing with law breakers ap-
pears to be incarceration. Beyond its physical costs, however, incarcera-
tion also comes with social consequences. First, it breaks an individual’s 
social circles and employment opportunities. Especially for young people, 
the collateral consequences of jail time include an inability to earn a col-
lege grant, or, more generally, to optimise a career trajectory. Second, it 
introduces the incarcerated to prison social norms and social circles that 
are at odds with the interests of their community and often lead to drug 
use and gang membership both during a prison term and after.  
A neurocompatible criminal justice system translates biological un-
derstanding into customised rehabilitation, viewing some aspects of crim-
inal behaviour the way we understand conditions such as epilepsy, schiz-
ophrenia, and depression.  
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Although rehabilitation was previously seen as too expensive and 
politically unpalatable, many people now recognise the long-term cost ef-
fectiveness of rehabilitating offenders instead of packing them into over-
crowded prisons. In California, for example, the prison system was re-
quired to release 30,000 inmates due to overcrowding, many of whom 
were incarcerated for non-violent drug offences. Without drug treatment, 
the chances of recidivism for these inmates are high and will create a neg-
ative feedback loop both for the prisoners and the taxpayers. But the chal-
lenge in this area has been the dearth of new ideas about how to rehabili-
tate.  
A better understanding of the brain offers new ideas. For example, 
consider the fact that poor impulse control is a hallmark characteristic of 
the majority of those locked in the prison system. Whether as a result of 
anger or temptation, their actions override reasoned consideration of the 
future. 
If it seems difficult to empathise with people who have poor im-
pulse control, just think of all the things we all succumb to against our 
better judgement. Another martini? Late night pints of ice cream? Reality 
TV? It is not that individuals do not know what is best for them; it is 
simply that the frontal lobe circuits representing long-term considerations 
do not always win elections against short-term desire when temptation is 
present.  
This line of reasoning suggests new strategies for rehabilitation to 
allow an individual to have better control of his behaviour, even in the ab-
sence of external authority. With Steven LaConte at Virginia Tech, we are 
developing a new approach, one that springs from the understanding that 
the brain operates like a team of rivals: a competition among different 
neural populations to control the single output channel of behaviour. Be-
cause it is a competition, the outcome can be tipped. 
The basic approach is to give the frontal lobes practice in squelch-
ing the short-term circuits. To this end, we have begun leveraging real-
time feedback to participants during brain imaging. This technique allows 
them to see when their brain is craving, and to learn how to control (in 
this case, to lower) that neural activity by strengthening other, long-term 
decision-making mechanisms. The approach leaves the brain intact – no 
drugs or surgery – and uses the natural mechanisms of brain plasticity to 
help the brain help itself. After training for better impulse control, a per-
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son may still crave cigarettes (or cocaine or someone else’s wallet), but he 
will know how to win over the craving instead of letting it win over him.  
This science of this ‘frontal lobe workout’ is at its very earliest 
stages, but we have hope that the approach represents the correct model: it 
is simultaneously well grounded in biology and libertarian ethics, allow-
ing a person to help himself to better long-term decision-making.  
At its most basic level, effective treatment options would help those 
who want to help themselves. Whether for those already in prison or for 
preventative treatment with individuals who are aware that they are at risk 
of anti-social behaviours, effective treatment methods offer people an op-
portunity to stay out of the system – a sort of voluntary preventative med-
icine that would reduce the burden placed on prisons and improve eco-
nomic development in neighbourhoods devastated by drugs and drug-
related crimes. 
2.3. Individualised Sentencing Based on Risk Assessment 
A neurocompatible criminal justice system provides for individual risk as-
sessment. While no system should treat similarly situated individuals dif-
ferently, neither should a fair system fail to account for the differences. 
The common law in Western countries is already forward-looking 
in some respects. For example, it has long been the case that crimes of 
passion (for example, reacting violently when catching a spouse’s lover) 
are subject to lower penalties than a premeditated murder. Those who 
commit the former are less likely to recidivate than those who commit the 
latter, and their sentences sensibly reflect that. Likewise, most systems of 
law draw a bright line between criminal acts committed by minors and 
those by adults, punishing the latter more harshly. This approach has low 
resolution, but the intuition behind it is sound: adolescents command dif-
ferent skills in decision-making and impulse control than do adults. It is 
appropriate to give lighter sentences to those whose impulse control is 
likely to improve naturally as adolescence gives way to adulthood.  
Taking a more scientific approach to sentencing, case by case, 
could move us beyond these limited examples. Consider the important 
changes that are happening in the sentencing of sex offenders. Several 
years ago, American researchers began to ask psychiatrists and parole 
board members how likely it was that individual sex offenders would re-
lapse when let out of prison. Both the psychiatrists and the parole board 
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members had experience with the offenders in question, as well as with 
hundreds before them – so predicting who would go straight and who 
would come back was not difficult. 
Or was it? The surprise outcome was that their guesses showed al-
most no correlation with the actual outcomes. The psychiatrists and parole 
board members had the same predictive accuracy as coin-flipping. This 
result astounded the research community, especially given the expectation 
of well-refined intuitions among those who work directly with offenders. 
So researchers next tried a more actuarial approach. They set about 
measuring dozens of factors from 22,500 sex offenders who were about to 
be released. At the end of the study, they computed which factors best ex-
plained the reoffence rates, and from those data they were able to build 
actuarial tables to be used in sentencing.  
As it turned out, when one compared the predictive power of the ac-
tuarial approach to that of the parole boards and psychiatrists, there was 
no contest: numbers won over intuitions to an astounding degree. In many 
courtrooms, these actuarial tests are now used in pre-sentencing to modu-
late the length of prison terms based on the risk offenders pose once re-
leased. 
It will always be impossible to know with certainty what someone 
will do upon release from prison – a person’s brain and experiences will 
never be fully quantifiable. But more predictive power is hidden in the 
numbers than people customarily expect. Statistically-based sentencing 
will be imperfect, but it nonetheless allows evidence to win over folk-
intuition, and it offers customisation in place of blunt guidelines.  
2.4. Eyewitness Identification Standards 
A neurocompatible criminal justice system follows the foundational prin-
ciple that the protection of the innocent trumps the prosecution of the 
guilty. No one is served when innocent defendants are convicted – not on-
ly is a productive member of society removed, but the guilty member is 
enabled to reoffend. 
Television and popular culture tell us that DNA and fingerprints are 
used in nearly every case to ensure the conviction of the guilty. But in 
many cases eyewitness testimony is used as the main evidence against the 
defendant. This type of evidence is often persuasive because jurors, just 
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like the witness, believe that their memories are like movies or photo-
graphs that can be recalled as objective truth. 
In reality, memory can be highly unreliable, and eyewitness testi-
mony is often plagued with errors. A victim is likely to be focused on the 
weapon being used against them and heavily affected by stress. The Inno-
cence Project, an American organisation which uses DNA evidence to 
overturn wrongful convictions, reports that 73 per cent of their wrongful 
convictions were the result of mistaken eyewitness testimony and, of 
those, a third rested on the testimony of more than one mistaken eyewit-
ness. 
More needs to be done to curb the failures inherent in this type of 
evidence. While eyewitness testimony can never be eliminated from crim-
inal proceedings, three decades of cognitive science literature suggest 
safeguards that can be put in place to ensure that these identifications are 
unbiased and put in their proper context during investigations and trials. 
Several studies have confirmed a number of reforms that would 
drastically improve the reliability of eyewitness line-ups. For example, the 
police may give unconscious cues to a witness when reviewing a line-up. 
It has been shown that when the police officer administering the line-up is 
also not aware of who the suspect is, the rate of incorrect identification 
drops significantly.  
New technologies will also continue to offer opportunities for im-
provement – for example, using iPads to display suspects’ photos at the 
scene of a crime, before memory has moved too far along the forgetting 
curve. 
2.5. Specialised Court Systems 
Because some crimes are the result of inherently different impulses from 
others, a neurocompatible criminal justice system utilises specialised 
court systems that embed expertise with issues ranging from mental ill-
ness, drug addiction, and juvenile decision-making. By separating the 
courts in which these crimes are tried, the judges and lawyers involved are 
better able to address the specific needs of their communities and those on 
trial. 
In many countries, family courts are already separated from other 
civil proceedings because of the level of expertise and uniqueness in-
volved with divorce and child custody issues. The same is often true for 
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purely statutory violations such as speeding or expired registration stick-
ers. And yet, most criminal courts may only distinguish between felony 
and misdemeanour cases, meaning that the same judge tries murder and 
copyright violations. Relatedly, while some district attorneys’ offices as-
sign prosecutors to a specific division of crime, many do not – and the 
same prosecutor who tried a 17-year old gang member the week before 
may try a 50-year old paedophile the next.  
By being forced to become repeat players in specific areas, judges 
and lawyers are more likely to understand that the intersection of an indi-
vidual’s motivations and capacities allows more refined treatment options, 
presumably with better societal and financial outcomes. After all, the 
same crime can be committed by very different brains for very different 
reasons.  
Collectively, specialised court systems provide people with an op-
portunity to receive more informed sentencing, counselling, and rehabili-
tation, thereby enhancing their chances of staying out of the prison sys-
tem. 
2.6. Incentive Structuring 
A neurocompatible criminal justice system is interested in tailoring incen-
tives to have the greatest positive impact on behaviour. With a better bio-
logical understanding of how people actually behave (as opposed to gen-
eral models of how they are hypothesised to behave, or should behave), 
there are several opportunities to optimise approaches in social policy.  
To give one example, it has become clear that brains are more like a 
parliament of competing interests than a unitary executive version of the 
self. Just as in any parliament, some parties are prone to short-term deci-
sion-making while others are invested in the long term. These parties bat-
tle it out before reaching a decision, and we often find that the short-term 
party wins out more often in people that commit crimes. 
As a result, people often appreciate the negative long-term conse-
quences of their decision-making (prison), but find the impulses (wanting 
someone else’s money) winning out nonetheless. In this light, one way to 
leverage this understanding is to build the incentive structure of a given 
penal system to help the long-term party win the day.  
One approach, advocated by the policy scholar Mark Kleiman, is to 
ramp up the certainty and swiftness of punishment. For example, a drug 
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offender may be required to submit to three-times-a-week drug testing 
and, if the test is failed, the offender is automatically sanctioned rather 
than simply facing the possibility of a future court date that would eventu-
ally lead to an uncertain sanction down the road. A similar program, Ha-
waii's Opportunity Probation with Enforcement, has led to a drop in re-
arrest rates from 47 per cent to 21 per cent. By this same logic, econo-
mists have suggested that the drop in crime since the 1980s has been due, 
in part, to the increased presence of police on the streets: their mere pres-
ence shores up support for the parts of the brain that consider long-term 
consequences.  
There are innumerable ways to tailor incentives to match our cur-
rent understanding of the biological processes in the brain. A neurocom-
patible criminal justice system would find ways to decrease crime and re-
cidivism by creating probation and parole systems that work with, rather 
than against, the decision methods offenders employ. 
2.7. A Minimum Standard of Science Education for Policy-Makers 
Nearly every state in America requires lawyers to spend some number of 
hours (usually around 15 a year) educating themselves on developments 
within the legal system. A neurocompatible criminal justice system would 
have a similar requirement for science education for judges, lawyers, law-
makers, and parole officers who practise in this field.  
Those involved in the day-to-day workings of our criminal justice 
systems should neither ignore nor exaggerate the relevant science. Just as 
the public once had to be educated on DNA evidence, parole boards 
should be equally aware of the social science relating to recidivism. At the 
same time, it is equally important for these repeat players to be told what 
science is not capable of telling us – for example, the idea that genetics 
would ever be able to tell us anything detailed about individual behaviour. 
Changing the opinions and knowledge base of those involved in 
writing and executing our criminal laws is crucial to the full integration of 
successful treatment and sentencing options into the courts. 
3. Conclusion 
We have outlined a series of recommendations by which a criminal justice 
system could become more neurocompatible – that is, aligned with cur-
rent knowledge about human brain science and psychology.  
Defining A Neurocompatibility Index for Criminal Justice Systems:  
A Framework to Align Social Policy with Modern Brain Science 
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Fundamentally, many issues relating to criminal justice systems 
around the world fall within the domain – or at least the penumbra – of a 
more refined understanding of human behaviour. A forward-thinking le-
gal system informed by scientific insights into the brain will enable us to 
move beyond treating prison as a one-size-fits-all solution. From tailored 
sentencing to customised rehabilitation, these recommendations will al-
low a community to remove and isolate criminal behaviour while increas-
ing the likelihood that those released from prison will return as productive 
and pro-social assets to the communities they are re-entering. 
It should also be clear that today no country would score perfectly 
on the neurocompatibility index. Every criminal system has some distance 
to go before any can be said to be fully in line with modern knowledge 
about human behaviour and crime. The index here, however, can be 
viewed as ‘best practice’ standards based on a modern view of neurolaw. 
In other words, this neurocompatibility index sets up a series of guidelines 
by which governments and policy-makers can consider the inclusion of 
modern science into their criminal justice systems.  
Finally, the issues outlined here mean that the lawyers and judges of 
the future will be handed a very different set of tools before entering their 
field. In addition to their current studies of legal history and concepts, the-
se future practitioners will also possess a bedrock understanding of sci-
ence, mental illness, eyewitness identification, opportunities for rehabili-
tation, and realistic ideas of how our brains process both the good and bad 
decisions each of us is faced with on a daily basis. 
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15Geoengineering’s Thermostat Dilemma 
Albert Lin* 
Geoengineering is gaining attention as a possible tool for ameliorat-
ing climate change. These largely untested techniques are some-
times analogised to a thermostat that will enable humans to fine-
tune the Earth’s climate. Although overly simplistic, this metaphor 
highlights a fundamental dilemma that the capacity to geoengineer 
would raise: whose hand should control the thermostat? Unpacking 
this question exposes multiple issues warranting careful research 
and debate: (1) which nations should decide; (2) what role scientists 
and other expert communities should have in the decision making 
process; (3) what role non-State actors should have in the process; 
(4) how to account for the interests and preferences of future gener-
ations; and (5) what mechanisms should be in place to ensure com-
pliance with decisions agreed upon. From the standpoint of organis-
ing collective action, geoengineering is relatively unproblematic 
because a single nation may have the resources and technical capac-
ity to undertake geoengineering on its own. However, as the ther-
mostat metaphor reveals, geoengineering will present extremely 
difficult challenges of law, policy making, and ethics for the inter-
national community. 
1. Introduction 
Geoengineering refers to a variety of unconventional and often controver-
sial proposals for responding to climate change. These methods include: 
spraying tiny sulphur particles into the atmosphere to block the sun’s ra-
diation, fertilising the ocean to stimulate phytoplankton growth that might 
store carbon in the oceans, and the like. Geoengineering technologies are 
far from mature, as no geoengineering techniques are ready to be de-
ployed, and thus no full-scale geoengineering projects have been under-
taken. Moreover, even if some geoengineering techniques are perfected 
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one day, they are unlikely to constitute a complete and permanent solution 
to climate change. Nonetheless, geoengineering proposals raise the pro-
spect of choosing a climate for the planet. Accordingly, geoengineering is 
sometimes likened to a thermostat for the Earth, a metaphor that high-
lights a critical question: who should control the thermostat? 
To be sure, the thermostat metaphor is overly simplistic. Similar to 
the term “global warming”, the metaphor focuses too narrowly on average 
temperature rise. Climate change poses a grave threat not only because of 
hotter temperatures, but also because of rising oceans, more powerful 
storms, more frequent droughts, and other expected climate effects. The 
thermostat metaphor potentially trivialises climate change in suggesting 
that the problem is merely a matter of comfort. Furthermore, the analogy 
both overstates the degree of control that humans have over the Earth’s 
complex climate systems and understates the technical difficulties of im-
plementation. Geoengineering proposals involve various risks and uncer-
tainties that we are only beginning to explore. These risks and uncertain-
ties are magnified by the incomplete climate models on which we rely. In 
addition, adverse effects of geoengineering are likely to vary from one re-
gion to another, suggesting that no climate setting will be without objec-
tion. Finally, the thermostat analogy gives short shrift to the effects of 
climate change on other living things. The comparison encourages a utili-
tarian, anthropocentric mindset that obscures ethical consideration of oth-
er species and the environment. Ultimately, the thermostat metaphor rep-
resents a potentially dangerous framing of climate issues that could foster 
complacency and undermine more realistic and important responses to 
climate change. 
Notwithstanding its serious shortcomings, the thermostat metaphor 
does capture a dilemma that looms over the geoengineering debate: who 
should decide whether and how geoengineering is implemented? In the 
discussion to follow, I assume that technically feasible methods of geoen-
gineering could eventually be developed. Even under this assumption, ge-
oengineering will raise numerous difficult issues for the international 
community. This essay uses the thermostat metaphor to explore some of 
the more prominent policy and legal questions at stake. 
2. Collective Decision-Making 
To what extent would a geoengineering thermostat pose a unique chal-
lenge for international decision making? On the one hand, ordinary inter-
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national law-making procedures, though imperfect, may be sufficient to 
address geoengineering. State representatives could consider geoengineer-
ing governance through the United Nations or other multi-State organisa-
tions and address relevant concerns through treaties and other formal 
mechanisms. On the other hand, if geoengineering departs from other 
global concerns in significant ways, we may need new or modified deci-
sion making mechanisms that take those differences into account. 
At least three aspects of the thermostat problem call for broader par-
ticipation and input than is typical for international decision making pro-
cesses. First, geoengineering decisions will have exceptionally far-
reaching and concrete impacts. Geoengineering deployment could have 
potentially disastrous effects for millions, such as modification of the 
Asian and African summer monsoons. Governance of geoengineering 
thus must address a truly global concern, in contrast to relatively local 
fishery conflicts or transboundary pollution problems. Second, geoengi-
neering would serve as a single thermostat for the entire world; for the 
most part, there is little realistic prospect for multi-zone climate control. 
This thermostat mechanism would allow little or no room for national var-
iations on a global norm, in contrast with many other subjects of interna-
tional regulation. Legitimate concerns thus would have to be considered 
in international fora if they are going to be considered at all. Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, a decision to implement geoengineering would 
require the resolution of contentious disputes rooted in deeply held values. 
People’s views on geoengineering will depend on their underlying values 
and beliefs concerning justice, nature and tolerance for risk, and these 
values and beliefs will play an especially significant role amidst the sub-
stantial uncertainty surrounding geoengineering.  
Granted, many problems addressed by international environmental 
law, such as climate change or ozone depletion, have involved disagree-
ment over whether a problem exists and how to address it. However, once 
a problem is acknowledged, there is usually relatively little disagreement 
regarding the appropriate goal. With respect to climate change, for exam-
ple, the international community agreed on a goal of stabilising green-
house gas concentrations so as to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference” with the climate system. Similarly, recognition of the problem of 
ozone depletion led swiftly to a consensus to protect and restore the ozone 
layer. Geoengineering, however, presents a particularly thorny political 
problem because no obvious point of equilibrium is likely to command 
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consensus support. Simply put, reasonable persons are likely to disagree 
on where the thermostat should be set. These circumstances suggest an 
especially strong need for open and deliberative decision making process-
es.  
3. Issues to Resolve 
The question of whose hand should control the thermostat actually in-
volves multiple inquiries regarding: (1) which nations should decide; (2) 
what role scientists and other expert communities should have in the deci-
sion making process; (3) what role non-State actors should have in the 
process; (4) how to account for the interests and preferences of future 
generations; and (5) what mechanisms should be in place to ensure com-
pliance with decisions agreed upon. This section considers each of these 
inquiries. 
3.1. Which Nations Should Decide? 
At first glance, it may appear self-evident that all nations desiring to be 
involved in setting the thermostat should have the opportunity to partici-
pate. Virtually every nation is a party to the U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (FCCC), which treats climate change as a matter of 
concern for the entire international community. A process inclusive of all 
interested nation-States is consistent with basic notions of fairness, and 
with the traditional international law narrative of equality and consent 
among sovereign States. Decisions resulting from such a process are 
therefore more likely to be viewed as legitimate than decisions made by a 
select few.  
Processes that require formal international consensus as a prerequi-
site to action, however, can be slow and ineffective. Indeed, the complexi-
ty of negotiating comprehensive greenhouse gas emission reductions 
among the nearly 200 parties to the FCCC has led many to advocate that 
climate change negotiation processes be limited instead to a smaller sub-
set of countries. Negotiations among the several nations responsible for 
the vast majority of carbon emissions, it is argued, can substantially re-
duce overall emissions without requiring commitments from non-parties 
to the negotiations. Geoengineering negotiations limited to a few States 
would offer similar advantages of relative simplicity and reduced vulner-
ability to obstruction by holdouts. Excluded parties would surely object, 
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however, that it is presumptuous for a handful of countries to commit the 
entire world to a particular thermostat setting. 
A bargaining structure akin to the World Trade Organisation’s 
“green room” offers a hybrid approach that might facilitate consensus 
formation without excluding interested States. Under such an approach, a 
small group of countries participates in initial bargaining on a tentative 
agreement. Such agreement would still be subject to consensus approval 
by a larger membership. Undoubtedly, participants in the small-group ne-
gotiations could wield substantial influence on ultimate outcomes, and 
there would often be pressures in the large-group approval process to go 
along with tentative agreements. Careful attention to the selection of 
small-group participants is critical to reduce the danger of inadequate rep-
resentation. Representation in geoengineering negotiations, for example, 
might include guaranteed seats for different geographic regions, on the as-
sumption that geoengineering impacts will likely vary by region. Repre-
sentatives of regions most vulnerable to the adverse impacts of geoengi-
neering might even be given veto authority over decisions to implement 
certain types of geoengineering projects.  
The fact that some geoengineering schemes could be carried out 
unilaterally complicates the question of which nations should decide. Uni-
lateral geoengineering, even if undertaken with good intentions, surely 
would be denounced if it occurred without the sanction of the internation-
al community. Nonetheless, the possibility that a single nation could at-
tempt to seize control of the thermostat or that several countries could en-
gage in counterproductive geoengineering efforts is sufficiently serious to 
warrant concern about international conflicts that could result. A few 
countries, including the United Kingdom and Russia, have already ex-
pressed an inclination to move forward with geoengineering field tests in 
the absence of international approval. While such field tests are not equiv-
alent to full-scale deployment, they still underscore the need for formal in-
ternational attention to geoengineering. More generally, the possibility of 
unilateral action, collateral damage, and subsequent hostilities suggests 
that institutions relevant to international armed conflict, such as the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council, may ultimately have an important role to 
play in geoengineering policy making. 
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3.2. The Role of Scientists  
A second issue raised by the thermostat metaphor focuses on the thermo-
stat makers: what role should scientists play? Under a conventional under-
standing of scientists’ role in policy making processes, while scientists are 
the ones generating data and recommendations, it is the democratically 
accountable officials who ultimately make policy choices. With respect to 
research activities themselves, the scientific community typically exercis-
es broad freedom of inquiry and enjoys minimal external oversight. 
Knowledge is intrinsically valuable, so the argument goes, and external 
influences that might circumscribe or corrupt its pursuit should be avoid-
ed. Following the distinct roles of scientists and policy makers, few would 
advocate that scientists direct science-based policy decisions. In particu-
lar, determining where a geoengineering thermostat should be set is a val-
ue-based choice that lies beyond scientists’ expertise and demands broad-
er societal deliberation. 
A strict dichotomy between research and policy, however, repre-
sents a gross oversimplification of reality. Research activities are not 
purely objective, as assumptions and models that underlie scientific re-
search necessarily incorporate researchers’ value judgments. Conversely, 
policy decisions often reflect significant influence by experts, whether re-
sulting from their recommendations or their direct participation in deci-
sion making processes. 
Science and policy issues are especially intertwined with respect to 
geoengineering. Firstly, as with other emerging technologies, early choic-
es regarding research and development are likely to have outsized effects 
on subsequent technology adoption and use. Substantial investment in re-
search can create and empower interests having a professional, financial, 
and psychological stake in promoting applications of that research. Sec-
ondly, the goal-oriented nature of geoengineering research means that ef-
forts in the field will inevitably reflect policy preferences. Geoengineering 
does not involve a neutral inquiry into scientific “truth”. Rather, geoengi-
neering is more applied science than pure science in that it encompasses 
efforts to discover particular means of achieving a selected end. As such, 
research into geoengineering presumes at least some willingness to go 
forward with implementation in the future so long as certain conditions 
(of safety, risk-benefit analysis, or otherwise) are met. Yet geoengineering 
raises serious ethical questions of moral responsibility that demand care-
ful reflection by society before committing to action. For example, is it 
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morally permissible to cause further harm for the sake of ameliorating 
threats generated by our own past, present, and future conduct?  
Ultimately, governance of geoengineering research cannot be di-
vorced from governance of geoengineering deployment. Because geoen-
gineering research may close off debate on the socially contested question 
of whether a geoengineering thermostat should be created in the first in-
stance, the scientific community should not exercise free rein over the 
pursuit of geoengineering research. The need to involve non-scientists – 
political actors, nongovernmental organisations, and the general public – 
in the oversight of geoengineering research is critical and is gaining grow-
ing recognition. However, the form of that oversight and the nature of 
non-scientist involvement are yet to be determined. 
Under one proposed option, scientists would take the lead in devel-
oping codes of conduct or other informal mechanisms of research govern-
ance. Bottom-up, non-governmental processes can be more immediate 
and flexible than those requiring State action. In theory, such processes 
can involve non-scientists, and they can lay the groundwork for more 
formal regulation. One danger in a bottom-up approach, however, is that 
the scientists whose research would be subject to any resulting norms may 
dominate the process. As a result, the option of not moving forward with 
research – an option that warrants examination because of the dangers of 
moral hazard and technological lock-in – is unlikely to receive serious 
consideration. Moreover, without the sanction of the international com-
munity, a bottom-up process and any norms generated by it will be lack-
ing in political legitimacy. 
3.3. The Role of Non-State Actors 
The Westphalian conception of international law envisions little or no role 
for non-State actors in the creation of international law. That conception 
does not accurately describe international law today, however, nor does it 
set out an ideal for geoengineering governance. A system operating solely 
through the consent of sovereigns is unlikely to be fully representative. 
Sovereigns imperfectly reflect the interests of the people they rule, some-
times overlooking indigenous or minority concerns, and the political pro-
cesses that lead to the formation of State positions may be exclusionary 
and opaque. Broader participation can increase the legitimacy of interna-
tional governance and foster more informed deliberation. 
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In the abstract, the goal of creating more inclusive processes for 
global decision making commands widespread support. How to achieve 
this goal in practice, however, poses difficult questions. Sovereign States 
are reluctant to yield power, reasonable persons disagree as to who should 
be involved and in what capacity, and options for resolving fundamental 
conflicts in values are limited. Universal direct participation in setting any 
geoengineering thermostat, for instance, is hardly sensible or realistic. 
Even decision making along the lines of a representative democracy may 
be impossible, given the lack of political structures for democratically 
controlling international institutions. Indeed, the very concept of demo-
cratic representation on a global scale is problematic in the absence of a 
global public that shares a collective identity.  
Notwithstanding the barriers to more inclusive governance, non-
governmental organisations, community organisations, labour unions, and 
other civil society organisations have come to play an increasingly im-
portant role in international law. Such organisations are not democratical-
ly chosen and have no formal law-making authority. Yet they participate 
by framing issues, setting agendas, developing policy options, shaping 
State positions, and monitoring State commitments. Civil society organi-
sations also function as pluralistic intermediaries between international 
legal regimes and the publics the regimes ultimately govern. These organ-
isations can articulate citizens’ concerns and channel them into interna-
tional deliberative processes, while communicating to citizens the issues 
and decisions that are subject to those processes. 
Civil society organisations could play an important role in raising 
public awareness of geoengineering and of the risks and uncertainties at 
issue. Their most critical task, however, may be to amplify the voices of 
those whom geoengineering would adversely affect. Whether working 
through formal law-making forums, less formal norm-setting arenas, or 
various media of general opinion formation, these organisations can re-
mind the world that setting the thermostat should not involve the exercise 
of power by the few to advance narrow or purely domestic interests. Nor 
should setting the thermostat consist merely of a calculation that maxim-
ises benefits and minimises costs. Geoengineering – like climate change – 
will have victims, human and nonhuman. By giving these victims a name, 
face, and voice, civil society organisations can push the world toward 
making responsible decisions regarding any development or use of a ge-
oengineering thermostat.  
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3.4. The Role of Future Generations 
Incorporating the interests of future generations in thermostat-setting de-
cisions presents an imposing challenge in light of political and economic 
pressures to respond to short-term concerns. To be sure, climate change is 
not unique among environmental problems in its enduring impacts. Ge-
oengineering using solar radiation management (SRM) techniques has es-
pecially lasting implications, however, because of the so-called “termina-
tion problem” associated with these techniques. SRM techniques would 
ameliorate the warming effect of higher greenhouse gas (GHG) concen-
trations by reducing the amount of radiation striking the Earth. Because 
GHG concentrations are unchanged, the sudden cessation of these tech-
niques would have catastrophic effects. Extremely rapid climate change 
would follow, leaving human societies and natural ecosystems little time 
to adapt. To avoid a catastrophe, SRM efforts, once deployed, would have 
to continue until GHG concentrations naturally decline. This process 
could take hundreds of years even if human societies drastically curb their 
GHG emissions. Deployment of SRM techniques, in other words, would 
commit future generations to continuing deployment for the foreseeable 
future, a politically and logistically daunting task.  
Like the long-term storage of nuclear waste, the termination prob-
lem raises serious questions of intergenerational equity. Namely, what du-
ties do we owe to future generations, and to what extent may we constrain 
their freedom of action? If intergenerational equity requires that each gen-
eration pass on the planet in no worse condition than received or that fu-
ture generations have equivalent options for flourishing, it is not clear 
whether SRM would meet those requirements. Future generations would 
retain some ability to adjust any geoengineering thermostat, but the de-
ployment of SRM would preclude the option of not using the thermostat 
at all. Obtaining the consent of future generations to such an arrangement 
is obviously not feasible, nor can we know in advance future attitudes that 
might inform our decisions.  
Conversely, geoengineering might help us meet our obligations to 
future generations if it were to protect them from even worse climate con-
sequences. It is critical to ensure, however, that geoengineering not be-
come a self-serving excuse for present inaction. To ward off the tempta-
tion to shift the burdens of climate change to the future, legal mechanisms 
will be needed to represent future generations in deciding whether to go 
forward with geoengineering, and if so, with what techniques. These 
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mechanisms might involve appointing a guardian or trustee to represent 
future generations in decision making processes or imposing fiduciary du-
ties on decision makers to consider impacts on future generations. Giving 
an explicit voice to future generations does not guarantee a fair weighing 
of their concerns, but can prevent them from being completely ignored. 
3.5. Compliance  
Environmental subjects of international concern often present difficult 
collective action problems because their solution requires the aggregation 
of cooperative efforts to supply a global public good. The temptation to 
free-ride off of others’ efforts has hindered agreement on significant re-
ductions in GHG emissions, for instance. In theory, geoengineering faces 
lesser barriers to implementation than emission reductions insofar as it 
could be undertaken by a handful of nations, a single nation, or even a 
private actor. Because there can be only one thermostat for the entire 
world, however, geoengineering raises a different issue of global coopera-
tion: ensuring that only authorised hands are on the thermostat. As already 
noted, there are likely to be strong disagreements regarding where the ge-
oengineering thermostat should be set, if at all. Thermostat-setting dis-
putes could lead to sabotage of geoengineering projects, countervailing ef-
forts to manipulate the climate, or even armed conflict. These considera-
tions suggest that compliance and enforcement mechanisms more typical-
ly associated with arms treaties may be needed. Mechanisms that may 
prove useful in enforcing a geoengineering thermostat include: verifica-
tion regimes incorporating external monitoring and inspections, well-
defined dispute resolution procedures, clear responses (such as sanctions) 
to treaty breaches, and export controls.  
Non-State actors may have a particularly important role to play in 
monitoring geoengineering activity and bringing instances of noncompli-
ance to the attention of relevant authorities. Ensuring long-term execution 
of an agreed-upon course will be particularly critical if SRM techniques 
are deployed. The institutions tasked with implementing SRM geoengi-
neering must not only have the resources and technical capacity to carry it 
out, but also be designed to withstand economic and political pressures to 
compromise for the sake of short-term gain. At the same time, external 
oversight of such institutions, whether by a group of nations or by non-
governmental organisations, can help assure that thermostat-setting deci-
sions agreed upon are actually carried out. 
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4. Conclusion  
The prospect of a geoengineering thermostat raises a host of difficult poli-
cy and legal questions. These questions cannot simply be ignored, as pres-
sures to geoengineer will only increase unless we promptly and drastically 
reduce carbon emissions. Spurred by eager researchers, supportive 
wealthy donors, and industries seeking to profit from geoengineering con-
tracts, geoengineering efforts are likely to move forward, and in doing so, 
to confront us with the conflicts embodied in the thermostat metaphor. 
Although the questions raised by geoengineering seemingly do not de-
mand immediate resolution, inattention to the thermostat dilemma may 
limit subsequent options, commit us to less-than-desirable courses of ac-
tion, and preclude careful and inclusive deliberation. 
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A Futuristic Exploration  
Surya Deva* 
In the years to come, autonomous robots will play an increasingly 
important role in our lives and society generally. What implications 
does this scenario have for human rights? Can robots be ‘holders’ 
of rights as well as duties? This think piece will explore whether 
and how robots can bear human rights obligations. It will be con-
tended that non-human entities like robots can (and ought to) be ob-
ligated to respect human rights. Here one can draw analogy with 
evolving jurisprudence concerning the human rights obligations of 
companies. 
As far as the modus operandi of imposing such a duty on robots 
is concerned, one easy solution might be to hold their human mas-
ters accountable for human rights abuses resulting from robotic ac-
tions or omissions. This think piece will investigate whether this 
approach will be adequate or it might be desirable to attribute re-
sponsibility directly to robots as well. 
1. Introduction 
Robots have already become an integral part of our lives. In years to 
come, they are likely to play a more decisive and pervasive role in our 
lives everywhere – from homes to offices, hospitals, crèches, supermar-
kets, airports, factories, mines, disaster zones, battle fields, educational in-
stitutions, sport grounds and entertainment kiosks. This scenario will ma-
terialise faster when scientists are able to develop more sophisticated and 
autonomous ‘social robots’ – robots that have the capability to interact 
with humans, respond to requests made by humans/robots with ease, un-
derstand human emotions, and can operate without much human guid-
ance. The invention of autonomous social robots is inevitable, because 
scientists keep on improving and testing the boundaries of existing gadg-
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ets. Moreover, robots would be more useful, at least in certain areas, when 
they behave like humans and do not rely too much on commands from 
humans. 
Several factors will contribute to this increased robot-dependency. 
Economic efficiency will be a dominant variable furthering the cause of 
robots. Unlike factory workers, robots will not demand – at least in the 
foreseeable future – wages, lunch breaks, weekly holidays or maternity 
benefits. It is reported that Foxconn, the world’s largest electronics manu-
facture and the key supplier of Apple, is planning to have one million ro-
bots working for it. It will not then be surprising if robotic factories may 
become a viable alternative to the current model of outsourced manufac-
turing. An ageing population and low birth rates should also encourage 
certain developed countries like Japan to push for a higher robot usage ra-
ther than relying on immigration to maintain a stable work force. The ten-
dency to avoid or externalise risk is another variable that will promote the 
use of robots in dangerous activities. We already see this happening in 
terms of robots being used to fight wars. Last but not least, robots hold an 
edge over human beings in respect of performing tasks with speed, preci-
sion and uniformity. 
This increased human-robot interaction will have many implications 
for legal and social norms. This think piece seeks to explore one such im-
plication: the potential impact of robots on the realisation of human rights. 
Can robots violate human rights? If yes, how can they be made accounta-
ble for human rights violations? I argue that non-human entities like ro-
bots can, if necessary, be obligated to respect human rights. While tradi-
tionally States were entrusted with the duty to ensure the realisation of 
human rights, this position has undergone significant changes over the 
years. The evolution of human rights obligations of non-State actors such 
as companies is a case in point. The Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, which were adopted by the United Nations (UN) Human 
Rights Council in June 2011, acknowledge that business entities have 
human rights responsibilities independent of States. If artificial (and as 
compared to robots, somewhat invisible) entities like companies can be 
subjected to human rights obligations, there is no reason why robots can-
not bear human rights obligations. In fact, the realisation of human rights 
requires that human beings can enforce duties against all centres of power 
– whether States, companies, terrorists organisations, robots or NGOs – 
that pose a threat to human rights.  
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This think piece also deals with the operationalisation of such a 
human rights duty vis-à-vis robots. One straightforward solution might be 
to hold the relevant human agents – for example owners, designers, pro-
grammers, manufacturers or sellers – accountable for human rights abuses 
resulting from robotic actions or omissions. However, since it is likely 
that human beings will form a company to programme and manufacture 
robots, this mode of accountability would be fraught with the same kind 
of challenges as experienced in making companies accountable for human 
rights violations. It might, therefore, be desirable to attribute responsibil-
ity directly to robots as well. Taking this path will of course imply devis-
ing sanctions that are appropriate and effective against robots. 
2. Robots and Human Rights 
2.1. Can Robots Violate Human Rights? 
The basic premise that underpins the analysis in this think piece is that ro-
bots can be bestowed with independent personality, because in future they 
will evolve to have attributes like intentionality, rationality, free will and 
autonomy. If this premise is valid and reasonably foreseeable, one can 
then make a claim for robots having rights as well as duties as moral 
agents (though their moral agency might not be equal to that of humans). 
In this think piece, I only explore the possibility of robots as bearers of 
duties in relation to human rights. Similarly, while robots can also pro-
mote the realisation of human rights – for example, the use of robot jock-
eys in camel races has saved some poor children from slavery and sex ro-
bots might reduce human trafficking – I do not explore that dimension 
here.  
Before conceiving human rights obligations of robots, one should 
ask whether and how robots can violate human rights. Robots can violate 
human rights in at least four ways. First, external actors such as humans, 
States and companies may programme or use robots to infringe human 
rights. Violations of this kind are more likely to take place in the context 
of current robots which rely significantly on human agents to perform the 
assigned tasks. The use of robots by States in war zones thus killing inno-
cent civilians or by companies for collecting personal data illustrates this 
possibility. Considering that this type of robots might not command much 
autonomy, they should not be personally liable for human rights abuses 
resulting from their actions. Nor should they be denied the benefit of the 
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defence that they were simply following the (unlawful) commands given 
by their human superiors. The situation should, however, be different in 
case of autonomous robots.  
Second, sophisticated autonomous robots themselves can possess 
(or acquire) the capacity to trample human rights. Imagine, for instance, 
the possibility of a sales robot making racial comments to a serving cus-
tomer, a caregiving robot touching inappropriately the body of an elderly 
person, or a security robot detaining a person unlawfully at the airport. 
Although it is difficult to predict at this stage, one cannot rule out the pos-
sibility of robots behaving like males and showing gender bias towards 
women.  
Third, robots can also act in concert with other actors and thus be-
come complicit in human rights violations. This is likely to happen only 
when we reach a stage of fully autonomous robots. Drawing analogy with 
various types of complicity of companies with State agencies, robots may 
participate directly in human rights abuses or merely benefit strategically 
by violations perpetuated by other actors.  
The fourth and final possibility might arise in the form of a robot 
violating human rights of another robot. While this may sound too fanci-
ful at this stage, it will not be inconceivable for powerful robots to abuse 
their position and power to infringe the interests of weaker robots if the 
humanity enters the age of a robotic society.  
Assuming that robots can violate human rights in these diverse 
ways, questions will also arise as to the nature and extent of their human 
rights responsibilities. For instance, should robots be held liable for omis-
sions as well? What about the indirect adverse impact of their actions on 
the human rights of others such as, for example, the impact of robot usage 
on unemployment. 
2.2.  Regulating Robots 
Isaac Asimov had proposed ‘Three Laws of Robotics’: first, a robot may 
not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to 
come to harm; second, a robot must obey orders given to it by human be-
ings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; and 
third, a robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection 
does not conflict with the First or Second Law.  
These Laws are precise but quite potent in safeguarding human in-
terests. They are, however, premised on the vertical hierarchy between 
 Can Robots have Human Rights Obligations? A Futuristic Exploration 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 189 
humans and robots in which the latter would serve the former. A related 
implicit assumption is that robots would not be completely autonomous 
from humans. The subservient nature of these laws, coupled with lack of 
legitimacy on account of robots not having a say in their drafting, makes 
them unsuitable to support a regulatory framework for a society in which 
robots may interact with human beings on a more horizontal level. Let me 
offer one illustrative example of the current asymmetry. Sex robots are 
being created to satisfy human urges and also make money in the process. 
But the dignity, emotions and sexual preferences of the robots providing 
sexual services do not seem to be taken into account at this point of time. 
This paradigm might have to change in future.  
What is the way forward then? A new regulatory framework at the 
international level may be needed. One option may be for the UN to nego-
tiate a framework convention dealing with various aspects of human-robot 
interaction – from licensing to agreeing a ‘no-go-zone’ (if any) for robots, 
their rights and responsibilities, the enforcement of rules, and potential 
sanctions. The framework stipulated in such a convention can then be 
used by States and non-State actors in regulating the robotic conduct. It is 
critical that there is a representation of robots in the drafting process of 
the convention, because States lack legitimacy to represent their interests. 
Even if robots possess the capability to participate in negotiations con-
cerning their rights and obligations, it would be impractical for all of them 
to do so. Therefore, a selected number of trustees of robots, representa-
tives of the International Robotics Society or representatives of robots 
should be invited to put forward the position of robotic community. 
Under the current setup, States play a dominant part in drafting and 
enforcing international rules and regulations. They are likely to continue 
playing this part, though in decades to come, the formulation and en-
forcement of law might not remain as State-centric as it is now. This 
change will have implications for human-robot interaction as well. It 
should be possible for the Robotics Society to self-regulate and discipline 
deviant robots. Civil society is also likely to monitor the behaviour of ro-
bots locally and globally. Moreover, consumers and investors of robotics 
may play a role in setting and enforcing minimum acceptable rules. 
3. Accountability Modes  
There are two broad possibilities of making robots accountable for human 
rights violations. One can either go after humans behind robots (agency 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 190 
mode) or grill robots themselves (self mode). I explore both these options 
below and suggest that we should consider relying on both accountability 
modes to achieve an optimal level of regulatory efficacy. In fact, the exist-
ing principle of ‘joint and several liability’ can be employed to combine 
both the ‘agency’ mode and the ‘self’ mode of accountability.  
3.1. ‘Agency’ Mode 
Under the agency mode, robots can be treated as agents of humans who 
may programme, manufacture or put to use robots for harmful effects. If 
robotic actions result in human rights violations, we may rely on the 
product liability jurisprudence. Liability (both civil and criminal) can be 
based on negligence, knowledge or intention. Treating robots as products 
implies that such robots have no or minimal autonomy, rationality and 
free will.  
In cases concerning autonomous robots which are controlled in cer-
tain respects by humans, one can invoke the principle respondeat superior 
(‘let the master answer’) to hold human agents responsible for the actions 
of robots. In other words, if the given conditions are satisfied (that is, a 
master-servant relation existed and the servant acted in the course of her 
employment), human masters can be held vicariously liable for human 
rights abuses committed by robots. It is also possible to employ the due 
diligence principle and attribute responsibility to a master who – despite 
having knowledge or reasons to believe that human rights violations can 
take place – failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the robot did not 
violate human rights. 
Although it is crucial to make accountable human beings who pro-
gramme or use robots to infringe human rights, the sole reliance on the 
agency mode is likely to prove problematic for a number of reasons. First 
of all, implementing this approach entails identifying the human beings 
and companies behind a given deviant robot. This might not be easy or 
straight forward in all cases, as companies know well how to keep dis-
tance by design and insulate themselves from potential liability.  
Another difficulty might be in establishing the master-agent or em-
ployer-employee relationship between human beings and robots. Even if 
such a relationship is made out, it may not be feasible to routinely rely on 
vicarious liability and attribute to their human masters the responsibility 
for human rights violations. For example, if a robot acted beyond the 
permissible scope of their programmed duties, modified its programme 
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code or created other robots, human masters are likely to plead that the 
robot was on one’s own ‘frolic’ and therefore, they should not be held re-
sponsible.  
3.2. ‘Self’ Mode 
The ‘self’ mode of accountability entails making robots directly responsi-
ble for their conduct. More specifically, in the context of this think piece, 
we consider responsibility for conduct that results in human rights viola-
tions. This mode will be especially relevant when we have truly intelligent 
and autonomous robots: the robots that are autogenous, possess the capac-
ity to improve their knowledge, and can act without much guidance from 
humans. 
One may ask how we could hold robots accountable for their ac-
tions. What sanctions could be invoked against robots and what purposes 
would they serve? Assuming that robots can and do own property, they 
can be required to compensate victims and pay fines for human rights vio-
lations. Robots can also be confined or injuncted to prevent future viola-
tions. In the worst possible scenario, the court can order a robot to be 
dismembered and destroyed. It is also possible to pass rehabilitative or re-
formative orders requiring robots to undergo remedial therapy and 
maintenance. ‘Naming and shaming’ should also remain a viable option, 
especially against those robots that have acquired public popularity.  
These potential sentences against robots should serve several pur-
poses – from vindication to retribution, deterrence and reformation. Vic-
tims of human rights violations feel vindicated when they see the visible 
perpetrator bear the consequence, whether it is a public apology or penal 
sanctions, of one’s wrongful conduct. So, sanctions against robots should 
satisfy the legitimate expectations of victims. Assuming that robots of the 
future will be able to feel pain and experience shame/guilt, sanctions 
should have deterrent effect on the behaviour of deviant robots as well as 
other bystander robots. For the same reason, reformation and rehabilita-
tion should also prove useful against robots.  
4. Conclusion 
Conceiving robots as independent moral agents who can bear human 
rights obligations will require a fundamental shift in how we have tradi-
tionally conceptualised human rights in the context of the ‘State’ versus 
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‘individuals’. Such a re-conceptualisation is, however, necessary to ensure 
that the human rights discourse keeps pace with the changing times. Con-
sidering that the language of human rights has already been invoked to 
capture interests of non-humans and even non-State actors are being sub-
jected to human rights obligations, extending human rights framework to 
robots would not be as radical as it might appear in the first instance. 
While at this point of time we do not really have fully autonomous 
robots, it would be naïve, considering the technological innovations 
achieved so far, to assume that scientists would not be able to stretch or 
refine the robotic technology further. Human beings should debate and 
conduct research around multiple issues concerning human–robot interac-
tions. This think piece, in which I have argued that robots can bear human 
rights obligations and that existing legal principles can be harnessed to 
achieve this outcome, should be seen in this context. Further debate and 
research is necessary not only for protecting the interests of humans but 
also for safeguarding robots against abuse by humans for commercial 
gains, social objectives or simply for pleasure. 
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Autonomous Intelligent Systems (AIS) are the next step in the de-
velopment of a more sustainable information society. Industries and 
governments around the world heavily invest in autonomous robots. 
The FET-Flagship Robot Companions for Citizens intends to de-
velop sustainable autonomous robots that are able to interact with 
humans in order to provide care and companionship for the rapidly 
ageing society. Autonomous Intelligent Systems can perceive in-
formation, are able to learn, reason and make decisions based on 
their experience, without direct human intervention or instruction. 
Actions of AIS may have legal consequences, and for AIS that are 
unknown entities considering the current legal and normative 
framework this creates uncertainty on issues such as free-will, lia-
bility, privacy, consumer protection and ownership of (intellectual) 
property rights. These need to be addressed in order to optimise ap-
propriate legal instruments for realising access to and acceptance of 
AIS-technology in society, thereby providing a unique opportunity 
for thinking about the future of law. 
1. Introduction 
Autonomous Intelligent Systems (AIS) are the next step in the develop-
ment of a more sustainable information society. The European Commis-
sion acknowledges this in its policy documents on sustainable innova-
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tion.1 One of the challenges indicated in Horizon 2020 (the financial in-
strument implementing the ‘Innovation Union’, aimed at securing Eu-
rope’s global competitiveness) is: “cognitive systems and robotics”. The 
aim is to develop “artificial systems that operate in dynamic real life envi-
ronments, reaching new levels of autonomy and adaptability”, 2  for 
“[t]here is a strong focus on advanced robotic systems, given their poten-
tial to underpin the competitiveness of key manufacturing sectors in Eu-
rope and a wide range of innovative products and services across the 
economy, from home appliances to health, security, space and leisure”, 
whereby the target is to produce “systems that can operate autonomously 
in the real world through for example, scene and context understanding, 
anticipation and reaction/adaptation to changes, manipulation and naviga-
tion, as well as symbiotic human-machine relations”.3 
AIS can be envisioned as soft bodied, sentient and intelligent ma-
chines that are able to understand and communicate with humans and 
each other, equipped with predictive and decisional capacities, based on 
their own experience, being energy efficient and sustainable, in order to 
provide personal companionship and care assistance for the rapidly ageing 
EU-society, among other things.  
In industry we can already see an increasing focus on robotics that 
is more or less autonomous. The global market for industrial robots was 
calculated in 2011 to comprise $12 billion, and industrial robot sales in-
creased by 18 per cent that year. Russian entrepreneur Dmitry Grishin has 
recently announced to invest millions in the development of robotics in 
New York. The South Korean Government aims at a market share of 13 
per cent in personal robotics to be achieved by 2013 and 20 per cent by 
2018 and has therefore drafted the Robot Special Act, calling for large in-
vestments in robotics research and development. Corporations in Japan 
for instance, are known for their research and development in the field of 
robotics. Honda has been developing their humanoid robot ASIMO from 
2000 onwards and predicts to sell as many robots as cars by 2020. Sony 
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developed humanoid QRIO and the four legged commercial dog-robot 
AIBO. 
1.1. Unique Opportunity for Law 
The realisation of AIS in the forthcoming years will offer a unique oppor-
tunity to study the legal consequences and implications of the introduction 
of truly new phenomena into society. The fact is that autonomous systems 
are unknown entities in the current (European) legal and normative 
framework. This creates uncertainty on issues such as free-will, liability, 
privacy and consumer protection as well as ownership of intellectual 
property rights. It will lead to changes in the legal order and may even 
lead to the hypothesis that the development of AIS shall result in a partial 
paradigmatic shift in thinking about law. These are challenges that will 
have to be met in order to realise the access to and the acceptance of AIS 
technology in society.  
Image 1:  iCub Robot, designed by the RobotCub Consortium. Photo by Lorenzo 
Natale, CC-BY-SA & GNU FDL 1.2 Licenses: http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/File:ICub_sciencefestival_1.jpg 
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After having given a definition of Autonomous Intelligent Systems, 
six scenarios will be presented in this contribution on the impact of the 
development of AIS on our society, which have been developed by the 
Utrecht University Centre for Access to and Acceptance of Artificial Au-
tonomous Intelligence (CAAAi). These scenarios shall be key to the re-
search into the legal and normative framework which will be developed 
by the CAAAi in the coming years. 
1.2. Defining Autonomous Intelligent Systems 
Autonomous Intelligent Systems consist of two elements. First, Autono-
my, which relates to the level of human intervention. It can be seen as a 
spectrum, “in which the capacity of decision making by the system corre-
lates with a proportional lessening of the degree of human intervention or 
interaction”.4 Less human intervention in the behaviour of a system impli-
cates a higher level of autonomy. The second element of AIS is Intelli-
gence, or the ability to think. Intelligence can be described as “the ability 
to adapt one’s behaviour to fit new circumstances [which] encompasses 
[…] the ability to learn, to reason, of problem solving, perception and 
language understanding”.5 Intelligent agents are held to be able to collect 
and select information from whatever source, to make recommendations 
based on their own calculations, and to make and implement decisions 
without being instructed to do so. For this contribution AIS are therefore 
defined as non-human entities that are capable of perceiving information 
delivered as language or otherwise, that are able to learn, reason and make 
decisions based on their experience, without direct human intervention or 
instruction. ‘AIS’ and ‘autonomous robots’ are used as interchangeable 
terms in this contribution. 
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2. AIS in Society in Six Scenarios 
From a practical perspective, the development and deployment of auton-
omous robots leads to questions regarding the normative framework for 
access to AIS-technology and the acceptance of the deployment of auton-
omous robots in daily life. These include legal questions such as whether 
or not AIS may enter into contracts in a way that is legally valid, and who 
may be held liable in case AIS inflict damage to people or property. Other 
indicated issues relate to the protection of private data collected by AIS, 
standardisation of AIS-technology and products, and the possibilities for 
protecting the intellectual property of AIS-generated works or inventions. 
These issues have future relevance upon the deployment of AIS in socie-
ty, and are at the same time rather important for the development process 
itself. It can be argued for instance, that legal uncertainty concerning risk 
allocation and liability for damages inflicted by AIS – as well as legal un-
certainty concerning rules for standards, consumer protection and privacy 
– may have slowing effects on innovation in this field. These issues form 
the basis for the six scenarios of AIS in society, some of which are well 
known in the field of law whereas others seem rather futuristic now but 
shall not be in the near AIS-future. 
2.1. Scenario Access: Standardisation  
A well-known issue in the field of innovation is illustrated in the first sce-
nario, which is of great importance to the potential successful develop-
ment and deployment of AIS in society:  
British manufacturer S supplies lower leg parts for certain autono-
mous robots. These are shaped by melting metal alloys into a 
mould. S has agreed to deliver an X amount of lower leg parts to 
Dutch producer T, who assembles these into complete robot-legs. 
When S’s mould cracks due to structural overuse he decides to buy 
a more robust matrix from a Japanese manufacturer. His new tem-
plate however does not have the exact same curve as the broken 
matrix, which makes the lower leg parts unusable for producer T, 
who rescinds his contract with S and starts the search for a new 
supplier of compatible parts. Unfortunately, this leads to a tempo-
rary shortage of legs and therefore an undersupply of the specific 
robot.  
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If the large majority of products or services in a particular business 
or industry sector conform to international standards, a state of industry-
wide standardisation exists. This is currently certainly not the case for 
most AIS-technology. International standards safeguard consumers and 
users of products and services. Clarity on the quality of products and ser-
vices that is created by conforming to international standards is not only 
beneficial to consumers, but also to all producers and manufacturers of 
AIS parts. Standardisation is voluntary and not legally binding unless na-
tional governments decide to incorporate the standards into their domestic 
legislation. Certain provisions in (intellectual property) laws, such as fair 
use and interoperability provisions for software allow research into the 
production of products that comply with technological standards. Discus-
sions may arise as to whether such exemptions to IP rights should be 
stretched further or whether this would deter the leading producers of the 
standard technology too much.  
2.2. Scenario Access: Intellectual Property Incentive  
A Dutch university’s research centre closely collaborates with a 
major Dutch private corporation on the development of ‘walking’ 
robots. Two post-doctorate researchers in the group are program-
ming the steering software. They exchange information with Italian 
computer scientists who have reached great results in programming 
the movement of joints in the feet of the robot. The corporate entity 
is eager to have access to this particular technology to apply it in 
their other production lines on adaptable wheelchairs in China. At 
the same time, another partner in the Dutch research centre is 
working together with British robot-designers and a team of aca-
demic psychologists, conducting research on the social functioning 
of robots and the effects of their appearance on humans. The work 
on the walking robot of the Dutch researchers is funded under the 
FP7 scheme of the European Union, which has specific rules on the 
open dissemination of research results. 
All research described above uses and produces information that 
may be protected by intellectual property rights. Robots are not only high-
ly complex machines; they also are a large collection of intellectual prop-
erty rights. The fundamental reason for protecting intellectual property is 
to create optimal conditions for innovation and creativity by safeguarding 
the exclusive exploitation thereof. Intellectual property protection impli-
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cates the creation of a temporary monopoly on the use of protected infor-
mation, which means, by the same token, that this protection creates a 
limitation of access to and use of this information, which in turn may be-
come an impediment to innovation. A second issue is that a significant 
part of this information is developed by publicly funded academic re-
search centres, co-operating with private corporate entities. Most software 
is furthermore developed under open access models, whilst other software 
may be subject to patent rights. It is likely that the private corporations 
involved in research and development of software are eager to make the 
newly developed software that they have contributed to, profitable, and 
would therefore not be keen to disclose the software as research results, 
under open access conditions, which is likely to be required by public co-
funding institutions.  
2.3. Scenario Acceptance: Legal Capacity? 
Elderly Mr. X has poor health. His autonomous robot interacts in 
society and concludes simple agreements on his behalf. Mr. X in-
structs his AIS to purchase food or to buy his daily medicine.  
To function in society, fully AIS should be able to enter into some 
legal transactions. Law attributes legal capacity only to natural and legal 
persons. International instruments do not include provisions deciding who 
is rendered legally capable. Because AIS are legally defined as neither 
natural, nor legal persons, agreements that AIS would be party to would 
be null and void. Legal certainty could be achieved through conferring 
some kind of legal capacity to AIS, which is a big step to take. However, 
alternatives need to be considered and evaluated to indicate whether or 
not legal capacity is indeed required. Should AIS be granted legal capaci-
ty, the impact on society would be radical, since AIS would become an 
active, participating object in commercial society. One alternative to full 
legal capacity might be to consider AIS to be mandated by its owner for 
the conclusion of certain legal transactions. This alternative would imply 
that the owner of an autonomous robot, who instructs his AIS to conclude 
an agreement on his behalf, is solely responsible for his transaction. An-
other alternative could be to follow the rules for minors, which implies al-
lowing AIS to conclude certain transactions that are common for minors, 
such as the purchase of groceries, music and DVDs. This would exclude 
the capacity to buy other goods such as luxury yachts, cars and houses.  
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 202 
In any case, when performing legal actions AIS should be built to 
also have basic knowledge with regard to the legal, economic and social 
rules and behavioural norms that apply when performing legal actions 
such as concluding purchase agreements. The legal and economic 
knowledge AIS are provided with can be tailored to the agreements that 
specific AIS will be making. AIS should furthermore be aware of the po-
sition that they fulfil when concluding agreements.  
Conferring legal capacity on AIS brings other questions into play, 
for example regarding possible responsibilities that tie in with capacity, 
such as liability.  
2.4. Scenario Acceptance: Liability 
For the acceptance of AIS in society, allocation of liability is crucial. 
Should damage be caused to a person or an object through or by an auton-
omous robot, rules on liability should indicate who is to provide monetary 
security. Several currently existing liability rules could apply in case of 
AIS. The most relevant kinds of liability will be outlined below, accom-
panied by a short corresponding scenario.  
An elderly robot-owner instructs her AIS to vacuum her living 
room. Whilst vacuuming, the autonomous robot suddenly stagnates, 
turns around five times and begins to move uncontrollably for a few 
seconds; long enough to knock over a Ming vase on the windowsill.  
According to current European Product Liability Law, the producer 
may be held liable for the damage to the vase. The Product Liability Di-
rective (85/374/EEC) decides that all producers involved in the produc-
tion process can be addressed for compensation insofar as their finished 
product, component part or any raw material supplied by them was defec-
tive.  
The housecleaning AIS described above wrongly calculates the 
weight of the vase and the force needed to lift it, causing the AIS to 
shatter it. 
The damage may be attributed to an imperfection in the AIS soft-
ware programme. There seems to be no technical impairment to the AIS, 
nor has the AIS-owner given an erroneous instruction. The damage is a 
consequence of a miscalculation of the AIS, generated by its self-learning 
software programme. With regard to strict liability rules, AIS-owners 
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need to be well informed of AIS’s imperfections and limitations. The lia-
bility for damages that are not the result of a defect in AIS can then be al-
located. To this end, insurance by AIS-owners can be considered. Thus, 
allocation of liability and possibilities for new insurance systems are is-
sues that need to be explored.  
An AIS is going down the street while carrying a large bag of gro-
ceries. As it turns a corner it collides with a woman on a bicycle. 
The woman is injured and the bicycle damaged.  
Should the AIS be considered a legal entity, the autonomous robot 
can also be held liable according to rules of fault liability negligence. 
Otherwise the owner will be liable, as a consequence of the strict-liability 
rules.  
General rules on tort law, dealing with strict liabilities and fault lia-
bility outside the realm of product liability have not yet been harmonised 
in the European Union. Therefore, the specific features of tort law differ 
largely between countries. Because of the great diversity in tort law, it 
should be considered whether or not it is desirable that certain actions of 
AIS are classified as tort.  
Product liability and strict liability pose no specific requirements to 
the functionality of AIS. It is however important that every AIS that is 
distributed is accompanied by a user manual in which the limitations of 
AIS are explicitly mentioned and warnings are issued. It is also necessary 
that the AIS’ log can be reviewed in order to trace technical errors and to 
recover the instructions that AIS have received. 
2.5. Scenario Acceptance: Privacy 
Mrs. A takes her AIS to a technical engineer for a periodic check-
up. Besides checking the hardware, the engineer also checks the 
AIS software for inconsistencies and irregularities. During these 
activities, the engineer stumbles upon information that is stored on 
the AIS’ memory. Amongst this information are Mrs. A’s medical 
files, bank account number and her pin-code as well as her GPS-
location information over the past 6 months. 
Personal information of AIS-owners and/or third parties will be 
saved in the memory of AIS software. In principle, this information 
should be accessible only to the person the data relates to. Effective secu-
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rity measures for the access of the data, for instance by putting in place 
login codes, can possibly form a first practical solution to this problem. 
However, it can for example be useful to extract medical data from the 
AIS memory by medical professionals. For such uses of stored personal 
data advanced tools based upon and aligned with at least the European 
Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) should be in place. Should there be 
transatlantic use of personal data from the USA, the safe harbour princi-
ples are leading. 6 AIS should in any case be equipped with a technique 
that safeguards personal data stored in AIS memory against the use and 
abuse of personal data without the unambiguous consent of the data sub-
jects, the owner of the robot and other people that have encountered the 
AIS, or without application of any of the other legitimate data processing 
criteria. 
The risk of abuse of private information stored in AIS software is 
an issue that can potentially harm the acceptance and use of AIS in socie-
ty. Securing personal information that is stored in AIS software can form 
a partial solution to this issue. 
2.6. Scenario Acceptance: AIS-Generated Works 
As an autonomous, sentient and learning system the AIS is involved in the 
creation of works of art, inventions or can be co-authors of miscellaneous 
designs: 
The owner of an autonomous robot is a retired artist. His AIS is 
equipped with tailor-made software allowing him to create works of 
art together with his robot. The artistic output is partially depend-
ent on the information (algorithm and database) the AIS-
manufacturer has implemented into the robot. However, the AIS as 
a learning and sentient machine, is able to build upon this infor-
mation through the experience that came from the instructions and 
examples the artist has confronted him with during their twenty 
years of cooperation. The AIS may therefore create new and mar-
vellous works of art miscellaneous but original of character. 
                                                   
6
 2000/520/EC: Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection 
Provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Ques-
tions Issued by the US Department of Commerce, notified under document number 
C(2000) 2441, in the Official Journal L 215, 25/08/2000 p. 7–47. 
Mapping the Legal Framework for the Introduction  
into Society of Robots as Autonomous Intelligent Systems 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 205 
Substantial investment or a certain amount of originality7 can give 
rise to intellectual property protection to creative and innovative output. 
The copyright works created by or with the autonomous or semi-
autonomous aid of the AIS, are referred to as AIS-generated works. Copy-
right is granted under the implicit assumption that the work is the expres-
sion of human creativity. Therefore utilisation of AIS in the creation pro-
cess confronts copyright with new challenges. In the United Kingdom a 
specific regulation has been introduced for works created by computers 
under such circumstances that no human author can be designated. No 
other country has similar provisions in place. However, the necessity for 
specific regulation has not yet become evident. This will however change 
in the future when actual or partial autonomous creations by AIS will take 
place.  
Depending on the extent of human-machine interaction, AIS-
assisted or AIS-generated works will be independently created. The more 
autonomous the creation, which implicates the least human intervention, 
the more difficult it will be to find a form of investment protection for the 
works created in current legal systems. This scenario involves defining 
notions such as AIS-created art, creation in itself, and the anthropocentical 
requirement in copyright, which means that the creator of a work should 
be human, the mind-brain dilemma, et cetera. 
3.  Conclusions 
To summarise, when AIS become active in our personal and social spac-
es, their acts will have legal impacts. For an AIS to fulfil its function as a 
companion for European citizens, it may need to enter into valid legal 
transactions, such as purchase agreements. Therefore it can be expected 
that some legal capacity will be required. On the other hand, if in the 
course of their activities material or personal damages occur, the question 
of who would be liable implies a range of potential candidates from com-
                                                   
7
 Whether copyright is granted or denied depends on the applicable copyright regime. 
Copyright protection applies to works that are “original”. In a common law country 
such as the UK there is a relatively low threshold for protection. A work is considered 
to be original if its creation required sufficient “skill, judgment and labour”. A work 
thus requires a certain amount of creative intellectual activity and a certain amount of 
effort. This requirement is modest when compared to the thresholds in the civil law 
countries such as France, Germany and The Netherlands, all of which require creativi-
ty and individuality. 
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puter programmers, manufacturers involved in the production of AIS to 
the user of the AIS. At the same time, AIS with some self-awareness can-
not be treated simply as things. Sentience, autonomy and the possible 
ability to experience frustration, or even suffering, raises issues of legal 
categorisation. The question arises as to whether and how degrees of sen-
tience, autonomy and capacity for feeling could be assessed as a basis for 
assigning legal capacity to AIS. Another issue that will have to be ad-
dressed is the AIS in its capacity for creating and inventing robot-
generated works or patentable inventions. This raises fundamental ques-
tions with regard to the objects of intellectual property rights, and to the 
ownership in general.  
Therefore, there are significant legal issues that need to be ad-
dressed if AIS are to be deployed in European society including our per-
sonal and public spaces. In international literature there is a call for sui-
generis regulation to avoid hurdles in the development of AIS. The first 
initiatives are already taken: A proposal for a European Commission di-
rective is now being prepared.  
Effectiveness of sui generis/technology specific regulations is how-
ever questionable, due to the unpredictable nature of technological devel-
opment. Legal history also shows that hasty measures may be counterpro-
ductive. In this we can learn from the principle of subsidiarity as advocat-
ed by the European Union, for it would be wise to demonstrate restraint in 
developing a specific legal framework regarding robots. At the same time, 
new rules and norms should be subject to the principle of sustainability, 
and take the interests of all stakeholders into account, with an emphasis 
on the longer-term interests. Whilst AIS are unique in some respects it is 
also important to recognise that many of the potential legal issues sur-
rounding robots are already addressed in existing legislation. For instance, 
regulations surrounding corporate entities, information communications 
technology systems, motor vehicles, or even domestic animals could be 
relevant to evaluating the legal status of AIS. Therefore it needs to be 
identified how and where AIS fit into existing legal and normative 
frameworks and where such frameworks will need to be extended to take 
account of AIS. At the same time, the potential of self-regulatory mecha-
nisms need to be involved. By doing this, one should seek to develop ap-
propriate legal instruments to both protect consumer interests (privacy, 
safety regulations) and to contribute to the innovation and acceptance of 
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AIS technology in society by finding a balance between protection, secu-
rity and innovation. 
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18Communication Technologies  
and the Future of Courts and Law 
Jim Dator* 
In order to forecast alternative futures of law, lawyers, courts, and 
judges, it is necessary to understand their alternative pasts and pre-
sents, and to determine what aspects of the pasts and presents might 
continue to influence the futures, and furthermore what contingen-
cies might generate new conditions. This paper looks at the way ju-
dicial systems have been shaped by communication technologies in 
the past and might be shaped by current and emerging communica-
tion technologies in the future. 
1. Changing Communication Technologies and Changing Humans 
For most of its existence, homo sapiens sapiens has existed as nomadic 
hunters and gatherers in small, face-to-face groups. We are biologically, 
and in many ways psychologically, evolved for that kind of life, and not 
for the world in which we now live. Agriculture and cities – civilisation – 
is only a few thousand years old. Industrial and information societies are 
mere recent eye-blinks in human history. Alfred North Whitehead said 
that civilisation is a race between education and disaster. It is also a race 
between biology and our constructed environment, and the cultures we 
have created within it, including the cultures of law. Many factors are re-
sponsible for the continuing, though uneven, transformation of humans 
over time and space. One of the most important factors has been changes 
in the way in which humans communicate. When we first emerged from 
the older homo line as homo sapiens, we could not speak. While we had 
big brains and helpful hands with opposable thumbs, our ability to think, 
to communicate thoughts, and especially to organise each other for group 
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projects was limited. It was only later when changes occurred primarily in 
our jaw and larynx making it possible for us to produce meaningful 
sounds that homo sapiens transformed into homo sapiens, sapiens. That is 
when we really took off as a species. 
2. Oral Societies 
While powerful and transformative, speech was still a very limited mode 
of communication. It was extremely difficult to hold ideas ‘still’ in oral 
societies – to take them out of their immediate context and to ponder over 
them. It was not possible to go back and review what had just been said, 
much less what had been said and intended yesterday, or (if the concept 
even existed) a hundred or a thousand years ago. With speech, we could 
better organise ourselves for group projects, but typically only for imme-
diate action. Planning and carrying out projects that ranged over years was 
very difficult (but not impossible, vide Jebel Faya, near the Persian Gulf, 
and the impressively large, geographically-separated, and successful Ha-
waiian kingdoms based entirely on the spoken word).  
3. Before Writing 
Then, only a few thousand years ago, some humans began using symbols, 
at first, not to convey ideas or emotions, but to designate items, identify 
who owned them, how much they were worth, perhaps where they were 
going. For about a thousand years or so, what eventually became writing 
was nothing but markers, labels, lists, tables. But these pale scratches 
made communication across time and distance easier than it had ever been 
before. Jack Goody notes that this began to enable forms of social organi-
sation the world had never seen in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, China, and 
central and western South America: institutionalised religion and priests 
in place of free-floating spirituality; formal education and teachers instead 
of amorphous beliefs, and skills based on observation and imitation; terri-
fying hierarchical authorities of many kinds including eventually, rulers, 
bureaucrats, judges and jailers. 
4. Order Without Law 
Before there was writing, there was order, but no law. As Stanley Dia-
mond made clear,  
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Custom – spontaneous, traditional, personal, commonly 
known, corporate […] is the modality of primitive society; 
law is the instrument of civilisation, of political society sanc-
tioned by organized force, presumably above society at 
large, and buttressing a new set of social interest […] Law 
and order is the historical illusion; law versus order is the 
historical reality.1  
5. Law and Rigidity 
Literacy – hand writing and reading – became a profoundly transforma-
tive technology. Even though most people did not know how to read and 
write, formal life in scribal societies was for the first time based on writ-
ten rules that were interpreted and enforced by power-wielding authori-
ties. Wherever writing developed, rigid, rule-based, remote, enforceable 
government emerged in place of flexible, functional, direct governance. 
Most importantly, writing enabled thoughts to be frozen, codified, and 
made mandatory across time and space. Vast empires capturing huge 
numbers of people spread in large part because of the power of the written 
word and the power that the word gave to those who interpreted and en-
forced it.2 
6. Colonising Time and Space 
By preserving written law and religious scriptures, and by empowering 
scribes and priests charged with further preserving, interpreting, and en-
forcing legal and religious words, for the first time the past could effec-
tively control the future, squelching spontaneous and easy adaptation to 
changing times and needs which the eternal present of oral societies made 
possible. While it might seem to one living in an oral society that norms 
and mores were eternal, in fact they were for the most part highly ephem-
eral and fleeting. Old norms were quickly forgotten when they proved 
dysfunctional and new ones easily adopted in ways that made them seem 
eternal.  
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Jack Goody writes about law: “The very fact that laws exist in writ-
ten form makes a profound difference, first to the nature of its sources, 
secondly to the ways of changing the rules, thirdly to the judicial process, 
and fourthly to court organization”. Once written and enforced, rules are 
harder to change than they are in oral societies. Moreover, “legal norms 
no longer reside in the memory of each and every individual (at least of 
every elder) but may be literally buried in documents to be disinterred on-
ly by specialists in the written word”.3 
7. Law and Gutenberg’s Printing Press 
The next big transformative step in communication and governance was 
the printing press – and now we are approaching modern times and the 
kind of governance, law, and courts with which we are all familiar. 
Though printing was known first in China and Korea, and played a role in 
forming the legal systems of those cultures, it was the printing press (and 
auxiliary developments) of Gutenberg and others of the 15th and 16th cen-
turies that enabled the spread and success of the Protestant Reformation, 
the flowering of old knowledge as new that energised the Renaissance, the 
creation of the Westphalian nation-State system, the cosmologies of Co-
pernicus, Bacon, and Newton, and other ideas and technologies of the 
modern scientific-industrial revolution, culminating in the maturing of 
theories of ‘democratic’ governance of Hobbes, Montesquieu, Locke, 
Rousseau and others.4  
8. The First New Nation 
Fortuitously ‘America’ provided the tabula rasa upon which the fantastic 
idea formed of ‘constituting’ a new nation out of widely separated and di-
verse, artificially-created colonies by assembling a group of highly privi-
leged men to come together, talk and then eventually write down a 
(handwritten!) Constitution for the United States. Informed by Greek and 
Roman Classics, and based on cutting edge ideas and technologies of the 
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day – especially Newtonian mechanics, Deistic theology, and the hand-
powered printing press (steam-powered printing presses did not come into 
existence until about 30 years after the US did) – the US Constitution was 
a breath-taking social invention, brilliantly overcoming a host of design-
challenges, though by no means all of them, while creating serious future 
problems as well. It was designed for, and fit for, a vast, overwhelmingly 
agricultural society with a small, widely-scattered, rural population of 
semi-illiterate farmers and plantation owners, many of whom wanted po-
litical independence from their mother country, far, far away. 
9. ‘Constitutionalism’ and the Magic of Words 
The fundamental principles of ‘constitutionalism’ have been widely cop-
ied. Since 1789, there have been very many opportunities for polities to 
envision and fashion new forms of governance – the governments of new 
American states themselves; the political revolutions in England, France 
and elsewhere in Europe in the 19th century; Russia in 1918; Japan, Ger-
many and other ‘Axis’ nations after the Second World War; numerous 
former colonies in South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, also 
after the Second World War; the collapse of socialist systems in the late 
1980s and early 1990s; the attempt to create a European union; and most 
recently ‘nation-building’ opportunities after America attacked and de-
stroyed existing governments. 
And yet, people sat down and ‘wrote a constitution’, which, at the 
end, unreflexively imitated the Newtonian mechanistic and rationalistic 
assumptions of the late 18th century, ignoring the subsequent scholarship 
of Darwin, Freud, Einstein, Heisenberg, and Foucault. Moreover, they 
have acted as though the only communication technologies available for 
governance are still the printing press and the spoken word. In spite of the 
social revolution produced by electric and later electronic communication 
technologies that increasingly enable people to participate directly in gov-
erning so many aspects of their lives, all formal structures of government 
make direct involvement in government difficult to impossible. They still 
require ‘representatives’ physically to assemble somewhere in a central 
location, debate policies, and ‘make law’ by writing down their decisions, 
which are then administered by bureaucratised humans and enforced by 
officers of the law backed by the threat or use of deadly force. All of that 
made sense at one time. It is problematic now, and has been for quite a 
while. 
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Certain printed words (and those who wield and interpret them) 
have obtained over time a kind of arcane, magical, holy, super-human 
power vastly exceeding that of other printed words. When the power of 
these words seems to fail, instead of reaching beyond the logo-centric 
cosmologies and technologies that underlie them, and trying to base social 
order on newer cosmologies and technologies, most people – rulers and 
ruled alike, look for stronger words and more powerful, magical, phrases. 
The situation in the United States is especially conspicuous in this 
regard. A stunning kind of logo-fundamentalism has captured both church 
and State. The US Supreme Court is currently controlled by people who 
believe that the original words of the US Constitution have an essential 
and unchanging meaning that is not only separate from, and superior to, 
what those words might have evolved to mean now (much less, how they 
might now be better interpreted to mean), but also have essential mean-
ings separate from what even the Founding Fathers themselves might 
have intended the words to mean. The source of this kind of interpretation 
might be the fact that some of the most influential members of the Court 
were educated at a time when what was known as the ‘New Criticism’ 
was popular in departments of English in US universities.5 According to 
the New Criticism, a work of literature must be interpreted on its own 
terms alone. An author’s intentions, his experiences, or the historical peri-
od in which a work was written have no relevance. All that matters is the 
meaning of the words themselves as discovered by a close reading of the 
text itself. 
10. The Word Is Out: The Image Is In 
Some years ago, Ethan Katsch insisted that the Word was out – or soon 
would be – and that law, in form and practice, was about to be trans-
formed by electronic communication technologies. Basing his argument 
on analogies of the role of the printing press as pioneered by the works of 
Marshall McLuhan and Elisabeth Eisenstein cited above, Katsh argued 
that law needed to, and would, find a new basis in electronics, and that 
new forms of governance would emerge. Many legal scholars seem not to 
have recognised the role that the printing press itself played over past cen-
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turies in making ‘law’ the conservative, change-resistant agency that it is 
(or was) as electronic media began to play a new, more dynamic role.6  
11. Consequence over Precedents? 
The concept of ‘law’ thus may be shifting once again from being the fluid, 
adaptive, oral statements of judges in the old medieval courts, to fixed 
print documents (expressed in written ‘constitutions’ and ‘positive’ laws) 
in the recent modern age, and now to being fluid electronic bits. With the 
advent of the curiously-named ‘word processor’ 40 years ago, everything 
written has become a draft that can be ‘cut and pasted’ into other docu-
ments for numerous purposes. In the current ‘Information Age’, nothing 
written is ever final. Everything is fluid, flexible, temporary. ‘Conse-
quence’ seems more important than ‘precedents’. As we move beyond the 
information age, perhaps to a ‘dream society’, law may become as tempo-
rary as everything else in the society it seeks to regulate. Law might be-
come a fleeting suggestion expressed in audio/visual/olfactory/tactile im-
ages in N-dimensional cyberspace.7  
12. Social Media and the Law 
Presently, social media and social networking are reshaping how people 
interact with themselves and with former ‘authorities’. When sick, many 
people prefer to link-in and seek remedies from friends than to go to a 
doctor. When faced with a problem, they seek the advice of each other, 
and not that of a priest or a lawyer. When members of trial juries, they 
tweet about the case if they can get away with it. They only go to libraries 
if they want a quiet, safe, dry place to sleep. They have decreasing respect 
for formal authorities and more faith in the judgment of their friends. 
                                                   
6
 Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law, Oxford Universi-
ty Press, New York, 1989; also Majid Tehranian, Technologies of Power: Information 
Machines and Democratic Prospects, Ablex Publishing, 1990. 
7
 Jim Dator, “Judicial Governance of the Long Blur”, in Futures, 2001, vol. 33, no. 1; 
Jim Dator and Yongseok Seo, “Korea as the Wave of a Future: The Emerging Dream 
Society of Icons and Aesthetic Experience”, in Susan Pares and J. E. Hoare (ed.), Ko-
rea: The Past and the Present; Selected Papers from the British Association for Ko-
rean Studies BAKS Papers Series, 1991–2005, Global/Oriental, Oxford, 2008. 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 218 
13. Extraterrestrial Law? 
Electronic communication technologies are also changing the practice of 
law with a clear movement from geographically defined ‘law offices’ and 
‘law libraries’, to ‘virtual communities’ – and virtual courthouses globally 
dispersed. Though many patriotic jurists strongly protest, there are many 
good reasons to encourage the emergence of law beyond that of sovereign 
nations alone, and beyond ‘international’ law as well. By adopting ‘best 
practices’ from each other, a functional global law is emerging to address 
the challenges of our increasingly globalised humanity. But since settle-
ments on the Moon, Mars, asteroids, and various L-5 locations are once 
again being seriously considered by China, India, Japan, Brazil, Russia, 
Europe – if not yet the United States – it is also time for future-oriented 
jurists to contemplate the emergence of law for the inner-solar system, 
which, being electronic – or ‘post-electronic’ – can be ‘located’ wherever 
intelligence is found throughout the universe. 
14. Rights of Robots? 
Indeed, electronic communication technologies have changed the ‘perso-
na’ of law as well. Once upon a time, intelligence, such as it is, was con-
sidered a human monopoly. With the rise first of ‘expert systems’ and 
now of robots with artificial intelligence, we might embrace the rule not 
only of ‘smart’ legal and judicial software, but also of cyber lawyers, 
cyber judges, and bills of rights for robots.  
In fact, it is not clear why humans need to be involved in routine ju-
dicial decision-making at all anymore. Of all social inventions (except 
mathematics itself), law is the most fit for computerisation of all but the 
most novel aspects of judicial decision-making. For 40 years, a major aim 
in most US legislatures has been to eliminate the discretion of judges by 
mandating determinant sentencing and other limitations on human judg-
ment. It makes sense now to eliminate human error, fatigue, and bias alto-
gether by eliminating humans wherever possible, relying entirely on 
judgments made by artificial intelligences. We do this in almost all areas 
of life already, why should judiciaries remain aloof?  
15. Intelligent Law? 
Marcel Bullinga has argued that “making rules and enforcing them are 
important government tasks. Right now, laws are written down on paper 
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and enforced by individuals. In the future, all rules and laws will be in-
corporated into expert systems and chips embedded in cars, appliances, 
doors, and buildings – that is, our physical environment. No longer will 
police officers and other government personnel be the only law enforce-
ment. Our physical environment will enforce the law as well”. In his 
view, future governments will no longer write laws on paper that are in-
terpreted and enforced by people. Instead, ‘laws’ will be open-standard 
software with authoritative algorithms that contain the appropriate regula-
tory information and protocols over the operation of all human activities. 
Intelligent devices will ‘know’ what laws or regulations apply and how to 
act upon them. They will make decisions and self-enforce them. They will 
resolve conflicts between them and conflicts of the laws among them. 
What were once called ‘constitutions’ will be composed of algorithms, 
describing processes by which they shall be distributed, protected, imple-
mented, and revised, and new authoritative algorithms formulated. What 
were once ‘courts’, ‘judges’, ‘lawyers’ and the rest will be algorithms as 
well. No unaugmented humans need to be involved.8  
16. Telepathic Law? 
In the foreseeable future, biochemical processes may replace electronics 
and lead to brain-to-brain and source-to-brain transfer. Behavioural con-
trol may then move not only from humans to the environment, but also 
from the environment to the brain and central nervous systems. We may 
finally break through the limited interface of our biological input-output 
mechanisms. So far we cannot make screens smaller than we can see or 
buttons too small to push. If we can go beyond the input-output mecha-
nism of eyes, mouths, ears, and fingers, and communicate directly brain-
to-brain, or source to brain, we can do away with all ‘media’ and have di-
rect mind-to-mind governance, either via electronic-like implants or direct 
mind transfer – ‘mental telepathy’. 
17. The End of Law and Order? 
This kind of high-tech dream and post-dream society may not be realised 
as some of us have imagined. It may not be achieved at all. On the one 
hand our attachment to written words and to lawyers and judges who in-
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terpret may be too resistant. On the other hand, looming and neglected 
environmental, energy, and economic challenges may make continued 
high tech societies impossible. We may effectively ‘run out of oil’ before 
we can develop and bring online viable alternatives. Long-deferred envi-
ronmental challenges loom. Global population growth continues cata-
strophically at the same time that population is declining in some parts of 
the world. All economies are unsustainable to the extent that they are 
based on endless debt and endless growth in a finite planet. These prob-
lems are global, and yet we have no way to address them globally. Our 
obsolete nation-State system is powerless, and so the future of humanity 
on Earth is uncertain. It is entirely possible a way of life called ‘develop-
ment’ that we have only known for a few hundred years is coming to an 
end. We may become farmers and hunters with their means of communi-
cation and conflict resolution once again. While I vastly prefer the high 
tech future I have outlined, the global trajectory seems to me to be largely 
heading in the other direction.  
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THE PERSPECTIVE OF STATES: 
WHAT IS CHANGING OR NEEDS TO CHANGE?
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4.1. 
______ 
19Nobody Owns the State: How a Board of Trustees 
Can Help to Innovate Our Core Institutions 
Maurits Barendrecht 
An intriguing feature of Western States is that no one is accounta-
ble for the core institutions. Take the parliament, the Cabinet of 
Ministers, the civil justice system, the Supreme Court, the law-
making process or the Ministry of Justice, for example. There is no 
ultimate owner who is responsible for its performance. There may 
be convincing historical explanations for this. But why keep it that 
way? Countries may be able to achieve major improvements in the 
quality of life and economic growth if they expose their core insti-
tutions to the innovation processes that are common outside the 
realm of these core State organisations. Imagine if the State were to 
have a board of trustees. How would it monitor State institutions, 
get rid of bad habits and trigger innovation? 
1. The Accountability Gap 
Members of parliament and of the highest courts are passers-by. They 
struggle hard to make the best of the years in which they work in these 
positions. Even the leaders of the pack are more like the temporary occu-
pants of a function, than the CEOs of organisations responsible for overall 
performance. A Prime Minister, the President of a Supreme Court or the 
speaker of a parliament can be criticised on how he performs his tasks. 
S/he is not supposed to take the lead in reorganising the cabinet, the court 
or parliament. So the working methods are left untouched. 
This makes these organisations very special. Unlike other organisa-
tions, these institutions have no clear strategy, no targets, no visitation 
processes, no annual performance appraisals and no supervisory boards. 
There is no independent auditing of what these organisations do, they are 
hardly ever reorganised by consultants. They are almost immune to 
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change. The formal rules governing them are set out in the constitution, or 
in other instruments that are very hard to adjust.  
The ownership of the civil justice system or the law-making process 
is even more diffuse. A civil justice system critically depends on the qual-
ity of substantive laws, the design and financing of courts, civil procedure 
rules and the quality of legal services provided by the market. Law-
making processes depend on the selection of the most urgent problems, 
the search process towards good solutions, bargaining with stakeholders, 
the quality of proposal-writing, the process of advising about laws, the 
scrutiny by parliaments, the options of challenging laws before courts and 
the way citizens are informed about new rules. These processes are hardly 
ever evaluated, let alone calibrated to make them work more effectively 
from input to ultimate outcomes.  
2. Stability, Changing the Constitution and Quality through Checks 
and Balances? 
Is this a serious flaw in design, or an implication of a choice for imperfect 
institutions that work through checks and balances? Most constitutional 
theorists are likely to argue that it is the latter. Democratic governance by 
these institutions may have many imperfections, but the mistakes made as 
a consequence of this can be corrected by public scrutiny or by other insti-
tutions. Gaps in laws can be filled by courts, and if necessary they can 
strike down the most inappropriate rules in a process of constitutional re-
view. Bad laws can be replaced by better laws. Cabinet ministers who 
cannot find a way to work together under the existing rules can be re-
placed by politicians who know how to play the game.  
Of course constitutions can be amended or replaced by new ver-
sions. Studies of these processes show that such change is slow and in-
cremental, but also that core elements of constitutional design are corre-
lated with economic growth and other desirable outcomes. On the other 
hand, we all know the examples of presidents manipulating constitutional 
change processes in order to grab power beyond two consecutive terms. 
So it may be better to seal off provisions regarding the number of terms a 
president can have or the way districts of members of parliaments have 
been defined. It may even be a good thing that institutions cannot be 
changed by their leaders. This protects them from being abused. By de-
sign, these leaders are doomed to be passers-by, the rule of law having 
freed us from the rule by men.  
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3. Run by Habit and Incentives of Participants 
But what happens to an organisation that is not capable of changing its 
work processes if needed? A company run in this way would soon be out 
of business, perhaps after being plundered by the directors and the em-
ployees, at the expense of shareholders, the tax authorities and the cus-
tomers. But State institutions are not exposed to competition, so they con-
tinue to exist. The way they work is very likely to be based on habits, 
good habits and bad habits, shaped by the incentives of participants. The 
following is a list of habits that have crept into the State institutions of 
some countries:  
 Spending a good part of the time in a leading government job to 
raise funds and to campaign for re-election; 
 Vicious advertisements, attacking competitors on the basis of a se-
lection of facts, and a biased way of presenting them; 
 Anti-competitive agreements always to follow the party line when 
voting in parliament; 
 Agreeing with other incumbents to set boundaries of districts in 
such a way that re-election for all of us is more certain;  
 Letting a vote for a proposal be bought in exchange for a specific 
benefit for your own constituency;  
 Trading with jobs in high government positions instead of letting 
the best person be selected; 
 Agreements between parties forming a coalition government in se-
cret negotiations limiting the issues that will be tackled by the gov-
ernment;  
 Ministries letting their agenda be determined by media and day-to-
day political reality instead of by a list of long-term priorities for 
their area of government; 
 Journalists interviewing politicians and trying to set them up against 
colleagues, because conflict sells; 
 Polarised debates over proposals; 
 Politicians not being allowed to collect information about issues 
from ministries directly but only through ministers answering ques-
tions in parliament; 
 Limited capacity for legislation;  
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 Selecting simple issues with simple solutions instead of tackling the 
most important problems for a country;  
 Holding officials accountable and firing them for the way they han-
dled one specific problem instead of on their overall performance as 
leaders of their organisations;  
 Writing rules that can only be understood by fellow lawyers;  
 Buying or using television stations to advance the position of one 
particular party;  
 Playing “chicken” with budgets and scaring the heck out of finan-
cial markets instead of responsibly managing the State coffers;  
 Calling elections in order to advance the interests of own parties in-
stead of serving the people with a good government until the end of 
the term; 
 Highest courts selecting interesting moral dilemma cases such as 
“wrongful birth” instead of helping to develop guidelines for the 
most common and urgent conflicts people have; 
 Letting people wait for years before issues are decided that have a 
huge impact on their lives or their businesses. 
Nobody is to blame for these habits. Yes, some practise them more 
fanatically than others. But they have become part of the game everybody 
plays. Within the framework of the old State institutions, these habits 
work for politicians wanting to build their careers and achieve results, for 
media wanting to sell their wares and for judges who want to have good 
relationships with their colleagues in court.  
Yet these habits have enormous costs. Without them, there would 
be more trust in government, less uncertainty and less squandering of re-
sources. Good government is one of the surest ways to enhance economic 
growth. So why not innovate ourselves out of these habits? 
4. Imagining a Board of Trustees 
Let us imagine a board of trustees, with the mission to ensure that the 
working methods of our core State institutions are gradually improved 
and innovated. This is just a thought experiment. There may be many oth-
er ways to get innovation of the State going, but for the moment we will 
assume that an owner of the problem is needed. 
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Getting this done would be really difficult. Such a new institution 
would suffer from similar problems as the old ones. After a good start, 
bad habits would start developing and incentives of the participants would 
take over the steering wheel. The board would need to be selected, would 
need to agree on working methods, would need some powers, a budget 
and much more. All of this would cause headaches and political bicker-
ing, at least under the present rules of the game in most capitals in the 
world.  
In a worst case scenario, such a board would develop into a Su-
preme Council of the Armed Forces such as the one in Egypt or Iranian 
Guardian Council of the Constitution. It might become just another of the 
world’s 4,500 think tanks, soon to be branded as conservative, liberal or 
religious.  
 But not every new and independent institution is a disaster. Central 
banks, specialised courts, international regulatory networks and regulatory 
agencies can contribute to the common good if they have a specific task, 
such as using interest rates to keep inflation in check, dealing with all em-
ployment problems in a country or ensuring food safety. So why not an 
agency that monitors the performance of core State institutions and en-
sures that innovation takes place to improve them if necessary? 
5. Monitoring Core Institutions: Are They Doing What Is Normal? 
One of the problems when monitoring State institutions will be the 
benchmarks. Benchmarks for courts and for parliaments are now develop-
ing. However, they tend to codify the present rules of the game on a com-
parative basis. So, implicitly, they allow all the bad habits that developed 
within the framework of these rules to remain. That is not a good way to 
stimulate innovation. On the contrary, if new parliaments being set up in 
Arab countries follow these benchmarks they are likely to take over all 
our bad habits. Selling our institutions abroad without first updating them 
against the latest viruses is a sure way to lose the remaining trust in the 
Western type of governance.  
The habits in the bulleted list in Section 3 suggest another way of 
monitoring what happens in State institutions. Many of them are habits 
that would be considered bad habits in other parts of life. A company is 
not allowed to mislead the public and to vilify competitors in an adver-
tisement. Agreements to vote always with others would be considered a 
cartel in most places. In my institute, I am supposed to evaluate people on 
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what they achieved on their tasks overall, not on how they handled one is-
sue. Looking for dissent and then blowing it up would be called “gossip” 
in most communities, and engaging in it is a sure career stopper in corpo-
rations, as is hopping from problem to problem and never tackling the real 
issues. Not having a budget ready on time is unthinkable, as is intentional-
ly and openly manipulating the processes for getting a job. 
A board of trustees could prioritise these habits and address them 
one by one, by showing how they relate to norms of cooperation in com-
munities, corporations and the market for goods and services. If the habits 
were out of sync with what happens elsewhere in society, adjusting the 
processes through innovation would be a good idea.  
Most of these habits were never intended to be part of the game an-
yhow. The framers of the constitution and Montesquieu did not foresee 
them. They are the result of creativity of the participants. Rules have to be 
adjusted to weed out bad habits and to level the playing field. Markets 
need regulation (remember the financial crisis?). In cycling, there are now 
rules for the minimum weight of racing bikes and anti-doping rules the 
founders of the Tour de France never considered. Parliaments, the media, 
cabinets and courts need to adjust as well.  
6. Ensuring Innovation  
Innovation is mostly about integrating good habits. Since the 1800s, the 
options for collective decision-making and governing communities have 
broadened enormously. The following habits would be rather high on any 
nomination to be really integrated in a variety of State institutions: 
 Methods for collective dialogue and facilitated interaction instead 
of debate;  
 Collective decision-making by Analytic Hierarchy Process, democ-
racy and many more; 
 Opinion polls as tools to let people participate in prioritising prob-
lems to be solved by governments; 
 Electronic voting on issues in a way that informs government deci-
sion-making; 
 Cost-benefit analysis and SWOT analysis by experts and interaction 
with the broader public in consultation processes; 
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 Methods for deliberative democracy around issues where both spe-
cialised expertise and citizen participation are essential; 
 Mediation and conflict management skills in courts and government 
decision-making; 
 Complaint handling methods. 
Innovation processes could be kick-started in many ways, for ex-
ample leaders of State institutions could be asked about their reform pro-
grammes addressing issues. It would also be good to create some compe-
tition, inviting prototypes for new versions of institutions and to test them. 
For instance, one area of governance such as housing or health care could 
be addressed by State institutions following new rules or entirely new de-
signs. Allocating funds for promising innovations, or engaging social en-
trepreneurs to do this would certainly also be part of the menu. 
7. Conclusion 
If institutions have no owners, we choose to be run by habit, good and 
bad. Relying on checks and balances between imperfect institutions, 
knowing that the game is increasingly manipulated by the participants, is 
not the only option that we have. Innovating our core institutions gradual-
ly is an alternative. We need to retake ownership of how we are governed. 
As a first step, governing our State should be brought in line with the way 
we – and the State – govern our own affairs. 
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20Definite Uncertainties and the Grand Design  
of the Legal System in China 
Ji Weidong* 
The world has become much more complex as a result of globalisa-
tion, which on the one hand frees the market economy from territo-
rial constraints, while on the other hand intensifies competition and 
conflicts of interests among countries. In the globalisation process, 
with incorporates the parallel and concurrent developments of uni-
formity-diversity and harmony-conflict, there have emerged certain 
complex structures. These global complexities and accompanying 
social uncertainties have further worsened since the financial crisis 
erupted in the United States in September 2008. Within this con-
text, the Chinese legal system faces a dilemma: reducing external 
complexity and uncertainty requires rigid binding norms, while 
changing circumstances demand expediencies, which relativize the 
effects of rules. 
Although fierce economic competition caused by globalisation 
enhances public awareness of the importance of the State, and Chi-
na needs to continue the modernisation progress of building a more 
complete sovereignty and a legal community, the political reality 
today is supranational. Moreover, modern capitalist civilisation is at 
a dead end. The recent economic depression is just another vivid 
example of the unsustainable mode of overproduction-overcon-
sumption and the collapse of the finance-driven development mod-
el. The future development pattern of China, therefore, is worth se-
rious exploration and consideration, especially in regard to its fun-
damental elements and institutional structure. 
                                                   
*
 Ji Weidong is Dean and Presiding Chair Professor of KoGuan Law School, Shanghai 
Jiao Tong University, China, since 2008. 
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1. The Dilemma of Promoting Rule-of-Law and Paradigm Innova-
tions 
1.1. Uncertainties and the Role of Policy 
The world has become much more complex as a result of globalisation, 
which on the one hand frees the market economy from territorial con-
straints, while on the other hand intensifies the competition and interests 
of conflicts among countries. Global complexities and social uncertainties 
have further worsened since the financial crisis erupted in the United 
States in September 2008. Under this unprecedented backdrop, the Chi-
nese legal system is in a dilemma: reducing external complexity and un-
certainty requires rigid binding norms, while changing circumstances de-
mand expediencies, which relativize the effects of rules. 
In general, uncertainties can be categorised into three types: 1. 
probabilistic uncertainties, which can be calculated and forecasted based 
on the probability theory (which may be termed ‘risks’); 2. definite uncer-
tainties, which lie completely outside of any rational calculation and pre-
diction (which may be termed fate); and 3. uncontrollable uncertainties, 
that is, a violent and extremely unstable insecurity that undermines the 
structure and functions of the system (in other words, a crisis). From the 
perspective of legal order, the most noteworthy are definite uncertainties, 
because in such situations human behaviour tends to imitate and follow 
the majority, causing a one-sided trend and resonance phenomenon. Since 
legal techniques are diminished and marginalised when we consider defi-
nite uncertainties, the tendency of mutual imitation increases and definite 
uncertainties multiply. In this sense, preventing probabilistic uncertainties 
from deteriorating into definite uncertainties is the key policy priority of 
today’s institution design. To state it in the positive, the rational first step 
is to transform definite uncertainties to probabilistic uncertainties. 
1.2. Inherent Tensions of the Existing Legal System 
In 2011, the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics was offi-
cially declared “basically formed”. A deeper analysis reveals that the Chi-
nese legal system contains inherently diverse and conflicting elements. 
‘Chinese characteristics’ connote local uniqueness and cultural regional-
isms, which directly contradict the generality of modern legal systems, 
participation in global governance, and the contemporary mission of pro-
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moting civilisation change. The term ‘socialist’, in addition, embodies 
non-market factors and an anti-individual liberty disposition against the 
very fundamental concept of personality as the basis of a modern legal 
system. Entangled in confusing relationships of individual, collective, 
State and society, the ill-fated Chinese civil code has therefore been con-
troversial for a long time. To a certain degree, the legal system is sup-
posed to be a closed set of rules; otherwise, formal rationality and norma-
tive effects could not be achieved. In China, on the contrary, the tradition 
of emphasizing differentiated treatment in accordance with QingLiFa (a 
mixture of human feelings, natural justice and statutory rules), the con-
ventional Chinese self-organising mechanisms, and the socialism of popu-
list democracy reinforced by coercive power, display strong openness and 
elasticity. The tension therein manifests itself in the heated debates of 
amending three procedural laws, respectively the civil, criminal and ad-
ministrative procedural laws, in which professionalism versus the mass 
line, the adjudicative power competing against the prosecutorial power are 
just the tip of the iceberg.  
2. The Pitfall of Shirking Responsibility 
2.1. Integration and Judicial Responses 
In order to grease institutional frictions and resolve conflicts of rules, the 
focus of integration efforts should shift from continually strengthening the 
legislative function to effective enforcement and adjudication, especially 
techniques of interpretation which could bridge the gaps between rules 
and facts of individual cases, expanding the protection of rights, and fine-
tuning or even creating special policies and jurisprudence with profes-
sional skills ingeniously applied in an indeterminate legal framework. The 
Chinese judiciary, unfortunately, has taken the opposite approach and has 
further pursued the openness and elasticity of rules. As the intrinsic con-
sistency of the legal system diminishes, uncertainties increase and the 
problems of power-above-the-law continue. 
A sympathetic inquiry into the logic behind the above-mentioned 
phenomenon reveals that the very reason that Chinese political-legal au-
thorities promoted so-called ‘big mediation’ (da tiaojie) practices to han-
dle social uncertainties lies in the impetus for flexibility in law. Within a 
rapidly transforming society such as China, conflicts intensify day by day, 
new controversies emerge endlessly and the fine line of legal-illegal grad-
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ually blurs. It is therefore very hard to make a definite decision under the 
prescribed statutory rules. Mediation and compromise come to adjudica-
tion’s rescue. In the same vein, it is also understandable that the ‘active 
judiciary’ campaign, imbued with specific political connotations and ad-
ministrative influences, was also launched to evade formal litigation and 
seek extra-judicial remedies.  
2.2. The Paradox of the Criterion of People’s Satisfaction with 
Court Performance 
Recently in China there has been a popular idea that judicial performance 
should be evaluated by the degree of people’s satisfaction. A hidden belief 
is that judges could adjust the application of law in accordance with main-
stream attitudes; judges’ discretion is therefore necessary and justified. 
Obviously, this active judicial policy will spur a flock of litigants to take 
advantage of the discretionary area carved out by this, greatly increasing 
communication between courts and the public. In practice, this judicial 
policy has caused Chinese courts trouble: disputants are encouraged to 
race to the courthouse, but judges are left with only outdated mediation 
techniques. As a matter of fact, it is impossible for courts to satisfy every-
one. At least in most cases, half of the parties (the losing party) will be 
discontent with the unfavourable judgment. If courts attempt to please 
everyone, it is nothing but a shackling of themselves. To put it in another 
way, when people’s satisfaction or people’s feelings become criteria by 
which judicial performance is assessed, the administration of justice is 
then reduced to nothing but subjective prejudices and capricious feelings. 
The implied message is that judiciary is insignificant, and the legitimacy 
of judicial authority rests upon public opinion. This is nothing less than 
the deconstruction of the court system, a variant of legal nihilism.  
2.3. Individual Responsibility and Nobody’s Responsibility in ‘Big 
Mediation’  
The State is a certainty supplier in an uncertain world. From disorder to 
order, anarchy to government, the pivot of the evolution is the change 
from definite uncertainties to probabilistic uncertainty, that is, reducing 
uncertainties and increasing certainties. 
When uncertainties increase, in addition to the resort to procedure 
as a solution, more emphasis should be placed on the responsibility re-
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gime, mainly the legal responsibility regime. The Achilles’ heel of the 
current ‘big mediation’ and ‘active judiciary’ movements is that no mean-
ingful responsibility or accountability system could survive. More than 
that, in the name of democratic politics on the basis of individual respon-
sibility, we might find ourselves in the woeful predicament of no one be-
ing responsible for anything. Take the active judiciary movement, for ex-
ample. Courts, supposed to be the last defence of State order, are now on 
the front line. The politicised judicial process draws attention to objective 
standards and firewalls in specific cases, exposing individual judges to 
unknown political consequences and risks. So judges tend to skirt their 
duties and dodge finger-pointing from the society.  
In a well-functioning rule of law system, the legislative power is 
objective-oriented, policy-driven, and tolerant of political compromises; 
the executive power emphasizes hierarchy, efficiency, activism and expe-
dience; whereas the judicial power is premised on law adherence, setting 
the bottom line of institutional fairness. In a specific case, the judiciary is 
only amenable to law and has the final binding say. This principle is the 
requirement of rules synthesis. It makes sure that the reasoning process of 
each judgment can be restored, verified and reproduced, substantiating the 
judicial responsibility system. Without sound, expounded reasons, judges 
cannot decline jurisdiction nor refuse to make decisions simply because of 
the lack of express statutory rules or a particular expertise. After an appel-
late procedure, judicial decisions are final and binding. Only in this man-
ner can a decision-maker be responsible, and can the responsibility be 
clear and certain. 
3. Ochlocracy Induced by Judicial Democratisation 
3.1. Flexibility in Law Application Breeds Judicial Corruption 
The primary side-effect of the ‘active judiciary’ and ‘big mediation’ 
movements in China is the ballooning flexibility of statutory rules, which 
gives free rein to executive power, thus changing probabilistic uncertain-
ties into definite uncertainties. As judicial discretion also expands, it be-
comes quite normal that disputants imitate each other and deliberately put 
pressure on courts through persistent threats and demands, just as a popu-
lar saying vividly describes, “no fuss, no solution; small fuss, small solu-
tion; big fuss, big solution”. As a result, it is the party agreement, instead 
of the general rule of justice, which serves as the legitimising basis of law. 
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The objective and neutral conception of justice eventually evaporates. 
This is the hidden logic of the so-called judicial democratisation. 
Since judicial decision-making is turning into a consensus reached 
on the basis of mediation and settlement, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine judge’s responsibility: the higher the mediated settlement 
rate, the narrower the scope for accountability. There follows naturally an 
epidemic of judicial corruption. Under the responsibility and pressure of 
incorrectly-handled cases, more and more judges would be willing to 
evade their decision-making responsibilities. ‘Big mediation’ is a most 
convenient bypass. With extra-legal measures unbound, no matter how 
much the accountability system is stressed, judges can never be blamed 
for failing to justify their decisions. The line between legal and illegal is 
starkly vague. What we have is the resurgence of unbridled power.  
3.2. The Danger of Judicial Deference to the Public  
If the judicial power degenerates so that it yields to the sham democracy 
of manipulable popular opinions, the spirit of rationality and self-
discipline will wither away, material desires and short-term acts of imme-
diate interests will prevail, and populism and emotive public opinion will 
dominate the public sphere. It might not be long before society regresses 
to ochlocracy. It is the ochlocracy of ‘bread and circuses’ policy, extrava-
gant social gathering in the Palace and bloody carnival at the Coliseum 
that hastened the decline of the Roman Empire. It is also the ochlocracy of 
generous annuity, bloated civil servants and indulging connivance of tax 
frauds and evasions that led to the budget failure and State bankruptcy of 
today’s Greece.  
4. Basic Dimensions of the Rule of Law: Sollen and Coordination 
4.1. Concepts Explained  
The principal cause of ‘active judiciary’ and ‘big mediation’ movements 
in China can be found in the misunderstanding of two fundamental di-
mensions of law. Generally, as rules of conduct, law deals with two types 
of issues: sollen and coordination. These two functions of law are respec-
tively distinctive and should be clearly differentiated. In China, on the 
contrary, there is no explicit distinction, those two are intertwined, mak-
ing impossible conceptual analysis and comparison. In particular, the co-
ordination function of law has long been ignored, resulting in a chronic 
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entanglement of ideology that institutional reforms have failed to shake 
off. 
In this paper, sollen refers to the duty to do the right thing. It con-
cerns value judgment, moral and legitimating elements, and also it relates 
to justifications of compliance. Sollen is closely associated with the cul-
tural tradition and ideology of a society, in Friedrich K. Savigny’s words, 
the ‘national ethos’. As a country attaches great importance to its substan-
tive ethical code and cultural identity, China always emphasizes core val-
ues. Thus sollen is a political priority and focal point of law. The rule of 
property ownership and domestic relationship, for instance, always in-
volves the social conception of justice and moral order. The same applies 
for principles of public order and equitable responsibility. Undoubtedly, 
sollen commands everything, sometimes even against the facts. Dispro-
portionate insistence on a single value or virtue brings out the dark side of 
the self-reinforcement of the said value or virtue, suppressing free and ra-
tional choices. 
On the other hand, the coordination function of law refers to order-
ing on a technical level, favouring certainty and efficiency which has no 
direct and consequent relationship with value judgment. Traffic rules, for 
instance, are different from place to place, but they are all feasible. In it-
self, driving on the right as in China and the United States, could hardly 
be seen as more beneficial than driving on the left, as in Japan and Britain. 
As long as the traffic rule is clear and strictly implemented, the flow of 
vehicles is coordinated and traffic jams and collisions can be avoided. Of 
course legal processes contain sollen elements, but the major function is 
to coordinate conflicting claims, diverse interests and competing values 
on an equal footing, from which arises the best solution. The significance 
of legal procedure is, therefore, to an extent adapting a sophisticated sol-
len problem to a coordination issue and resolving the complicated value 
judgment on a technical and rational basis. 
5. The Adjudicative Power Revisited from the Perspective of Coor-
dination 
5.1. Undo the Mishandled Problems 
However, what we find in reality is always the opposite. Chinese people 
appear to prefer turning any simple dispute into a deep value contest, turn-
ing a coordination issue into a sollen problem, thus transforming technical 
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issues into value-loaded wherein easy questions become complex. The 
dire consequence is the increase of social uncertainties. One cannot help 
thinking that this might be an intended situation that makes fishing in 
troubled waters possible. Equally interestingly, however, we have also 
witnessed incessant supervision drives, mass movements, and vindica-
tions of miscarriages of justice, as if the ruling party were determined to 
clear the muddy water and maintain social certainty. There might be good 
reasons behind these efforts. In any event, if sollen and coordination func-
tions are confused, the latter certainly will be weakened. Once the coordi-
nation function of law is in doubt, the legal order itself is on the verge of 
collapse.  
5.2. Highlighting the Coordination Function and Strengthening the 
Forces of Law 
Besides overcoming defects of the current power structure, the key to 
weak law awareness and non-compliance problems in China is to differ-
entiate the sollen function from the coordination function, give a full ac-
count of the coordination function, and make the law as effective as it 
should be, so that law contains both flexible structure and rigid binding 
effects. In essence, in order to unshackle the judiciary from such value 
judgments as morals, class wills, and State ideology, and make sure that 
judges are only subject to law and insulated from outside influences, we 
should commit ourselves to develop the coordination function of law. 
When the legislature’s majority enacts its will, the courts can conduct 
constitutional review, safeguarding the certainty of the constitutional or-
der and the coherence of the legal system. In this situation, law can have a 
coordination function. When the government abuses its power and in-
fringes upon personal rights, administrative litigation balances the rela-
tionship of the State and the individual, which is also a coordination func-
tion of law. In these circumstances, had rules not been abided by and the 
judiciary not been independent, the inevitable coordination problems 
could not have been resolved and the social order would falter. Sollen 
then would fail too.  
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6. Legislative Sollen and Judicial Coordination 
6.1. Distinguish Ends from Conditions 
It is not difficult to imagine that so-called ‘judicial democratisation’ in 
fact not only twists justice and corrupts democracy, but also misunder-
stands some proper perceptions of democratic ‘judicial participation’. In a 
modern rule of law State, democracy is supposed to concentrate on sollen 
issues, redesigning the institution through, as in Niklas Luhmann’s terms 
a ‘conditional programme’, and expressing public wills through legisla-
tion. The judiciary should concentrate, in comparison, on coordination is-
sues, redesigning the institution through ‘goal-oriented programmes’, and 
bridging individual claims and public wills through such systems and me-
dia as the principle of judicial independence and professional judging 
skills. Meaningful judicial participation is conditioned on the establish-
ment of the procedural fairness principle and the formation of the legal 
community. In any event, it is not the negation of the legal system. In the 
real sense, the judiciary is democratic only when we can discover and 
build anew consensus through concrete trials, transforming reasonable 
demands of individuals, minorities and disadvantaged groups into legal 
terms through case law, and gradually pushing forward institutional re-
forms by way of responsive judicial interpretations different from the leg-
islature. 
6.2. Interaction between Sollen and Coordination 
Considering the judicial function from the perspective of coordination, we 
find that judicial independence is no more than a legal yardstick by which 
power relations are in balance, an institutional brake to control the abuses 
of the legislature and the executive, and a prominent fortress of legitimate 
order and social fairness. It is exactly its independent and neutral status 
that enables judges to stand outside the factual power relations and fulfil 
the sollen function in the process of technical coordination. For judges, 
the right ideology is de-ideologisation; the correct value judgment is val-
ue-neutrality. As to those partisan values, they are better handled at the 
levels of government or law firms. When it comes to such sollen issues 
like political democracy, the people’s congress should be the right forum 
for deliberations. Obviously the legislature should also perform the coor-
dination function, especially on issues of determining taxes, tax rates, and 
re-distributional budget planning. Above all, the legislature should pay 
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more attention to transforming sollen into positive rules in clear terms and 
to balancing or determining the appropriate sollen to coordinate and regu-
late social relations. 
7. The Chart of Democracy and the Anchor of Rule of Law in the 
Financial Crisis 
7.1. Uncertainties and Governmental Credibility  
When conceiving the future legal order, we should never forget that the 
world is undergoing great changes. What we are facing is a global struc-
tural transformation. 
The political domino has toppled – like the fall of the Berlin Wall – 
in North Africa and the Middle East since the Tunisian event in early 
2011. Greater shock waves, however, came from developed countries. 
The US dollar devaluation, the EU debt crisis and the Japanese trade defi-
cit have collectively triggered an epidemic of credit disturbances early this 
year, followed by a rapid gravitational shift of the global monetary system 
to the East and the South. Ever since the abolition of the gold standard in 
1971, currencies have been guaranteed by governmental credit. But as the 
explosion of financial derivatives and futures trading on the exchange 
market, intervention and guidance measures adopted by government and 
central banks have all proven ineffective. Even government bonds become 
risky. It is therefore not surprising that the governmental credibility of de-
veloped countries is on the verge of breakdown. Moreover, representative 
democracy and constituency structure also make it hard for countries to 
cut deficits through higher taxes. Instead, as John M. Keynes pointed out, 
inflation as a disguised form of taxation becomes popular. Inflation, how-
ever, leading to local currency devaluation and relative appreciation of 
foreign currencies, has also become an alternative tool to adjust trade bal-
ances. All these increase social uncertainties. 
7.2. The Rule of Law Should Take Priority Over Democracy, 
Especially Now in China 
The megatrend has brought China unprecedented pressure, painful lessons 
from which to learn, and at the same time presented a significant and stra-
tegic opportunity. If, against this backdrop, we forecast China’s develop-
ment after 2012, it is important to realise that building and maintaining 
governmental credibility is the key point. In China, although the economy 
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is relatively strong, the rich-poor divide widens further; improving in-
vestment environment and fairly distributing social wealth are now top 
priorities. Thus government credibility is more than ever dependent on ef-
ficient and equitable ordering, that is, rule of law and democracy. But in a 
country such as China where the local government debts now account for 
30 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and substantive appre-
ciation of the Chinese Yuan can in no circumstances exceed 30 per cent, 
chaotic mass politics and ‘big mediation’ will probably twist the process 
of democratisation, increase social uncertainties and may even lead to the 
collapse of the system and social anomie. Thus, top-level design of the 
political reform should simply focus on coordination issues, prioritise rule 
of law (especially judicial justice), and clarify the detailed roadmap from 
rule of law to stable democracy.  
As to the power structure in China, if the People’s Congress and 
governmental departments could be viewed as representing the majority, 
it is equally important to recognise that the judiciary represents the minor-
ity, individuals and the disadvantaged. The majority’s interests could be 
secured either through legislative procedures or in the name of the public 
interest protected through the executive implementation, but dissenting 
voices of the minority, especially of a common citizen, would hardly be 
reflected in the system even it is reasonable and correct. Only in court can 
every opinion be carefully heard and a way of incorporation into the 
framework of the system found. Especially in a relatively centralised gov-
ernment structure, judicial independence could clearly delimit the bounda-
ries of power while providing institutional validity for the basis of power. 
Moreover, if judgments are made after considering special conditions and 
reasonable claims of the parties involved, it may as well remedy the loop-
holes of law and administrative measures. In and only in this sense, can 
the judiciary limit and correct the legislature and the executive to some 
extent, and be the lever for the minorities and individuals to promote so-
cial progress and institutional changes. This is the reason why the demo-
cratic process of legislation and the judicial independence are indispensa-
ble to each other. 
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21Openness and Transparency  
in Central and Eastern Europe:  
Building Sustainable Governance? 
Dacian C. Dragos 
Very often, countries from Eastern Europe adopt state of the art 
legislation which is then difficult to implement due to factors such 
as limited administrative capacity coupled with differences between 
urban and rural areas, resistance to change within the bureaucratic 
machinery, passiveness on behalf of the citizens, et cetera. Imple-
mentation thus becomes the missing link in public administration 
reforms in these countries. Challenges remain as to the timing, ac-
curateness and worth of the information disclosed, especially due to 
the fact that the experience of these nations had led to a genuine 
distrust of citizens in their governments. My think piece looks at 
trends in the foreseeable evolution of the practice of transparency in 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, in the context of the 
ongoing debate on closing the gap between regulation and imple-
mentation of transparency laws. I believe that the culture of secrecy 
will be hard to overcome, but the trend of advancing transparency 
incrementally, through e-government tools, will continue. Institu-
tionally, the preeminence of Ombudsman-type institutions will be 
the trend, and they will act both as mediators and enforcers of 
transparency. A sort of proceduralisation of transparency will be 
noticed also in the future, with different regulations brought togeth-
er for increased clarity and effectiveness. The role of the media will 
continue to be strong; meanwhile a more active civil society will 
mark a shift in the effective oversight of transparency. 
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1. Introduction 
Europe has long had a tradition of practicing discreet and confidential 
administration (Sweden being an exception). Only around the 1960s the 
principle of openness of administration started to develop in Western de-
mocracies. Nowadays this principle has gained the status of the highest 
standards of administration; it is enshrined in constitutions and is even 
considered a fundamental right. 
Transparency was expected to be among the first priorities of the 
new regimes from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), in transition after 
the 1989 changes. However, transparency legislation was adopted only 
around year 2000 (Czech Republic 1999, Bulgaria and Slovakia 2000, 
Romania and Poland 2001, Croatia and Slovenia 2003, Serbia 2004, Mon-
tenegro 2005), with the exception of Hungary (1992). Fundamental laws 
either preceded this development by declaring the right to access public 
information (for instance, in Poland, Romania), or were amended after 
Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA) were in place, as recognition of the 
highest level of interest for transparency as a political freedom or right. 
The preoccupation of many Central European and former Soviet countries 
with reviving their own national legal traditions played a role here, while 
adopting and integrating international practices and trends were of sec-
ondary interest.  
More difficult was the implementation of the new laws, as it is 
common knowledge that implementation is the ‘missing link’ of public 
administration reform in these countries. Questions remain about the tim-
ing, accurateness and worth of the information disclosed, especially due to 
the fact that the experience of these nations had led to a genuine distrust 
of citizens in their governments.  
2. Implementing Transparency Laws in CEE: a (Insurmountable) 
Challenge? 
The sole presence of the rules of transparency in a legal system does not 
guarantee their application and effectiveness. CEE countries have re-
established pre-communist legal regimes inspired by Western ideals or 
adopted new regimes inspired by contemporary Western regulations. In 
any case, revered French, German and Anglo Saxon legal systems are 
used as models for this part of Europe. Against this background, it is 
noteworthy that resistance to change plays a very important role in CEE 
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legal systems, and the fact that Western Europe is struggling as well to ef-
fectively implement transparency laws is not helping either. Governments 
from the new EU members feel encouraged in their secrecy by the fact 
that role-model jurisdictions like UK and Germany have only recently 
adopted FOIA legislation, and the implementation process is subjected to 
criticism everywhere. Even the country with the most developed regime 
of transparency, the USA, is struggling to get back on track after years of 
decline in the name of national security. 
The development of transparency rules has stretched from being 
handled as part of human rights stemming from international treaties (data 
protection, access to public information), to being part of the principle of 
good governance. 
The initial passive and minimal disclosure of information – basic 
data on public authorities – has been replaced gradually by pro-active 
transparency, the result of increased pressure for more relevant infor-
mation about processes, procedures and outcomes. Specific regulations 
imposed by the EU have contributed as well – especially in areas like 
public procurement. A final stage was reached by adding civic participa-
tion to passive disclosure (Hungary, for instance, adopted a sunshine law 
only in 2010).  
On the other hand, the process of developing norms of transparency 
was hindered by the development, alongside or even prior to that, of rules 
for protection of classified information and government secrecy. Thus, the 
FOIA in Poland has tailed the already (too) well designed laws about pro-
tection of personal data and of confidential information, while the Roma-
nian FOIA was soon after adoption crippled by an extensive law on classi-
fied information. Such sequence gave rise to an unfavourable environment 
for the new legal culture being brought into light, that of openness in gov-
ernmental dealings, and affected its effectiveness. 
The evolution was markedly influenced either by strong Ombuds-
man type institutions (for instance in Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia 
and Poland) or by (constitutional) court rulings. Furthermore, the devel-
opment of the regulatory framework of transparency granted new tools for 
political parties to compete on the public scene, by asking for public in-
formation and fighting in courts to get it – thus unintentionally assisting 
its dissemination.  
An important challenge with regard to implementation is the exist-
ence of universal provisions for all public authorities, irrespective of their 
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administrative capacity, existing cultural and social characteristics of pub-
lic participation and communication in urban/rural communities as well as 
the relationship between the central and the local tiers of the government. 
Applying the same procedures to achieve transparency to central govern-
ment and local government is sometimes a bad idea, as the results are 
quite different. The lack of administrative capacity at the local level of 
government entitles specific approaches towards how transparency is to 
be achieved.  
The laws of transparency are considered one of the main tools to 
fight against corruption, which is both a plague that still impairs govern-
mental performance in CEE countries and a catchword for the dialectic of 
reform in government. The role of the media is very important in this re-
gard. Many legal systems have promoted special rights to information for 
representatives of media, with shorter deadlines and steeper penalties for 
non-disclosure. The idea behind this is to encourage mass dissemination 
in order to leave less room for individual encounters between citizens and 
administration. For instance, in Poland, the Press Law has played a dis-
tinct role in fostering transparency of governmental activities but also in 
shaping perceptions of citizens about governmental performance.  
A general assessment of the implementation of transparency laws 
would come to the conclusion that practice is way behind regulations. 
Controlling mechanisms, when available, are based too much on the civil 
society as opposed to internal administrative control. Judicial review, alt-
hough available, is not often effective due to the loopholes that can divert 
the final outcome – public authorities disregarding or resisting court deci-
sions, finding ways to get around the imposed obligations, while lengthy 
court proceedings are a deterrent to possible litigants. 
Public authorities often satisfy only formal requirements but do not 
provide essential information to interested persons. Aside from the ambi-
guities coming from the wording of FOIAs themselves, which usually do 
not benefit from supplementary enforceable guidelines, public offices 
regularly hide behind provisions of other specific statutes in order to ex-
plain the failure to provide an interested person with certain information. 
Public hearing is treated instrumentally by the government, and policy 
measures and regulations are adopted without prior consultations or only 
after formal ones (for instance, one practice is selecting participants to 
justify decisions already taken). In Slovenia, for instance, in spite of hav-
ing procedures for impact assessment in place, two thirds of all draft regu-
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lations submitted to ministries, government and parliament are not sub-
jected to transparency prior to adoption; the fact that there is a low de-
mand for transparency and a low interest in public debates does not help 
either. 
Scholars unequivocally agree that the explanation for resistance to 
implementation of transparency laws is the lack of a culture of openness, 
participation and the low esteem for public accountability as a concept.  
However, the rhetoric of the governments in CEE countries is im-
pressive: it shows commitment to transparency, initiative in assessing its 
effectiveness, and willingness to improve. Many policy papers and de-
claratory statements are evidence of this trend: the decision of many gov-
ernments in the region (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, Mon-
tenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, Bulgaria) to join the Open Government 
Partnership initiative (initiated by Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, 
Philippines, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States in 2011) 
is meant to improve access to data, efficiency of the State administration 
and to encourage public participation in decision-making processes at na-
tional level. These aims involve further regulation but also, more im-
portantly, implementation of existing regulations. 
The gap between regulation and implementation is best showcased 
by the evaluation of transparency laws performed by outside experts. In 
September 2011, the Spanish-based organisation Access Info and the US-
based Centre for Law and Democracy conducted a detailed analysis of the 
legal framework for the right to information in 89 countries around the 
world. The evaluation criteria included: the right to access, sending re-
sponse procedures, exemptions, rejections, appeals, penalties and promo-
tion of the law. Serbian law was ranked first, although the watchdog of its 
implementation, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance 
and Personal Data Protection argues in its reports that implementation is 
faltering due to arbitrariness and abuse of public authorities when tagging 
information as confidential (which cannot be reviewed by the Commis-
sioner), when refusing to comply with decisions of the Commissioner and 
when adopting a purely passive approach to transparency.  
In spite of implementation deficiencies, a certain progress cannot be 
denied or overlooked. The result of court cases and pressure from NGOs 
has advanced the implementation process. There are more and more ap-
peals to review bodies (administrative or judiciary) in matters of transpar-
ency, and the case law is aiding the development of best practices. The 
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press (itself constantly evolving towards independence) has always re-
vealed affairs of corruption using transparency inquiries. The proactive 
transparency has improved as well, due to the promotion of e-government. 
Generally, more and more public authorities are publishing reports online.  
As a result of pressure from civil society (mostly NGOs), public 
sector organisations have become more responsive and aware of their re-
sponsibilities (this is true especially in the case of those organisations crit-
icised in the evaluation reports drawn by NGOs). The motivating factor 
may have been in many cases the fear of being exposed by NGOs as being 
in non-compliance, but nonetheless, improvements are noticeable.  
At their end, citizens have become more educated and aware of 
their rights in their relationship with public authorities. Citizens in urban 
areas are becoming more demanding and tend to hold public authorities 
accountable for how decisions are made at the local level. 
3. The Future of Transparency Laws and their Implementation 
Resistance to change will be an important reality in CEE democracies for 
the next 20 years, and it will constantly influence the way in which trans-
parency laws are implemented. In this context, advancement of transpar-
ency is to be achieved by personal commitment of those holding public 
office. This regards both public authorities that apply the law and those 
that oversee the process.  
Another factor contributing to the enforcement of transparency laws 
is the degree of involvement and the strength of NGOs or other represent-
atives of civil society. CEE countries have yet to develop a culture of par-
ticipation in public matters that would bear up a better involvement of cit-
izens in administrative proceedings. This can be achieved through educa-
tion, but also through effective enforcement of existing regulations, under 
the pressure of the civil society and media. 
Watchdogs of transparency are very important for the enforceability 
of these laws. Some legal systems in the area have both Ombudsman-type 
institutions and courts to deal with litigation stemming from failure to im-
plement transparency provisions. However, understaffing, under-
financing, politicisation and other shortcomings hinder the effectiveness 
of such (independent) institutions. This is the point where the lack of po-
litical will to subject public institutions to an effective scrutiny is the most 
obvious. It will always depend on the personal abilities and commitment 
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of an officeholder (Ombudsman, Commissioner, Head of an agency) to 
make a dent in the secrecy of the government, as governments are hardly 
going to be initiators in the process of openness and transparency. The 
level of activism of the watchdogs is paramount for the success for im-
plementation. This should be fading gradually leaving room for the devel-
opment of more stable institutions, which would act in a consistent and 
linear manner, fulfilling legitimate expectations. 
For some countries in the region (Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, 
Macedonia), accession to the EU can also be an incentive for better im-
plementation of transparency laws, at least in the short term. Thus, lack of 
domestic political will for administrative reform and transparency could 
be replaced by external commitment to adoption of acquis, including the 
rule of law standards. For the rest of the countries in the region that are al-
ready members of the EU, a strong factor of development will be the pro-
cess of Europeanisation of administrative law, and through it, of the 
transparency procedures. 
Extensive legislative action on the harmonisation of other laws with 
the provisions of FOIAs should be undertaken. Effective implementation 
of transparency requirements could be enhanced by their inclusion in a 
general procedural administrative law, so as to form the day-to-day oper-
ating procedures for public officials, and not a special procedure, provided 
for by a special law. This codification can be part of the process of har-
monisation envisaged above. 
Large scale re-evaluation of information classified as secret or con-
fidential should also be carried out. Clear guidelines on how to assess the 
public-private interest in disclosure and which information is worth keep-
ing secret are necessary, both for those who apply the law and for those 
who enforce it. 
Amended FOIA laws should take into consideration empowering, 
where not already the case, a Transparency (or Public Information) Om-
budsman to look into the legality of classification decisions, in order to 
better advise petitioners about the likelihood of public information being 
wrongly withheld from disclosure. This would encourage the use of court 
actions against such administrative acts, which now are risky to take to 
court. I consider this institution-building to be a trend in CEE countries. 
The interplay between freedom of information and data protection 
will be very important for the future of transparency as well. The use of 
personal data protection to justify non-disclosure of important public in-
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formation is a preferred scapegoat for public bodies. With the increased 
use of internet in commercial transactions, the pressure to protect personal 
data will come more and more from the private sector, so I foresee a trend 
(at least in the near future) in giving pre-eminence to data protection over 
access to public information. The explanation is that data protection was 
neglected until recently, and there is the drive to catch up with the free-
dom of information, which sometimes intrudes in the personal life of per-
sons. In the long run, an optimal balance has to be struck between the 
public access to information and data protection. 
Implementation in local government (especially in rural areas which 
lack administrative capacity the most) could be enhanced provided that 
local authorities are given more discretion with regard to how certain pro-
visions can be implemented (flexibility in the choice of policy tools); 
then, more discretion should be complemented by increased sanctions for 
non-compliance and their effective enforcement. 
Transparency will be increasing inevitably due to technology and 
due to incremental professionalisation in public administration. The eco-
nomic crisis has given opportunity for reform, and increased transparency 
is demanded due to limited public resources. 
It is expected that public administration will be more and more 
forced to implement the emerging legal and policy standards regarding 
openness and accountability of public administration. Pressure from the 
media and civil society organisations should also be taken into considera-
tion. They can serve as a tool for fostering and stimulating modernisation 
of public administration by putting pressure on public bodies to imple-
ment policies of transparency and accountability. 
The constant development of e–government shall be the most obvi-
ous assistance to transparency, because it allows citizens to monitor the 
dealings of the government more easily and fosters participation in public 
affairs. 
The Europeanisation of administrative law is a prominent issue in 
public administration, and it also covers many aspects of administrative 
law. National courts are engaged in shaping smooth paths for the applica-
tion of good governance principles, including transparency in administra-
tion. The pressure of the European Commission in areas subjected to har-
monisation will also be important for the overall advancement of trans-
parency.  
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As part of various initiatives to promote the open government, a 
trend will be the attempt at uniformisation of databases in order to allow 
searches. A number of important data files will be transferred to systems 
that comply with open data standards, to ensure that anyone can freely in-
corporate this data in their work and publish it, particularly through auto-
mated computer processing. The laws of transparency are most likely to 
incorporate such requirements on the occasion of their amendment. 
The concept of “open data” will be at the heart of future incentives 
for open government, both regulatory and operationally. This involves 
technical openness (data published electronically in a standard machine-
readable format), legal openness (data published under an open license), 
availability and originality (individual data storages are published as a 
whole and unchanged; based on that statistics can be calculated) and 
structured data (the cataloguing of data in order to facilitate searching). 
As for the legal education and training of future lawyers, the “law 
of transparency” will gain in importance both in initial education and in 
on-the-job training. It affects firstly public law but has far reaching conse-
quences for the private law as well. Through field regulations, soft law 
and case law, the European Commission and the Court of Justice, respec-
tively, will have an instrumental role in promoting transparency in gov-
ernment in this region, probably more evidently than in Western democ-
racies. 
4. Conclusions 
The data shows that in countries which effectively implement transparen-
cy laws politicians are less likely to be corrupt, and those that are corrupt 
are more likely to be caught. A former judge of the US Supreme Court, 
Louis Brandeis, once stated that “sunlight is said to be the best of disin-
fectants”. I fully agree with that, and this is the reason why I consider the 
issue of transparency as being at the core of any future reform of adminis-
trative law in CEE countries. However, in the near future, CEE countries 
will not encounter any far-reaching and spectacular developments that 
will significantly improve openness of government, for there are no social 
or institutional actors able to initiate such changes and to coordinate their 
implementation. Alternatively, at best, one may expect incremental re-
forms concerning particular problems (exempli gratia improving the qual-
ity of the law on access to public information and its implementation). 
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4.4. 
______ 
22The Future of Preventive Detention  
Under International Law 
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross* 
This think piece will argue that fervent hopes to the contrary not-
withstanding, policies relating to the preventive detention of violent 
non-State actors (VNSAs) will not end any time soon because the 
challenge posed by violent non-State actors will not end any time 
soon. What this think piece will not argue is that preventive deten-
tion of VNSAs is unproblematic. Rather, it will explore the line of 
argument that the issue of VNSAs that resemble a transnational 
military adversary in fact raises very specific problems. The pre-
ventive detention of VNSAs is undeveloped within international 
law, and has evolved only in the most ad hoc manner in US law. 
However, preventive detention by the United States or other West-
ern powers is treated in mainstream discourse as though it is the 
worst of all options, when it is far from that, and this sanctimonious 
approach has helped give birth to a number of dangerous fictions 
with perverse second-order consequences.  
1. Preventive Detention in International Law 
Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings 
Institution, notes that “enemy combat detention is as old as warfare”.
1
 The 
reason is obvious: concern that a soldier or “unlawful combatant”, if re-
leased, will return to the fight. Detention of combatants in armed conflict 
thus has a preventive rather than punitive function and has traditionally 
been uncontroversial within international law. The third Geneva Conven-
tion explicitly contemplates the detention of enemy combatants until “the 
cessation of active hostilities”. However, following the attacks of 11 Sep-
tember 2001 and the wars against VNSAs that the terrorist attacks set in 
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motion, detention policy became highly controversial, so much so that 
Western countries are now clearly ashamed to utilise their power to de-
tain. No Western nation-States other than the United States will do so in 
the course of “war on terror” operations. 
The post-9/11 fight against al Qaeda and affiliated organisations has 
contained elements of anti-terror policing and also military force. After 
the attacks, the US Congress passed an act on the Authorisation for the 
Use of Military Force (AUMF), and in the US the idea that the country is 
at war has been affirmed by two presidential administrations of different 
parties, six different Congresses and the Supreme Court. In other words, 
no branch of the US government disputes that military force is one ele-
ment of fighting al Qaeda and its affiliates. NATO partners similarly af-
firmed this by devoting troops to toppling the Taliban, the de facto rulers 
of Afghanistan who had sheltered al Qaeda, and undertaking stability op-
erations thereafter. 
However, the controversy over detention arose because this was a 
new kind of armed conflict, fraught with new problems. Several aspects 
of this new conflict made the traditional law of detention a poor fit, in-
cluding the fact that al Qaeda operatives did not wear uniforms and confu-
sion over what cessation of active hostilities means in this context. If al 
Qaeda really poses a generational challenge, as many observers claim, 
does that mean that individuals who supported al Qaeda and were picked 
up on the battlefield – even low level supporters – could be detained for a 
an entire generation? 
These questions are difficult. However, the fact that formulating an-
swers is hard does not mitigate the concern driving preventive detention: 
combatants who are released may well return to the fight. This can in fact 
be illustrated by recidivism amongst released detainees. In December 
2010, the US’s Director of National Intelligence released an unclassified 
summary of intelligence on recidivism, concluding that of 598 detainees 
transferred from Guantánamo, “81 (13.5 per cent) are confirmed and 69 
(11.5 per cent) are suspected of re-engaging in terrorist or insurgent ac-
tivities after transfer”.2 Though some analysts have questioned the relia-
bility of these numbers, the fact that some percentage of released detain-
ees have returned to the fight is beyond dispute. 
                                                   
2
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Summary of the Reengagement 
of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 2010. 
 The Future of Preventive Detention Under International Law 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 259 
Now, it is well known that no new detainees have been admitted to 
the Guantánamo Bay detention facility in years. However, this does not 
mean that the US and its allies will no longer need a detention policy. 
There remain broad geographic areas where the fight against al Qaeda, its 
affiliates, and fellow travellers resembles armed conflict more than a po-
licing operation. These include Somalia, where al Qaeda’s affiliate al 
Shabaab was until recently the dominant military force in the southern 
part of the country; Yemen, where al Qaeda until recently was so power-
ful that it could impose its harsh justice as the dominant force in the 
Abyan province; and Mali. Mali is perceived as of particular concern by 
Europeans. As a senior Western diplomat serving in the capital told a re-
gionally-based journalist, “If Islamists continue to control vast areas of 
Mali where they can do what they like, then this will pose a direct threat 
to Europe”.
3
 
Military action to clear out al Qaeda strongholds in any of these ar-
eas will involve detention. Even if Western countries are not in the lead of 
military operations, preventive detention remains relevant. If Western 
countries refuse to engage in detention then, far from having clean hands, 
they are affirmatively choosing to let local partners shoulder detention re-
sponsibilities. After all, the alternatives to detention are simply unac-
ceptable. One alternative involves an absolute preference for killing over 
capturing the enemy force. At the other end of the spectrum, catching and 
releasing enemy fighters rather than detaining them will result in a profu-
sion of conflicts that nation-States abiding by the norms of international 
law cannot win. 
2. Guantánamo Bay 2012 
I undertook field research for this chapter at the Guantánamo Bay deten-
tion facility in July 2012. The last time I had been there was October 
2006. During the previous visit, personnel were quick to point to positive 
aspects of the detainees’ treatment, but I was left with a great many ques-
tions, in part due to recent incidents between the detainees and guards. 
In May 2006, detainees had mounted a surprise attack on guards in 
Gitmo’s Camp Four, which featured communal living. One detainee ap-
peared to be attempting suicide, and when guards rushed in to thwart the 
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attempt, they were ambushed by inmates wielding fan blades and broken 
light fixtures as weapons. The following month, three detainees did com-
mit suicide by hanging themselves with nooses comprised of sheets and 
clothing. 
The changes in the intervening six years have been significant. De-
tainees can be divided into those whose behaviour is generally compliant 
with the rules, and those who are non-compliant. In 2006, about 80 per 
cent of detainees were non-compliant, a percentage that has basically re-
versed since then. Several independent interviews with Gitmo officials es-
tablished that compliance rates at Camps Five and Six, the two remaining 
camps for conventional detainees, were now about 80 per cent (those 
dubbed “high-value detainees” are kept in Camp Seven, which is off lim-
its to the media). The increase in compliance rates can be seen by detain-
ees’ living patterns. Today, Camp Six, which is modelled on a prison in 
Lenawee County, Michigan, is entirely comprised of communal living, 
while Camp Five, modelled on a prison in Terre Haute, Indiana, features 
both single-cell detention and also a communal wing. 80 per cent of de-
tainees are held in communal living areas, which is seen as a reward for 
compliant behaviour. 
I spoke at length with Zak, a senior cultural adviser of Jordanian 
origin at the detention facilities. He thought that much of the change in 
compliance was because detainees had been given a different incentive 
structure. “By listening to the detainees over the years, we have managed 
to understand how to give them something valuable”, he said. When Zak 
first arrived in 2005, detainees were perhaps given one hour of recreation 
out of their cells; now they have 20 hours of access per day to the recrea-
tion yard at Camp Six. In addition to outdoor time, those in communal liv-
ing facilities are given 24 hours a day of free movement within the block 
where they live (see Figure 1, illustrating communal living facilities in 
Camp Six).  
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Figure 1:  Communal Living Facilities in Camp Six 
Detainees have been given access to television, allowed to watch 20 
different stations. Their library contains over 30,000 books; and they are 
provided with educational classes that include language classes, personal 
health and wellness, computer classes, art classes, and, most quixotically, 
courses on job interviews and resume writing. From Zak’s perspective, 
expanding detainees’ freedom of choice has been critical to increasing 
their compliance. “They want to go to class, we give them class”, he said. 
Further, although the Bush administration attempted to evade judi-
cial review when it first set up its system of detention, various layers of 
review have developed. No new detainees have been admitted to Gitmo in 
years, so it is not clear if the Department of Defense would utilise the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) which are meant to deter-
mine whether detainees were properly designated enemy combatants. Af-
ter all, the process provided by CSRTs was panned by the Supreme Court 
in its 2008 decision Boumediene v. Bush. Nonetheless, all current detain-
ees have been through the CSRT process. 
Detainees are then given habeas rights in federal district courts to 
challenge the legality of their detention. The district courts have reviewed 
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detention decisions as original finders of fact, providing no deference to 
the CSRT determinations. Thereafter, an executive order provides a fur-
ther layer of process both to detainees who are designated for continued 
law of war detention (there are 48 whom the Obama administration will 
not prosecute due to evidentiary issues, but will continue to detain be-
cause intelligence assessments conclude that they would be serious threats 
if released) and those who have been referred for prosecution. Under this 
order, detainees can challenge their detention before an inter-agency Peri-
odic Review Board (PRB) that will determine whether detention remains 
“necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the 
United States”. Detainees have a right to counsel before the PRB, which 
undertakes a file review every six months, and holds a full hearing before 
the board every three years. 
Is this system ideal? Of course not. It was forged on an ad hoc ba-
sis, carved out primarily by US Supreme Court decisions holding that the 
legal processes provided for detainees were inadequate, as well as by a 
few executive orders. In some ways, the present system is designed to 
produce absurd results. For example, there are dual tracks for detainees 
whom the administration does not want to release outright, one punitive 
and one preventive. Because detainees who are treated punitively will be 
released when their sentences are up, this raises the strong possibility that 
detainees who have committed war crimes will be freed prior to those 
who have not. 
There are also serious questions about the contours of preventive 
detention of VNSAs. In a conventional war, there is no real uncertainty 
about who the enemy is, while in the fight against al Qaeda, there is no 
clear and well-established definition of who qualifies for belligerent de-
tention. This substantially increases the risk that someone will be detained 
long-term who should not be if there were clearer guidance. A second 
problem is that in conventional armed conflicts, the warring parties may 
not know when the conflict will end, but everyone involved can be rela-
tively certain that the war will not last 30 years. There is inherently an end 
state that is far less than a lifetime. However, in the context of the war on 
terror, the principle that detention is justified for the duration of the hostil-
ities produces a potentially very troubling result. A third problem, as Wit-
tes notes, is that the present system of habeas review does not give either 
the detainees or the government what they need: 
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The emerging system consistently fails to give the detainees 
what they really need from a system of review. For the de-
tainees, after all, speed is of the essence. The innocent de-
tainee rounded up by mistake has an abiding interest in get-
ting before whatever adjudication mechanism there is rela-
tively quickly and having a chance to make his case in a rea-
sonable period of time.
4
 
Needless to say, speed is not one of the present system’s virtues. 
Moreover, from the government’s perspective, Wittes notes that “certainty 
and predictability” are of key importance, and yet the habeas system is 
forging rules as it goes along, which is the very antithesis of certainty and 
predictability. 
For these reasons, when I spoke with William Lietzau, the US’s 
deputy assistant secretary of defense for rule of law and detainee policy, 
he said that the detention of VNSAs is an unsettled area of law. To 
Lietzau, clearly defined and developed rules govern the prosecution of 
VNSAs under the law of peace (lex generalis). The Geneva Conventions 
have forged a well-defined body of law governing the detention of privi-
leged belligerents under the law of war (lex specialis). However, when it 
comes to unprivileged belligerents such as VNSAs, the applicable body of 
law is largely undefined. Lietzau has even designed a chart, which has be-
come famous among his colleagues, illustrating the law’s lack of devel-
opment (see Figure 2 below). 
3. Conclusion  
The problems relating to forging a law of detention appropriate to VNSAs 
are many. However, the clear problems that exist do not mean that deten-
tion is the worst among a suite of hard choices for dealing with VNSAs. 
This is where the issue of perverse incentives becomes relevant. For one 
thing, if preventive detention is seen as an option that truly must be 
avoided, we must ask whether that will incentivise killing over capturing 
the opponent. As Wittes writes, “the increasing prevalence of kill opera-
tions rather than captures is probably not altogether unrelated to the fun-
damental change in the incentive structure facing our fighters and covert 
operatives”.
5
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Figure 2:  The law’s lack of development, according to Lietzau 
Second, there is the question of whether detainees will end up in 
worse conditions due to the stigmatisation of detention by Western gov-
ernments. One overarching idea that has taken hold in our discussion of 
detention policy is that detention of VNSAs by Western governments is 
always unjustifiable and immoral, and local detention is preferable. How-
ever, when one compares detention conditions in Afghanistan or Somalia 
to those in Gitmo, the fiction at play here becomes apparent. As I stated 
previously, even if Western countries are not in the lead of military opera-
tions, preventive detention remains relevant, though it will be carried out 
not by Western powers, but rather by nation-States that will almost cer-
tainly have a far lower standard for detainee treatment. So the question 
must be asked whether the stigmatisation of preventive detention, rather 
than having a salutary effect on human rights, is in fact eroding them in 
important – but to international observers, somewhat invisible – ways.  
In the foreseeable future, little is likely to change with respect to 
preventive detention policy. Obama indeed came into office determined to 
close down Gitmo, but his views on the matter evolved after he had dug 
more deeply into the relevant details. The claim that only “vehement con-
gressional opposition” stands in the way of closing Gitmo is just one of 
the many fictions that dominates the debate over preventive detention. 
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Even if Obama had moved the detainees to Illinois, the actual problems 
attendant on detention would not go away. 
And thus it will remain. There will continue to exist both the pre-
ventive detention that activists and the international community grumble 
about (Gitmo) and the detention that they ignore but is in fact significant-
ly worse (Bagram, Somalia, and other local detentions). Unless our dis-
cussion of preventive detention matures significantly, the perverse incen-
tives, absurdities within the law, and questions about legal protections 
will remain unanswered. 
A more mature discussion would acknowledge the values that have 
driven preventive detention, and seek to determine when detention is jus-
tified as compared to other options: prosecution in military or civilian 
courts, kinetic military action, or simple release of the individuals in ques-
tion. This discussion would acknowledge the second-order consequences 
of severely discouraging detention across the board, such as the potential 
for incentivising kills over captures or leaving detainees in worse condi-
tions when they are held by ostensibly preferable local partners. From the 
recognition that detention will sometimes be justified, this discussion 
would attempt to alter the law governing it to remove aspects that do not 
make sense – such as the likelihood that war criminals will be released be-
fore those who have not committed war crimes – and truly address the 
hard issues. Those hard issues include establishing who qualifies for bel-
ligerent detention under a detention regime, and addressing the fact that 
cessation of hostilities may not occur during our lifetime. It would seek to 
build a system that includes speedy and predictable adjudication. 
However, this mature discussion is exceedingly unlikely. The 
shame that Western countries feel about detention policy will probably 
shunt these questions to the side as everyone rushes to cleanse their hands 
of the matter – and in so doing, most likely allows an even worse system 
to remain. 
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4.5. 
______ 
23Changes in the Administration of Justice 
Benjamin J. Odoki* 
The future developments of law will be as a reaction to many of the 
challenges that we are already facing today. Scarcity in terms of re-
sources such as food, water and energy will both force States to 
look outwards in search of these resources and compel them to look 
inwards in order to build stronger relationships with neighbours for 
security purposes and convenience. This, combined with the disap-
pointment of a divided and uni-polar international community, will 
lead to a growth in stronger regional networks. These networks will 
move to consolidate resources, economies and ultimately power, 
anchored by a common legal system, based on legal pluralism. The 
laws will be inspired by a common/civil law-based tradition with 
less emphasis on customary law which will be deemed out of touch 
with modern society. This modern judiciary will rely heavily on the 
advantages provided by technology in terms of both substance and 
processes.  
1. Introduction 
Law has always had to take account of the fact of change in order to re-
main relevant and continue serving a purpose In society. The way we live, 
interact and communicate is all subject to change, and the law which gov-
erns all of these aspects has to adapt to the constantly changing reality and 
the new challenges that it brings. Most of these changes will be precipitat-
ed by continuing globalisation, which has already changed considerably 
the actors in society, their respective interests, demands and expectations, 
their interrelations and the way they interact. The world is now connected 
in ways that would have been unimaginable three decades ago. The law 
has had to adapt in order to effectively address the numerous opportuni-
ties and challenges brought about by these changes.  
One of the areas that will see changes will be in the administration 
of justice, more specifically in relation to judicial and court systems and 
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processes. This will be impacted by changes in global governance and 
within the international order which will give rise to new superpowers 
that will shift the balance of power from the current dominance of Europe 
and North America. However, bottom-up pressures and the need to an-
swer to the needs of the members of our society in an increasingly com-
petitive legal sector will also impact the way justice is administered.  
In this think piece, I have chosen to touch upon several issues that, 
from my perspective as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ugan-
da, are particularly pertinent: 1) geo-political changes and the increasing 
regional integration; 2) legal pluralism; 3) the impact of technology on 
law and courts; and 4) specialised courts. Each one of these topics is 
hugely important. I could have focused my think piece exclusively on any 
one of them, but I have chosen to bundle them together, as I believe this 
can give rise to a broader perspective on the challenges that we face.  
2. Between Legal Trends and Grand Societal Challenges 
The legal trends mentioned above and further described below all relate in 
one way or another to grand societal changes and challenges.  
One of the major societal challenges that impacts almost everything 
that we do and will have to be continuously dealt with in the future is 
scarcity. The growth of the world population to the estimated nine billion 
in 2050 will put great stresses on the resources that we have. States are 
therefore trying to find the most effective way of providing for their popu-
lations. For some States, acting as part of a regional community of a few 
States will enable them to pool resources together and use them more effi-
ciently while also providing a stronger military and security might for 
their protection.  
This scarcity of resources is also what will lead to a reform in the 
way that courts operate, as a means of using resources effectively, but also 
by taking advantage of available technologies.  
The quest for better and more effective security will continue to 
provide an impetus for governments to focus on areas that they had previ-
ously side-lined. Recognising the global reach and networks of terrorism 
has forced governments to focus on those avenues being used by these 
groups to promote their agendas. One of the most important areas is the 
Internet. While it has provided great opportunities for communication, in-
formation gathering and interaction across borders, it has also been co-
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opted as a tool for procuring information on how, where and when to 
launch attacks as well as a recruitment tool particularly targeting young, 
frustrated and impressionable youth. Indeed, research indicates that hardly 
any terrorist operates entirely as a lone wolf – there is also a form of so-
cial and/or professional support in the background, which nowadays is of-
ten provided through online platforms. How we police the Internet to pre-
vent these types of scenarios has become a fundamental part of govern-
ments’ defence policies. It has led to more regulations both nationally and 
internationally with a broader definition of jurisdiction.  
3. Emerging and Future Legal Trends 
3.1. Geopolitical Changes and the Rise of Regionalism 
There has in recent years been a drive towards more regional integration 
on the African continent. This trend is primarily driven, and will continue 
to be driven, by the need for greater security and influence due to the 
scarcity of resources and changes in global governance. Apart from the 
revival of the African Union, previously the Organisation of African Uni-
ty, the various regional blocs such as the East African Community (EAC) 
and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have ex-
panded their scope and taken on a more proactive role than before. Within 
African States, the reality that only a strong community-based approach 
can yield enough influence to impact international policies will lead to 
greater regional integration and more deference to regional law and courts 
than to international law which will largely remain unbinding. Further-
more, regional blocs such as the EAC will take on greater prominence 
than continental blocs such as the African Union, because they will be 
more efficient and effective.  
The countries comprising the EAC have already taken steps towards 
economic integration, with the intention eventually to have full political 
integration. The process towards economic integration will lead to the free 
movement of goods, people and services across the borders of the coun-
tries comprising this Community in the near future. This trend will only 
increase, with a greater move towards social, economic and also political, 
integration which could ultimately result in a single currency economy for 
the bloc. The EAC also has a Parliament as well as a community court 
(the East African Court of Justice (EACJ)) whose mission is to ensure ad-
herence to the East African Treaty. It is envisaged that within 20 or 30 
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years there will be full political integration as well among the member 
States of the EAC. It is likely that this trend will be replicated across the 
other regional blocs in Africa and perhaps in other regions of the world as 
well.  
Such regional integration will inevitably impact the law due to the 
convergence of the various legal systems within each bloc. All five East 
African States, for example, have different variations of African custom-
ary law within their systems, while two of them have a civil law-based le-
gal tradition, although they are in the process of moving towards a com-
mon law one in order to align with the three other countries. Furthermore, 
we can expect that the EACJ, as the community court of the EAC, will 
play a role in bringing about such convergence of the respective legal sys-
tems. Indeed, this Community Court has already made rulings that have 
influenced the laws in the parent countries and we can expect more of this 
to come.  
The trend towards regional integration will impact the global order 
as these organisations will have the economic and military strength to 
provide alternative paradigms to those created by the current superpowers. 
These regional blocs will form new power hubs which will be instrumen-
tal in creating new global systems as power moves from a predominantly 
national to a predominantly regional regime. This will lead to the creation 
of a legal environment with more binding force than is currently provided 
for in international law. It could lead to a fundamental reform of the UN 
system, or otherwise to the weakening or even complete dissolution of the 
United Nations and the creation of a Global Parliament, deemed more rep-
resentative of the world’s population. 
Similarly, changes can be expected regarding the system of interna-
tional criminal justice. Greater regional integration of and in Africa may 
very well impact the way in which African States handle international 
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Ten 
years ago, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was considered a great 
promise in the global fight against impunity. Many African States ratified 
the Rome Statute. Today, many African States are frustrated and disap-
pointed by the performance of the ICC in the first decade of its operation. 
They perceive it as a manifestation of the imbalance and unfairness of the 
global order. This may lead to a more localised approach to the fight 
against international crimes. States such as Uganda have already given lo-
cal courts jurisdiction to try some of these crimes. Today, there are indica-
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tions that regional courts such as the EACJ or the African Court of Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) could also be given jurisdiction over 
these crimes, thus shifting the focus from the ICC as a global court to lo-
cal and regional venues. In summary, with the ICC being accused of se-
lective prosecution, on the one hand, and with African States becoming 
stronger and more influential as a matter of greater integration in blocs on 
the other, in the foreseeable future we might see a shift towards prosecut-
ing international crimes more and more at the national and regional levels, 
rather than by global institutions.  
3.2. Legal Pluralism  
In many African States, traditional forms of customary law exist either 
within or in parallel to the formal legal system. As regards to customary 
law, there is no blanket prescription for its criteria. Since customary law 
originated from different cultures, it is inevitable that there will be differ-
ences across the States. There is also no doubt that customary law has 
largely been side-lined as it is perceived to be archaic. The proliferation of 
the international human rights regime has further increased the anti-
customary law rhetoric since it is perceived as being insensitive to gender 
equity and several other individual freedoms and rights guaranteed by 
modern constitutions and international human rights instruments. In order 
to accommodate it, in Uganda, customary law has continued to exist 
alongside statutory law, but the law has made it clear that it is only valid 
insofar as it is allowed by and does not conflict with the Constitution. 
This marginalisation of customary law is expected to continue until 
it is fully absorbed into statutory law and there is no distinction between 
the two. A factor that will contribute to this is the increase in globalisation 
and in particular regional integration, which will necessitate the various 
national laws moving into conformity in order to have a regional law that 
is applicable to everyone.  
3.3. Law and Technology 
3.3.1. Internet 
Judiciaries in Africa and indeed the world over are still grappling with the 
new realities presented by the rise of technology and its constant advance. 
Technology has impacted virtually every imaginable field that can be leg-
islated upon, whether health, agriculture, information, or defence, to men-
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tion just a few prime examples. While it has brought many advantages, 
there are many issues related to technology that have to be dealt with and 
regulated. Communication technology and the Internet in particular, are 
prime examples.  
The Internet especially has connected the world in ways that were 
previously unimaginable. It has made it possible to communicate with 
someone in a different part of the world in a matter of seconds, transfer 
money to them, sign and e-mail a contract and exchange all kinds of data. 
These possibilities however have also created new avenues for crimes to 
be committed in the web sphere, whether it is online piracy where hackers 
are now able to infiltrate and secure secret government documents for 
their own use, or identity theft, which can then lead to fraud and theft.  
There are two great difficulties with any attempt to regulate the In-
ternet. The first is that technology, including internet technology, is de-
veloping much faster than it takes to legislate. The second is that the In-
ternet, by definition, is a cross-border phenomenon.  
Thus, while many laws have been created to try and tame these 
crimes, the law has still not been able efficiently to deal with it because 
the Internet is a rapidly evolving creature that can be difficult to antici-
pate. Many of the laws we still use are outdated, and because the Internet 
operates in a completely foreign way to the text- and rules-based approach 
of the law, the judiciary is always playing catch-up, so that by the time 
legislation has been approved and passed, the area you are trying to legis-
late has morphed into a different entity. The other difficulty with the leg-
islation of the Internet is its cross-border nature. The Internet is a true re-
flection of globalisation, with its effects being more far-reaching than lo-
cal jurisdictions. One person’s actions in Uganda can have serious conse-
quences for another in Australia. It makes using only national legislation 
highly ineffective. Truly effective legislation needs to be international in 
scope and policed strictly, and this will entail greater cooperation among 
States. This legislation will have to be reflected in all sectors. Interested 
readers particularly fascinated by this field are referred to other think 
pieces in this volume, such as the ones by Weber and by Lipton, who dis-
cuss the regulation of cyberspace in greater detail. 
3.3.2. Virtual/E-Courts 
The judicial process will also be dramatically influenced by technological 
advances.  
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The concept of a court today denotes a specified, physical, building 
or room in which a judicial officer sits with lawyers and their parties. This 
idea will have to change and adapt as technology makes it an increasingly 
unnecessary and expensive venture.  
At present, in many African States there are simply not enough 
courts, and very few of them are located in remote areas. This creates one 
of the greater hindrances to access to justice in Africa, due to the distance 
that people have to travel in order to reach courts. So more courts are 
needed, but then there is the very high cost of setting up new courts, as 
well as maintaining and running them. Whether it is in the cost of con-
struction of courthouses, or the amount of resources and personnel that 
have to be relocated for administering justice, this is a very expensive en-
terprise. The result is that there are fewer courts than needed, and their 
reach remains limited. One of the results of advancing with technology 
will be a move towards virtual courts which will allow judicial officers to 
cover larger areas, thus increasing access for people in distant locations, 
as the requirements will be far fewer and cheaper than they currently are.  
Since technology is today more readily available and the cost con-
tinues to reduce, virtual courts have come to be viewed as a solution to 
this problem. Currently, the possibilities of a Video Conferencing System 
(VCS) which will enable in-court trials and hearings of defendants and 
witnesses who are in remote locations are being explored. The main goals 
are to increase transparency and to improve access to justice, by saving 
travelling costs for both parties. In 20 years, we may have to look to a 
completely virtual court system which would allow essentially paperless 
courts, largely or even entirely based on e-filing (with e-summons, e-
pleadings et cetera). 
The use of technology in the way court processes are conducted will 
lead to an almost paperless trial with more reliance on digital evidence, 
video relayed evidence et cetera. Not only will that technology increase 
efficiency, it will also be instrumental in the quest to improve access to 
justice, in particular to people in remote areas, who have hardly any ac-
cess to justice.  
3.4. Specialisation of Courts 
Another recognisable trend that relates specifically to courts concerns the 
increasing role played by specialised courts. This is not an entirely new 
phenomenon and has been particularly prevalent in economic and busi-
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ness-related matters. Such matters require a certain level of technical 
knowledge from the judicial officers, without which procedures may be-
come unduly long, inefficient and may even lead to unfair results. I expect 
this trend gradually to cover additional areas of expertise.  
Uganda has seen an increase in efficiency and decrease in the back-
log of cases as a result of introducing several specialised courts: the 
Commercial Courts, the Anti-Corruption Court, and the Land Division 
Court. As crimes become more sophisticated and areas of focus become 
too broad, courts will have to gain more technical knowledge and inevita-
bly become more specialised. As new areas of civil litigation open up, 
courts will have to adapt to meet these new demands as well. We can 
therefore expect to see the specialisation trend continuing, with courts 
specifically dedicated to areas that were previously neglected, such as 
natural resources and the environment, as well as technology.  
Somewhat linked to this, will be an increase in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR), in particular inasmuch as ADR will prove able to offer 
expertise through quick and relatively simplified and cheap procedures, as 
opposed to lengthy and expensive court processes.  
4. The Most Significant Challenges for the Development of Law 
There are two challenges that I would like to highlight regarding the fur-
ther development of the law. 
The first, continuing and persisting, challenge for the development 
of law relates to its intrinsic features: its reactionary nature and the lag-
ging behind of slow law-making processes. The law needs to be more 
adaptable and able to anticipate changes in society and to regulate them 
proactively. It is possible to gauge global trends and legislate accordingly, 
and endeavours such as the ‘Law of the Future’ project will hopefully as-
sist in this effort.  
The second challenge is extrinsic, as it relates more broadly to geo-
political realities. Despite the interconnectedness caused by globalisation, 
it is still clear that States do not all have the same sphere of influence as 
others on the global stage. Countries in the developing world are still to a 
large extent marginalised, reinforcing the uni-polar order that has become 
significant over the past decade. The only way in which many of the chal-
lenges will be dealt with is if there is a greater partnership between the 
North and South countries. As the economies start to slow down in Eu-
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rope and North America, the world will increasingly look to Asia and Af-
rica as growing markets and providers of resources, and this will inevita-
bly shift the balance of power. 
5. Recommendations 
With regards to policies and strategies for the future, it is clear that the 
global governance landscape has changed and will continue to do so. It is 
important that the current policies used in governing the world are reflec-
tive of these changes, as otherwise they risk becoming obsolete.  
In order to anticipate major challenges brought by developments in 
technology, it is important for legal practitioners to conduct research in 
this field and constantly remain abreast of emerging trends thereby ensur-
ing that the law is always evolving alongside them, rather than far behind. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER V 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF TRADE 
AND PRIVATE ACTORS:  
HOW ARE TRADE AND COMMERCE 
DRIVING THE FUTURE?
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24The Future of International Trade Law: 
How Best for Trade to Deal With (New) 
Non-trade Concerns? 
Gabrielle Marceau 
The precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, was essentially about enhancing 
trade. Some of its provisions recognised, however, linkages be-
tween non-trade concerns and trade matters, including its famous 
Article XX which foresaw the possibility of non-trade concerns cir-
cumscribing trade promotion. The transition to the WTO saw WTO 
Members agree to expand the inclusion of some non-trade con-
cerns, while keeping other non-trade concerns outside the parame-
ters of the WTO agreements. Why has this happened, and can the 
WTO agreements’ differential approach to addressing these non-
trade concerns be understood? Perhaps on the basis that there is a 
need to bring certain non-trade concerns within the WTO system in 
order to further enhance trade; and to try to define when and how 
non-trade concerns can restrict trade. This piece offers a conceptual 
framework for categorising the different manners in which non-
trade concerns are addressed in the WTO agreements. Employing 
this framework, this piece analyses how various non-trade concerns 
of contemporary and future significance for the WTO (which either 
impact or are impacted by the trade matters) might be addressed in 
international trade. 
1. Introduction 
The rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) essentially intend to 
promote trade by reducing trade barriers on a non-discriminatory basis. 
These rules do not promote trade above all else, as trade interacts with is-
sues other than trade. Such overlaps and intersections of interests and 
rules give rise to difficult questions. For example, should a country have 
                                                   

 Gabrielle Marceau is Counsellor in the Legal Affairs Division of the World Trade 
Organization, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law at the University of Geneva 
and Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute (HEID) Geneva. 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 280 
the right to invoke religion as a basis for banning the entry of imports 
manufactured by persons of another religion? Should a country be al-
lowed to refuse to export cotton to a country which fails to prevent the use 
of abusive child labour in manufacturing cotton t-shirts? Is it correct that a 
developed country can offer greater trade preferences to some developing 
countries over others on the basis that the former have ratified human 
rights (HRs) conventions?  
These scenarios may illustrate the intersections of trade/non-trade 
concerns. It is very difficult to delineate between what constitutes a trade 
concern rather than a non-trade concern (NTC). Do all measures which 
promote non-discriminatory ‘barrier-free’ trade represent the furthering of 
trade concerns? Are the rationales offered in each of the foregoing scenar-
ios trade or non-trade based, or both? In brief, what gives an issue its trade 
or non-trade character? Not everything that one might ordinarily attribute 
as a “trade issue” is regulated by WTO rules, but perhaps we can suggest 
that all matters covered by WTO rules are “trade” concerns? Economists, 
political scientists and lawyers may offer differing answers to these ques-
tions. This paper examines some issues relating to these questions from a 
legal perspective.  
Trade remains important for a variety of reasons, as do non-trade 
concerns (NTCs). The future legitimacy and (legal) effectiveness of inter-
national trade law (ITL) depends on its capacity to address an increasing 
number of NTCs intersecting with trade. In the coming years, how WTO 
Members respond to calls to adopt more policies relating to NTCs will be 
critical. Compared to the days of its precursor institution, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), legal landscapes are becoming 
increasingly complex; today they address more issues in more nuanced 
ways due to increased knowledge that translates to demands for new regu-
lation. The WTO rules form part of these landscapes in which trade and 
non-trade regulations intersect. WTO law is only one (important) facet of 
ITL and only one component of the broader intricate web of domestic, re-
gional, and international obligations which represent our global legal sys-
tem. However, we need to understand which existing WTO rules regulate 
the intersections of trade/non-trade matters, to what extent, whether we 
should rethink them, or whether the status quo is appropriate.  
The consequences for trade and NTCs will obviously differ depend-
ing on whether and how they are regulated (for example, inside or outside 
the WTO system) with resulting implications for (possible) conflicts with-
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in the WTO Agreement and between WTO law and other areas of interna-
tional law. One might point to a plethora of contributories underlying 
countries’ decisions as to whether and how to regulate matters. These may 
be economic, political or legal and this paper does not purport to address 
all or even the majority of them. Rather, this paper presents a legal per-
spective on the different ways in which existing WTO rules regulate 
NTCs. Of course WTO law is not static, and neither are other fields of 
law.  
Section II finds that the WTO rules reflect different tools which co-
opt the regulation of NTCs’ interaction with trade to varying degrees. 
These tools are placed at different points on the WTO’s spectrum of regu-
lation. Some obligations traditionally considered as “non-trade” (id est in-
tellectual property (IP) protection) are fully incorporated into the WTO by 
cross-reference. IP’s place on the WTO spectrum is an example of where 
the non-trade subject of regulation is known and precisely regulated. Oth-
er NTCs are not represented on the spectrum because they are not specifi-
cally regulated by WTO law. In between these two extremes, NTC stand-
ards can serve as the basis for presumptions of WTO-consistency; while 
others are exceptions to generally applicable WTO rules. This paper 
shows that, while the WTO recognises that its rules cannot be read in 
“clinical isolation” from international law, where and how specific NTCs 
are placed within the WTO spectrum makes a difference. Notably, it af-
fects the likelihood of, and the scope for unilateral regulation by Members 
for domestic non-trade objectives with extraterritorial effects. 
2. Mapping the Different Legal Relationships between Trade and 
NTCs According to WTO Rules  
Negotiations which preceded the establishment of the GATT (1944–47) 
suggested that the multilateral trading regime should address NTCs more 
deeply than the GATT eventually did. It was intended that, after World 
War II, the International Trade Organization (ITO) would be dedicated to 
regulating labour, employment and trade. In sum, it was on account of the 
impossibility of obtaining US Congress approval for trade and labour that 
the ITO never came into being. The GATT's provisional application con-
tinued until 1995, with a much narrower mandate than that envisaged for 
the ITO. Initially, the GATT essentially acknowledged NTCs only as 
trade-restrictive exceptions to the otherwise applicable rules prohibiting 
protectionism and promoting trade. In the context of goods trade, these 
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trade-promoting rules ensured, and still ensure in current WTO rules, 
market access through the elimination of trade barriers, principally by re-
ducing and binding tariffs and prohibiting quotas. However, recognising 
the intersection of NTCs and trade, Members gradually accepted the need 
to integrate NTCs in “trade rules” so as to explicitly allow NTC policy 
space while further eliminating other trade barriers. The 1970’s brought a 
push for a trade-promoting harmonisation of standards used for regula-
tions; some GATT parties agreed to base their domestic regulations on in-
ternational standards.  
History shows that how trade disciplines should address NTCs has 
always been a challenge but one that had to be faced, albeit sometimes 
more squarely than others, depending on the NTC and the moment in 
time. The following subsections demonstrate WTO law’s current differen-
tial approach to regulating trade/non-trade interactions. It is notable that 
although non-trade/trade intersections are discernible in the application of 
essentially all WTO disciplines, there are few rules referring expressly to 
NTCs. 
2.1. No Textual Reference to NTCs: WTO Rules Do Not Prevent the 
Non-Discriminatory Application of Regulations for Non-Trade 
Reasons 
NTCs permeate the trading system. Products and services have qualities 
that are distinct from the fact that they are traded, and non-trade motiva-
tions may underlie trade-restrictive domestic regulations. For example, 
WTO rules do not prevent the non-discriminatory application of taxes and 
regulations to like products for cultural reasons.  
2.2. Specialised WTO Agreement Fully-Integrating a NTC: Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) 
WTO Members undertook, inter alia, to implement the provisions of pre-
existing World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) conventions in 
the TRIPS. Members can resort to the WTO dispute settlement (DS) 
mechanism to ensure adherence to TRIPS, which also contains NTC de-
fences (like public health, ordre public, the environment, and morality) for 
alleged failures to protect IP. This is the most WTO-integrated of NTCs. 
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2.3. Defences, Rights and New Presumptions: In WTO Legitimate 
Objectives Other Than Trade Can Be Invoked to Justify Trade 
Impediments Caused by the Promotion of NTCs 
2.3.1. Famous Article XX: NTCs as Defences to Trade Restrictions  
Since GATT times, Article XX has permitted countries to maintain oth-
erwise inconsistent trade-restrictive measures (TRMs) which are non-
protectionist and materially contribute to achieving non-trade policies 
specifically listed in Article XX. In DS, responding WTO Members can 
invoke these exceptions as defences – the precise parameters of which are 
not set in stone. Once invoked, the DS employs a “balancing” test in order 
to determine WTO compatibility: this involves considering the value of 
the non-trade policy sought, the choice of measure, and the availability of 
less restrictive alternatives. It has been emphasised that the WTO Agree-
ment’s preambular reference to ‘sustainable development’– not found in 
the GATT– demands an evolutionary interpretation that adds “colour, tex-
ture and shading” to the old exceptions’ interpretation. Therefore, the fu-
ture may see WTO DS interpret these terms to find other NTCs not ex-
plicitly specified.  
Significantly, unlike during the GATT, multilateral support for the 
NTC measure defended is not necessary: an early WTO dispute concern-
ing this recognised that all these Article XX exceptions allow responding 
Members to “unilaterally prescribe policies” for NTC purposes.  
2.3.2. The Right to Adopt Trade-Restrictive Regulations to Promote 
NTCs  
The WTO era brought the refinement of some NTC regulation. In contrast 
to the GATT, where health measures were exceptions, the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) explicitly 
confirms Members’ right to apply TRMs necessary to protect health. Such 
SPS measures cannot represent disguised protectionism and must actually 
protect against the identified health risk. The Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) also acknowledges Members’ right to dictate 
product characteristics and related process/production methods through 
trade-restrictive “technical regulations”. While they must be aimed at 
promoting “legitimate objectives”, unlike the GATT exceptions, the list of 
permissible non-trade objectives is not closed, and the reference to ‘sus-
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tainable development’ as one of the WTO’s legitimate objectives is im-
portant.  
2.3.3. New Presumptions of WTO Compatibility Given to Interna-
tional (Non-Trade) Standards 
Harmonisation of the basis for TRMs: measures taken for health and other 
NTC purposes are now presumed consistent with the SPS and TBT where 
their implementation complies with “international standards”. Such 
measures can be based on non-international standards (including those 
more stringent) where achievement of Members’ legitimate objectives so 
require, but they do not benefit from presumptions of consistency.  
2.4. Members’ Control over the Interpretation of WTO Provisions:  
There are a number of ways for Members to control the interpretation of 
WTO provisions. WTO law allows the membership to decide on the exact 
scope of WTO terms via various decision-making processes. Moreover, 
important substantive decisions have been adopted by the WTO member-
ship further to SPS and TBT working committees.  
2.5. Inhibiting Infringing a NTC Policy Cannot Be the Basis for a 
DS Claim (Except Under TRIPS) 
Despite the increased breadth for NTCs to justify the circumscription of 
trade promotion, disputes cannot be initiated on the basis that the promo-
tion of a legitimate non-trade policy concern has been prevented; in other 
words, there are no WTO obligations to protect the environment, health, 
human rights. Such policy defences or presumptions only operate to justi-
fy TRMs. 
2.6. Governance Choices Reflected 
For Members, the importance of regulating trade/non-trade interactions at 
the WTO varies. Nonetheless, for current and future NTCs, the central 
question remains where (if anywhere) they should be placed on the spec-
trum of WTO regulation. The ultimate placing generally reflects the bal-
ance between Members’ social realities (policy space for trade and 
NTCs), international pressures, and Members’ view of the current and fu-
ture global legal order. States seem generally to favour specialisation re-
flecting the comparative advantage of different international organisa-
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tions. For example, the presumption of consistency for measures which 
enforce international standards (pertaining to NTCs) confirms Members’ 
respect for specialisation, as well as the efficiencies that such specialisa-
tion brings (harmonisation of standards reduces costs for traders). This re-
spect was also reflected in WTO DS when Members were encouraged to 
consider resolutions of other international institutions in assessing wheth-
er the requirements of a WTO provision providing for exceptional prefer-
ential tariff schemes for development needs had been met. 
3. New Trade and Non-Trade Connections 
Exchange rates, freshwater sustainability, migration, and corruption are 
all important and their regimes’ interactions with the WTO will certainly 
continue to present extremely complex ramifications. This section sets 
forth how each of these NTCs interact with trade and how WTO law ap-
plies to them. Section 3.2 relies on the framework set forth in Section 2 in 
assessing whether and how Members can regulate these interactions using 
WTO tools. 
3.1. Examples of (New) Trade and NTCs Interactions 
3.1.1. Trade and Freshwater Sustainability  
Freshwater is scarce and unevenly distributed across Members which 
have sovereignty over their territories. Tensions regarding access to water 
in foreign territories and water sustainability have already arisen between 
certain Members, and these tensions are set to heighten. 
Although they do not specifically address water, WTO rules apply, 
to the extent that water is a commercial good. On-going trade facilitation 
negotiations could also affect water trade, as some of the issues it raises 
are similar to those of oil and gas trade. For example, WTO rules prohibit 
quotas but a Member might defend such an export water ban as required 
to conserve exhaustible natural resources or to protect health (both explic-
it Article XX exceptions). Moreover, products requiring large quantities 
of water in their production (virtual water) may soon be subject to 
measures applied for environmental or other legitimate purposes. No in-
ternational standards for water sustainability appear to exist that could 
base a presumption of consistency under the SPS/TBT, but this could 
happen. 
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3.1.2. Trade and Corruption 
Corruption is the misuse of public power for private gain. It negatively af-
fects all Members’ trading activities. While the word corruption never ap-
pears in the WTO agreements, many provisions have corruption-
preventing effects by requiring transparency in the exercise of administra-
tive discretion. The WTO’s treatment of this subject is much narrower 
than other instruments. Indeed, the WTO rules do not address the supply 
side of corruption or provide for asset recovery or for the criminalisation 
of corrupt acts. However, the revision to the existing plurilateral Agree-
ment on Government Procurement explicitly provides that one of its aims 
is to control corruptive practices and its Preamble explicitly references the 
UN Convention Against Corruption. 
3.1.3. Trade and Economic Migration 
Arguments abound that the abolition of restrictions on trade in 
goods/services should be matched by parallel action for the free move-
ment of persons. Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), Members may undertake to allow service suppliers (natural per-
sons) to enter and stay in their territories temporarily (but not to enter the 
labour market). Adherence to these undertakings can be ensured at WTO 
DS (like TRIPS). Despite the fact that this form of temporary economic 
migration is much narrower than the larger migration debate (which also 
covers forced migration, such as sex trafficking, human smuggling, and 
refugees), commitments have been few and generally prefer highly-skilled 
service suppliers (often intra-corporate transferees), a reflection of the 
world as a “knowledge economy” where Members compete for skills and 
talents. This is not sufficient for developing Members who want broader 
commitments for other service suppliers. To this end, in December 2011, 
the membership made a (waiver) decision allowing the grant of preferen-
tial access to lower-skilled service suppliers from LDCs with which they 
share closer socio-cultural ties. Such preference for certain nationalities 
seems to be a (new) flexibility that will encourage Members to welcome 
LDC nationals into their societies. 
3.1.4. Trade and Exchange Rates 
Stable systems of exchange rates and trade are both global public goods. 
Significant challenges to the former have occurred at various points in 
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history (notably since the 2000s). These have heightened attention on the 
dependence of trade on exchange rates. Moreover, while both the law of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WTO law contain provisions 
on exchange arrangements, a focus on the latter has resulted because of its 
binding DS system, which has no equivalent at the IMF and which some 
Members hope could be used to challenge alleged currency manipulators. 
Despite this recent attention, IMF law more specifically addresses ex-
change rates, and WTO law reflects this specialisation by emphasizing in-
stitutional cooperation. This division of labour and interconnectedness is 
evident in GATT Article XV which seeks to ensure that countries’ ac-
tions, regulated by the two institutions, do not negatively affect the other. 
While this provision is not very clear, it seems to permit Members to 
bring WTO disputes on the basis that an exchange action (IMF’s regulato-
ry domain) impedes trade. Other WTO provisions may be relevant to 
tackle undervalued exchange rates, which might be considered an export 
subsidy, or dumping, or justify higher than agreed tariffs. 
3.2. The Future of These Four NTCs 
This subsection considers “whether and how” future WTO law might 
more specifically address these four non-trade concerns. It highlights 
some of the multitude of factors (of varying relevance depending on the 
concern) that might be considered in deciding whether to more specifical-
ly address these concerns. Then, bearing in mind the description in Sec-
tion 2 of the existing tools used to regulate NTCs, some examples are of-
fered on how these NTCs might be addressed.  
3.2.1. Whether to Address These NTCs More Specifically 
Extent of Appropriate Coverage?  
As a preliminary matter, one should note that each of the four NTCs de-
scribed above has a much broader life than the common space they share 
with trade. Accordingly, if it is determined that they should be addressed 
more specifically by future WTO law, one must question how deeply into 
their spheres WTO regulation should reach. To date, it may seem that on-
ly the “trade-related” aspects of non-trade issues are addressed in WTO 
rules. This might be another emanation of the respect for specialisation 
and the expertise necessary to effectively regulate the full spheres of these 
NTCs. For example, oversight of the system of exchange rates requires 
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specific expertise, surveillance and information from countries. The pro-
visions relating to exchange rates in the current WTO rules do not extend 
to such systemic oversight, but only to the area of trade/exchange rate in-
tersection. This seems appropriate, as seems the manner in which 
trade/migration is currently addressed (once optional commitments are 
undertaken, they reflect the extent of the intersection). Despite the forego-
ing, the great challenge remains the difficulty in definitively pointing to 
what constitutes a “trade-related” aspect of a particular issue or to where 
the frontiers between trade/non-trade concerns lie. The TRIPS purports to 
comprise only the “trade-related aspects” of IP, but some might argue that 
its protections go beyond this. 
It might be argued that this is not the case for corruption. For exam-
ple, although the GATS exceptions (similar to those in GATT Article 
XX) might allow Members to maintain otherwise inconsistent TRMs to 
combat supply-side corruption (such as service suppliers offering bribes), 
WTO rules do not impose obligations regarding supply-side corruption 
and disputes cannot be initiated on this basis.  
Are Clarity and Consensus Considerations?  
The integration of TRIPS by reference to existing conventions, previously 
under the auspices of another institution, shows at least prima facie a will-
ingness to fully integrate NTCs in this manner. One might question, how-
ever, why IP protections were incorporated, while the minimum labour 
standards (individual rights like IP protection) of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) were not? Is TRIPS’ inclusion simply down to power-
ful US lobbyists? Could the unclear parameters of ILO obligations – sub-
ject to notorious divergence and disagreement among States – also be a 
factor? Did the clear-cut nature of IP obligations incline developing coun-
tries, which had not agreed to numerous TRIPS provisions in other fora, 
to accede to being bound at the WTO? If so, what are the implications for 
the four NTCs examined here? Given that there are no real functioning 
regimes for migration and water sustainability, one might suggest that 
they may not be candidates for full integration. Could other non-trade 
concerns be more apt to full integration? Suffice it to say that divergence 
and uncertainty as to obligations’ exigencies might indispose Members 
from agreeing to full (TRIPS-like) integration. 
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Treatment Outside the WTO 
The background as to why some NTCs are already WTO-regulated sug-
gests the membership’s consideration of both trade promotion and devel-
opments within and outside the trade sphere. For example, a WTO multi-
lateral corruption agreement was proposed, but key proponent Members 
were eventually satisfied that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention had 
achieved what they sought. Therefore, they did not lobby for its inclusion 
in the WTO.  
3.2.2. How to Address These NTCs within the WTO Spectrum? 
Different NTCs are more or less close to trade and WTO matters and thus 
call for different types of legal relationships through different mecha-
nisms. 
TRIPS-like Approach? 
Members could decide to integrate (new) NTCs as WTO obligations but 
Members will presumably not treat all NTCs similarly. For example, it 
seems unlikely that WTO law will allow the initiation of disputes on the 
basis of alleged violations of water sustainability obligations in the near 
future. However, the legitimacy of trade-related regulation affecting water 
sustainability may be addressed by WTO law. One might imagine more 
specific, multilateral obligations covering corruptive practices in WTO 
law. Indeed, if additional obligations were being conceived, many ques-
tions would need to be addressed: should they be among all Members 
(multilateral), only among some (plurilateral), or optional (like GATS 
commitments)? For example, cross-references to existing conventions 
could be used for WTO to various ends (interpretations, obligations, de-
fences or presumptions). Members could, for example, adopt decisions 
whereby illegal acts of private persons and enterprises could be attributed 
to them. Defences and justifications for maintaining export restrictions on 
water could also be negotiated as amendments or other forms of decisions 
and integrated into the WTO. 
Conditional Rights? 
As was done in the SPS and TBT, provisions could be drafted stating 
Members’ right (subject to conditions) to adopt (restrictive) measures in 
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order to promote any of these four NTCs so as to place the burden on the 
complaining Member to prove that such measures are not legitimate. 
WTO DS has allowed Members to maintain TRMs for the achievement of 
legitimate objectives, even if they have extraterritorial effects. Could the 
TBT also be interpreted, for example, so that its reference to preventing 
deceptive practices could include the right to ban particular imports on the 
basis of a need to combat corruptive practices in the country of origin or 
the specific foreign sector failing to comply with anti-corruption best 
practices? 
Defences and Justifications? 
Members can invoke the listed non-trade objectives of Article XX or oth-
er WTO flexibilities in order to justify TRMs. WTO exceptions and flexi-
bilities have been interpreted in an evolutionary manner. For example, the 
exception in favour of “measures necessary for the protection of public 
morals” includes “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or 
on behalf of a community or nation”. How broadly can these terms be in-
terpreted? Could they include certain corrupt practices? Could they permit 
a Member to prohibit the entry of a service supplier on religious grounds? 
Could a scenario even be conceived where these terms could cover the 
promotion of sustainable water management? In the future, exceptions 
and justifications may be interpreted to include NTCs not examined to 
date, including some of these four specific NTCs.  
Members might prefer not to wait for such DS interpretations and 
adopt consensus decisions, authoritative interpretations or amend existing 
provisions to ensure that they cover the NTCs they want, in the way they 
want.  
Presumptions in Favour of International Standards? 
Given that there are no real international standards for economic migra-
tion and water sustainability, the relevance of a WTO-consistency pre-
sumption appears moot today. However, Members may one day adopt a 
decision whereby TRMs maintained on the basis of guidelines issued by 
the IMF, or secretariats of institutions combating corruption, benefit from 
a presumption of WTO consistency.  
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Treatment outside the WTO? 
Some NTCs may be best regulated uniquely outside the WTO. This may 
be the case for exchange rate or migration issues or other ‘“new’” NTCs. 
If it is, in recognition of their potential interactions, cooperative mecha-
nisms between institutions might be established to ensure coherence and 
coordination.  
4. Conclusion 
This paper describes different types of relationships that exist between 
WTO trade provisions and NTCs. In particular, it highlights the extent to 
which interactions between some NTCs and trade have been more or less 
integrated into the WTO legal system. It demonstrates that where WTO 
rules have been introduced to regulate these interactions, they have gener-
ally been framed to promote trade, for example the harmonisation of 
standards is incentivised by presumptions of consistency. However, exist-
ing WTO rules do not fail to acknowledge the need for NTCs to circum-
scribe trade on occasion, as evidenced in broadly interpreted exceptions.  
This paper surveyed the milestones in the trading regime’s history 
where countries addressed the “whether and how” of NTC WTO integra-
tion. It appears that Members are spurred to do so where non-trade mat-
ters are either impacted by, or impact, trade. For example, increasing reg-
ulation of water sustainability outside of the WTO may eventually require 
reactions in WTO law. To date, the resulting approach of WTO law to 
various NTCs is a differentiated one. This paper does not suggest that the 
regulatory tools discussed are exhaustive or necessarily appropriate to 
regulate all interactions, or even the four “new” NTCs specifically ex-
plored. However, existing WTO law does have mechanisms whereby 
Members can experiment or gradually integrate NTCs as they see fit. In-
deed, the membership may adopt decisions influencing the interpretation 
or application of existing provisions; or amend existing provisions; or ful-
ly-integrate NTCs (like TRIPS). Developments outside the WTO, includ-
ing regional and preferential trade agreements, may explore experimenta-
tion in this regard. Such agreements have gone further in integrating 
NTCs as rights and obligations and have even given rise to disputes based 
on alleged labour violations. 
Delineating between “trade” and “non-trade” or “trade” and “trade-
related aspects” may forever remain an elusive task. However, the inabil-
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ity to delineate is not critical. It is not the identification of the delineation 
that is important, but the response. It is not critical but whether, and how, 
to deal with NTCs is nonetheless one of the biggest challenges for interna-
tional trade law. ITL is here to stay. Will it manage to adequately address 
the complexities of trade-NTCs common spaces? Should it address these 
interactions? It seems that future collaboration and coherence which takes 
advantage of the efficiencies resulting from regimes’ specialised man-
dates, but which focuses on potential synergies, will be essential for the 
sustainable development of the relationship between trade and NTCs in 
future international trade law.  
I end with a final comment concerning a very live issue for the 
WTO: the power of trade is long-recognised and, with the establishment 
of the WTO, its strong DS system has ensured Members’ adherence to 
their “trade” obligations. The conclusions of the WTO adjudicators are 
implemented, inter alia, for fear of retaliatory action. This makes WTO 
DS an attractive forum for countries wishing to enforce their “trade” 
claims, regardless of the fact that such a claim may put NTCs at stake. 
Once a claim is brought, WTO adjudicators are obliged to decide, and 
they can only make findings on the consistency of the challenged measure 
with WTO law. While WTO adjudicators have to date managed to avoid 
conflict with rights and obligations of other legal regimes, this may not 
always be possible in the future. Credit should be given to the highly ef-
fective adjudicative arm of the WTO, but it is no substitute for the input 
legitimacy that would come from a much needed consensus of the whole 
membership (one-hundred and fifty-five Members) directing how trade 
and non-trade concerns should interact. Unilateral actions on NTCs re-
main the second- and third-best alternatives to deal with these fundamen-
tal tensions between trade and NTCs. Only multilateral actions can offer 
sustainable and coherent solutions to the challenge brought about by 
NTCs which are at the heart of our human sustainable development. 
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25International Competition Law? 
Imelda Maher* 
Competition law is characterised by a proliferation of national re-
gimes and some shared sense of purpose predicated on the domi-
nance of an economics-approach in this field in relation to private 
market behaviour. States have entered into enforcement agreements 
and enforcement networks have grown, especially since the turn of 
the century primarily with the aim of improving enforcement 
through policy learning, technical assistance and the provision of 
examples of best practice. All of these initiatives point to the con-
tinuing significance of national legal boundaries with some weaker 
recognition of challenges that global trade poses for competition 
enforcement. With the focus on enforcement, there is limited debate 
as to the nature of competition policy and the question that finds 
less common purpose is the extent to which States are subject to 
competition rules. In short the relationship between competition 
and regulation is under-developed. The introduction of competition 
laws in Brazil, India, China and South Africa suggests that this 
question will become more significant in the next decade and be-
yond with a re-calibration of the balance between international 
trade laws and international competition law. 
1. Introduction 
Despite the globalisation of international trade there is no international 
competition law. Efforts to create an international competition law under 
the aegis of the World Trade Organisation were dropped in the Doha 
Round with the working group on trade and competition disbanded in 
2004. There has been a large increase in the number of States with compe-
tition statutes, over 100, with most enacted in the last fifteen years. This 
suggests that despite globalisation, when it comes to competition law na-
tional legal boundaries are fixed and impermeable. This however does not 
fully capture what has happened in the competition sphere or how it is 
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likely to develop. Unilateralism, while a feature of competition law since 
the post-war era with the emergence of the doctrine of extraterritoriality 
and the tolerance and even encouragement of export cartels, is only a 
small part of the web of rules, agencies, networks, agreements and institu-
tions that currently characterise international competition law. 
Given the proliferation of national laws, can there ever be and 
should there ever be an international competition law? The answer to this 
question lies in part in examining to what extent competition law has been 
internationalised so far and the characteristics of that internationalisation. 
Thus, the first section will outline agreements that have emerged in the 
field. The second section will explore the emergence of networks. The fi-
nal section will suggest what lies ahead, reflecting on the triggers of a 
global constitution, legal boundaries and legal internet before concluding.  
Two preliminary observations that both point to the thick nature of 
national boundaries in this sphere are that first, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of competition laws is a feature of the most influential competition 
regimes, that of the United States and the European Union. Second, unlike 
international trade law where the aim is to regulate the conduct of States 
as to what rules they can introduce and implement, competition law pro-
hibits certain private behaviour and State conduct in the market where it 
acts as a private participant such as in procurement. Thus, debates and ini-
tiatives in this field are about how national competition regimes can pro-
hibit certain conduct rather than having international rules prohibiting that 
conduct. The focus has been on two issues: the introduction of competi-
tion regimes at the State level and on improving transnational enforce-
ment of national competition laws through cooperation across national 
boundaries. Thus, national boundaries remain a focus in relation to rules 
and enforcement with internationalisation indirectly seeking to shape pri-
vate conduct through reliance on action on the national or regional level. 
Thus, in the absence of binding international competition norms the inter-
national competition regime will remain dense with national laws.  
2. Agreements on Competition Law  
The proliferation of national competition laws suggests that there is some 
common purpose between States to tackle anti-competitive conduct. This 
commonality arises from the importance of economics in the field and the 
prominence of an economic-based approach to enforcement. What is not 
clear is whether this leads to a common approach in enforcement. Howev-
 International Competition Law? 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 299 
er, the emergence of agreements and networks to address this suggests 
that there is some concern to at least develop best practices. 
2.1.  Bilateral Competition Agreements 
One of the most important tools an agency has is information on the mar-
ket and the conduct of parties within that market. The sharing of such in-
formation across national boundaries especially given the globalisation of 
trade is important to ensure the effectiveness of competition regimes. If 
this information cannot be garnered at the international level, this would 
suggest it should be shared at the bilateral level. The legal difficulty with 
sharing such information is that only some regimes criminalise breaches 
of their competition laws, most notably the US, and more recently the 
UK. Thus, sharing information that may lead to criminal prosecution is 
not possible for those regimes that rely exclusively on civil law remedies.  
Nonetheless, bilateral agreements are commonly directed mainly at 
cooperation in enforcement. The first agreement was entered into between 
Germany and the United States in 1976 and the EU and US entered into 
two such agreements. The most integrated agreement is that between Aus-
tralia and New Zealand where the competition agencies can enforce each 
other’s competition laws. The agreements provide mechanisms to assist 
the States when both are faced with the same competition issue or when 
one State needs the cooperation of the other to investigate an infringement 
of its laws because for instance, the evidence is available in the other 
State.  
The extent to which such agreements can improve the effective en-
forcement of competition law is not clear. The EU/US reports point to 
deeper cooperation and there are some examples of the sharing of agency 
information, non-confidential but not necessarily in the public domain. 
The emphasis seems to be mainly on improving institutional understand-
ing and support. In fact, bilateral agreements may not resolve difficulties 
or lead to a common response as can be seen in the approval of the 
GE/Honeywell merger by the US authorities and its disapproval by the 
EU authorities. This led to strong diplomatic exchanges, but ultimately to 
greater engagement between the agencies. 
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2.1.1. Extradition 
Following 9/11, the UK and US entered into an extradition treaty. While 
primarily concerned with terrorist activity it has been used to extradite 
British company executives for competition-related offences. Where both 
regimes have criminal sanctions such cooperation on extradition is possi-
ble. 
2.2. Trade Agreements  
Competition provisions are often found in trade agreements, underlining 
the synergy between trade and competition. Where a trade agreement re-
moves trade restrictions at the State level, there is a risk that private actors 
achieve market foreclosure through anticompetitive conduct. To mitigate 
such risk, some competition provisions are included in the agreement. 
There are two main forms, those that reflect mutual trading interests such 
as the US and Canada and those mainly entered into by the EU where the 
aim is to encourage harmonisation of competition norms, a form of com-
petition law export. These agreements can be either bi- or pluri-lateral and 
there are examples with varying degrees of intensity on competition law 
from across the world, for example NAFTA, MERCOSUR, WAEMU, 
SADU, and ASEAN. The agreements range from those with a general ob-
ligation to have national competition laws and to cooperate on enforce-
ment – for example, NAFTA – to the more common agreements which 
contain substantive provisions prohibiting certain forms of activity such 
as cartels. The scope of the substantive provisions vary with some only 
addressing private market behaviour and others extending to public pro-
curement rules, mergers and even State aid to industry. The EU can be 
seen as the pinnacle of integration for regional trading blocs. It has exten-
sive substantive competition rules binding on all member States and since 
2003, all national agencies enforce the EU rules, assigning cases between 
them and the European Commission. 
These agreements are the institutional response of the States to 
common problems and opportunities in the context of shared, if not glob-
al, markets. At the same time, national legal boundaries remain with those 
agreements that only address enforcement placing greater significance on 
national boundaries and laws than those with substantive obligations 
where the agreement penetrates further into the State and points to a 
greater sharing of sovereignty. 
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3. Networks 
The patchwork of agreements on cooperation and/or linked to trade has, 
since the demise of the WTO competition law agenda, been supplemented 
by a growing number of networks focussed on enforcement cooperation. 
These networks vary in nature. Some consist of agencies acting voluntari-
ly and entirely outside the realm of formal law, such as the International 
Competition Network; some are part of international agencies, such as the 
OECD Global Forum on Competition, the UNCTAD International Group 
of Experts on Competition Law and Policy; while others are part of other 
regional groupings – for example, APEC and ASEAN. The common 
thread between them is the focus on improving enforcement of competi-
tion law through cooperation, shared learning, provision of best practice 
guides and technical assistance. Thus all the networks, albeit to a lesser 
degree than the more formal agreements and MOUs above, take the na-
tional boundary and State law as their starting point and seek to support 
national regimes albeit in the context of a recognition of common prob-
lems and global markets. In this instance, it is possible to say that the ex-
istence of these networks is recognition that the agreements are not suffi-
cient to address the common challenges of competition law enforcement 
transnationally.  
3.1.  International Bodies 
The role of international bodies in the development and support of net-
works and indeed in the creation of their own networks is significant with 
the OECD providing recommendations on best practices, reviewing na-
tional competition regimes at the behest of a State, and providing tech-
nical assistance through its competition programmes in South East Asia 
and eastern Europe, where it works in conjunction with a national compe-
tition agency in South Korea and Hungary respectively, to provide work-
shops and seminars on a regional basis. UNCTAD, like the OECD has an 
annual meeting of experts and also supports regional initiatives, notably in 
South America and Africa, with technical assistance being offered to na-
tional agencies. The relative ‘new-ness’ of many competition regimes 
means that there is a dearth of expertise and the networks provide support, 
information, knowledge and advice as required. The largest network is the 
International Competition Network set up following the collapse of the 
WTO agenda. It is now eleven years old having grown from fourteen 
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members to one hundred and fourteen agencies, China being a notable ex-
ception. It has no offices, staff or budget. Instead, an agency volunteers 
each year to run the annual conference which has in excess of five hun-
dred delegates. Matters of common concern are discussed with the main 
point of contact and content through the year being the excellent website. 
It is a self-governing body with effective competition enforcement as its 
main and only objective. The agencies are supported by non-
governmental advisers who attend the conference following nomination 
by a national agency. These NGAs also participate in writing reports and 
other documents reflecting best practice. Smaller networks are also a pri-
mary vehicle for technical assistance allowing States to converge within 
particular regions such as Compal, the Nordic competition network, or 
around a common language such as the Lusaphone network.  
The field of competition law now looks crowded with international 
bodies and a web of networks in operation with national agencies mem-
bers of many. The challenge is to ensure that the multiple platforms do not 
fail by their very existence to meet their common objective. A plethora of 
fora runs the risk of diluting the already slim resources of agencies if they 
find themselves responding to more than one network. It is important to 
note in this regard that the networks may be seen primarily as sites of in-
formation and knowledge that do not demand active participation.  
3.2.  Why Networks? 
The proliferation of networks with their emphasis on sharing best practice 
suggests first, that there is a common understanding of shared problems 
and a common discourse which is shared by the agencies and second, that 
there is a dearth of knowledge and that in some way these networks are 
responding to a common need. The networks operate primarily at the level 
of the agency and the emphasis on enforcement suggests general agree-
ment as to what is being enforced and why. One critique of the networks 
is that the emphasis on praxis means that the question of the appropriate-
ness of competition law and the different nature of markets receives lim-
ited if any attention. While the competition laws of different States bear 
often a remarkable level of similarity, with a well-nigh universal condem-
nation of price-fixing cartels, there are areas where similarity is not so 
marked such as the extent to which competition laws apply to State activi-
ty in the market, to mergers, to procurement and with regard to how far a 
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market analysis is applied to activities that historically were offered by the 
State such as communications, water, energy.  
The common thread in competition law seems to be in particular a 
common economics discourse, with economic analysis intrinsic to compe-
tition law. Economics transcends legal boundaries in ways laws do not, 
and the hegemony of the US economic thinking is apparent. While the 
ordoliberal tradition has been and remains an important influence in con-
tinental Europe in particular, it has not garnered the same level of recogni-
tion as the classic economics of the Harvard and Chicago Schools and be-
havioural economics. 
3.3.  Whither National Competition Laws? 
In relation to a need for knowledge, this raises the question as to whether 
the rush to adopt competition laws at the national level is really the best 
response to the globalisation of trade. This is especially so given the prac-
tical problems of seeking to enforce competition norms that are national 
in nature in relation to conduct that can have a global impact, as seen in 
relation to international cartels. The extent to which competition policy 
needs to be integrated into national polities, and hence support and render 
meaningful competition laws, is a major issue. While competition law 
may be akin to a constitutional principle, for example, in the US, there 
remains ambivalence about it in many parts of the world. In developing 
countries there is a concern that developed countries did not introduce 
competition laws and encouraged cartels as a means of building econo-
mies for many years. Yet, they are expected to have competition laws in 
place. On the other hand, a competition law can be one aspect of good 
governance, acting as an anti-corruption mechanism provided it is en-
forced and applies to issues such as public procurement. It is also ques-
tionable whether competition law enforcement is an appropriate use of 
limited resources in States where the people have issues such as limited 
access to water, poor energy supplies and limited communications infra-
structure. The response in part to this criticism is that an effective compe-
tition regime can allow such systems to develop and improve.  
In other words, a key question that these networks and agreements 
do not – and are not designed to address, is the extent to which competi-
tion policy as articulated in the model UNCTAD law or the many national 
laws around the world, is perceived of as a public good, with a strong le-
gitimacy predicated on public support both for the substantive measures, 
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themselves, the scope of their application, how they are enforced and their 
relationship with other policy fields such as employment, environment 
and public service.  
4. Conclusion 
At this moment international competition law is a misnomer. Instead, 
competition law remains primarily a creature of national law with that law 
supported by overlapping and complementary networks of agencies fo-
cussed on enforcement and for developed economies primarily, more 
formal agreements dealing with competition enforcement or with compe-
tition provisions as part of a wider trade agreement.  
A general competition law at the WTO level has been roundly re-
jected suggesting that fragmented national laws remain the only true 
measure with large economies, notably the US and EU having influence 
beyond their boundaries by applying their competition rules extraterritori-
ally, by entering into agreements concerned with competition, and provid-
ing technical assistance to States without or with very new competition 
regimes. These entities remain highly influential in the OECD and the 
ICN. One argument as to why the UNCTAD model law for instance has 
not been as widely adopted as might have been expected is because the 
US and EU have not actively supported its initiatives as much as those of 
the OECD and the ICN.  
The emergence of networks at the regional and international level 
suggests a flatter structure although it is not clear to what extent this is re-
ally the case. Given that the networks’ main focus is on knowledge ex-
change and policy learning, rather than confronting difficult policy choic-
es and given the implicit assumption of a common problem and common 
understanding of the economic rationale underpinning the competition re-
gimes, this is possible. At the same time, it may mean that more intracta-
ble issues such as the relationship between competition rules and State in-
volvement in the market are not addressed in these networks.  
4.1.  What Does This Mean for Policy? 
At the policy level this means that States, who are not members of region-
al bodies with competition policy obligations such as the EU and 
ASEAN, are free to develop competition norms that take the best from the 
expertise and information provided by those networks or indeed to adopt 
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no competition norms at all. Small open economies do not necessarily 
need any competition laws as competition is vibrant in any event. Howev-
er, adoption of competition norms can be required by the IMF or World 
Bank or encouraged by the EU or the US or any other developed econo-
my, which may provide assistance to facilitate it. For developed econo-
mies, soft influence can still be exercised through providing assistance 
and knowledge both on a bilateral and plurilateral level.  
These trends suggest that having a competition statute per se says 
little about the nature of an economy and despite the rhetoric of common-
ality, there is a lot of difference between regimes. This suggests that it is 
for the State to articulate and to examine what can loosely be described as 
the limits of competition policy and law enforcement. What can competi-
tion policy achieve, how does it bed down with other regimes? What 
benchmarks can be applied to the national competition regime so that it 
can be evaluated? If competition policy is either poorly understood or not 
popular, should it be changed or should government or the competition 
agency lead from the front because it is the government’s view that ulti-
mately there is a strong case to be made that competition policy is a public 
good? The introduction of competition laws in Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa suggests that these questions will become more significant 
in the next decade and beyond with a re-calibration of the balance be-
tween international trade laws and international competition law. 
4.2.  What Are the Implications for Research? 
What we know is that there is no appetite, for political reasons at least, for 
a transnational competition regime that can apply in particular to transna-
tional corporations. Even if there was a move towards a global competi-
tion law, it has been stopped in its tracks. On the other hand, global mar-
kets remain and there are efforts to develop some sort of institutional 
framework both through articulating competition objectives in agreements 
and by developing governance structures and networks, to assist and sup-
port agencies. What we do not know and need to address is what are these 
networks doing and is there any empirical evidence of impact for what 
they do. It is necessary to articulate criteria against which to measure the 
effectiveness of these networks and for the ICN also to address its objec-
tives given its size. One suggestion is that it will become a network of 
networks – it will be where the shape and scope of the patchwork of inter-
national initiatives are laid bare so it is at a minimum possible to see 
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where gaps remain, what the on-going challenges are and to avoid unnec-
essary duplication.  
4.3.  What Does This Mean for the Lawyer of the Future? 
What this means for the lawyer of the future, is that he/she needs to un-
derstand markets given that the law plays such an important role in their 
operation and hence he/she should be trained in some economics. As the 
relationship between the State and the market remains challenging, the 
need for the lawyer of the future to know the relationship between the 
market and the State, often articulated as competition and regulation, is 
important. This is important also for the citizen of any State. While com-
petition law is so often cast as a prohibition designed to set as few limits 
as possible to the market cornerstone of freedom of contract, the key issue 
for developing the law and its application to international markets is the 
better understanding of the public dimension of competition law and how 
it can constrain inappropriate concentration of economic power, be it in 
the State or in private hands. 
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26Changing Ideologies in Trade, Technology and 
Development: The Challenge of China for  
International Trade Law 
Mary E. Footer*  and Andrew R. Forbes** 
The continued economic rise of China presents a range of challeng-
es for international trade law. The only real certainty for the future 
of China is that its development will continue on a unique trajecto-
ry, influenced by ancient Confucian tradition and modern authori-
tarian ideology. This presents a challenge for the multilateral trad-
ing system, which has previously dealt with a largely ideologically 
homogenous group of States that take a similar approach to the rule 
of law. A number of suggestions will be made as to how actors in 
the multilateral trading system may need to adapt to the changing 
ideologies in trade, technology and development that China’s rise is 
bringing about. This will require increasing sensitivity in norm cre-
ation from policy makers. Future lawyers and researchers must pre-
pare for the challenges that will come to permeate all aspects of in-
ternational trade law as a result of China’s long march forward. 
1. Introduction 
China has emerged to become one of the world’s largest trading nations, 
becoming the second largest economy in the world in 2010. This is the 
first time since the Cold War that a nation has reached this size while 
maintaining an ideology that is fundamentally different to that of other 
major trading groups. This presents a challenge for the multilateral trading 
system that must now adapt to effectively include China within both law-
making processes and systems of implementation. 
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It is vital that this challenge is addressed effectively. China’s coop-
eration is required to address all the major issues affecting global trade. Its 
continued use of the World Trade Organisation to carry out its trade poli-
cy will affect the status and importance of the institution itself. Any turn 
towards protectionism will have knock-on effects in other nations and 
conversely, China’s continued support for free trade can promote the 
maintenance of open trade elsewhere despite the current impasse in the 
Doha Development Round. It is clear that as a large and active member of 
the multilateral trading system, it is vital that it plays by the rules agreed 
upon by all trading nations. This requires that the rules gain legitimacy for 
Chinese trade policy officials. In order to promote legitimacy, the interests 
of China must be seen to be sufficiently represented within the system and 
the rules to be applied in a fair and even-handed manner.  
This contribution suggests that for this to occur, the ideological dif-
ferences between China and other nations must be taken into account. On-
ly then will the multilateral trading system be capable of maintaining the 
objectivity and impartiality that is needed for it to function effectively 
across different countries and cultures, including that of China. The focus 
of this contribution is on the identification of the areas in which these dif-
ferences may have practical implications for the future of international 
trade law given the challenge that China presents for the multilateral trad-
ing system as an economic powerhouse. The three broad areas to be con-
sidered are trade, technology and development. In these key areas dispari-
ties in cultural and ideological perspectives between China and its trading 
partners will increasingly cause tensions and raise challenges for the mul-
tilateral trading system. By highlighting alternative perspectives it is 
hoped that more attention may be paid to promoting diversity in opinions 
and interests among China’s trading partners, and thereby assist with 
meeting those challenges. 
2. The Bases of Cultural and Ideological Differences 
The root of such alternative perspectives stems from the combination of 
ancient Confucian tradition and modern authoritarian ideology. Until the 
economic opening up in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, Chinese society had 
largely resisted the growing trend towards globalisation. This left the Chi-
nese population with a markedly different perspective from much of the 
industrialised world. This is likely to remain the case even if more inter-
national influences do come to play an increasing role in Chinese culture. 
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It has recently been argued that Confucianism is returning to play a 
more prominent role in Chinese society as the ideology of Marxist com-
munism fades from the rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 
This can be seen in the use of Confucius Institutes for the projection of 
Chinese soft power. The fact that the CCP has embraced the Confucian 
tradition, as part of China’s push to interact with the outside world, is sig-
nificant. Through its selective interpretation of Confucian tradition the 
CCP has sought to steer a middle ground that appeals to the Chinese pub-
lic without contradicting its continued use of official Marxist theory. 
On the internal plane, the rise of CCP Confucianism is timely given 
the Party’s need to deal with a rising tide of social unrest in China caused 
by growing income inequality, disquiet about environmental pollution and 
rampant official corruption. A return to Confucianism provides the Chi-
nese Government with a broad platform to advance its narratives through 
a readily understandable message for its people while simultaneously un-
derpinning the legitimacy of its system of governance. This can be seen in 
the CCP’s continued focus on the promotion and maintenance of harmony 
in Chinese society, one of the core values in Confucian thinking, against 
the backdrop of an emerging pluralism. The difference between placing 
the highest value on harmony in the whole of society as opposed to the 
freedom of each individual within it should not be underestimated. It 
forms the basis of many of the most fundamental differences between 
Western and Chinese policies over the conduct of trade in a (non)market 
economy, the pursuit of technology and investment, and development.  
Differences also stem from the more recent Communism experi-
enced in China since the revolution in 1949. The Communist regime 
clearly consisted of a value system which was incompatible with the val-
ues of Western liberal democracies. Attitudes towards religion, property 
and freedom of expression differed almost entirely from the cultural val-
ues expressed in Western nations following World War II. By the end of 
Mao’s time in power, the rule of law had been completely abolished and 
vilified in Chinese society and the ‘unequal treaties’ were portrayed as 
key to the century of humiliation experienced prior to the Communist 
revolution. While the regime has clearly adapted to an extent, particularly 
with regards to the property rights of citizens and the rule of law, differ-
ences in attitudes still remain. 
China’s governance system is very different to the liberal democra-
cies in the Western world. Protection of rights and freedoms, which are 
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deemed fundamental in the West, are often completely disregarded. The 
justifications for such actions are different to those used by Western gov-
ernments. The recent National Human Rights Action Plan of China 
(2012–2015), issued by the State Council, provides a good example. The 
opening paragraph explains why the protection of human rights is im-
portant because “[i]t is of great significance to promoting scientific devel-
opment and social harmony, and to achieving the great objective of build-
ing a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way”. 
In the Western world no such justification would be required for the 
protection of individual freedoms which are seen as intrinsically good. 
The concepts of scientific development and social harmony form part of 
the Chinese ideology and are valued more highly than freedom and pro-
tection of individual rights. The availability of these justifications in the 
Chinese discourse means that different policies such as increased State 
control over the economy, censorship of cultural materials and economic 
development are given priority over the development of civil and political 
rights. This poses a challenge for the multilateral trading system since 
many of these policies cannot be justified by other nations and give rise to 
charges of unfairness. The subsequent sections highlight certain areas in 
which the Chinese position has been challenged and demonstrate how 
Chinese ideology is affecting the application of trade law in these areas. 
3. Changing Ideologies in Trade 
Differences in ideology between China and other key players in the multi-
lateral trading system may continue to cause problems in the creation and 
implementation of international trade law. The root of these differences 
between China and its major trading partners lies in the ideological dis-
parity about market structure and economic governance. 
China has clung on to its patrimonial sovereignty in the field of 
economic governance with its State-led socialist market-economy. State 
planning is an expression of an ideology that, in Pitman Potter’s words, 
“draws on a reservoir of Chinese tradition derived from Confucianism and 
its assumptions about authority and hierarchy in social organization”. 
Consequently, more emphasis is placed on the rule of technical experts 
over the views of individual members of society. This is scarcely recon-
cilable with the rest of the world’s move towards the progressive en-
dorsement of embedded liberalism in the multilateral trading system, 
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based on free trade and a market economy, which is part of its freedom-
centred ideology. 
When joining the WTO in 2001 China agreed to be classified as a 
non-market economy (NME) for 12 years (and 15 years in anti-dumping 
disputes). Yet, the current Chinese leadership yearns for full ‘market 
economy’ status. To date China has been recognised as a market economy 
in bilateral treaties by 79 countries. However, its key trading partners, the 
US and the EU, have remained reluctant to grant it. Their aim in denying 
market economy status to China might be to encourage the Chinese au-
thorities to complete economic and political reforms, which could lead to 
a more open and transparent economy, but the evidence suggests other-
wise. 
Despite its NME status, China is being treated sufficiently like a 
market economy already when it comes to the imposition of countervail-
ing duties. This is illustrated by complaints involving dumping investiga-
tions, such as EU – Footwear (China). In that case, an analogue country, 
Brazil, was used to determine ‘normal value’, with adjustments being 
based on world market prices. Had it been treated as a market economy, 
as China claimed it should have been, a determination of normal value 
would have been made by comparing export and domestic prices in the 
Chinese footwear industry. 
More recently both the US and the EU have begun crying foul on 
unfair subsidies. Treating China as a market economy, rather than as an 
NME, in anti-subsidy complaints is economically and legally more signif-
icant than in anti-dumping because it goes to the heart of how a country 
regulates its economy. This can already be seen in US – Certain Products 
from China where a subsidy dispute was decided not on the basis of Chi-
na’s status as an NME but according to the Appellate Body’s decision in 
US – Softwood Lumber IV, which involved two market economies, on the 
basis of out-of-country benchmarks. Thus, in US – Certain Products from 
China, in-country benchmarks for State-owned enterprise (SOE)-
produced inputs, government provision of land-use rights and in-country 
interest rates set by State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) were all re-
jected, as contrary to the relevant WTO rule on the matter. Significantly, 
China must constantly rebut the presumption that government ownership 
of an SOE (more than 50%) does not automatically result in its control of 
the enterprise; otherwise it would be a ‘public body’ for the purpose of 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 314 
WTO anti-subsidy law. This is hurting Sino-American trade relations, as 
recent consultations between the two countries demonstrate. 
The continuing failure to recognise these differences is damaging 
the legitimacy of the multilateral trading system. To China it seems unfair 
that anti-subsidy rules are being applied in this manner, especially when 
many of its major trading partners engage in similar practices in support 
of economically sensitive sectors such as agriculture, automobile produc-
tion or the electronics industry, or else they have already chosen to grant it 
market economy status under a bilateral treaty. To some of China’s key 
trading partners it seems unfair that Chinese industries and certain eco-
nomic sectors are recipients of a wide range of subsidies in everything 
from iron and steel fasteners to wind-power equipment. At least in the 
matter of unfair trade practices, it appears that international trade law has 
so far failed to adapt to the ideologically different nature of China.  
By not granting market economy status now China may be chal-
lenged through the WTO to comply with more open business practices, 
particularly in the matter of subsidies. For example, there is continued 
dissatisfaction (mostly from the US) over China’s failure to revalue the 
renminbi (RMB), thereby aiding Chinese exports, as well as government 
subsidies for wind and solar power equipment.  
Looking forward, it seems there is potential for the concept of mar-
ket economy status to change, reflecting a shift towards increasing levels 
of State intervention in markets both in China and in the West. The recent 
bank bailouts in Europe have shown that even the most liberal economies 
may require intervention in times of crisis. Combining this with the pres-
sure that China is increasingly putting on other economies to recognise its 
market economy status, the concept of market economy status is bound to 
undergo further change, possibly more rapidly than originally anticipated. 
This could have far reaching consequences for acceding WTO Members 
and perhaps influence anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions under 
WTO rules.  
At the same time, China will continue to move along the path of 
State capitalism in support of SOEs, which even extends to SOCBs and 
other SOEs in the financial sector. Timely challenges to this policy, under 
WTO dispute settlement rules, may yet prove to be the most effective 
means of opening up the Chinese economy to greater foreign competition. 
In China – Electronic Payment Services, China’s designation of the SOE 
China UnionPay, as the sole supplier of electronic payment services for 
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all domestic RMB payment card transactions, was found to have violated 
its market access and national treatment commitments under the WTO 
Services Agreement. 
4. Changing Ideologies in Technology 
Ideological differences have already had an impact on the use of technol-
ogy in China, as is clear from some recent trade disputes concerning the 
Internet, and censorship or content review mechanism. The Chinese ap-
proach towards censorship emphasises the maintenance of harmony with-
in the Chinese society over and above the promotion of individual free-
doms, both of expression and information. This is clearly an area in 
which, ideologically, Chinese and Western liberal perspectives differ.  
Such differences have arisen in several ways. One example is the 
China-Google dispute, which arose in early 2010. It centred on an alleged 
cyber-attack by domestic computer hackers on the Gmail accounts of 
Chinese human rights activists and at least twenty other large corporations 
from different sectors in the economy. In retaliation, the American Inter-
net giant declared that it would stop censoring politically and socially sen-
sitive search results in China. Negotiations to resolve the dispute, in 
which Google sought self-regulation rather than censorship, failed. The 
corporation closed its Internet search service in China (google.cn) and be-
gan rerouting Chinese users through its uncensored search engine, based 
in Hong Kong.  
Whereas direct attempts to deal with ideological differences arising 
from free speech may have failed, it has been suggested that “the WTO 
can play a role in opening up Chinese society”. Joost Pauwelyn has sug-
gested that by making use of free market principles it may be possible to 
limit China’s public censorship and to “pry open markets”, and thereby 
“pry open [the] minds” of the Chinese people. This is misguided. 
The case of China – Publications and Audiovisual Products clearly 
demonstrates the Chinese Government’s alternative perspective on cul-
ture, technology and trade, caught as it is between CCP Confucianism and 
the maintenance of its authoritarian ideology through censorship. Before 
the WTO panel and the Appellate Body, the Chinese Government argued 
on the basis of the public morals exception of Article XX (a) GATT 1994, 
that its content review of books, periodicals, electronic publications, and 
audiovisual home entertainment products was necessary to protect the 
Chinese people. It argued along Confucian lines that to do otherwise 
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would jeopardise the nation’s solidarity, destroy its social stability and 
endanger social morality. However, the challenge of understanding exact-
ly how and why China’s public censorship system operates on ideological 
grounds was swept away, amidst the subordination of its content review 
mechanism to the dictates of the free market. 
The Appellate Body in China – Publications and Audiovisual 
Products upheld the panel’s finding that China’s WTO-plus trading rights 
commitments, forcing any importers of audiovisual products to be SOEs, 
was not ‘necessary’ to promote the aims of protecting public morals. In-
stead, this objective could be pursued by means of alternative, less trade-
restrictive measures. One alternative was to have the Chinese authorities 
conduct all of the content review on imported material, following customs 
clearance, and thereafter grant the right to import and distribute such ma-
terial to all companies, including foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) un-
der China’s foreign investment regime. 
While this action might make it easier for foreign material that 
passes the Chinese censor to be imported and distributed more effectively, 
it does not necessarily open up the Chinese market to cultural products 
nor does it lead to greater freedom of speech in the country. In fact, it 
might make it harder because China’s substantive content review is left 
intact. It is noteworthy in this connection that China’s Human Rights Ac-
tion Plan (2012–2015), while reinforcing its adherence to a universalist 
doctrine of human rights, only endorses ‘citizens’ freedom of speech and 
the right to be heard in accordance with the law on its own terms. What 
the China – Publications and Audiovisual Products does not do is address 
the challenge that China, as a major trading partner which still sees itself 
as a fully functioning market economy with distinct “Chinese characteris-
tics” and cultural values, poses for international trade law. 
5. Changing Ideologies in Law and Development 
China’s unique ideology has had broad effects on the path of its recent, 
rapid development. The creation of legal institutions has come to play an 
increasingly prominent role in development theories. Development theo-
rists have highlighted the importance of legal institutions as a way to at-
tract investment and promote economic growth. The law has played a cru-
cial role in China’s development, forming the basis of the property rights 
vital to the new capitalism that has emerged, and providing the founda-
tions for foreign investment in the country.  
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This contribution suggests that ideological differences have affected 
the way in which the rule of law has been interpreted and applied in Chi-
nese governance. China’s development of the rule of law is still in pro-
gress but it is clear that its approach is noticeably different to that in 
Western governance systems. We argue that the success of Chinese de-
velopment without the existence of a rule of law system in the image of 
Western liberal democracies is affecting development paradigms. New 
conceptions of the rule of law ‘with Chinese characteristics’ will have a 
growing impact on development theories as other nations seek to emulate 
the rapid economic growth achieved by China in the past three decades. 
China takes a unique approach towards the rule of law and it serves 
a different purpose to that in the Western world. It is not intended that the 
rule of law be used to promote democracy, liberal values or a liberal con-
ception of human rights. Instead, law is seen as more important as a 
means of achieving social order. Additionally, China’s recent history, cul-
ture and ideology affect how the rule of law is perceived and implement-
ed. 
Another influence is the role that Confucian principles play in the 
Chinese understanding of the rule of law, particularly the principle that 
rulers derive their authority to govern from their superior virtue. This sug-
gests that they may be above the law by which they rule. CCP Confucian-
ism can legitimise the broad discretion extended to decision-makers, and 
the view that ‘morality trumps law’, by appealing to these deeply rooted 
cultural beliefs. 
China’s unique approach to development challenges development 
paradigms. For example, there are clear differences between the Washing-
ton Consensus, which has held sway in the Western world since the early 
1990s, and the alternative ‘Beijing Consensus’ applied by China. Instead 
of a sharp turn to free market reform and a liberal democratic system, the 
policies used by China have emphasised gradual export-led economic re-
form and the pursuit of State capitalism, constant innovation and experi-
mentation, incremental governance reforms and authoritarianism. Alt-
hough not expressed in a formal document, this approach has been la-
belled the Beijing Consensus because for China it replaces the widely-
discredited Washington Consensus. A gradualist approach to development 
may have significant practical implications, particularly for sub-Saharan 
African nations that are now receiving increased levels of aid and infra-
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structure investment from China, which at the same time remains largely 
indifferent to, or else supports authoritarian regimes across the continent. 
As Randall Peerenboom has pointed out the Beijing Consensus pre-
sents, from a development perspective, a different path where the integra-
tion of global ideas is “rigorously gut-checked against the demands of lo-
cal suitability”. It offers an alternative to the rapid exposure to liberal 
markets and ideas that were advocated and applied in the Washington 
Consensus, allowing broader policy space for governments to find their 
own best path to development and modernisation. 
Ideology has had a great effect on the unique path taken by China in 
its development. At home and abroad, China’s international interests fol-
low directly from its domestic reform strategy and are managed by a 
strong party state that carefully balances domestic and global interests. 
China’s official policy discourse, which still recognises the “Five princi-
ples of Peaceful Coexistence” (sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutu-
al non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual 
benefit; and peaceful coexistence), is complemented by Confucian slo-
gans advocating a “harmonious society” and a “harmonious world”. 
In the coming decades China’s ideology may have an increasing ef-
fect on how other countries approach their own development. If the Bei-
jing Consensus gains popularity, increased ideological pluralism may be-
come the norm in the development paradigm. This will lead to a far more 
varied landscape than the one-size-fits-all approach advocated in the 
Washington Consensus. New conceptions of the rule of law could emerge, 
which while they lack the separation of powers and the array of civil and 
political rights that are contained in Western liberal systems, nevertheless 
maintain those existing structures so as to form a ‘rule by law’ system of 
governance. 
6. Conclusion 
This contribution has sought to highlight the new approach to internation-
al trade law that stems from the challenge that China’s unique ideology 
and culture poses. At the same time, China’s economic significance pre-
sents a direct challenge to the Western-centric system of law with its em-
phasis on the rule of law. How the international legal order and the multi-
lateral trading system, which is bound by the rule of law, is affected by 
China’s rise could set a precedent for the future as other nations with dif-
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fering perspectives come to form a larger proportion of global economic 
activity. 
There are a number of areas where Chinese ideology is already af-
fecting the way in which China interacts with the rest of the world. This 
can be seen in its recognition as a market economy by some 79 countries 
even though there are others that still treat it as an NME but judge it by 
market economy standards. When it comes to technology Chinese ideo-
logical differences with its major trading partners appear to be narrowing. 
We can, however, expect China to continue to protect its unique traditions 
and culture, where necessary through new or existing forms of content re-
view or by means of a public morals defence at the WTO. Finally, the 
unique Chinese ideological perspective can be seen in the recognition of a 
new discourse in development, typified by the Beijing Consensus, which 
demonstrates China’s path to stimulating economic growth.  
The coming decades will witness new interpretations of internation-
al trade law – be they in the field of WTO or preferential trading arrange-
ments – and new directions in trade governance. The effect of Confucian 
ideology on the governance systems in ASEAN is already apparent and an 
expanded ASEAN + 3 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), between 
ASEAN and each of China, Japan and South Korea, might also display 
such characteristics. Any new rounds of multilateral trade negotiations or 
international treaties, affecting the trading system as a whole, will need to 
reflect this new ideological pluralism or else it will be vulnerable to criti-
cism by its membership for lacking legitimacy. 
The implications of these developments for future policy makers, 
corporations and lawyers, active in the realm of international trade, are 
widespread. For policy makers, increased awareness of Chinese ideology 
could aid negotiations as it may lead to improved insight into the Chinese 
position in both multilateral and bilateral settings. For actors involved in 
trade disputes, their strategy may be affected now that the public morals 
defence, in support of cultural values, has received due recognition in the 
WTO dispute settlement system. For businesses and lawyers, an aware-
ness of the cultural context may allow for an improved understanding of 
trends in international trade governance and provide a great opportunity to 
apply international trade law in a range of novel situations. 
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27Challenges in Public and Private Domain Will 
Shape the Future of Intellectual Property 
Severin de Wit* 
Market failures, troubled access to medicine, impediments to free 
flow of information, copyright overextension, digital right protec-
tion, overkill and patents stifling rather than stimulating innovation 
are just a few of the disparaging themes around intellectual proper-
ty. The main drives behind changes in IPR systems are growing 
discontent with the right to exclude, which is essential to most IPR 
systems, the diversity of IP policies between the West and the De-
veloping countries, as well as digitalisation of information. The fu-
ture of IPR will be shaped more by its users than by international IP 
legislative initiatives. This think piece explores the main drives be-
hind a growing critical view on intellectual property and how the 
law can change so as to restore confidence in the workings of intel-
lectual property systems. 
1. Introduction 
Intellectual property (IP) law practitioners are generally not known for 
their preoccupation with shaping the future of the law. Engaged with daily 
routines, IP law practitioners are more concerned with practical issues like 
the question in which EU country a new, unified, European Patent Court 
will be established and whether such a court, once in place, will maintain 
or change long held patent law concepts like “obviousness”, and if so, 
whether common or civil law traditions will prevail.  
2. IP Does Not Feature Prominently in International Law 
Publications 
Literature on what intellectual property will look like in 2030 is scarce. 
Well-known writers seem more concerned with the possible future for dif-
ferent fields of law, ranging from criminal and environmental to constitu-
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tional and corporate law. Intellectual property is notably absent. When an-
alysing the inconsistencies or inadequacies of current legal systems, intel-
lectual property rights, also known as IPRs, do not attract the imagination 
of legal minds when they explore the challenges law systems face in the 
new millennia. Even a recent publication, Realizing Utopia: The Future of 
International Law, edited by a formidable legal mind in international law, 
Antonio Cassese, covered all imaginable areas of the law, except intellec-
tual property.  
The reason behind this is simply that intellectual property is not a 
subject that “translates” well into the mind of politicians, scientists, poli-
cymakers or even economists. IPR, however, is an important instrument 
in opening markets for knowledge, increasing Foreign Direct Investment 
and allowing innovation to spur (that at least still many believe). There-
fore, IP should be included when we discuss about changes in the law to-
day and consequently how the law of the future will look like with or 
without intellectual property. 
Realizing Utopia is a collection of essays, written by a group of 
well-known international jurists, reflecting on some of the major legal 
problems faced by the international community. Remarkably, shaping an 
improved architecture of world society – or at a minimum, reshaping 
some major aspects of international dealings – does not seem to include 
what impact intellectual property laws have on these subjects.  
3. Intellectual Property as a Historical Public Policy Instrument 
The protection of intellectual property has a history that dates back sever-
al centuries. Christopher May and Susan Sell address this in their collabo-
rative work on IP, “Forgetting History is Not an Option! Intellectual 
Property, Public Policy and Economic Development in Context”, and note 
that the “[p]rotection of intellectual property has always been a form of 
public policy, an intervention in markets to transform their functioning”. 
Tracing the development of IP policy as far back as the Middle Ages, 
May and Sell elaborate further on the topic: 
In the 1300’s patents were grants of privilege awarded to 
those who brought new techniques into a sovereign’s territo-
ry. British kings awarded letters of protection to innovators 
who developed new weaving techniques and various new in-
dustrialist processes. Rulers sought to attract and retain tal-
ented artisans in their territory, inspired by the mercantilist 
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goals of limiting imports and promoting exports. Intellectual 
property rights emerged during the early mercantilist period 
as a means for nation-States to unify and increase their pow-
er and wealth through the development of manufactures and 
the establishment of foreign trading monopolies. The term 
patent, derived from the Latin patere (to be open), refers to 
an open letter of privilege from the government to practice 
an art. The Venetian Senate enacted the first patent statute in 
1474 providing the maker of any ‘new and ingenious device 
... reduced to perfection so that it can be used and operated’ 
an exclusive license of 10 years to practice the invention. 
Other nations followed suit and the granting of limited mo-
nopolies for inventions, and later to publishers and authors of 
literary works, became the dominant means of promoting in-
novation and literature.
1
  
 However, the question now is what has become of this romantic 
idea of IPRs stimulating innovation? 
4. Property as the Leading Justification of IPRs 
Over time, the predominant theme around intellectual property rights has 
been the right to a creation of the mind – to own this as if it is one’s prop-
erty – enabling the holders of IP to exclude others. As we will see later in 
this think piece, in the private domain the concept of “property” has 
caused many to argue that a right to exclude third parties from using such 
property should be altered into a compensatory liability regime. 
Given the distributional consequences of the ability to own (and 
control, even temporarily) products of the mind and imagination (books, 
films, software, trade dress as well as technological innovations), intellec-
tual property has frequently been an instrument of power and, once cap-
tured, the basis for further accumulation of power. However, unlike power 
that comes from the control of sparse material resources, the holders of in-
tellectual property have had to construct the scarcity of property through 
legal instruments. The very process of defining what constitutes intellec-
tual property effectively reinforces particular perspectives that may bene-
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Property, Public Policy and Economic Development in Context”, George Washington 
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fit, some at the expense of others, treating some things as “property”, 
while others remain “freely” available. 
5. Intellectual Property Rights as a Source of Economic Power  
Patented innovative ideas, copyrighted new creations of the mind, break-
through product designs and the power of famous brands coincide with 
economic power as soon as these are exercised on the market. However, 
this economic power is not equally enforced or exercised. The right to ex-
clusivity that is so quintessential to IP rights also creates asymmetrical 
economic power between the “have” and the “have not”. As a matter of 
fact, asymmetrical economic power goes a long way towards explaining 
why semi-conductor chips are identified as intellectual property, whereas 
indigenous folklore is not. As Susan Sell and Christopher May describe in 
their “Moments in Law, Contestation and Settlement in the History of In-
tellectual Property”,
2
 the legal institutional development of IP shows sig-
nificant difference from other forms of productive relations. In this sense, 
while other markets emerged prior to capitalistic models of organisation 
and were slowly integrated into the modern capitalist system, with prod-
ucts entering markets through production processes organised in a multi-
tude of ways, this is not true of intellectual property. For markets in 
knowledge, the property had to be constructed through law, so that it 
could be allocated through market mechanisms; but those who sought this 
commoditisation were essentially nascent capitalists. Thus, unlike other 
forms of productive relations that were re-configured through the emer-
gence of capitalism, intellectual property relations are the product of the 
great transformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
 
 
Economic power has long been the leading force behind the pres-
sure put on developing countries to accept Western intellectual property 
concepts that were previously alien to those countries. Chile provides a 
striking example. In 1990, an American-based private business associa-
tion used its power not only to reject, but also actively to shape, the legis-
lation of a foreign sovereign government. Until 1991, like many develop-
ing countries, Chile refused to grant patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products. This refusal was an effort to keep the prices of necessary medi-
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 Susan K. Sell and Christopher May, “Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement 
in the History of Intellectual Property”, in Review of International Political Economy, 
2001, vol. 8, no. 3. 
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cines affordable by placing public health considerations above property 
right concerns. Chile faced increasing pressure by a small group, called 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America (PMA), to revise its laws to 
extend patent protection to pharmaceutical products. In 1990, Chile pro-
posed a revised patent law, which was rejected by this small but powerful 
group, forcing Chile to go back to the drawing board and revise its patent 
law. This exceptional industry lobbying was basically a prelude to the re-
lated and even more far-reaching international agreement on IP, the 1994 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
6. Diversity of IP Policies Between Countries is a Function of Their 
Development Stage 
As Susan Sell and Christopher May have shown, the diversity of intellec-
tual property policies between countries is in part a function of their dif-
ferent stages of development. All other things being equal, a technological 
leader will prefer strong protection of its innovations, whereas a follower 
will favour access over protection. Strong economies will be served by 
expanding the markets for their goods, while weak economies are best 
served by cheap or free access to the technologies of advancement and 
development.  
In the current world economic climate this is all the more true. In 
the public domain, India, due to its increasing economic power, allows its 
national pharmaceutical companies much more legal lenience in using 
proprietary processes and products, owned by foreign counterparts and 
covered by foreign owned patents, in order to protect national interests 
despite TRIPS: interests that collide with internationally recognised patent 
rights of third parties.  
In the early 1960s, the first Indian drug companies came to the mar-
ket. At that time, foreign multinational companies had mainly dominated 
the Indian drug market. This did not change until the early 1970s when 
domestic Indian companies were able to capture only about 25 per cent of 
the Indian market. The Indian government then decided to implement new 
legislation to allow its domestic companies to gain a greater market share. 
The motivation for that was to allow for a better and cheaper supply of 
medication. The Patents Act of 1970, which was later amended in 1972, 
1992, 1995, and 1999, virtually abolished IPRs in the pharmaceutical sec-
tor using the following provisions: (1) product patents for pharmaceutical 
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products were not granted; (2) the available process patents were very 
weak and offered only insufficient protection due to their restrictive five- 
to seven-year statutory term; (3) the equity share of foreign companies in 
Indian drug manufacturers was limited to 40 per cent; (4) price control 
was introduced to cut prices; and (5) a wide ranging system for compulso-
ry licences was introduced. Of the above, the fifth is the most restrictive 
to the industry since it virtually eliminates all judicial reliance on the Indi-
an IPRs. Over the years, mainly the production of generic drugs fuelled 
the growth of the Indian pharmaceutical industry. This was done through 
copying existing formulations of multinational companies and producing 
them in a larger scale after making slight process alterations. Since the 
weak IPR did not allow for litigation, more and more foreign companies 
ceased investment in the Indian market. Consequently, by 1991, Indian 
companies had turned market share numbers round in their favour and 
now served roughly 75 per cent of the market. However, after flourishing 
by means of the weak IPR for about 24 years, the regulatory framework 
changed for the Indian companies in 1994. In the process of joining the 
WTO, the Indian government had to sign the TRIPS agreement.  
The case of India and its efforts to protect national generic indus-
tries is just one example of an intellectual property system that has come 
under increasing international criticism. Emerging economic powers, like 
those in BRIC countries, no longer tolerate a unilateral “dictate” on how 
to seek equilibrium between protecting national interests and protecting 
third party rights of foreign investors. Local indigenous knowledge, long 
ignored by Western pharmaceutical companies, is now at the heart of 
R&D projects in many developing countries, creating new challenges 
about who owns the intellectual property in knowledge derived from in-
digenous sources. The increased self-consciousness of those countries, 
caused by economic prosperity, provides them with the confidence that 
they can withstand international pressure to adapt their IP laws.  
The overall theme behind the pressure by Western countries on de-
veloping countries to meet international TRIPS standards was that IPR 
strengthening would be a boon for increased Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI). A further argument for developing countries to accept TRIPS was 
that the more importance was given to intellectual property rights, the bet-
ter the behaviour of their economy would be: a proposition denied by 
many, among them Joseph E. Stiglitz. Stiglitz concludes that intellectual 
property regimes designed inappropriately not only reduce access to med-
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icine, but also result in a lower economy efficiency and may even slow 
down the rhythm of innovations, with weakening effects, particularly se-
rious in developing countries.3 
The evolving trend of developing countries of showing economic 
growth where Europe and the US are lagging behind will only increase 
the number of occasions on which Western-originated pressure to adapt 
IPR regimes will be faced with scepticism and resistance, unless a fairer 
and more equitable IP system is put into place that allows those countries 
to develop their own IP legal systems. As Fink and Maskus point out in 
“Intellectual Property and Development, Lessons from Recent Economic 
Research”,
4
 future empirical work should look for natural experiments 
that explore within one country how economic variables have changed af-
ter a regime shift on a well-defined element of the intellectual property 
system.  
7. Property and the Right to Exclude 
At the heart of this growing discontent with the functioning of intellectual 
property systems are a number of developments. Firstly, there is the 
changing moral and social understanding on how property can be the le-
gitimate reason for an IP right holder to exclude others even if this exer-
cise of ownership has consequences on public health, security or public 
safety. Can a holder of patented AIDS/HIV medicines prevent countries 
from delivering generic copies of the patented version to open up a market 
that would otherwise be restricted to the rich and fortunate? As Susan Sell 
sets out:  
The history of intellectual property protection reveals a com-
plex yet identifiable relationship between three major fac-
tors. First, it reveals shifting conceptions of ownership, au-
thorship, and invention. These ideas denote what “counts” as 
property, and who shall lay claim to it. Second, this history 
reflects changes in the organization of innovation and the 
production and distribution of technology. Third, it reflects 
institutional change with these shifting ideational and mate-
rial forces.  
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Legal institutionalization of these changes in law alters pow-
er relationships and inevitably privileges some at the expense 
of others. Property rights both are situated within broader 
historical structures of global capitalism and serve to either 
reproduce or transform these structures. Particular historical 
structures privilege some agents over others, and these 
agents can appeal to institutions to increase their power. 
Furthermore, the age of digital technology, the internet and the 
greater ease of reproduction have increased the demand for modifications 
in intellectual property practices. Young people have difficulty under-
standing why music, videos and other information kudos cannot be freely 
downloaded. Perceptions of “property” rights on information have under-
gone an almost revolutionary shift from the powered few having access to 
proprietary information and resources to a mainstream audience on all 
kinds of public internet platforms assuming and demanding information to 
be “freely available”. This shift in perception of access to information has 
dramatic effects on the most core of traditional IP thinking: property and 
exclusivity.  
The infinite information resources that the internet provides give 
further impetus to a shift in ideological views on who owns information 
materials, ranging from the concept that ideas and information should be 
completely free – unprotected and unrestricted – to the belief that intellec-
tual property laws should remain the ultimate means of regulating who 
can and should get access to information, and at what price. It is this con-
stant legal and societal battle that forces traditional providers of infor-
mation, publishers and writers, composers, entertainers, film-makers and 
inventors alike, to change their business models over time. Again, this 
search towards the boundaries of private ownership where concepts of 
“property” and “exclusion” are the main themes will have serious implica-
tions on what intellectual property law will look like over time. 
For advocates of the commons model
5
, the legacy of the internet's 
development provides even further reason for questioning the durability 
of broad intellectual property protection as a means of spurring innova-
tion.  
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8. Power Shift in IP Public Policy  
Lastly, the shifting political power towards emerging economies in the 
BRIC countries, as discussed above, has a deep impact on legislative pro-
cesses and global IP enforcement. As the history of TRIPS shows, a hand-
ful of powerful industries were able to force countries to adapt their IP 
laws so as to align them with Western concepts of intellectual property 
enforcement. Unilateral legislative initiatives use compulsory licensing to 
break patent monopolies on medicines deemed crucial for public health in 
developing countries. India’s government, in May 2012, authorised a drug 
manufacturer to make and sell a generic copy of a patented Bayer cancer 
drug, arguing that Bayer charged a price that was unaffordable by most of 
the nation. Although the decision by the India Controller General of Pa-
tents, Designs and Trademarks was not the first time when a so-called 
compulsory licence of a patented drug had been granted in India, many 
believe that this opens the door to a flood of other compulsory licences 
creating a new supply of cheap generic drugs. This evidence of an in-
creased self-consciousness is a clear sign of a power shift in intellectual 
property public policy. 
9. Changes in the Private IPR Domain 
In the private domain, it can be seen that intellectual property concepts – 
long held to be the cornerstone of the legitimacy of that part of the law – 
meet increasing criticism, questioning whether intellectual property has a 
future at all. It is undeniable that the form of intellectual property we have 
been taught at law schools and propagated by institutions, governments 
and multinational corporations and IPR practitioners – a system of com-
plex statutorily-defined property rights – is in dire need of reconstruction. 
The future of intellectual property is at stake. No longer can the IPR es-
tablishment – current users of IP systems and law-makers who have been 
proliferating the advantages of IP – rest on their laurels and rely on fun-
damentals that have guided them for centuries: that patents reward inven-
tors by granting them a monopoly for a limited time in exchange for the 
patentee disclosing his invention so that others can rely and build on his 
work, thus fostering innovation as a theme that slowly develops into 
anathema.  
 Criticism of the relationship between innovation and patents is in-
creasing and certainly no longer limited to the academic world. As a result 
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of modern technology, children of the information age hold different 
views on “openness” and “free (available) information”. The general idea 
is simple enough, as Robert P. Merges describes in his recently published 
book Justifying Intellectual Property.
6
 Digital media, driven by the inter-
nal logic of widespread availability and network effects, will flourish bet-
ter and better serve the goals of the intellectual property system if digital 
content, and the platforms that carry it, are freed from property-based lim-
itations. Merges’ book is a legal and philosophical work in search of the 
best answers to these “openness” and “commonality” trends. He defends 
the idea that IP protection is in no way inconsistent with the promotion of 
a flourishing environment for digital media; quite the contrary: IP rights 
are essential to this goal.  
10. Alternatives to Property-Based IPR Systems 
Alternatives have been proposed to intellectual property as a right based 
on property that allows the owner to “exclude” and “control”. IP laws that 
favour liability rules have been proposed as an alternative to exclusion. 
Property rules, as the name suggests, secure “entitlements” (like an in-
junction against a party that uses the patented invention or the trade-
marked sign or the copyrighted work, or monetary compensation – a roy-
alty) as “property”. To secure something as property, the rules must effec-
tively prohibit others from taking or damaging the entitlement without 
first gaining the consent of the owner. Liability rules, on the other hand, 
neither seek to provide the security of a property rule, nor seek to force 
those who would take or damage an entitlement from first obtaining con-
sent from the IP right owner. Instead, such rules create an obligation to 
remedy the usage of the property, for example by paying a reasonable 
price, or “rent” in economic terms. Failure to honour this obligation 
would in some cases constitute an infringement for which reparation 
could be sought. 
Jerome Reichman is the leading proponent of using liability rules to 
address problems concerning the protection of traditional knowledge and 
sub-patentable
7
 inventions. Under his proposed compensatory liability 
scheme, second comers will be required “to pay equitable compensation 
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for borrowed improvements over a relatively short period of time”. As 
Reichman explains, such an alternative regime has several benefits. For 
example, it “could stimulate investment without chilling follow-on inno-
vation and without creating legal barriers to entry”. Such a regime “would 
also go a long way toward answering hard questions about how to protect 
applications of traditional biological and cultural knowledge to industry, 
questions that are of increasing importance to developing and least-
developed countries”.  
11. Conclusion 
Whatever the outcome of academic research into alternative IP systems, 
the future of intellectual property will be in large part dependent upon the 
actors in the IP field themselves. No remedy to a failing IP system can be 
found in new legislative initiatives, as is shown by the legislative process 
to create a new unified European Patent Court. As Jonathan Koppell 
shows in his book World Rule, Global Governance Organisations like 
WIPO, the WTO and other legislative bodies entrusted with international 
IP legislation, tend to face trade-offs between legitimacy and authority, 
often violating democratic norms, sacrificing equality and bureaucratic 
neutrality, to satisfy key constituencies and thus retain power. So it is not 
altogether that strange that no major new treaties on IP can come off the 
ground. As a result, inequalities caused by intellectual property “owner-
ship” and “exclusivity” in the public domain will most likely in the future 
not be remedied by more internationally agreed legislation: for example, a 
change in TRIPS, but rather by domestic and case law, local legal initia-
tives and common practices. In the private domain, we have already seen 
the emergence of a new “openness” in intellectual property, evidenced by 
a “Commons” approach of Open Source in copyright and, in patent law, 
the Patent Commons Project initiative launched in 2005 by the Open 
Source Development Laboratories (OSDL). Furthermore, we will see a 
growing number of limitations in national case law around the world 
where the exercise of intellectual property-based ownership and exclusivi-
ty claims will make way for liability-based remedies. We can expect to 
get more differentiation between fundamental advances in knowledge and 
logical extensions of existing knowledge or incremental improvements 
that will, over time, receive a different kind of intellectual property pro-
tection. Societal needs to breach the “exclusivity” rule in intellectual 
property for the greater good (access to information, basic research, ex-
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emptions on patentable subject matter, resistance against overly long cop-
yright term protection and other restrictions of IP exclusivity) will, as we 
expect, force the judiciary to allow much more room to exceptions to 
ownership and exclusivity in intellectual property in the future. 
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28Intellectual Property Law without Secrets 
David S. Levine* 
Secrecy, particularly effective secrecy, is on the wane, and with it 
archaic forms of law-making must similarly be reconsidered and 
discarded. This think piece posits that international negotiations re-
garding intellectual property (IP) laws like the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership Agree-
ment (TPP), and any future international IP law-making proce-
dures, lessen the adherence to a theory of secret negotiations and 
embrace the inevitable and desirable need for the public to ask 
questions and offer meaningful input. The risk of attempting to con-
tinue on the current course, futile or not, pretending that secrecy is 
desirable, causes an erosion in the relevance of and confidence in IP 
law as a legitimate and effective form of regulation, as already seen 
in the systematic problems associated with ACTA. 
1. Introduction 
The idea of secrecy is becoming quaint. Or, at least, the notion that one 
can maintain a secret for the period of time necessary to derive significant 
social value from maintaining a given piece of information as secret – 
what I call “effective secrecy” – is increasingly threatened. The threats to 
effective secrecy are many and varied, but operate at the nexus of tech-
nology and its intellectual property, and the human desire to innovate and 
change. Primary among the threats are the pervasiveness of powerful 
communication mediums like the Internet and hand-held computers like 
smart-phones and the resultant expectation that information will be free 
flowing and available in real-time; the advent of constant and pin-point 
surveillance whether in the form of Google Street View or United States 
civilian and military drones; the slow erosion of strong privacy values 
through the increasing utilisation and acceptance of social media; and an 
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ever-expanding belief that there is no real privacy or security online. The 
logical extension of this pincer attack against effective secrecy is that 
there are, in reality, fewer and fewer effective secrets. 
At the same time, secrecy is attempting to forge new inroads. Gov-
ernments are labelling information as secret, classified, and secret but not 
classified, in ever expanding numbers and related to topics, such as the 
creation of intellectual property law, that have never been secret before. 
Secret courts, secret warrants and secret tools like computer viruses and 
drone aircraft increasingly play a role in intelligence gathering, military 
attacks and national defence. The logical extensions of this attempt at in-
creased secrecy are secret law negotiations encompassing vast substantive 
areas from financial regulations to intellectual property law, epitomised in 
the on-going negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(TPP). But these vestiges of the secrecy world of yore are increasingly fu-
tile attempts at maintaining effective secrecy, as the aforementioned tech-
nology, information architecture and activism trends converge to over-
whelm these efforts: witness Wikileaks’ public document dump of 
250,000 US diplomatic cables and the public backlash against the secret 
negotiations of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).  
Thus, if you are keeping score, effective secrecy is losing the battle 
with openness. What is left is, not surprisingly, ineffective secrecy, whose 
hallmark is antagonism of the public, increased administrative morass 
and, in the case of IP law-making, imbalanced and poorly-drafted law – 
the very opposite of the assumed virtues of effective secrecy.  
Thus, it is time to reconsider the theoretical underpinnings for se-
crecy in a technological age defined by unprecedented and unimpeded 
flows of information. Counter-intuitively, this think piece posits that the 
decline of effective secrecy must be embraced in intellectual property law 
not just because it is inevitable, but because it is also theoretically benefi-
cial. Secrecy’s very theoretical underpinnings have been proven unstable 
and unsustainable by examination of the creation and expansion of intel-
lectual property law through the on-going negotiations of and tension sur-
rounding the excessive secrecy attendant to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) and Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).  
Efforts to maintain effective secrecy, even if futile, have an uninten-
tional consequence: they have made the procedure used in the creation of 
intellectual property law as important as its substance. The experience of 
ACTA and TPP leads to a counter-intuitive suggestion that is the focus of 
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this think piece: intellectual property law and law-making should embrace 
the trend towards less “effective secrecy” because it is socially desirable. 
By doing so, we will begin to harness the power and benefits of a world 
less governed by secrecy generally, which drastically improves the pub-
lic’s ability to offer meaningful, real-time input through the method of the 
under-valued question-and-answer format. We will, in sum, be able to re-
conceive our underlying theory about how IP law should be made. Be-
cause the way that IP law is made has a direct impact on the contours of 
the law itself, we will get better IP law.  
2. There Will Always Be Some Secrets 
Let us begin with a qualification: there will always be some secrets. Con-
sider a few basic scenarios. At its core, a human being (as far as we can 
currently foresee) will always be able to keep information in her head that 
no other person will be able to access easily unless she begins to speak or 
write it on paper or in an electronic medium, or technology advances to 
the point where detailed mindreading is possible (and it might advance 
that far, although we are apparently decades from such a possibility). 
Plenty of secrets, like the outcome of most high-profile court cases, are 
kept secret this way. Two people will be able to go into a closed room, 
check for surveillance equipment and other people, and have a private 
conversation, subject to those individuals’ ability to not share the contents 
of the discussion. Several people will be able to write down some infor-
mation on a sheet of paper or electronic medium, place it in a locked safe 
or device, and maintain its secrecy so long as it remains securely there and 
everyone keeps their mouths shut. Or, as a recent story in The Huffington 
Post reported, nine grandmothers will be able to secretly pool their money 
to then use to make cakes and anonymously leave care packages for those 
less fortunate – and maintain their secret charity for 30 years until one of 
their husbands notices large withdrawals of money on a bank statement 
and asks questions. Most people would say that we want to be in a world 
where such secrecy is possible. Few people would want to live in a world 
where there were no secrets.  
But is such secrecy always desirable? Note the threats to secrecy 
embedded in each of the basic scenarios identified above. In each scenar-
io, technology, error and human nature operate to maintain a constant 
threat that a given secret will be revealed. Thus, putting a premium on 
maintaining the secret can cause enormous stress, both personal and pro-
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fessional, and in many cases will ultimately prove futile. Sometimes, the 
effort will be worth the payoff and social good will be maintained, as in 
the case of sensitive bilateral or multilateral negotiations to end an armed 
conflict.  
However, increasingly and particularly in the creation of intellectual 
property law, Internet policy and other areas where collective and diverse 
interests are at stake, the effort, futile or not, is not worth the payoff and, 
in fact, is detrimental. For example, why should we slavishly maintain 
that such secrecy is necessary and warranted, much less possible, in intel-
lectual property law-making? Why not embrace the uncertainty and foster 
a new governing paradigm that celebrates the fact that some information 
treated as secret, to paraphrase Stewart Brand, truly wants and needs to be 
free – particularly when the outcome will be positive?  
2.1. Baby Steps: The Value of Asking Questions 
The operative proposition of this think piece is that legislators and poli-
cymakers maintain adherence to regimes of secrecy simply because that is 
how it has always been done – control of information is the lever of power 
and influence – and, more perniciously, if no one knows what you are do-
ing, the lack of accountability can keep you in office longer than the alter-
native. However, the effective power of such secrecy is increasingly be-
coming a figment of one’s imagination or a wistful desire to return to a 
simpler time before secrecy was under pressure. As the ACTA backlash 
has shown, once the secret is effectively revealed, the sought-after power 
is usually severely diminished or eliminated for all but the few top-level 
decision-makers (like the lead trade representative or a leader of govern-
ment) who are not at the actual negotiation table, but rather offer the top-
level policy directives that are resident in their minds. For everyone else, 
including the staffers who actually negotiate the law and implement the 
policy, and who themselves may be victims of the same imperfect secrecy 
efforts that impede useful and timely public input, the inevitable leak ren-
ders them merely belligerent and unrealistic in the public’s eyes if the 
continued perceived necessity of secrecy is asserted and pursued. The ef-
fort to protect the illusion of secrecy is, in a word, no longer effective, but 
rather counter-productive.  
From a policy perspective, the continued adherence to the fiction of 
secrecy squanders opportunities to improve law-making. Thus, rather than 
view the current landscape as unfortunate and hopeless, law-makers 
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should view it as offering a unique opportunity. The decline of secrecy 
and of the related control over information offers a unique opportunity to 
force experimentation in new, more inclusive and democratic forms of 
law-making, appropriate for a world where secrecy is not as respected, or 
perhaps needed, as it once was. At its most basic level, it allows for a 
heretofore unrealised use of questions as a form of offering public input 
and value into the intellectual property law-making process. Questions are 
an under-theorised form of public input, perfect as an initial first step to-
wards public inclusion, for the new world into which law-makers are 
largely unwillingly being thrust. 
In Hamilton Bean’s ground-breaking study of the use of open 
source (read: public) information in current and future intelligence gather-
ing and operations, he relates a comment from a member of the United 
States’ 9/11 Commission that studied the events leading up to the terrorist 
attacks. He notes that, according to a 9/11 Commission staffer, questions 
from 9/11 victims’ family members played a significant role in the sub-
stance of the Commission’s investigation. The staffer noted: 
Most of [the family members’] influence was [in] the ques-
tions that they asked us that they wanted answers for. So, in 
the very beginning, we solicited from the families their list 
of questions, and every time they called us with another an-
gle, or another thing to investigate, we kept [a list], and we 
made sure all those questions were answered in the commis-
sion’s report, and we gave them an annotated version of 
where to find their answers, so that [the public] didn’t have 
to go searching. 
Of course, the predicate for being able to ask good questions is hav-
ing essential information upon which to base questions. The 9/11 Com-
mission was designed as a truth-finding commission that would ultimately 
offer suggestions regarding how the United States should respond legisla-
tively so as to prevent future terrorist attacks, a topic that would have been 
normally viewed as highly sensitive, and therefore meriting a high degree 
of secrecy. But, in the structure and vision of the 9/11 Commission, the 
questions were welcomed (even if they were not always useful or on 
point) as a procedural device to further the mission of the 9/11 Commis-
sion and the collective interests of US citizens. 
Current IP law-making, reflected in the on-going negotiations 
around TPP, adheres to the fiction of effective secrecy at the expense of 
more useful, modern law-making possibilities. For example, in the current 
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climate pervading international IP law-making, such useful questions are 
not only generally unwelcomed, but they are impossible to ask. Because 
of procedural hurdles like the treatment of ACTA and TPP as a national 
security concern by the United States, public access to formal and current 
negotiating texts and proposals must clear the same procedural hurdles as 
a request seeking information about how to make a weapon of mass de-
struction, a nearly impossible hurdle to jump. And this secrecy, even if 
imperfect by virtue of leaks, nonetheless has an impact. In the case of 
ACTA, an official text was not released during the vast bulk of the nego-
tiations, but several leaks occurred which formed the basis for rampant 
speculation and conjecture about ACTA’s actual content. In the case of 
TPP, there has yet to be a formal release (although there have been a few 
leaks), even though the thirteenth round of negotiations have just con-
cluded.  
The result of this halting and imperfect secrecy: in the United 
States, only selected “cleared advisors”, made up almost entirely of corpo-
rate representatives of the entertainment and pharmaceutical industries, 
have official access to portions of the draft texts. Thus, only they can offer 
meaningful input to the negotiators. Indeed, only they know what ques-
tions need to be asked. Similar situations exist in other negotiating coun-
tries. In the case of ACTA, the public, its experts, and everyone else were 
left asking shot-in-the-dark questions based on speculation, conjecture 
and fear, generating agitation against the process. When it was finally re-
leased, its every failing was perceived as the product of a corrupt process, 
and the ensuing protests rendered it all but dead. Given the equally closed 
nature of the TPP negotiations, the same fate likely awaits it once the se-
cret is revealed, as must happen eventually. This is no way to make IP law 
in the 2012, and it benefits no one. 
Aside from the strange reality that the 9/11 Commission focusing 
on terrorism and fundamental national security concerns, like the protec-
tion of life and borders, was more transparent than an international pro-
cess for creating intellectual property law, this issue is troubling on its 
own because of its impact on the ability to ask knowledgeable questions. 
Under current conditions in the TPP negotiations, it is impossible to ask 
any questions, much less offer any input of significant detail and use, un-
less one happens to accurately speculate, based upon leaked drafts and/or 
conjecture based upon public statements, what might be an actual issue.  
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Indeed, at the San Diego round of the TPP negotiations, held in July 
2012, civil society groups bravely attempted to offer detailed input based 
on a 16-month old leaked IP chapter draft text. Whether they were com-
menting on issues that had been resolved in the intervening 16 months is 
anyone’s guess, but it was hard not to view their efforts as the idealistic 
part of a cynical charade. In other words, current IP law-making operates 
in almost the exact opposite fashion as the 9/11 Commission, with secrecy 
as the operative theory (and, given the leaks, imperfect secrecy as its reali-
ty), rather than a theory that embraces making sure that all public ques-
tions are answered with “an annotated version of where to find their an-
swers, so that [the public] didn’t have to go searching”. 
Intellectual property law and the public at large suffer from the con-
tinued adherence to secrecy despite all of the mounting obstacles to it, and 
the resultant eschewing of questions. As a body of law that increasingly 
encompasses collective interests like how information will be shared 
among individuals, be they German inventors or Egyptian protestors, and 
who will have the legal right to create new works of authorship and inven-
tion, IP law no longer has the luxury (if it ever did) of pretending that its 
issues are provincial or of concern to a small percentage of the population. 
Indeed, IP law is increasingly the body of law that regulates who will 
have access to information and who will be considered part of the global 
economy. To paraphrase Professor Eric Goldman, we are all both creators 
and consumers of IP, and IP law must recognise that fact lest it become 
disconnected with reality and eventually irrelevant. 
Thus, administrative hurdles, such as equating intellectual property 
law-making with national security, have the basic impact of impeding 
questions. More broadly, it reflects the larger problem that intellectual 
property law faces: a continued adherence to the need for and sacrosanct 
theory of secrecy as a method of law-making. It is that staid adherence to 
the methodology of secrecy, which events beyond the control of intellec-
tual property law and law-makers are rendering archaic, which is the trend 
that must be addressed if IP law is to remain relevant to today’s innova-
tors and creators. If effective secrecy is increasingly difficult to maintain, 
and if maintaining the secret proves more harmful than beneficial, then 
the operative theory underlying secrecy as a modality of law-making is 
under severe stress.  
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2.2. SOPA, PIPA, the Internet and Questions 
To illustrate the value of questions at the expense of secrecy in the context 
of IP law-making, it is useful to consider the 2011 protests surrounding 
SOPA and PIPA and why they arose. The text of SOPA and PIPA, unlike 
ACTA (for most of the time that it was under negotiation) and TPP, were 
and are not secrets. They are bills, introduced in Congress and publicly 
available. The December 2011 web blackout, where dozens of websites, 
including Wikipedia, shut down for one day, reflected an awareness of the 
challenge in regulating Internet activities that goes back to its inception as 
a commercial medium. As explained in a letter authored by Mark Lemley, 
David Post and the author of this think piece, “The approach taken in [PI-
PA] has grave constitutional infirmities, [at least what we think would be 
the current PIPA] potentially dangerous consequences for the stability and 
security of the Internet's addressing system, and will undermine United 
States foreign policy and strong support of free expression on the Internet 
around the world”. These three primary concerns reflect the interlocking 
challenges of regulating Internet activities. Specifically, the Internet, and 
the intellectual property law that often forms its rules and contours, impli-
cates issues of commerce as well as personal and national security, global-
isation and communication through free media between peoples whom, 
prior to the advent of the Internet, had no pervasive way to share infor-
mation and ideas directly. 
The protests may have brought home to many elected officials that 
it is no longer acceptable to profess ignorance of the technology underly-
ing the Internet and the impact of regulation on it. By way of the protests, 
the public asked the basic question: do you, members of Congress, know 
or care about what you are doing to the Internet and what the impact will 
be of what you propose to do? In a very real sense, the protests epitomised 
what Hal Abelson, Ken Ledeen and Harry Lewis wrote in their terrific 
book Blown to Bits: “the entire social structure in which Internet protocols 
evolved prevented special interests from gaining too much power or 
building their pet features into the Internet infrastructure”. The public ap-
plied that principle by asserting that no single industry or activity can (or 
should be allowed to) define what the Internet is, or how it should be reg-
ulated. The Internet is more holistic, and because of its pervasiveness as a 
medium to create, distribute and sell intellectual property, has taken intel-
lectual property law along with it. Legislators were forced to reckon with 
that question because they could not hide the SOPA and PIPA texts, and 
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in so doing were forced to table SOPA and PIPA. Whatever happens, we 
will all benefit from better law as a result.  
However, in the international IP law-making arena, secrecy, effec-
tive or not, has become the procedural hammer used to violate this princi-
ple of holistic values, derived from the Internet but now impacting intel-
lectual property law. Allowing only certain interests full access to the in-
formation needed to ask the right questions, while everyone else relies on 
leaked information, goes against the very basis of IP as a law designed to 
encourage innovation by all, not just a privileged few. That reality now 
threatens to fundamentally undermine not only balanced IP law, but its 
very legitimacy as a form of regulation. Thus, this think piece has ad-
dressed what secrecy means as a modality of regulation going forward, 
especially if the ability to maintain a secret – effective secrecy – is on the 
wane. 
3. Conclusion 
Unfortunately, the Internet’s core value of eschewing special interests 
in the architecture is not as well-established in governments. Indeed, 
information flows to and from government are less sacrosanct as a 
governmental value than the similar value reflected in the architecture 
of the Internet. But if IP law is to find a middle ground that balances the 
competing interests of all involved, which is quite literally all humans, 
there has to be, as Yochai Benkler has described it, a space for such a 
middle ground to be found. But it cannot be discovered unless all stake-
holders, not just the technology and content industries, are part of the dis-
cussion. It will not be found unless secrecy is made less paramount and all 
are able to ask intelligent questions. 
IP law must embrace the Internet founders’ core operating princi-
ple. The decline of effective secrecy and the under-appreciated power of 
the knowledgeable question means that if we are to find an IP middle 
ground, if we are to strike a balance, if we are to embrace the decline 
of effective secrecy and the rise of questions, then the technology and 
content industries, the USTR and the other negotiators of ACTA and 
TPP, and law-makers in all involved countries, need to embrace the 
public, or at least (in the near term) be open to meaningful questions 
from it. As Professor Bean has indicated, the very act of being allowed 
to ask intelligent and knowing questions is an enormous step in the di-
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rection of embracing new forms of intellectual law-making for a new 
century, and would provide heretofore unparalleled legitimacy to the 
on-going TPP negotiations. 
Importantly, there are no technological impediments to allowing 
the positing of intelligent questions. Rather, the only impediment is vi-
sion and confidence in the public’s ability to improve the process and 
create better intellectual property law by asking an intelligent question. 
It requires a theoretical reorientation away from secrecy as a means of ef-
ficiency and towards secrecy only where it is socially beneficial and 
where generally monolithic views are present. The recent miasma in in-
ternational IP law-making has shown, to all but the very few “in” on what 
is left of the secrets, that secrecy is no longer a theoretically sound or 
practically useful prism through which to view all IP law-making. Effec-
tive secrecy as a tool of law-making may be nearing its death, and as that 
plays out, the vestiges of its attraction must be reconsidered.  
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5.6. 
______ 
29Export of the Rule of Law: Corporate  
Self-Regulation of Global Data Transfers 
Lokke Moerel* 
The digital era is characterised by an unprecedented continuous 
worldwide flow of data, both within multinational companies as 
well as with their external service providers. Whilst large corpora-
tions operate internationally, State governments legislate nationally. 
Besides leaving gaps in the patchwork of national data protection 
regulations, this situation also leads to overlaps in applicable na-
tional rules that often deviate or outright conflict. Further, the tradi-
tional territory-based enforcement tools are not adequate for States 
to force compliance. This legal landscape provides a challenging 
background for testing whether transnational private regulations 
(TRP) of data protection can provide solutions where legislation 
fails to do so. This think piece evaluates a remarkable example 
within the European Union (EU) regarding the emergence of a 
complex hybrid system of self-regulation (global corporate privacy 
policies) with public arrangements (the data protection authority of 
the EU headquarters of the multinationals validating such corporate 
privacy policies and providing support in the area of supervision 
and enforcement). In this manner, transnational supervision and en-
forcement is achieved not at the transnational level, but by granting 
the Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) and the court of the EU 
headquarters, global central supervision and enforcement powers. 
This leads to enforceable rights for individuals, even in jurisdic-
tions where no (adequate) data protection laws are in place or 
where insufficient enforcement infrastructure is available. 
1. Data Protection: The Regulatory Landscape 
In the digital age, data protection is of increasing concern for govern-
ments, individuals and companies alike. Especially, the maturing of the 
internet led to a vast increase in cross-border flows of personal data both 
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within and between groups of companies. Although all countries face es-
sentially the same problem regarding the regulation of these vast flows of 
personal information, their governments have chosen substantially differ-
ent solutions. Within the EU, the protection of individuals prevails, and 
the rights of individuals regarding the processing of their personal data 
have become a fundamental right and freedom, regulated by the EU Data 
Protection Directive (Directive). The wish to protect personal data of EU 
citizens when transferred outside the EU resulted in a “long arm” provi-
sion in the Directive, where it prohibited data transfers to countries out-
side the EU without an adequate level of data protection (EU data transfer 
rules). This extraterritorial provision prompted many countries outside the 
EU to follow suit in adopting comprehensive data protection legislation to 
facilitate on-going access by their multinationals to the EU market. Of the 
one hundred and ninety two member States of the United Nations (UN) 
about fifty to sixty of them currently have a legal framework for data pro-
tection. Many of these countries have imposed restrictions on the out-
bound transfer of personal data from their respective countries. Such out-
bound data transfer requirements are considered necessary by most coun-
tries, as there are still many countries with no data protection laws at all, 
as well as countries (most notably the US) with a limited regime, which 
mostly focus on the public sector and certain sensitive industries (most 
notably healthcare and telecommunications). As a consequence, the 
worldwide data protection regulatory landscape presently consists of (at 
best) a patchwork of very diverse national data protection laws which of-
ten deviate or outright conflict.  
At present, the main tool applied by DPAs to try and solve gaps in 
applicable data protection laws and enforcement, is seeking cooperation 
with other DPAs in the event of cross-border data protection violations 
(that is, a network approach whereby each authority enforces in its own 
territory). However, until all jurisdictions have adequate data protection 
laws and supervision of these laws, this network approach cannot ade-
quately solve all gaps in the applicable laws and enforcement issues faced 
by data protection regulators. As it is generally not expected that a global 
standard for data protection will be realised within the coming ten years, 
more creativity is required in order to solve the gaps in data protection, as 
well as in enforcement.  
Solutions may only be forthcoming if DPAs are empowered to en-
force on a cross-border basis rather than each DPA in its own territory. 
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Such central enforcement may be achieved if companies would be able to 
regulate their data protection by means of corporate self-regulation and 
make a choice of forum for central enforcement by one “lead” DPA (and 
its courts), preferably the headquarters of such a multinational. This will 
lead to enforceable rights even in jurisdictions where no (adequate) data 
protection laws are in place or where insufficient enforcement (infrastruc-
ture) is available.  
2. Cross-Border Enforcement Issues in Data Protection Cases 
The applicability, jurisdiction and enforcement of data protection legisla-
tion are generally based on a jurisdictional approach. These concepts are 
subject to limitations set by private international law (PIL). This is due to 
the fact that a key concept in determining the limits of State regulation is 
“sovereignty”, which is a concept founded on the very existence of a terri-
tory. Cross-border data flows inherently challenge such sovereignty. In 
order to seek regulation of these cross-border data flows, States gave their 
laws a “long arm reach” (both in terms of the scope of applicability of 
their laws and of adopting outbound data transfer rules).  
Although data protection regulation in many cases is of relatively 
recent times, the concepts of applicable law and jurisdiction are embedded 
in a long tradition of rules of PIL, where laws that over-extend their juris-
dictional reach are considered an unacceptable form of “hyper-
regulation”, if they apply so indiscriminately that there is no hope of en-
forcement. Applicability regimes are therefore inherently delineated and 
cannot be instrumental in solving the present gaps in the protection of 
personal data and its enforcement. This automatically also applies to data 
transfer regimes, as these are only triggered if the relevant data protection 
laws are applicable in the first place.  
Cross-border enforcement issues proliferate if (as is the case with 
data protection) the laws are highly varied across the globe or even lack-
ing (as is often the case in developing countries). As a result, questions 
arise as to their enforceability within an international context. For exam-
ple, are supervisory authorities of a country entitled (or obliged) to pro-
vide assistance to another supervisory authority regarding a breach of 
such authorities’ national laws, whilst not constituting a breach in the 
country of the authority whose assistance is requested? Similar questions 
arise in respect of investigation powers and recognition or enforcement of 
foreign judgements, et cetera. This may entail that supervisory authorities 
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have to obtain information on alleged breaches via the internet rather than 
relying on investigation performed in the relevant other jurisdictions.  
From the perspective of individuals whose data are processed, the 
present jurisdictional approach does not provide effective protection. This 
is not for a lack of rights and remedies of individuals. For instance, the 
Directive provides for quite broad remedies and liabilities, and in princi-
ple allows individuals ample opportunity to ensure that a breach is reme-
died and compensation is obtained. However, to effectuate these rights 
and remedies through traditional judicial means is not viable in practice 
for a number of reasons. Data protection breaches in most cases involve 
relatively small levels of economic damages for individuals where it 
would be more costly to pursue a case through traditional judicial means. 
Due to the networked economy, even relatively simple breaches of data 
protection further present complicated cross-border jurisdictional and en-
forcement issues. The example below is for clarification.  
A US consumer purchases a product over the internet from a Dutch 
company. The Dutch company involves one of its group companies in In-
dia for customer service purposes (help desk for installation of the prod-
uct). The Dutch company has a privacy policy informing the consumer 
that his data are shared with the Indian group company for helpdesk ser-
vices and the consumer provides his consent for this. The data of the con-
sumer are hacked and the consumer becomes subject of identity theft. 
Here, as in all other cases, the consumer has to determine: (i) who is at 
fault; (ii) which laws apply; (iii) what are his rights under the applicable 
law(s); (iv) what are his damages; and (iv) where does the consumer seek 
redress? Even in this relatively straightforward case, answering each of 
these questions proves problematic and leads the consumer to effectively 
having no recourse.  
2.1. Re (i) Who Is at Fault? 
In this case, it will be difficult to establish which company is at fault (that 
is, the Dutch or the Indian company), as in practice it is often impossible 
to determine at which point in a network a hacker found entry. As a con-
sequence, it will be impossible for the consumer to prove which of the 
two companies actually did not secure the data properly, in the absence of 
which each company can avoid liability. 
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2.2. Re (ii) Which Laws Apply? 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) does not apply to a Dutch 
company doing business from the Netherlands, and the FTC has no juris-
diction. Dutch data protection law applies in respect to the data processing 
by the Dutch company. Supposing that the consumer can prove the securi-
ty breach occurred in the systems of the Dutch company, the consumer 
could file a complaint with the Dutch DPA. Chances are slim that the 
Dutch DPA will take action based on an individual complaint of a US 
consumer in an isolated case. Instigating civil action in the Netherlands is 
too costly and not justified in light of the damages (if any) suffered by the 
US consumer. Language issues and time differences may also prove to be 
impediments. If the consumer can prove that the security breach occurred 
in India, chances are that the Indian company did not breach any provi-
sion of Indian law, as a result of which no recourse is available at all.  
2.3. Re (iii) What Are His Damages/ Re (iv) Where Does He Seek 
Redress? 
As long as the relevant identity theft has not led (yet) to any actual dam-
ages (like abuse of the credit card number of the US consumer), it will be 
difficult for the US consumer to prove actual damages and to establish 
whether these are recoverable under Dutch law. 
This example shows that even if the questions can be answered, in 
practice still no effective resources may be available.  
3. Thinking about Alternative Solutions for Enforcement  
3.1. Self-Regulation Backed Up by Governmental Enforcement 
Tools 
When looking at other forms of international ICT regulation of cross-
border enforcement, these show few ideas about a more integral approach 
to enforcement. Initially, ICT regulators both at the national and the inter-
national level seemed to be united in their opinion that industry self-
regulation and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) would prove a better 
alternative to solve enforcement issues in an international context than the 
traditional forms of jurisdiction-based government regulation, dispute 
resolution and enforcement mechanisms. However, as ICT law developed 
over the years, by now a preference can be discerned for co-regulation 
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above pure self-regulation. The prevailing current thinking is that en-
forcement, in particular, cannot be left to the industry alone; self-
regulation should be backed up by governmental enforcement tools. This 
can only be achieved by means of co-regulation rather than by self-
regulation and ADR.  
In the absence of more in-depth studies on cross-border enforce-
ment of data protection, reference may be made to the general literature in 
respect of cross-border enforcement of consumer protection laws, which 
is shaped by ideas about what generally works in regulatory enforcement. 
This literature shows that the (by now) traditional forms of private en-
forcement, complemented by agency enforcement (as is also the current 
status under the Directive), are inadequate to force compliance. More cre-
ativity is required and also this literature points in the direction of self-
regulation, backed up with governmental enforcement. Such self-
regulation, however, does not materialise just like that and some of the al-
ternative enforcement measures in the consumer protection arena are in-
tended to work as an incentive for just that purpose. For instance, the im-
position of disclosure obligations on companies has proven a stronger in-
centive for companies to achieve compliance (often by introducing self-
regulatory policies) than the introduction of material rules. What I find in-
structive myself in this literature is that at first glance, the possibility of 
self-regulation and this particularly in an international context has a fla-
vour of “leniency”, of a soft approach to compliance and that in an area 
where human rights are at stake. The first thought is “who is going to 
monitor and enforce compliance”? It is instructive to realise that empirical 
research shows that government regulation and enforcement will not do 
the trick in a cross-border environment, unless such governmental regula-
tion aims at regulating private regulation and some form of governmental 
enforcement of such private regulation.  
3.2. Private Choice of Law and Forum in Global Corporate Self-
Regulation 
Solutions may only be forthcoming if DPAs are empowered to enforce on 
a cross-border basis rather than each DPA in its own territory. This would 
solve some of the problems discussed above, most notably the potential 
requirement to address different courts under the application of different 
laws. The starting point of this solution is that, given the sovereignty of 
States, any such form of central enforcement will entail States relinquish-
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ing enforcement powers in some cross-border situations, in return for 
gaining central enforcement powers in other cases. As long as the instanc-
es, where central enforcement powers are obtained, are of more relevance 
to a regulator than the instances in which enforcement powers are relin-
quished, this would seem a viable option. Such central supervision and 
enforcement may be achieved if companies were able to regulate their da-
ta protection in transnational private regulation (TRP) and make a choice 
of forum for central supervision and enforcement by one “lead” DPA 
(Lead DPA) and the courts of the country of such Lead DPA, preferably 
of the EU headquarters of such multinational. As the headquarter has con-
trol of all data processing operations of such multinational, it is able to 
procure compliance on a global basis, and transnational enforcement is 
achieved. 
4. Binding Corporate Rules (BCR) 
4.1. Drivers for the Introduction of Global Corporate 
Privacy Policies 
“Facebook has 900 million active users of which 7.5 are below 13”; 
“Wall-Mart handles more than 1 million customer transactions per hour, 
the equivalent of 167 times the books in America's Library of Congress”; 
“Every day, we create 2.5 quintillion bytes of data – so much that 90% of 
the data in the world today has been created in the last two years alone…” 
Box 1: Some facts regarding data. 
Group companies exchange employee and customer data as a course of 
business. Multinationals increasingly process these data in central IT sys-
tems, which are accessed by the group companies around the world. Due 
to innovations, such as dynamic routing and cloud computing, it is often 
no longer predictable how these data will be routed over the internet or 
where these data will be ultimately stored. The data transfers between 
group companies attract a multitude of applicable data protection laws. 
The existing overlap and conflicts in applicable data protection laws make 
one hundred per cent worldwide compliance by multinationals a practical 
impossibility. Furthermore, multinational companies largely ignore the 
EU (and other countries’) data transfer rules as these lead to dispropor-
tionate administrative burdens. Practice shows that multinationals, rather 
than striving to comply with applicable national data protection laws on a 
country-by-country basis, implement worldwide self-regulation by intro-
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ducing corporate privacy policies. Their corporate privacy policies pro-
vide for both company-wide data protection rules and for an adequate lev-
el of data protection throughout the group, and often ignore possible 
stricter national provisions. The territory-based enforcement tools of the 
DPAs have not been able to counter this continuing widespread disregard 
for data protection laws. The introduction of corporate privacy policies by 
multinationals has created bottom-up pressure on national legal orders. 
This is reflected in the growing number of beneficiaries who invoke these 
policies before national courts (so far mainly in the US). It is also reflect-
ed in the pressure exerted by multinationals on the EU DPAs to recognise 
their corporate privacy policies as a tool to comply with the EU data 
transfer rules (as their policies ensure an adequate level of protection of 
personal data when transferred throughout their group of companies).  
4.2. The BCR regime 
The EU Commission’s advisory committee on data protection, Working 
Party 29, recognises the added value of transnational private regulation in 
the data protection area in light of the gaps and deficiencies of the present 
EU data transfer regime. In a series of opinions, the Working Party 29 set 
criteria for these corporate privacy policies, labelled Binding Corporate 
Rules, BCR, to provide for a minimum level of protection for the pro-
cessing of data by a multinational on a worldwide basis. These BCR 
should (inter alia): 
(i) be internally binding within the organisation (on all group compa-
nies and on employees) and externally binding for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries of the privacy policy (that is, must create third-party 
beneficiary rights for these individuals); 
(ii) incorporate the material data processing principles of the Directive 
and the restrictions on onward transfers to third parties outside the 
group;  
(iii) provide for a network of privacy officers for ensuring compliance 
with the rules;  
(iv) provide for an internal complaint handling process;  
(v) provide for an auditing programme covering all aspects of the cor-
porate privacy policy;  
(vi) ensure suitable training of the employees who process the data;  
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(vii) be enforceable by the beneficiaries of the corporate privacy policy 
(that is, the employees and consumers) via the DPA and the courts 
in the Member State of the EU headquarters of the multinational;  
(viii) the EU headquarters should accept liability for paying compensa-
tion and remedying breaches of the corporate privacy policy; and, 
(ix) group companies should have a duty to cooperate with the DPAs, to 
abide by their advice regarding the corporate privacy policy and to 
submit to their audits. 
With BCR, the Working Party 29 introduced a complex hybrid sys-
tem of self-regulation (corporate privacy policies) with public arrange-
ments (the DPA of the EU headquarters of the multinationals validating 
such corporate privacy policies and providing support in the area of su-
pervision and enforcement).  
Empirical research, performed as part of a HiiL project1, shows that 
the data protection compliance of multinationals that introduced BCR, 
doubled on all ten measured principles, comprising in total of seventy 
four indicators (see Figure 1 below).  
 
                                                   
1
  The BCR case study was performed as part of the HiiL research project Private 
Transnational Regulation: Constitutional Foundations and Governance Design, 
see for scope www.hill.org. The empirical research has been performed by means 
of a privacy maturity tool which is developed by Nymity Inc, an international 
private-sector privacy compliance research firm. 
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Figure 1: HiiL Study Results: Nymity BCR Accountability Analysis. 
Despite the evident benefits of BCR, some EU DPAs still oppose 
central authorisation and enforcement of BCR by one Lead DPA, for the 
reason that they do not have many of such headquarters in their territory, 
and therefore have not much to gain from such central authorisation and 
enforcement system. EU legislators are well advised to ignore this opposi-
tion and facilitate and encourage the adoption of BCR in the upcoming 
EU Regulation on Data Protection (Proposed Regulation).  
4.3. Do BCR Provide for Adequate Redress Mechanisms? 
A prerequisite for any form of redress is that BCR are enforceable. The 
requirement of enforceability is reflected in the first requirement of the 
BCR regime, which notes that the BCR should be “externally binding” for 
the benefit of the beneficiaries of BCR (that is, the employees and con-
sumers whose data are processed under the BCR). BCR are in principle a 
unilateral undertaking by the multinational and not a contract. Many, but 
not all EU member States, take the view that rights may be granted to 
third parties by means of unilateral undertakings. If Lead DPAs in certain 
countries have doubts as to whether the BCR are externally binding (that 
is, legally enforceable) in their respective jurisdiction, a solution is to put 
a contract in place between the EU headquarters and, for instance, the 
group company in the jurisdiction of the DPA. In all member States it is 
possible to grant third-party beneficiary rights in a contract. However, ra-
ther than having to resort to legal solutions to ensure that BCR are exter-
nally binding, it would simplify matters considerably if European legisla-
tors could provide in the Proposed Regulation that BCR can be enforced 
as unilateral undertakings by third-party beneficiaries.  
As BCR apply to the data processing operations of the multinational 
on a worldwide basis (that is, also to data processing operations not gov-
erned by the EU data protection laws), multinationals introducing BCR 
have a strong interest in including a choice of law and forum clause in 
their BCR. The main reason for this is that it is in the interest of the mul-
tinational that all complaints under the BCR are indeed ultimately dealt 
with by the Lead DPA (and the courts of the Lead DPA) as this DPA ne-
gotiated the provisions of the BCR under the applicability of the Lead 
DPA’s own law (that is, the law under which the provisions of the BCR 
were drafted). This ensures for the multinational a consistent and predict-
able interpretation and application of the BCR. For the same reason, the 
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multinational has an interest in the Lead DPA having central supervision 
over the BCR. Given the uncertainties under EU rules of PIL as to wheth-
er indeed a valid choice of law and forum can be made in respect of data 
protection, I recommend that European legislators ensure that in BCR 
such choice of law and forum may be made for the laws and courts of the 
member State of the Lead DPA. 
To ensure that individuals have sufficient possibility of redress, the 
BCR regime requires that the multinational provides for an internal com-
plaint and response facility. Many obstacles to cross-border enforcement 
of data protection, currently encountered by individuals, will be addressed 
by introduction of an internal complaints system. The individual will be 
able to file a complaint in his own language, with the group company with 
which he has a relationship, regardless of where the breach occurred or 
which of the group companies was responsible for the breach. The group 
company that receives the complaint will be responsible for ensuring that 
the complaint is processed through the complaints procedure of the multi-
national, and for ensuring that the required translations are provided. If 
the complaints procedure does not lead to a satisfying result for the indi-
vidual, the group company will have to facilitate the filing of the com-
plaint by the individual with the Lead DPA (or its courts). This procedure 
will lead to enforceable rights, even if damages of individuals are diffuse 
or too small to pursue through traditional judicial means, and where juris-
dictions have no (adequate) data protection laws or if insufficient en-
forcement (infrastructure) is available. It further overcomes language-
issues, time zone obstacles and minimises costs.  
5. Conclusion 
BCR, as an instance of Transnational Private Regulation, can do better 
than the present jurisdiction-based application and enforcement of the Di-
rective:  
5.1. Providing Material Data Protection to Individuals 
BCR provide for more material data protection to individuals in practice 
than the current Directive and further provide data protection also to data 
processed by the multinational in countries where no or less data protec-
tion is provided for by State laws. Thus, gaps in data protection left by the 
regulations of nation States are no longer relevant. 
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5.2. Avoiding Gaps in Enforcement 
The beneficiaries of BCR are provided with a central facility for com-
plaints and the many obstacles to cross-border enforcement of data protec-
tion by individuals will be addressed. By granting central supervision and 
enforcement powers to the Lead DPA and its courts, transnational en-
forcement is achieved on a global basis. 
5.3. Improved Regulation of Trans-Border Data Flows 
BCR result in fewer administrative burdens for multinationals and simul-
taneously provide for more material data protection and redress to indi-
viduals. This is a vast improvement to the current situation, where trans-
border data flows within multinationals are regulated by means of the EU 
standard contractual contracts to be entered into between the EU group 
companies and each and every non-EU group company, which lead to 
high administrative burdens for multinationals, while at the same time the 
data protection rights and remedies of individuals under these contracts, 
do not lead to meaningful data protection and redress in practice.  
It is high time that the current uncertainties as to the validity and en-
forcement of BCR are solved; that the BCR authorisation procedure is 
streamlined; and that the enforcement powers of DPAs are harmonised 
and a common enforcement strategy for the DPAs is developed to ensure 
equal enforcement. This should not be achieved by way of further opin-
ions of the Working Party 29, but by a revision of the Directive, which 
should preferably take the form of an EU regulation. 
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30The Regulation of  
Public-Private Partnerships 
Christopher H. Bovis
*
  
The notion of public–private partnerships reveals complex forms of 
cooperation between the State and private actors, which exceed the 
remit of traditional contractual interface, moving into a strategic 
sphere of public sector management. Public–private partnerships 
aim at delivering both infrastructure facilities and public services, 
and are regarded as attractive and credible solutions to the infra-
structure deficit of many developed and developing States. A con-
ceptual forecast of the legal and regulatory mapping of public–
private partnerships is attempted in this think piece, and it also 
elaborates on the current and future legal trends within which the 
regulation of public–private partnerships will be developed. Fur-
thermore, and in conjunction with the emergence of legal trends, 
this think piece reflects on societal needs, which need calibrating in 
terms of expectation, but mostly perception when faced with the 
modality of public–private partnerships for the delivery of public 
services. Finally, this think piece attempts to cast a conceptual map 
of the challenges for the development of the law in relation to pub-
lic–private partnerships, by depicting their interface as public ser-
vices instruments, as investment instruments and as growth instru-
ments. The think piece then concludes with recommendations for 
law- and policy-makers in relation to the law of the future for pub-
lic–private partnerships. 
1. Background 
The modern State justifies its existence through the provision of public 
services, a concept which encapsulates the pursuit of public interest. The 
delivery and regulation of public services are based on two diametrically 
different models, which reflect on internalisation choices or externalisa-
tion choices on the part of the State. Firstly, as far as internalisation 
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choices are concerned, the notion of public services often fuses with that 
of State ownership of assets or infrastructure, and amalgamates the ensu-
ing provision of services to the public. It also refers to functions which 
underpin essential facilities of the State (these are, defence, justice and 
policing), and as a result these functions are sheltered from market forces 
in order to ensure the integrity of their delivery. Secondly, in relation to 
externalisation choices of the State, public services regularly capture in-
terests of general needs, which are delivered through market-based mech-
anisms where the public sector interfaces contractually or even competes 
with private actors. However, the externalised organisation and delivery 
of public services reveals that their providers interface with the State in a 
market place which does not correspond to the principles and dynamics of 
private markets, thus requiring a different type of regulation, which could 
be seen as an amalgam of legal, financial and policy attributes reflecting 
the constant changing of societal needs, expectations and requirements.
1
 
2. The Axiom of Partnerships in Public Service Delivery 
Optimal risk management is the prime advantage to the State which 
emerges from involving private actors through a partnership format in the 
delivery of public services. This axiom underlines the principle of public 
accountability for the modern State in a number of ways. 
The private actor partner often commits its own capital resources 
for the funding and the delivery of public services. It is not therefore a 
mere contractor; it is a stakeholder which has a vested interest in the ef-
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fective and efficient delivery of the relevant public services in order to at-
tain its returns and recoup its investment. This attribute results in an in-
creased certainty of outcomes, both in terms of on-time delivery (the pri-
vate actor is strongly motivated to complete the project as early as possi-
ble and to control its costs, so that the payment streams can commence) 
and in terms of within-budget delivery (the payment schedule is fixed be-
fore construction commences, protecting the State from exposure to cost 
overruns). As a result, by transferring the risk of the funding required for 
the delivery of public services to private actors, the latter become an es-
sential component of the State’s functions, thus revealing a conceptual 
and strategic convergence between public and private sectors. 
Private actors in public–private partnerships are often financially 
incentivised to offer value-for-money solutions in the delivery of public 
services through continuous quality improvement, innovation, manage-
ment efficiency and effectiveness. As such, behavioural elements, which 
traditionally underpin private sector entrepreneurship, are harnessed by 
the State to improve the quality of public services through a transfer of 
operational risk to private actors. 
3. Legal Trends in Public–Private Partnerships  
3.1. Public–Private Partnerships as Public Service Instruments 
Public–private partnerships can be viewed as public service instruments. 
As such, the State opts for an externalised model in the delivery of public 
services and heralds a departure from an “asset-based” to an “enabled-
based” format in public services. Through risk transfer mechanisms, the 
public–private partnership is treated as an emanation of the State and re-
veals a different ethos in public sector management, one where the State 
takes on the role of an enabling and facilitating agent. However, the stra-
tegic role of private actors in financing and delivering infrastructure fa-
cilities and public services by providing input into the various phases such 
as finance, design, construction, operation and maintenance, reflects the 
need for longevity of the relations between public and private sectors. The 
(often) lengthy duration of public–private partnerships is justified on the 
basis of the affordability for repayment on the part of the public sector 
and on the basis of the ability of the private sector to recoup its invest-
ment profitably. Nevertheless, this could potentially result in market fore-
closure. There is a pertinent need to address the competitiveness of pub-
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lic–private partnerships before and after the procurement process of the 
private actor. 
A legal trend has emerged in relation to the structure and operation-
al interface of public–private partnerships. Three operational types of 
public–private partnerships codify the relations between the State and pri-
vate actors. All types have as a pivotal feature asset ownership and poten-
tial transfer to the public sector. The first type of such relations includes 
legal formats where the private actor designs, builds, owns, develops, op-
erates and manages an asset with no obligation to transfer ownership to 
the public sector. Secondly, another type of public–private partnerships 
includes legal formats where the private actor buys or leases an existing 
asset from the public sector, renovates, modernises, expands it, and then 
operates the asset exclusively, with no obligation to transfer ownership 
back to the public sector. Thirdly, another legal format of public–private 
partnerships includes relations where the private sector designs and builds 
an asset, operates it, and then transfers it to the public sector when the op-
erating contract ends, or at some other specified time. The private partner 
may subsequently rent or lease the asset from the public sector to deliver 
the related public services.  
A different type of public–private partnerships has emerged through 
the award and granting of concessions, which are revenue-generating rela-
tions, involving an infrastructure or a service, the use of which necessi-
tates the payment of fees borne directly by end users, and any operation or 
function emanating from the sale, rent or exploitation of public land or 
buildings. The notion of a concession is based on the assumption that no 
contractual remuneration is paid by the granting public entity to the con-
cessionaire. The latter must therefore be given the right to exploit the con-
cession economically, although this right may be accompanied by a re-
quirement to pay some consideration to the grantor, depending on ele-
ments of risk allocation agreed between the parties.  
Finally, as the private sector provides the financing for the infra-
structure facilities and delivery of public services within a public–private 
partnership, it has emerged that a different accountancy treatment benefits 
the State, in that the debt financing of public–private partnerships is re-
garded as off-balance sheet borrowing. This means that the borrowing of 
the State to repay the investment of the private actor does not affect the 
State’s public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR) and any measure-
ments or calculations of its indebtedness. As a result of this development, 
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the legal treatment of debt financial instruments for public–private part-
nerships should be standardised. 
3.2. Public–Private Partnerships as Investment Instruments 
Public–private partnerships can be viewed as investment instruments. Fi-
nancing for a public–private partnership can take one of the following 
forms: a) a stand-alone project, where the funding raised is for only one 
specific project; b) a special purpose vehicle (SPV) as the borrower, 
where an independent legal vehicle is created to raise the funds required 
for the project; c) a high ratio of debt to equity through either gearing or 
leverage, where the newly created project company usually has the mini-
mum equity required to issue debt for a reasonable cost; d) private lending 
based on project-specific cash-flow and not a corporate balance sheet, 
where the project company borrows funds from lenders; the lenders look 
to the projected future revenue stream generated by the project and the 
project company’s assets to repay all loans; and, e) various financial guar-
antees, where the guarantees are provided by the private sector partners, 
often limited to their equity contributions. As a result, the lender receives 
its payment from the income generated from the project or directly from 
the public sector.  
Secondly, public–private partnership financing can be provided via 
SPVs comprising consortia of banks and other financial institutions, 
which are set up to combine and coordinate the use of their capital and 
expertise as well as to share any relevant risks. Accountancy treatment of 
the SPV’s consolidated accounts is aligned with that of the party which 
controls the SPV. If the private sector partner controls the SPV, its debt is 
recorded off-balance sheet for public sector borrowing considerations. If 
an SPV is controlled by the public sector, debt should be consolidated 
with public sector borrowing and its operations should be reflected in the 
fiscal accounts.  
Thirdly, a public–private partnership can be financed by securitisa-
tion of claims on future project revenues. In a typical public–private part-
nership securitisation operation, the public sector would sell a financial 
asset – its claim on future project revenues – to an SPV. The SPV would 
then sell securities backed by this asset to private investors, and use the 
proceeds to pay the public sector, which in turn would use them to finance 
the public–private partnership. Interest and amortisation would be paid by 
the SPV to investors from the public sector’s share of project revenue.  
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The cost of capital needed to finance a public–private partnership 
should depend on the characteristics of project related risks and not on the 
source of finance. However, the source of finance can influence project 
risk, depending on the maturity and sophistication of the risk bearing 
markets. On the one hand, within advanced risk bearing markets, it is ir-
relevant whether project risk is borne by the public sector or the private 
sector. On the other hand, when risk-bearing markets are less developed, 
project risk depends on how widely that risk is spread. This outcome 
might contravene the assumption that private sector borrowing generally 
costs more than government borrowing. However, this mainly reflects dif-
ferences in default risk. The public sector’s power to tax reduces the like-
lihood that it will default on its debt, and the private sector is therefore 
prepared to lend to the public sector at close to the risk-free interest rate to 
finance risky projects. The crucial issue is whether public–private partner-
ships result in efficiency gains that offset higher private sector borrowing 
costs.  
3.3. Public–Private Partnerships as Growth Instruments 
Public–private partnerships can be viewed as growth instruments. In the 
European Union, as part of the Initiative for Growth and the 2020 Growth 
Strategy, the European Council has approved a series of measures de-
signed to increase investment in the infrastructure of the trans-European 
transport networks (TENs) and also in the areas of research, innovation 
and development, as well as the delivery of services of general economic 
interest. The UN has devised a blueprint to close the gap between the 
poorest countries and industrialised nations, and agreed the UN Millenni-
um Declaration, committing its members to a new global partnership and 
emphasizing the potential of public–private partnerships in achieving the 
realisation of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.  
4. Trends in Regulation of Public–Private Partnerships 
4.1. Structure Regulation of Public–Private Partnerships 
The development of two distinctive legal structures/models will assist the 
evolution and delivery of public–private partnerships. Firstly, the contrac-
tual model, where the interface between the State and the private actors 
reflects on a relationship which is based solely on contractual links. Under 
this model and structure, it is unlikely that there would be any element of 
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exclusive asset exploitation or end-user payments levied by the private ac-
tor. However, mechanisms of profit sharing, efficiency gain sharing as 
well as risk allocation between the public and private partners distinguish 
contractual public–private partnerships from traditional public contracts 
for works or services. The contractual model of public–private partner-
ships assumes that the private sector partner will provide the financing for 
completing the project and the public sector partner will pay back by way 
of “service or unitary charges”, which reflect payments based on usage 
volumes or demand (that is, payments in lieu of fees or tolls for public 
lighting, hospitals, schools and roads with shadow tolls).  
Secondly, the institutional model of public–private partnerships in-
volves the establishment of a separate legal entity held jointly by the pub-
lic partner and the private partner. The joint entity has the task of ensuring 
the raising of finance and the delivery of a public service or an infrastruc-
ture project for the benefit of the public. The direct interface between the 
public partner and the private partner in a forum with a distinctive legal 
personality allows the public partner, through its presence in the body of 
shareholders and in the decision-making bodies of the joint entity, to re-
tain a relatively high degree of control over the development and delivery 
of the project. The joint entity could also allow the public partner to de-
velop its own experience of running and improving the relevant public 
services, while having recourse to the support of the private partner. An 
institutional public–private partnership can be established either by creat-
ing an entity controlled by the public and private sector partners, or by the 
private sector taking control of an existing public undertaking or by the 
participation of a private partner in an existing publicly owned company, 
which has obtained public contracts or concessions. 
4.2. Procurement Regulation of Public–Private Partnerships 
Considerable emphasis has been placed on observing the public sector 
management principles such as transparency, accountability, competitive-
ness and value for money during the procurement process of public–
private partnerships. When a transaction creating a mixed-capital entity is 
accompanied by the award of tasks through an act which can be designat-
ed as a public contract, or even a concession, it is important that there is 
compliance with the principles of transparency and accountability, as well 
as the principle of non-discrimination. The selection of a private partner 
called on to undertake such tasks while functioning as part of a mixed en-
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tity can therefore not be based exclusively on the quality of its capital 
contribution or its experience, but should also take account of the charac-
teristics of its offer in terms of the specific services to be provided. The 
conditions governing the creation of the entity must be clearly laid down 
when issuing the call for competition for the tasks one wishes to entrust to 
the private partner. Also, these conditions must not discriminate against or 
constitute an unjustified barrier to the freedom to provide services or to 
freedom of establishment. 
In many jurisdictions, legislation allows for mixed entities, in which 
the participation by the public sector involves the contracting body, to 
participate in a procedure for the award of a public–private partnership or 
a concession, even when these entities are only in the process of being in-
corporated. In this scenario, the entity will be definitively incorporated 
only after the contract has actually been awarded to it. In many jurisdic-
tions, a practice has been developed which tends to confuse the phase of 
incorporating the entity and the phase of allocating the public services 
tasks. Thus, the purpose of the procurement procedure is to create a mixed 
entity to which certain tasks are entrusted.
2
 
Such a solution does not appear to offer satisfactory outcomes. 
First, there is a risk that the effective competition will be distorted by a 
privileged position of the company being incorporated, and consequently 
of the private partner participating in that company. Secondly, the specific 
procedure for selecting the private partner also poses many problems. The 
contracting authorities encounter certain difficulties in defining the sub-
ject matter of the contract or concession in a sufficiently clear and precise 
manner, as they are obliged to do in this context. This in turn not only 
raises problems with regard to the principles of transparency and equality 
of treatment, but even risks prejudicing the general interest objectives, 
which the public authority wishes to attain.  
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 See Steven van Grasse, De Concessie in het Raam van de Publiek-Private Samenwer-
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4.3. Risk Treatment and its Regulation in Public–Private Partner-
ships 
A significant regulatory trend which has emerged as a result of the strate-
gic role of the private sector and its long-term engagement in delivering 
infrastructure and public services reflects on the legal treatment of risk 
distribution between the public and private sectors within public–private 
partnerships, especially the allocation and pricing of construction or pro-
ject risk, which is related to design problems, building cost overruns, and 
project delays; financial risk, which is related to variability in interest 
rates, exchange rates, and other factors affecting financing costs; perfor-
mance risk, which is related to the availability of an asset and the continu-
ity and quality of the relevant service provision; and demand risk, which 
is related to the on-going need for the relevant public services; and resid-
ual value risk, which is related to the future market price of an asset.  
Risk transfer from the public sector to the private sector has a sig-
nificant influence on whether a public–private partnership is a more effi-
cient and cost-effective alternative to public investment and publicly 
funded provision of services.
3
 The public sector and the private sector 
typically adopt different approaches to pricing market risk. The public 
sector tends to use the social time preference rate (STPR) or some other 
risk-free rate to discount future cash flows when appraising projects. The 
private sector in a public–private partnership project will include a risk 
premium in the discount rate it applies to future project earnings where, 
under the widely used capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the expected 
rate of return on an asset is defined as the risk-free rate of return plus a 
risk premium, the latter being the product of the market risk premium and 
a coefficient which measures the variance between the returns on that as-
set and market returns. 
A number of criteria have been devised to assess the degree of risk 
treatment in public–private partnerships, and again these criteria involve 
asset ownership as an essential feature. The extent of risk transfer be-
tween the parties and the quantum for such transfer can be assessed by 
reference to separable contractual relations in a public–private partner-
ship, where a distinction is made between asset ownership and delivery of 
public service elements or non-separable contracts where asset ownership 
                                                   
3
  See David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager, 
Harvard University Press. 2002. 
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fuses with public service delivery.
4
 For non-separable contracts, the base 
line for the assessment rests on the balance of demand risk and residual 
value risk borne by the public sector and the private operator. Demand 
risk, which is an operating risk and is the dominant consideration, is borne 
by the public sector if service payments to a private operator are inde-
pendent of future need for the service. Residual value risk, which is an 
ownership risk, is borne by the public sector if an asset of a public–private 
partnership is transferred to the public sector for less than its true residual 
value. Residual value risk is borne by the public sector because the private 
operator reflects the difference between the expected residual value of the 
asset and the price at which the asset will be transferred to the public sec-
tor in the price it charges the public sector for services, or the revenue the 
public sector receives from a project. If the asset ends up being worth 
more or less than the amount reflected in the service payment or govern-
ment revenue, any resulting gain benefits the public sector and any loss is 
borne by the public sector. Reference can also be made to various qualita-
tive indicators, including government guarantees of private sector liabili-
ties, and the extent of government influence over asset design and opera-
tion.
5
  
4.4. Future Trends in Regulation 
Future trends in regulation for public–private partnerships will reflect on 
the current regulatory deficit and, in particular, the conceptual limitations 
of anti-trust to intervene in and regulate such complex relations between 
public and private sectors. Such limitations have set a new paradigm, 
which has established that public services and the modality of public–
private partnerships function in a sui generis market-place, where State 
intervention in the organisation, structure and delivery of public services 
reveals a type of regulation based on public law. 
As a result of the importance of public–private partnerships to close 
the infrastructure deficit in developed and developing countries, the pub-
lic law type of regulation mentioned above should be standardised.
6
 Three 
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regulatory actors emerge with competence to accomplish such task of 
standardisation: firstly, the United Nations, through the specific task of 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals by the modality of public–
private partnerships; secondly, the European Union, through its advanced 
legal framework,
7
 which produces extra-territorial effects in third coun-
tries; and, lastly, the World Trade Organisation, which as a result of its 
globalised agenda in improving trade and liberalising its patterns across 
its member signatories, could develop standardised legal and regulatory 
formats for the procurement of public–private partnerships, their legal in-
terface and corporate structure as vehicles in public service delivery and 
risk treatment in relations between the State and private actors.  
It is worth noting that the public law type of regulation will present 
national and trans-national features in such a way that jurisdictional and 
enforcement characteristics will emerge not only within national markets 
but also within regional trading blocs. The national and trans-national 
regulation will pave the way towards international norms of coherent and 
standardised dimensions with a view to establishing not only standardisa-
tion of law and policy, but also uniformity of application and implementa-
tion of public–private partnerships, and an increased and enhanced legal 
certainty for the State, private actors and the public as end users of public 
services.  
A new trend in societal needs which will emerge out of the route of 
national towards international regulation of public–private partnerships, 
will reflect on competing models for the delivery of public services. The 
State will have absolute discretion in engaging with private actors through 
public–private partnerships to deliver public services or advance models 
of public–public partnerships, which include intermediary marketisation 
of public services through mutual societies, social enterprise, and in-house 
arrangements. The competitive dynamics from the interface between pub-
lic–private partnerships and public–public partnerships will present a val-
uable benchmark to the State for the ever-increasingly changing back-
ground, expectations, standards and needs for the delivery of public ser-
vices in the twenty-first century. 
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5. Conclusions 
The concept of public–private partnerships represents a genuine attempt 
to revolutionise the delivery of public services by introducing the private 
sector as strategic investor and financier of public services. The private 
sector assumes a direct responsibility in serving the public interest, as part 
of its contractual obligations vis-à-vis the public sector. The motive and 
the intention behind such approach focus on the benefits which would fol-
low as a result of the private sector’s involvement in the delivery of public 
services. Efficiency gains, qualitative improvement, innovation, value-
for-money and flexibility appear to be the most important ones, whereas 
an overall better allocation of public capital resources sums up the ad-
vantages of engaging with the private sector in delivery of public services. 
Public–private partnerships as a concept of public sector management 
have changed the methodology of assessing delivery of public services in 
both qualitative and quantitative terms. 
The case for the success of public–private partnerships rests on the 
relative efficiency of the private sector. However, this efficiency must 
demonstrate itself in a dynamic mode, reflecting the need for competition 
in the provision of the relevant services through the public–private part-
nership. In traditional public contracting, public procurement through ten-
dering secured the repeated competition for a market which is inherently 
oligopolistic yet contestable by new entries or offerings. However, the 
scope for competition in the activities undertaken by public–private part-
nerships is more limited, because they tend to be less contestable for rea-
sons relevant to the longevity of the engagement between public and pri-
vate sectors, for reasons under which social infrastructure remains under-
valued and economic infrastructure involves large sunk costs. For public–
private partnerships to operate in a global competitive environment, safe-
guard the principles of transparency and accountability in public sector 
management, incentive-based regulation is paramount. Where a private 
sector operator can sell public services to the public, even with little scope 
for competition, the public sector must regulate the prices for the relevant 
public services. However, the challenge is to design well-functioning reg-
ulation which increases output towards the social optimum, stabilises 
prices in a sustainable manner, and limits monopoly profit while preserv-
ing the incentive for private sector to be more efficient and reduce costs. 
The Europe 2020 strategy
 
highlights the importance of public–private 
partnerships for accelerating growth and boosting innovation. In addition, 
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the Single Market Act
8 
announced the adoption of a legislative initiative 
on concessions in 2011 in order to promote public–private partnerships 
and to help deliver better value for money for users of services and for 
contracting authorities, while improving market access for EU under-
takings by ensuring transparency, equal treatment and a level playing field 
across the EU.  
The challenges which face both the public and private sectors in 
public–private partnership arrangements focus on the delivery and the fi-
nancing of public services respectively from a quality and efficiency per-
spective. They also reveal a close link with industrial policy at global and 
national levels, and as a result a strategic direction of certain sectors.  
These challenges translated in the legal interface of the developed 
and developing nations pose some considerable questions in relation to 
the role and scope of private actors in delivering public services, the regu-
latory compatibility between norms of anti-trust and exclusivity of private 
actors in delivering public services, questions relevant to the expectations 
of private actors in financial, operational and strategic perspectives, ques-
tions in relation to compliance and enforcement of public–private partner-
ship relations in the process of delivering public services, and finally, 
questions in relation to risk treatment arising out of such relations.  
Strategically, in the author’s view, the law of the future in relation 
to public–private partnerships will focus on regulatory standardisation. 
Regulatory standardisation will have recourse to both hard law and soft 
law. Hard law will utilise normative acts of a public law character in order 
to ensure a safeguard for competition, procurement and selection of pri-
vate sector partners; contractual issues such as terms and conditions, 
guarantees, and dispute resolution; and corporate structures between pub-
lic and private sectors. The role of international organisations such as the 
EU, the UN and the World Bank will be pivotal in shaping such instru-
ments of hard law which will be applicable to both developed and devel-
oping nations. Their standardisation will augment legal certainty amongst 
public and private sectors and the society at large. On the other hand, soft 
law in the form of guidelines will create the appropriate consultative envi-
ronment in the fields of risk management, risk assessment, financing and 
securitisation as well as debt treatment of public–private partnerships. 
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Regulatory standardisation of public–private partnerships will emit 
best practice transparency and consistency in public services, ensure in-
novation and quality in the delivery of public service and articulate on 
constantly developing issues such as the competitive environment in de-
livering public services, as well as issues relevant to the financing, in-
vestment, control, and exit of private actors from public–private partner-
ships. 
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31Reflections on the Legal Future 
of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Austin Onuoha  
In this think piece, I reflect on some of the areas in which laws 
could be used in the future to ensure better and more impactful cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR). I examine the tension between 
the use of national legislation and the application of international 
law against the background of the push for soft law by the interna-
tional community. Although laws act as guides for human behav-
iour, and the debate around CSR has been between voluntary and 
mandatory initiatives, I reflect that there are areas where laws could 
in the future be used to streamline the practice of CSR, and manage 
relationships between companies and communities, including indi-
viduals. Some of the areas that I reflect on include community con-
sultation and engagement, criteria for allocation and sharing of 
funds for CSR initiatives, professionalisation of CSR function, 
monitoring and evaluation and the streamlining and strengthening 
of community governance structures. I conclude that the future of 
law should be to complement and not to compete with voluntary in-
itiatives. 
1. Introduction 
One of the responsibilities of business identified in corporate social re-
sponsibility (CSR) theory is legal responsibility. This means that busi-
nesses have a responsibility to obey the laws of the land. However, there 
have been issues associated with businesses obeying the law. First, busi-
nesses are considered influential and powerful, therefore could act with 
impunity with minimum restraint. Corporations also have the wherewithal 
to navigate the legal maze in case they are found wanting. Lastly, there is 
the debate around who should be held responsible for corporate abuses of 
human rights. Is it the company or the individual managers who make the 
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decisions? And because of worsening economic crises and the drive for 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), governments are proving incapable of 
regulating business conduct. Another issue that lends to the complexity of 
the issue is the nature and ownership of businesses. It is on record that 
many political office holders are full or part owners of businesses or they 
have been sponsored to political positions through donations from busi-
nesses. Because of the alleged compromise of the decision-makers, they 
are unable to rein in businesses when they misbehave. 
Because of all of the above and more, there has been a certain level 
of obfuscation as to the responsibilities of businesses especially as it re-
lates to human rights. The passing of Resolution 2005/69 on “Human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises” by 
the United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights was aimed at 
clarifying issues and standards that entangle this issue. Earlier on, the UN 
has developed the UN Norms. This was thrown out at the Human Rights 
Council because it was argued that the norms were assigning the same re-
sponsibility due to States to companies in the realisation of human rights. 
Because of the hostility that the norms suffered, the UN Special Repre-
sentative on Human Rights and Business, Professor John Ruggie, decided 
to build consensus around the current mandate. It is also in an attempt to 
come around the legal entanglements that he decided to build consensus 
around the mandate. In fact, Professor Ruggie has been criticised by cer-
tain members of academia and civil society for leaning more towards con-
sensus than principles. 
The debate on CSR has revolved around whether the mechanisms 
and structures that deal with it should be made mandatory or voluntary. In 
legal terms, it is whether the initiatives should constitute “hard” or “soft” 
law. By “hard” law they mean elaborate legislations with accompanying 
sanctions, while “soft” law deals with instruments and initiatives that al-
most always verge on moral suasion. Most human rights NGOs opt for 
and support hard law because in their estimation, laws have the capacity 
to hold companies accountable. The business community and to some ex-
tent governments tend to lean more towards the soft law option. Interest-
ingly, however, the soft law option has mostly been promoted by the in-
ternational community, namely the UN and the European Union. The rea-
son for this may be connected with the challenges of implementing laws 
at the international level, especially with the anarchy that characterises the 
international system. 
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The hard law option seems to have been popular at the national lev-
els. This may be because laws are easier to enact at the national level and 
such issues as extra-territoriality are not prominent. Moreover, law en-
forcement can prove more manageable at the national level. However, 
most of the companies that are targeted with legislation at the national 
level are multinational corporations. There is the general perception, es-
pecially in the developing world, that these companies do not respect na-
tional legislations and are more inclined to respect international laws. Par-
adoxically, part of the reason is the fear of litigation in their home coun-
tries. 
In Nigeria, CSR has taken a beating from different commentators. 
This is because of the various breaches that have been experienced be-
tween companies and communities. The Niger Delta crisis is too well-
known to warrant recounting. The issues that create tension between 
companies and communities in the Niger Delta include land, environmen-
tal pollution, oil spill compensation and clean-up, employment, contracts 
and recognition. Interestingly there are laws dealing with almost each one 
except for such issues as employment, contracts and recognition. Alt-
hough subsumed in law, what is lacking has been “specificity” in these 
areas. For instance, how much should a company commit to community 
development? What are the criteria for allocation? 
Already in Nigeria there has been a push to update and harmonise 
laws that deal with the petroleum industry, for instance. The Petroleum 
Industry Bill is an attempt to streamline and harmonise legislation in and 
around the industry. This proposed law is an executive bill which has 
been sitting with the national legislature for close to three years and has 
passed through two different legislatures. The controversies that have 
trailed the proposed legislation point to the challenges of law. First, some 
stakeholders argue that the law is not far-reaching enough. These include 
NGOs, human rights groups and community leaders. Others argue that it 
has made the petroleum industry unprofitable and therefore would not at-
tract investors. Among these are oil industry experts, and on the process it 
is said that there are different versions of the proposed law in circulation. 
2. The legal future of CSR in Nigeria 
The focus of CSR law seems to have been too much on the oil industry. 
Although understandable, it is limited in strategic thinking. Oil for in-
stance, may lose its importance as a strategic energy resource in the near 
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future if the current research efforts are intensified. With the heavy in-
vestment in research, if this comes to pass, it means that nation States may 
have to go back to the drawing board. In my opinion, the future of CSR 
should focus on having laws that consider the activities of construction 
companies, finance and insurance, manufacturing, agricultural, chemical 
and allied industries. The excessive focus on the oil industry is short-
sighted. 
In 2009, distinguished senator Chukwumerije proposed a law to es-
tablish a CSR Commission in Nigeria. This law was amongst others 
aimed at compelling companies to contribute a specified percentage of 
their profit to a joint pool that will be used to develop host communities. 
The thinking was that this would reduce pressure on companies and make 
them focus on their business, whilst a specialised agency focuses on de-
livering CSR dividends on their behalf. The bill was vehemently opposed 
by businesses and therefore did not see the light of the day. One of the ar-
guments put forward by the opponents of the proposed legislation was 
that there was already a similar law though targeted at the oil industry. 
This is the Niger Delta Development Commission Act 2000, which estab-
lished the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). It was also ar-
gued that although the oil companies contributed money to NDDC, the 
impact was not being felt since the NDDC has become an instrument for 
political patronage. Moreover, the oil companies alleged that they still ex-
perienced production disruption occasioned by perceived neglect. In other 
words, after contributing money to NDDC for the development of the 
communities, they still spent more money doing the same thing. 
Recently in Nigeria, we held a series of consultations on the UN 
Guiding Principles on Human Rights and Business. One of the outcomes 
of the consultations was the push to domesticate the Guiding Principles in 
the form of legislation. Even after explaining that the intention of the 
Guiding Principles was not to make it into a hard law, the general mood 
was to enact it into a law. In the views of most participants, that was the 
only way to make it effective. This was interesting for me, because here 
was a group of people whose favourite past time complaint was the lack 
of will to enforce laws. I still could not understand the rationale and impe-
tus for the push for a national legislation. More intriguing is the fact that 
the participants included people from government, business, civil society 
and community leaders. 
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My experience working in the CSR environment in the last twenty 
years, tells me that the issue may not be law after all. It is the process of 
conceptualising and initiating CSR initiatives. In my mind, the future of 
CSR does not lie in more laws but in more participatory processes. It also 
does not lie in how much corporations are committing to community de-
velopment, but in how the development priorities are reached and agreed 
upon. Laws are mere guides to human behaviour but do not guarantee that 
human beings will necessarily behave better, even though law could act as 
a deterrent against bad behaviour. 
Having said that, there is also the need to regulate and streamline 
expenditure, manage expectations, and ensure transparency and accounta-
bility within the CSR movement. This is where law could act as a guide. 
For instance, in recent research, it was found that many community mem-
bers were more concerned with how oil companies arrived at the amount 
allocated to them for community development than the actual amount it-
self. In the future, laws could be made to develop criteria for the alloca-
tion of funds. Laws could also stipulate guidelines for the management of 
these funds. For instance, the Chevron Nigeria Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMOU) provides for a governance model for administer-
ing Chevron’s contribution to community development in its areas of op-
eration in Nigeria. 
The development of this guidance by law should not be restricted to 
criteria for fund allocation. It could also be extended to such areas as em-
ployment, contracts and relationships with existing community govern-
ance structures. Laws could also be used to harmonise and coordinate 
community development efforts at the local level to achieve maximum 
impact. For instance, in the research that I referred to earlier, one missing 
piece was the lack of coordination between different development agen-
cies at the local level. For instance, there were instances of project dupli-
cation. A law that will ensure that clusters of communities have a pool of 
funds for community development contributed by the various develop-
ment agencies, including companies in the area, could be useful in stream-
lining and ensuring maximum impact. 
One other area, which seems to not have received considerable at-
tention, is when a community is fractionalised and companies find it diffi-
cult to identify leaders to engage. Over the years, companies have been 
accused of masterminding the fractionalisation. This is referred to as ‘di-
vide and rule’. The argument is that companies engage in activities that 
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polarise communities with a view to distracting them from company ac-
tivities. Whatever the case, in the future it might be necessary to have a 
law that creates community governance structures that will support devel-
opment at the local level. For instance, in south-eastern Nigeria, the town 
development union is a strong institution but unfortunately, the lack of 
formalisation and institutionalisation have affected its performance espe-
cially as it relates to community development. The law will cover such is-
sues as structure, tenure, succession, funding, discipline and election. 
Having a well-organised, recognisable and legitimate structure on the 
ground will help companies to relate better to their host, and to access and 
impact communities and even individuals. 
Further, laws could also help in delineating the various stakeholders 
that a company may encounter and engage in a community. I am aware of 
the fact that the concept of stakeholder could be fluid and evolving, some 
form of legal guidance may be required to identify at least the more exist-
ing and stable ones with room for the incorporation of emerging new 
stakeholder groups. I make this point because the recognition of stake-
holder groups in communities by companies has more often than not been 
left to the whims and caprices of company managers. Even though stake-
holder theory suggests that more influential stakeholder groups be accord-
ed more attention, other stakeholders no matter how less influential could 
also act as potential spoilers of corporate relations. 
I also think that in the future, laws will prove more definitive in out-
lining community’s role and participation in company activities, especial-
ly if we use a Phased Approach Model. For instance, when a company is 
coming into a community, what is the role of that community? In fact, the 
law of the future ought to do something about the issue of FPIC. For in-
stance, if a community withholds its consent for a project, could that stop 
the project, or what is the process enunciated to get consent except 
through coercion? When a company has started operations what is ex-
pected of the community and when the company is leaving what is the 
role? Apart from outlining the roles of communities, the law will also do 
well to outline the roles of other stakeholders, such as government and 
development agencies. In the research to which I referred earlier, one re-
curring issue was the lack of clear allocation of roles and responsibilities 
in CSR initiatives. 
Future laws that may deal with CSR issues may do well to institu-
tionalise a consultation process. This is because community engagement 
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or consultation is a much abused process. Business managers have also 
struggled with this issue. For instance, the law could specify the periods 
of consultation in which stakeholders shall be involved. 
One of the most ignored issues in CSR is that of the capacity of per-
sonnel. For instance, in most oil companies, the function is managed by 
engineers. There is nothing wrong with this. However, what is wrong is 
the capacity of company personnel to “get it right”. Community engage-
ment, consultation and CSR are increasingly becoming complex and chal-
lenging. It could no longer be an all-comers affair. There is the need for a 
certain level of professionalism that should go into it. This professional-
ism calls for a certain level of certification as well. So a law that proposes 
the training and certification of personnel for the CSR function is long 
overdue. CSR is not the same as PR, it is not a personnel function and it is 
also not a legal affair. It calls for specialised training and the law may 
help in this regard. The essence of law in this regard is to specify appro-
priate training that will qualify personnel to carry out the function. 
In 1997, Shell started a process of inspecting its community devel-
opment projects. This was in response to criticisms that alleged communi-
ty development projects were either non-existent or functional. The in-
spection team was made up of experts from the World Bank, UNDP and 
NGOs. In many instances, oil companies in Nigeria were accused of not 
executing projects, which they claimed to have executed. A neglected ar-
ea, therefore, where the law could prove useful in CSR practice, would be 
the institutionalisation of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for 
CSR initiatives. 
3. Conclusion 
Like most activities that focus on human relationship, CSR should move 
away from the either mentality of mandatory or voluntary initiatives. Vol-
untary and mandatory initiatives must complement each other. The reason 
why many commentators seem to favour mandatory provisions is the 
sanction and punishment embedded in law. This need not be so. Law 
ought to be aimed at correction not punishment. The future of CSR is rich 
and ripe for major legal intervention, this does not in any way minimise 
the need for voluntary measures. 
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5.9. 
______ 
32Does CSR Need More (Effective) Private  
Regulation in the Future? 
Martijn W. Scheltema* 
One might expect a further increase in international private regula-
tion in the area of CSR. However, the need for more private regula-
tion is questionable. To date, a plethora of private regulation exists. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of private regulation in this area has to 
be assessed to distil the useful regimes. Assessing effectiveness re-
quires an integrated approach involving legal, economic, sociologi-
cal and psychological insights. Furthermore, research on hybrid 
systems and on the question in which cases public or private en-
forcement is effective, is required. As to conflict resolution and 
prevention, non-judicial mechanisms seem preferable. However, 
stakeholders experience difficulty in finding the proper ones. More 
research and a global facility are needed to assist stakeholders in 
this respect.  
The future lawyer in this area has to acquire additional skills, for 
example on assessing effectiveness of international private regula-
tion and its enforcement and on non-judicial dispute management 
and prevention mechanisms. 
1. Introduction 
In the Law of the Future Scenarios, four possibilities are discerned. One 
of them is the legal internet scenario in which international private regula-
tion is predominant. International private regulation has a very broad 
meaning and encompasses many different private regulatory frameworks. 
International private regulation might be defined as a set of private norms 
which are established, sometimes in collaboration with others, by those 
who are bound by these rules, their representatives or an overarching 
body. The key actors in such regimes include civil society, (non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)) and enterprises. Although private 
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regulation has a self-binding effect in many instances, the implications 
thereof also affect third parties, in many cases even intentionally.  
In the area of CSR, it seems probable that international private 
regulation will be predominant in the next decades, although legislation 
on some CSR issues might be promulgated in certain countries or regions, 
for example regarding reporting standards connected with CSR. Global 
understanding at the State or supranational level on the majority of CSR 
issues is not conceivable in the near future because ideas on what consti-
tutes socially responsible business vary widely. For example, the obliga-
tions of countries under human rights treaties are felt in a different manner 
around the world, let alone the obligations to mitigate climate change and 
lessen the ecological footprint of business.  
Therefore, CSR responsibilities are not entirely reflected in legal 
systems of States, a grey area exists between legal and normative stand-
ards and some responsibilities are considered to be purely social or ethical 
in some countries. This implicates that even if common understanding 
does exist to a certain extent, for example stemming from ILO conven-
tions on child labour, forced labour and safety concerns in specific indus-
tries or treaties on industrial accidents and specific environmental issues 
such as oil pollution, this is not necessarily reflected in State or suprana-
tional legislation. Furthermore, differences in applicable legal norms 
might cause some host countries to lower their norms or to implement 
lower standards to be attractive for foreign investors. Besides, the en-
forcement of legislation, if it exists, is sometimes difficult, especially be-
cause CSR has an international reach. The responsibilities of a company 
in the area of CSR may go beyond its legal responsibility in a certain 
(host) country, although it might be held legally responsible for violations 
of certain CSR rules/standards in its home country. However, enforce-
ment of these foreign judgments in the host State is rather difficult. 
2. The Policy Implications in the Area of CSR 
2.1. Increase in (International) Private Regulation? 
To a certain extent, multinational enterprises are willing to self-regulate or 
adhere to international private regulation in the area of CSR, because of 
the responsibilities felt by these enterprises. For example, in order to cre-
ate a level playing field and because it might be profitable to them, a level 
playing field between competitors is deemed necessary to prevent disad-
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vantages for enterprises complying with CSR norms vis-à-vis those which 
do not. Besides this, some economic drivers exist for sustainable business, 
because economic research has revealed that it is profitable in the long 
run. Therefore, enterprises are more inclined to serve the public interest as 
reflected in CSR rules/standards, where the public interest used to be the 
prerogative of governments.  
As multinational enterprises are more and more geared through 
tackling CSR-challenges and States by and large are not able or willing to 
regulate this area on a global level, it is not difficult to predict that inter-
national private regulation (the legal internet scenario) is (partly) going to 
bridge that regulatory gap.  
However, international private regulation, such as the Global Com-
pact or the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises, is not always 
recognised as an effective instrument because of its rather voluntary na-
ture. The presumption of its voluntary nature is questionable. It is con-
tended that voluntarism with regard to CSR has long past. If a certain ini-
tiative is perceived by business as voluntary, this might be countered by 
NGO research and the market behaviour of citizens in the home county of 
a multinational enterprise, behaviour of politicians and lobby groups. The 
attenuation of voluntarism also is reflected by corporate governance, 
which entails the obligation to implement CSR policies in many countries. 
Hence, in the European Commission strategy on CSR of October 2011 the 
voluntary nature of CSR is abandoned.  
The increase in private CSR initiatives implicates that private poli-
cymakers are becoming increasingly important. Indeed, many of them 
have taken their responsibility, with a plethora of sometimes rather inef-
fective international private initiatives as a consequence.  
However, if effective private regulation is adopted, some States 
might eventually promulgate public regulation which partly reflects this 
private regulation. Private regulation, then, might become a standard 
which fills out open norms in State legislation. Hybrid systems of private 
regulation and public enforcement might originate. Furthermore, States 
might contribute to CSR in another way, for example through the UN and 
OECD as was done in the Global Compact and through the OECD guide-
lines for multinational enterprises, by funding advertisement of and re-
search on effective private regulation in the area of CSR as well as by im-
plementing CSR standards in their public procurement. 
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2.2. Policy Implications with Regard to Private Regulation 
The policy implications of the further increase of international private 
regulation constitute a need for the reduction of the overwhelming amount 
of existing private regulation in the CSR area. 
Less but more effective private regulation might be an important 
factor to reduce voluntarism in the area of CSR. Only effective regulation 
calls for effective and efficient implementation. The plethora of CSR la-
bels causes difficulties in public procurement too. If a government or an 
enterprise prescribes a CSR label, applicants might contend that another 
label they adhere to is as good as the label prescribed. Governments or en-
terprises currently have no tools to assess this contention. Furthermore, 
international private regulation, especially when intended to create a level 
playing field between competitors, might cause market disruption. Inter-
national private regulation should effectively meet the CSR policy re-
quirements, while not unnecessarily disrupt markets. Effective private 
regulation might favour investments and might enhance trade if it is ad-
hered to on a global level.  
Governments used to be the main protector of the public interest. 
Private regulation must effectively equate this to be sustainable and a 
proper replacement for State legislation in this area. And last but not least, 
to date enterprises are unable to assess whether a certain initiative they 
adhere to is effective or whether they should implement yet another new 
CSR initiative. If effectiveness could be assessed, this might be a driver 
for enterprises to adhere to effective and efficient private regulation in the 
CSR area more so than they do to date and a tool for NGOs to assess 
whether enterprises really implement effective CSR rules. 
International private regulation in the area of CSR also raises legit-
imacy issues. Unlike public regulation, virtually everybody might set pri-
vate regulation. No instruments for control exist. If too much public regu-
lation is enacted, democratic control mechanisms are able to reverse this: 
for example, by voting for other government functionaries. As far as pri-
vate regulation is concerned, no or at least less democratic mechanisms 
for reversal of the plethora of initiatives exist. Clearly this gap has to be 
bridged as too much ineffective international private regulation exists in 
the area of CSR. Partly, this could be achieved by implementing mecha-
nisms to enhance the legitimacy of private rule-making in the CSR area, 
for example by involving more stakeholders. However, as legitimate as 
public legislation is, private regulation is not going to be. The latter gap 
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could be bridged partly by assessing the effectiveness of international pri-
vate regulation. The more effective international private regulation is, for 
example in terms of economic benefits and sociological acceptance, the 
more reasons for its existence might be assessed. Therefore, a little less 
legitimacy in the traditional sense is not something to fear. In any case, 
legitimacy and public regulation are becoming less important on a global 
level, unlike for example social media, for the decision-making processes 
of enterprises. 
The need for reversing the plethora of CSR initiatives for more uni-
formity in private rules/standards in this area and for assessing their effec-
tiveness is clearly felt by many stakeholders.  
2.3. Policy Implications with Regard to Enforcement and Dispute 
Resolution 
Another challenge with regard to private CSR rules is the enforceability 
and effective conflict management and resolution. As far as the enforce-
ment of private CSR rules is concerned, the traditional division between 
public and private enforcement will blur and more hybrid systems will 
originate. In some instances, private enforcement might be effective: for 
example if a private rule setting body controls market access, the threat of 
reputational damage exists; or NGOs, consumers or investors direct an en-
terprise at complying with certain rules. Certification might also play a 
role in this respect. In other instances public enforcement is desirable, for 
example if agreements are concluded or a foreign direct liability claim is 
honoured. Furthermore, public enforcement seems indispensable if the 
chance of detection of non-compliance is low. The mix of public and pri-
vate enforcement seems especially feasible if open norms in public regu-
lation might be filled out by international private regulation in the area of 
CSR. For example an open norm in public tort law might be filled out by 
international private regulation and might result in a foreign direct liabil-
ity claim against (the parent enterprise of) an enterprise in its home coun-
try. If the claim is honoured, public enforcement against (the parent enter-
prise of) this enterprise in its home country is feasible.  
 Comparable public enforcement might be invoked with regard to 
contractual agreements and non-judicial settlements if not complied with. 
However, the possibility of filling out public open norms depends on the 
effectiveness and clarity of the international private regulation referred to. 
The less effective and clear these rules are, the fewer the possibilities exist 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 394 
to make use of them in order to fill out open norms. Only if such private 
norms impose clear duties on an enterprise, which effective private regu-
lation does, it is feasible to make use of them. As international private 
regulation on CSR becomes clearer in this respect, the stick of, for exam-
ple, foreign direct liability will be more threatening and encourage enter-
prises and their subsidiaries to take reasonable care. Therefore, from this 
point of view the effectiveness of international private regulation has to be 
assessed too. 
As to conflict resolution in the human rights field, in the third pillar 
of his framework, Ruggie emphasizes the need to improve the patchwork 
of current non-judicial mechanisms. He and others in his research team 
have demonstrated that litigation is rather ineffective, for example be-
cause applicable legal norms are unclear, because of jurisdictional issues 
and because it might encompass parallel litigation in many jurisdictions. 
Litigation in many national courts has adverse effects: for example, it is 
slow, costly, not always predictable, and it might cause legal uncertainty. 
Apart from jurisdictional issues, it might entail litigation and enforcement 
in several countries, the difficult process of assessing applicable norms if 
possible at all and difficulties in gathering sufficient evidence.  
It is not only in the area of human rights that litigation in national 
courts might be unproductive. The same may be true also in other CSR 
areas, for example in connection with the environment. Different envi-
ronmental challenges exist in different countries, public rules differ, dif-
ferent stakeholders are involved in different industries and no global pub-
lic supervisor exists.  
Therefore enterprises have to be geared towards non-judicial dis-
pute resolution and prevention mechanisms to resolve CSR issues, for ex-
ample regarding the compliance with international private regulation in 
this area, instead of instigating or taking part in parallel litigation in sev-
eral jurisdictions. Governments should advocate non-judicial dispute reso-
lution and prevention mechanisms and assist in improving the current 
patchwork of non-judicial mechanisms in this area. Of importance in this 
respect is to assist enterprises, representatives of local communities, 
NGOs and other international bodies, like the World Bank, to find their 
way through the existing non-judicial mechanisms. Currently many stake-
holders experience difficulty in finding the effective, legitimate, transpar-
ent and rights-compatible mechanisms. A global facility has to be estab-
lished in order to provide such guidance to stakeholders because other-
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wise proper use of non-judicial mechanisms by stakeholders stays remote. 
Such a facility should provide information on available non-judicial 
mechanisms and a kind of “roadmap” to assist stakeholders in finding the 
proper mechanisms in a particular case. Furthermore, it should promote 
the use of such mechanisms, for example by compiling experiences of 
stakeholders which have made use of these mechanisms. 
3. What We Do Know and What We Should Learn About 
A lot is written on CSR cases, the binding or voluntary nature of existing 
public and private regulation in this area, and on conflict resolution and 
prevention. More and more software tools are being developed to measure 
the sustainability of business, notably on the environmental impact and 
the ecological footprint of enterprises; however, less so on labour stand-
ards, and there is little on human rights. Furthermore, enterprises are chal-
lenged to reveal their impact in the area of CSR, for example through the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). So we do know a lot of CSR. Still, es-
pecially regarding the policy issues described hereinabove, additional re-
search is needed. 
As has been discussed before, it is necessary to assess the effective-
ness of international private regulation and of dispute resolution and pre-
vention mechanisms in this area from different perspectives. This might 
be achieved by finding ex ante indicators to assist private rule-makers in 
setting effective regulation and ex post measurement tools to assess the 
effectiveness of currently existing private regulation.  
The ex ante indicators should stem from legal, economical, socio-
logical and psychological insights. The legal insights mainly deal with the 
effectiveness of enforcement and conflict resolution. The economical in-
sights refer to the efficiency of private regulation in terms of the increase 
of profit of enterprises set off against the negative external effects of their 
activities. The sociological insights deal with the acceptance of private 
regulation by those governed and affected by it. The psychological per-
spective is connected with the human decision-making process.  
The ex post approach should mainly use the aforementioned legal, 
economical and sociological insights. It has to be assessed whether all 
these insights might be used in practice. In that respect it is important that 
the figures needed, especially in connection with the ex post approach, 
can be derived from public sources in order to enable enterprises, re-
searchers, governments and NGO’s to make use of these figures in order 
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to assess the effectiveness of certain mechanisms. The call for transparen-
cy, advertised by, amongst others, the GRI, might support this. An inte-
grated approach using all of the mentioned disciplines is necessary, be-
cause using them separately causes incorrect results.  
However, in connection with the ex post measurement tools, the 
question arises whether retrieving figures, as are currently available on 
environmental footprint and labour standards, is feasible with regard to 
human rights. Additional research is needed to assess this. In this respect, 
the problem of sometimes unclear relationships between multinational en-
terprises and suppliers (in many instances not subsidiaries) and the lack-
ing possibilities to make suppliers adhere to certain international private 
regulation in the CSR area have to be solved. Research is also needed as 
to the question of whether public regulation is more effective than private 
regulation in certain areas of CSR. Linked to this issue is the competition 
issue stemming from private regulation, especially private regulation aim-
ing at a level playing field. This might necessitate at least some public 
regulation to prevent unnecessary market disruption. Beside this, it might 
be helpful to assess whether, and if so which, public legislation currently 
applied to governmental behaviour and processes might also control busi-
ness behaviour and processes. As has been said, CSR rules are connected 
with the public interest and used to be dealt with by governments. There-
fore, it would not be surprising if some of the rules with regard to gov-
ernmental behaviour and processes could be of assistance to regulate 
business behaviour and processes. Furthermore, research is needed to as-
sess to what extent public enforcement mechanisms are still required, and 
if so, which ones. Finally, it has to be assessed whether effectiveness 
might partly be used as a substitute for legitimacy. 
As to conflict resolution we know the basic requirements of non-
judicial mechanisms in the area of human rights. We are aware of the 
many current mechanisms and facilitators on a local level in the CSR area 
too. However, multinational enterprises and large international institutions 
like the World Bank often are unable to find them. Research has to be 
done in order to assist these stakeholders to navigate through the land-
scape and to find effective mechanisms.  
4. The Lawyer of the Future in the Area of CSR 
The lawyer of the future in the area of CSR has to acquire additional 
skills. To date, public regulation is mainly a fact for lawyers outside the 
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government, and they do not participate (directly) in the rule-making pro-
cess. International private regulation might change this. Lawyers outside 
the government might become rule-makers and could advise enterprises 
on which private regulatory regime to implement. Therefore they need to 
get acquainted with assessing the effectiveness of such regulation ex ante 
when advising on setting such regulation and ex post when advising on 
implementation of existing private regulation. Its binding force is not self-
explanatory as is the case with government regulation. As private regula-
tory regimes in the area of CSR are mainly international or global, the 
classic distinction between national and supranational law and treaties be-
comes less prominent. They become truly international lawyers in the area 
of CSR. The CSR norms by and large stem from the public interest, and 
public law knowledge on corporate law does not suffice. One needs thor-
ough knowledge of public law as well, not only on public substantive 
norms but also on public stakeholder engagement rules. 
As non-judicial dispute resolution and prevention becomes more 
important in the area of CSR, lawyers need to acquire new skills in non-
judicial conflict resolution and prevention. These skills are not (very) fa-
miliar to many of them. The classic litigation and arbitration skills are not 
sufficient. For example, discussions on jurisdiction, substantive norms 
and the enforcement of arbitral awards might become less important. In-
stead, a long lasting collaboration agreement between a multinational en-
terprise, its subsidiary or supplier, and, for example, affected local com-
munities might prove more effective. Furthermore, lawyers do not only 
need knowledge on domestic court systems and international arbitration 
facilities, but must be able to navigate through all kinds of non-judicial in-
ternational dispute resolution mechanisms in order to use them effectively 
and to give proper advice on them. 
5. Conclusion 
One might expect an increase in international private regulation in the ar-
ea of CSR. However, the need for more private regulation is questionable. 
To date a plethora of private regulation exists. Therefore, the effectiveness 
of private regulation in this area has to be assessed to distil the useful re-
gimes. Assessing effectiveness is far from easy and requires an integrated 
approach involving legal, economic, sociological and psychological in-
sights. More research is needed in this respect.  
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Furthermore, more enforcement of private regulation as well as 
conflict resolution and prevention is tempting. As to enforcement, re-
search is required on hybrid systems and on the question as to in which 
cases public or private enforcement is effective. As to conflict resolution 
and prevention, non-judicial mechanisms seem preferable, especially if 
local communities are affected. Many of such mechanisms already exist. 
However, stakeholders experience difficulty in finding the proper ones. 
More research and a global facility are needed to assist stakeholders in 
this respect. 
The future lawyer in this area has, apart from his current skills, to 
acquire rule setting skills and knowledge on public legislation in general, 
on assessing the effectiveness of international private regulation and its 
enforcement, on finding proper non-judicial dispute management and pre-
vention mechanisms as well as experience with those mechanisms. 
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33Collective Redress in the Cross-Border Context: 
Litigation, Arbitration, Settlement and Beyond 
S.I. Strong* 
Globalisation has broken down numerous physical, social, 
economic and cultural barriers. However, one boundary that 
still remains involves legal barriers. Despite the creation of a 
single global marketplace, most types of legal injuries are 
compensatable only in national courts constrained by territo-
rial boundaries. This is true even in the increasing number of 
cases involving large-scale injuries in the cross-border con-
text. Rather than resolving the dispute at one time, in one fo-
rum, defendants are forced to proceed simultaneously in sev-
eral different jurisdictions, with all the costs and risks asso-
ciated with parallel litigation, while plaintiffs who are simi-
larly situated in all other regards often hold different legal 
rights and remedies simply by virtue of their place of resi-
dence. This situation seems neither fair nor desirable. This 
essay considers whether any alternatives to litigation exist 
and whether any of these other options offer a superior 
means of addressing injuries of this nature. 
1. Genesis of a Modern Legal Crisis 
Globalisation has been a watchword for some time now, and it seems 
somewhat passé to speak of its impact on law and society. However, the 
creation and expansion of a global economy continues to inspire new 
challenges and new solutions in equal measure. This is nowhere more true 
than in law, which is seeing the need for and creation of a truly twenty-
first century phenomenon: cross-border collective redress. 
The cross-border element is easily understood: as providers of 
goods and services expand from a local into an international market, 
through either physical or virtual means, international legal injuries be-
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come more common. The second element – mass claims – is more sub-
tle, but equally important: as markets open up, providers take advantage 
of the economies of scale and provide goods and services on a magnitude 
not previously possible. Thus, large-scale, international injuries are be-
coming increasingly common. Furthermore, the types of disputes that can 
arise are extremely diverse, including a wide variety of subject matter are-
as such as consumer law, company law, labour and employment law, anti-
trust/competition law, tort law, commercial law and internet law.  
Given the reality of these kinds of injuries, the question is how so-
ciety – or, better said, societies – should respond. Cross-border regulation 
in the form of international treaties is one alternative, though the need to 
establish international consensus and then create a system that provides an 
adequate system of accountability means that the process is very slow. 
Furthermore, political obstacles can prove fatal at any stage of the pro-
cess. Private means of redress may therefore be the best alternative, either 
to supplement public means of relief that are already in existence or to 
create some form of compensation while States are working to create oth-
er types of remedies. Several types of private action are possible. 
2. Litigation 
The most well-known type of private relief for large-scale legal harm is 
litigation. For years, only one nation – the United States – offered a pro-
cedural mechanism that allowed a large number of individuals to band to-
gether and assert a legal claim at a single time, in a single court. Although 
the class action has been severely criticised both at home and abroad, it 
has nevertheless inspired law-makers outside the United States to consider 
whether and to what extent private forms of mass relief should be allowed 
in their jurisdictions. At this point, over thirty civil and common law 
countries have adopted various forms of class and collective relief for use 
in domestic disputes, with other jurisdictions considering whether and to 
what extent to do the same. Some of these procedures resemble the US 
class action in certain regards, whereas other actions are entirely new. 
The problem is that many of these newly developed devices have 
been designed primarily, if not exclusively, for use in domestic disputes. 
Although various States and regional bodies have attempted to find ways 
of establishing acceptable cross-border procedures, significant difficulties 
arise whenever parties reside in different jurisdictions. Some of these 
problems involve procedures that are acceptable in one State but objec-
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tionable in another as a matter of fundamental or constitutional law. This 
issue is most commonly seen whenever US or Canadian courts attempt to 
create so-called “global” (meaning international) class actions. Both the 
United States and Canada use a form of mass relief that designates certain 
plaintiffs as part of the class unless they indicate otherwise by opting out. 
This can cause problems if some plaintiffs reside in a country that prohib-
its opt-out actions as a matter of public policy or constitutional law. 
However, difficulties can arise even when opt-out systems are not 
used. For example, the European Union has recently announced its inten-
tion to create a coherent approach to cross-border collective relief based 
on an opt-in procedure. Although the EU has avoided certain policy issues 
relating to opt-out procedures, other problems arise as a result of conflicts 
between the parties’ individual participatory rights and the primary means 
of establishing jurisdiction and enforcement in inter-European disputes, 
Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and on recognition and en-
forcement of civil and commercial judgments, commonly known as the 
Brussels I Regulation. 
These and other problems suggest that large-scale judicial actions 
may not be the best means of addressing cross-border collective injuries. 
Instead, other alternatives may be both possible and preferable. 
3. Alternatives to Litigation  
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a major part of many legal sys-
tems. While ADR is most commonly used in bilateral disputes to supple-
ment judicial means of dispute resolution, some of the mechanisms may 
be equally valuable in the realm of cross-border collective injuries. Two 
major forms of ADR, arbitration and mediation, are discussed below. 
3.1. Arbitration Alternatives to Litigation  
3.1.1. Comparing Large-Scale Arbitration and  
Large-Acale Litigation 
Arbitration is often seen as a speedy, low-cost means of resolving small-
value disputes in an informal setting. As such, it is often associated with 
consumer or employment controversies. However, arbitration exists in 
many forms, and arbitration of class and collective disputes, particularly 
in the cross-border context, is more likely to resemble international com-
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mercial arbitration: a highly respected and often extremely formal means 
of resolving large, complex, high-value claims.  
Class arbitration has been available in the United States since the 
1980s, although the device has recently faced a variety of types of legal 
challenges focusing primarily on the circumstances in which class arbitra-
tion can arise. Interestingly, most of the resistance to class arbitration is 
the result of the unique way in which the device arose. Rather than being 
developed as a preferred alternative to litigation, as was the case with ar-
bitration of bilateral disputes, class arbitration in the United States devel-
oped somewhat by mistake, at least in the eyes of corporate defendants 
who thought that the use of arbitration agreements in consumer, employ-
ment and similar contracts would eliminate the possibility of all forms of 
class relief. Since class relief provides a necessary compensatory and reg-
ulatory function in the US legal system, courts developed class arbitration 
as a means of giving effect to both the parties’ clear desire to arbitrate and 
the need for a collective mechanism in certain circumstances. 
As a result of this historical accident, very little research has been 
conducted regarding the relative benefits of class action and class arbitra-
tion. However, those analysts who have considered the matter have con-
cluded that class arbitration may be better for the parties than class litiga-
tion for four reasons.  
First, arbitration eliminates many of the problems that litigation ex-
periences with jurisdiction over international parties, since arbitration is 
based on the concept of consent. Consent can arise in the context of a pre-
existing contractual relationship or as the result of a post-dispute submis-
sion agreement (compromis). Though the latter scenario was long be-
lieved to be impossible, an international investment tribunal recently 
demonstrated precisely how a post-dispute arbitration agreement can be 
established with thousands of individual claimants.1 
Furthermore, although there is some debate about the legitimacy 
and scope of certain waivers of class proceedings that can accompany pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the United States, a growing number of 
court cases have refused to enforce these provisions, even after the United 
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States Supreme Court suggested that some such waivers could withstand 
judicial scrutiny.2  
Second, arbitration provides significant procedural advantages to 
the parties. Not only can arbitration harmonise conflicting national proce-
dures (indeed, international commercial arbitration is well known for suc-
cessfully blending common law and civil law processes), it can also pro-
vide a tailor-made mechanism specially designed for the dispute at hand. 
Additionally, arbitration allows parties to choose impartial and independ-
ent decision-makers who are free from national biases and who have sig-
nificant expertise with the type of dispute at issue, thus taking the dispute 
away from juries (in the United States) or judges who may be prejudiced 
against foreign parties or who may not have either the technical expertise 
or the practical resources to deal with a large-scale, international dispute. 
Arbitration of mass disputes is also faster than litigation of similar dis-
putes, since the parties do not need to wait for court dates, nor are they 
subject to the same kind of lengthy judicial appeals, extensive motion 
practice or burdensome discovery processes that mark litigation. 
Third, arbitration offers parties a much easier and more predictable 
means of enforcing the outcome of the dispute resolution process, since 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is governed by treaty rather 
than by international comity, as is the case with the enforcement of for-
eign judgments. Indeed, the United Nations Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more commonly 
known as the New York Convention, is the most successful commercial 
treaty in the world, with 147 State Parties.  
Fourth, arbitration may avoid certain conflict of laws problems re-
lating to statutes that ostensibly provide for exclusive jurisdiction over 
disputes involving certain types of vulnerable parties. These statutes may 
prohibit foreign forum selection clauses, although some judges have been 
willing to uphold arbitration agreements in identical circumstances, sug-
gesting that arbitration is the only way in which the parties can consent to 
resolve their disputes in a single time, in a single forum. 
These four factors relate to certain tactical and legal advantages that 
international arbitration holds over international litigation of mass claims. 
However, arbitration offers another, more practical benefit, and that is 
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timeliness, meaning that parties can begin to resolve their disputes in this 
fashion immediately, without waiting for any sort of State action.  
This is not to say that public officials are unable or unwilling to act. 
To the contrary, efforts to facilitate cross-border litigation in cases involv-
ing collective harm have already been undertaken by both the European 
Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). Relevant policy papers and practice proposals have also been 
compiled by organisations such as the American Bar Association (ABA), 
the American Law Institute (ALI), the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) 
and the International Bar Association (IBA). However, any form of offi-
cial action is years away, and many parties simply cannot wait that long. 
3.1.2. Developing and Facilitating Large-Scale Arbitration 
Once arbitration is determined to be either a viable alternative to litigation 
or – as suggested here – a superior means of resolving cross-border col-
lective claims, it then becomes necessary to find ways of developing and 
facilitating large-scale arbitration. Several alternatives exist. 
First, the legal community can and should work to develop appro-
priate rules of procedure relating to international class and collective dis-
putes, building on existing efforts reflected in the American Arbitration 
Association’s (AAA) Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, the 
JAMS Class Action Procedures, and the German Institution of Arbitration 
(Deutsche Institution für Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit or DIS) Supplementary 
Rules for Corporate Law Disputes. Additional insights can be gained from 
mass procedures adopted in arbitrations proceeding under the auspices of 
the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).3 
However, while parties can agree to mass arbitration under existing 
rules on class and collective arbitration or under many of the general rule 
sets published by reputable arbitral institutions such as the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Centre for Dispute Reso-
lution (ICDR) and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), 
there are significant benefits associated with creating a model procedural 
framework that is not tied to a single national system, as the AAA and 
JAMS class arbitration rules are. For example, arbitrations that adopt a 
pre-existing set of cross-cultural rules appropriate for mass disputes will 
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likely enjoy increased predictability, a higher degree of procedural fair-
ness and lower transactional costs, since the parties will not have to create 
their procedures on an ad hoc basis.  
Second, the international community would do well to create a ros-
ter of expert arbitrators who are qualified to serve on tribunals handling 
mass disputes. To some extent, reputable persons are already well known 
within the international arbitral community, either informally or through 
the rosters of the various arbitral institutions, but not everyone has the 
same amount of knowledge about who constitutes an expert arbitrator. 
Furthermore, some of these lists are only available in administered arbi-
trations. Therefore, a single repository of information on competent arbi-
trators would be welcome.  
Third, the international legal community should consider whether it 
would be worthwhile to establish a neutral international body to help ad-
minister these types of proceedings. Although a new institution could be 
created, such services might also be rendered by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA). Not only does the PCA have the respect of the world 
community, it has administrative mechanisms already in place to help par-
ties deal with the task of coordinating a large-scale international action. 
There are some drawbacks to this approach, most notably with respect for 
the need for some form of State action to bring the dispute within the 
competence of the PCA. However, the PCA has experience in creating 
and administering a variety of mass claims processes, and thus could pro-
vide useful insights into how to devise a new form of collective redress 
that would resolve all or part of the claims, such as those concerning lia-
bility, in a single proceeding. 
3.2. Mediation  
While arbitration is already well established as a means of addressing col-
lective legal injury, it is not the only alternative to litigation. Indeed, me-
diation has been receiving a great deal of attention in recent years as a 
way of resolving domestic and international disputes of all shapes and 
sizes, with the European Union recently passing a directive concerning 
the use of mediation in cross-border matters involving civil and commer-
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cial concerns. 4  This suggests a third method of resolving cross-border 
class and collective disputes that is based on consensus rather than adjudi-
cation.  
Traditionally, mediation has been very attractive in certain types of 
circumstances, such as when parties wish to preserve an on-going rela-
tionship. Mediation has also been seen as a useful alternative to interna-
tional commercial arbitration, which is increasingly viewed as a some-
what expensive means of obtaining relief.  
At this point, mediation is a somewhat untested prospect. There is 
very little data on how successful mediation is in resolving international 
disputes, let alone large-scale international disputes. Furthermore, there 
are no models currently in place that might suggest how the parties to a 
large-scale mediation might be represented and what protocols, if any, 
should be put in place to protect against any procedural unfairness or col-
lusion on the part of counsel or certain subgroups within the class or col-
lective.  
This is not to say that mediation may not be a viable means of re-
solving mass disputes. Indeed, the experience in the United States has 
been that most class actions are settled prior to trial, suggesting that many 
parties to large-scale legal actions prefer settlement to an adjudicated out-
come. Ground-breaking innovations are always possible, as seen by the 
Dutch Collective Settlements Act 2005, which allows parties to an inter-
national dispute to create a class or collective for settlement purposes on-
ly.  
4. Looking Beyond Traditional Models  
Globalisation has both its positive and negative effects. While on the one 
hand it has opened the doors to international trade and increased opportu-
nities for both businesses and consumers, it has also created an environ-
ment where far-flung and widespread legal injuries can arise. Fortunately, 
the ability to cause this type of harm is currently matched by an ability 
and inclination for providing legally sanctioned redress to address those 
wrongs.  
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As society considers the various means of resolving cross-border 
collective disputes, it will have to think beyond conventional boundaries, 
since the types of injuries that are now being suffered are in many ways 
unlike any that have come before. Public and private actors need to work 
together to find the best means of addressing these harms, both through 
litigation and through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as 
arbitration and mediation. New processes can and should also be consid-
ered. Critically, there may not be one single method of dispute resolution 
that works in all situations. Parties should instead be able to move freely 
between the different options, just as they do in bilateral disputes, so as to 
take advantage of the procedure that best suits their needs. In providing a 
number of reputable and reliable alternatives, the legal community serves 
both the parties and society at large. 
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______ 
34Obstructing Law’s Future with  
Conceptions from Its Past 
Edward Rubin 
The law of the future has already arrived, but it still strikes us as a 
disconcerting potentiality because our concept of law is tied to the 
legal system that modernity has displaced. This system regarded 
law as a set of rules governing human behaviour that were promul-
gated in definitive form. The law that has already arrived, and will 
dominate our foreseeable future, will be concerned with producing 
real world results, rather than specifying decision-making proce-
dures, it will be tailored to particular situations rather than being 
stated in general terms, and it will be seen as a means of adminis-
trative supervision, rather than a declaration of general principles. 
1. Introduction 
Law is an instrumentality of governance. We cannot say anything about 
the law of a particular society until we have described its government. 
Any similarity among the laws of different societies is a purely empirical 
matter, an observed relationship that exists primarily in the mind of the 
observer or as a result of specific cultural contacts, and not as either a 
pragmatic necessity or a moral obligation. To be sure, most societies have 
forms of governance that can be reasonably described as law, but that is 
just one of the many commonalities that human societies share. It is hard-
ly surprising that these parallel systems possess homologous structures, 
and that an observer can usefully describe these structures with a single 
term and compare their purposes and features. That does not mean, how-
ever, that any of these aspects of society, including law, has any overarch-
ing, trans-cultural reality. 
The future of law in Western society thus depends on the future of 
its governance structures. Those structures underwent a fundamental and 
momentous change during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – the 
advent of the administrative State. In an earlier work, Beyond Camelot: 
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Rethinking Politics and Law for the Modern World, I argue that this 
change can be dated to the half-century between 1775 and 1825, but the 
precise chronology in not important for present purposes. All that need be 
established is that such a change occurred sometime between the end of 
the Middle Ages – when our traditional ideas of law were formulated – 
and the contemporary era. The further point, which is necessary for any 
consideration of future law, is that this transformation will not be re-
versed. 
This essay will attempt to describe the future of our legal system by 
focusing on this transformation of governance that occurred with the ad-
vent of modernity in the late Eighteenth century. Pre-modern Europeans 
would have rejected all the statements about law that appeared in the pre-
ceding paragraphs. They conceived of law as a universal principle, appli-
cable to all societies, from which the provisions specific to each particular 
society could be derived. This conception of law, like all conceptions of 
law, was an instrumentality of the governance systems that prevailed in 
pre-modern Europe. In order for us – as heirs to that society and that con-
ception – to perceive the nature of contemporary law and predict its future 
contours, we must understand that this pre-modern conception is not the 
eternal verity as it claims to be, but a specific ideology that emerged from 
and functioned within the systems of governance that prevailed in pre-
modern Europe, which no longer exist. 
2. The Pre-Modern Concept of Law 
One well-known aspect of the medieval thought, which contributed to the 
concept of law as a universal principle, was natural law. Inherited from 
the Romans and reinterpreted as an element of Christianity, the doctrine 
held that general rules regarding human relations were established by 
God, and thus obligatory. As elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas in his 
Summa Theologica, natural law is an application of eternal law to human 
relations, which is promulgated (all law must be promulgated to be effec-
tive in Aquinas’ view) by God through the medium of human reason. 
Since humans are, in their essence, rational creatures, the eternal law is 
present in every human through this natural law, even if they person does 
not know Christ, and all people are bound by it. Natural law does not de-
termine all aspects of the legal system – Aquinas believed most law was a 
purely human creation. To be valid, however, human law must be con-
sistent with natural law and must be directed toward the common good.  
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Secular beliefs arising from the theory and practice of governance 
were equally important factors in determining the pre-modern West’s 
concept of law. During the late Roman Empire and the Early Middle Ag-
es, the effectiveness of central government in Western Europe steadily 
declined. Tenth century Western Europe consisted of a welter of small 
principalities presided over by semi-autonomous and perennially truculent 
landowners belonging to a military aristocracy. Law was viewed as essen-
tially a local matter, a set of rights specific to each unit of governance. 
Thus, each large estate ruled by an earl or baron, each sub-estate ruled by 
a lesser nobleman, and each manor ruled by an ordinary knight, possessed 
its own set of laws. Enforcement of the law in this decentralised setting 
was intermittent and ineffective. The countryside was filled with bands of 
marauders, often members of the local nobility whose self-declared no-
bility consisted largely of their ability to buy a horse and use a sword, ra-
ther than of any solicitude for those weaker than themselves. 
For various reasons, this process reversed in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, and the central governments of the royal regimes that 
would ultimately become modern European nation States began to re-
assert control. Their goal was to establish civil order, to secure the obedi-
ence of local aristocracies, end the marauders’ depredations, and create 
stable conditions for commerce, on which their own wealth and the wealth 
of their inhabitants increasingly depended. Law was one of the instrumen-
talities by which these purposes were achieved. To do so, it had to be seen 
as a form of command originating with the sovereign, it had to be exclu-
sively determined, or monopolised, by that sovereign, and it had to be uni-
form, or universal within the sovereign’s domain. 
The conception of law, as a uniform set of commands promulgated 
by the sovereign or under his authority, was linked to natural law and the 
idea that the ruler governed with God’s approval, if not His direct impri-
matur. A law inconsistent with these universal principles, many medieval 
writers held, was not a law at all, and a ruler who would promulgate such 
commands under the name of law was a tyrant who deserved, at least in 
theory, to be deposed. These closely connected conceptions of royal and 
natural law led to the general view that law should consist of normative 
statements that reflected general principles, and thus constituted a coher-
ent body of doctrine. To rule by law meant to use such statements as a 
mode of governance, and the rule of law meant that the sovereign was in 
fact ruling in this manner. Often, it was said that in promulgating law, the 
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sovereign was merely discovering or enacting the laws that already exist-
ed, that is, the law established by the Divine Law-maker. Everyone under-
stood, of course, that kings issued many orders and granted many benefits 
that did not conform to the model of a coherent set of general rules re-
flecting universal principles. However, the general view was that these 
orders and benefits were not true to the meaning of law. Law was a sys-
tem of commands issued by the sovereign that reflected general principles 
and fit together into a coherent whole. 
3. The Advent of Modern Governance 
The era that we call modernity results from many complex, interrelated 
causes, but the two most relevant to this discussion are industrialisation 
and urbanisation. These trends simultaneously generated an opportunity 
and a demand for the expansion of central government – an opportunity 
because people became detached from the traditional structures of local 
government such as the local landowner and the Church, a demand be-
cause the people thus detached were exposed to the unfamiliar miseries of 
urban life and the depredations of a new industrial class whose severity 
was not tempered by tradition. The resulting expansion did not increase 
the central government’s control of society; that goal had already been 
achieved. Rather, it was an expansion of the functions that the govern-
ment performed. Instead of simply keeping order and dealing with foreign 
affairs, government now undertook to manage the economy and provide 
all the social services that had previously been the responsibility of the lo-
cal landowner, the village and the Church. Tocqueville describes this as 
the difference between governmental centralisation and administrative 
centralisation. As he notes:  
Under Louis XIV, France saw the greatest governmental 
centralisation that one could conceive of […]‘L’etat, c’est 
moi’ he said; and he was right […] Nevertheless, under Lou-
is XIV there was much less administrative centrali[s]ation 
than in our day. 
The expansion of governmental functions was related to, albeit not 
restricted to, the growth of democracy that occurred during the same peri-
od. Granting ordinary citizens the vote, and allowing the results of those 
votes to determine the identity of governmental leaders, enabled the citi-
zens to make insistent demands upon the government. What they de-
manded, and to some extent received, was protection from the harshness 
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of their employers and the rigors of the capitalist system: health insurance, 
disability insurance, social security, unemployment benefits and, in a later 
era, consumer and small investor protection. They also demanded pubic 
recreational facilities and environmental protection to improve their quali-
ty of life, and public education to improve the prospects for their children. 
Programmes of this sort were not restricted to democratic regimes. Be-
cause these programmes had the general effect of securing the loyalty of 
the citizens, providing more productive workers and supplying healthier 
and more easily trained soldiers, European autocracies were motivated to 
provide the same services to citizens, particularly when they were in mili-
tary competition with democracies. 
This massive expansion of central government responsibilities 
changed the character of law as a mode of governance. It was no longer 
sufficient to establish rules of conduct designed to confirm the authority 
of the central government and establish civil order. Now government 
needed to manage complex public institutions and benefits programs, 
monitor private businesses and delicately adjust the switches and levers of 
an enormously complex economic system. Simple statements by the legis-
lature were inadequate; detailed regulations were now required. General 
statements were equally inadequate; each institution needed its own dis-
tinctive rules and regulations, each benefit its own rules of distribution, 
each industry its own permissions and restrictions. As a result, most rule-
making functions had to be delegated to administrative agencies. 
Given these new purposes and instrumentalities of governance, the 
commands of the sovereign could no longer be framed as general rules, 
universally applicable to the entire society. There was, moreover, no 
longer any possibility that these commands could be seen as part of a co-
herent totality; they were simply too numerous, too varied and too specif-
ic. Indeed, the term command itself becomes a misnomer in the modern, 
administrative State. Governmental purposes are often carried out by es-
tablishing institutions, distributing benefits and adjusting incentives, ra-
ther than by giving orders. To take just two examples, an act by a city 
council to build playgrounds throughout the city does not give commands 
to any citizen. Rather, it provides funds to induce a private corporation to 
build facilities that people can use or not use, as they so desire. Similarly, 
an act by the national legislature to provide medical care and income sup-
port to disabled workers does not command anyone to become disabled; it 
simply provides a benefit to those who suffer from this condition. To be 
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sure, commands of the traditional sort, that is, establishing norms of be-
haviour, will be needed to ensure that people do not vandalise the play-
grounds or falsely claim the benefits, but these are subsidiary to the pri-
mary purpose of the legislation. 
None of this should have been particularly difficult for modern 
people to accept. After all, at the same time that the administrative State 
was evolving, and for possibly related reasons, secularisation was under-
mining the belief in natural law. In modern, democratic States, laws need 
not conform to any set of principles ascribed to a Supreme Being. The on-
ly test of their validity is their proper enactment by a secular legislation 
and, in many nations, their conformance with a secularly established con-
stitution enforced by a secular judiciary. In other words, not only has the 
use of law as a pragmatic instrument of governance changed in the mod-
ern State, but the rationale that describes the purpose of and constraints 
upon that law have changed as well. 
4. The Persistence of the Pre-Modern Concept of Law 
Surprisingly, however, the modern world, which has had so much success 
in re-conceptualising other things, has failed to re-conceptualise the law. 
When people speak of law, they still conceive it as a set of commands is-
sued by the sovereign that establish rules for human conduct, rules that 
are expected to fit into some coherent general pattern. This is essentially 
Hans Kelsen’s definition of law; when H.L.A. Hart undertook to revise 
that conception, he did so by noting that law functioned as a norm as well 
as a command. In other words, he moved backwards toward the idea of 
natural law, which Kelsen had dispensed with, rather than forward into 
modern administrative government. His Concept of Law centres on the 
statement that “law is a means of controlling human conduct”, thus ex-
cluding all the statutes appropriating funds, creating institutions, estab-
lishing benefits and adjusting incentives from that category. Hart’s theory 
not only wrongly describes the use of law as an instrumentality of modern 
governance, but also preserves the empty shell of natural law, with God 
subtracted but the notion of overarching principles retained. 
This pre-modern conception of law, perhaps because of its persis-
tence in legal education, continues to influence governmental action, de-
spite its conflict with the rather evident realities of modern governance. 
Statutes continue to be written as if they were stating general norms of 
behaviour; more seriously, they tend to be designed and drafted with this 
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conception in mind. Judges continue to re-interpret statutes and regula-
tions on the basis of this same conception. More generally, political and 
legal actors of all kinds express a continuing discomfort with the realities 
of modern administrative governance. They worry that this mode of gov-
ernance is inconsistent with our norms, that it is intrinsically oppressive, 
that it is uncontrolled or incoherent. In other words, they worry that it vio-
lates ‘the rule of law’. 
5. Modern Governance and the Law of the Future 
The law of the future will bring the long-overdue demise of this pre-
modern concept of law. In its place will be laws that function as an in-
strumentality of modern administrative governance. Three aspects of this 
transformation are the shift from procedures to results, from generality to 
particularisation, and from regularity to supervision. 
5.1. From Procedures to Results 
A command tells people what they should or should not do; in other 
words, it gives them instructions about the way to behave. At the same 
time, such instructions specify a result: declaring that people should not 
commit murder is essentially equivalent to declaring that no murders 
should be committed. This may seem obvious, but the reason for the over-
lap is that the instruction is being given to people as separate individuals, 
and the instruction itself consists of a simple prohibition. Once we con-
sider the regulatory laws characteristic of the modern State, a substantial 
space begins to open between these two types of instructions. Suppose, 
for example, the legislature enacts a law to provide benefits to disabled 
workers. This obviously cannot be implemented by simple prohibition, 
since no behaviour is being prohibited; the law is an allocation of funds, 
not a command. The instruction is being given to an administrative agen-
cy, a large, complex organisation, and the task to be carried out is itself 
complex. In other words, a large space has opened between the instruction 
and its implementation. 
Because pre-modern law is structured in terms of command, mod-
ern law-makers, who have failed to fully re-conceptualise law in modern 
terms, have tended to follow the command format and instruct the agency 
how to go about its task. In other words, they have tended to specify pro-
cedures. Needless to say, these are not always effective; in the example, 
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not all the workers who are eligible for the benefit will necessarily receive 
it as a result of the specified procedures. An alternative approach would 
be to legislate the result, that is, that a certain percentage of the eligible 
workers actually receive the benefit. It would then be the agency’s task to 
design procedures that yielded the specified result. 
There is a tendency to regard the second approach as a more exten-
sive delegation of legislative authority to the implementing agency, but 
that assertion simply returns to the pre-modern concept of law and pro-
jects it into the qualitatively different modern situation. It assumes that the 
task of legislating necessarily consists of specifying procedures – the al-
ternative that most closely resembles pre-modern legal commands – so 
that when the legislature does not do so, it is transferring ‘its’ power to the 
agency. In fact, the legislature’s power consists almost entirely of its abil-
ity to instruct administrative agencies to carry out various tasks in one 
way or another; if it could not do so, it could only enact pre-modern, pro-
hibitory type laws, and not any of the regulatory, institution-creation or 
resource-allocating laws of the modern administrative State. 
The two alternative approaches are simply different ways of con-
trolling and monitoring the implementing agency. The first approach con-
trols the procedures that the agency uses, and suggests that the legislature 
will oversee the agency to determine whether it complied with those pro-
cedures. The second approach controls the results the agency achieves, 
and suggests that those results will be the basis on which the agency’s 
performance is judged. The question is not, as some modern writers have 
suggested, which approach is more ‘lawful’. Both are law, as re-defined 
for modern governance; the question is which approach is more effective 
in achieving the desired goal. 
As we move into the future, we will recognise that the second ap-
proach, where the results are specified, tends to be more effective, despite 
being less familiar. When a programme is first established, the best mode 
of implementation –the best way to achieve the desired goals – is not nec-
essarily clear. Moreover, it may change over time as circumstances 
change. The implementation strategy that is most effective when a pro-
gram is established may not continue to be most effective once the pro-
gram has matured. Discovering the most effective mode, and changing it 
as circumstances change, will generally not lie within the legislature’s ar-
ea of expertise. By specifying the goal itself, and leaving the agency to 
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develop and adapt the implementation strategy, the legislature is more 
likely to achieve its desired result. 
5.2. From Generality to Particularisation 
Pre-modern Europeans regarded generality as the hallmark of law. The 
sovereign, typically a monarch, could engage in individualised acts of fa-
vouritism or vindictiveness, based on personal preferences, but he could 
also abide by the law and act through general rules that treated everyone 
the same, or, to be more precise, like cases alike. There was a further con-
straint on the content of those rules, which, if they were to be properly de-
scribed as law, were expected to cohere into a consist system that reflect-
ed general principles. At present, however, Western nations are no longer 
ruled by single individuals with personal preferences, but by complex 
groups of elected officials whose authority is determined and controlled 
by structural rules. When a single person is in charge of government, it is 
relatively easy to tell when he is playing favourites and when he is acting 
in accordance with general rules. When an elected legislature is in charge, 
it will often be impossible to distinguish between its preferences and its 
policies. 
As we move into the future, therefore, and re-conceptualise law in 
modern terms, we will be increasingly able to dispense with the pre-
modern norm of generality and choose our mode of governance on the ba-
sis of its effectiveness in implementing our purposes. Just as that criterion 
will often lead to specifying results rather than procedures, it will often 
lead to particularised rather than general action. We have already aban-
doned any belief that enacted law must cohere into a unified whole. Leg-
islators are often motivated by a general ideology of course – citizens 
need more protection, business suffers from over-regulation – but in im-
plementing that ideology, they no longer argue that the idea of law itself 
demands internal consistency among enacted measures. If one believes 
that government is subject to excessive regulation, the fact that a proposed 
law would de-regulate one area, while related areas remain subject to reg-
ulation, would be regarded as an argument in favour of that law, not 
against it. 
The law of the future will not only move from generality to particu-
larity in terms of the connections among its various provisions, but also in 
terms of the way it relates to private parties. Because the government’s re-
lationship to business enterprises, to recipients of benefits, and to clients 
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or inmates of public institutions is an intensive and on-going one, general-
ised rules are no longer sufficient or, indeed, effective. Instead, the gov-
ernment must design specific strategies for many of the situations it ad-
dresses. Educators generally agree, for example, that individualisation is 
the most effective way to teach young children – not to control them, per-
haps, but certainly to obtain the results that constitute the purpose of cre-
ating public schools. The same can be said for the treatment of patients in 
mental hospitals. Probation and parole, without which our criminal justice 
system would collapse, represent efforts to individualise an area of law 
where uniformity and generality would seem to exercise their greatest 
claims. 
The same is true for economic regulation. Agencies that implement 
such regulation will be most effective if they develop particularised strat-
egies for each firm in concentrated industries or each recognisable group 
of firms (grouped according to the agency’s goal) in other cases. This re-
quires an extensive staff and massive information processing capacity, but 
that is precisely what the modern agency, with the assistance of the elec-
tronic revolution, now provides. Ronald Dworkin has strenuously tried to 
maintain the pre-modern conception of law as a coherent unity in his ac-
count of common law. His claim is only plausible because common law 
judges were the primary means of enforcing law in the pre-modern era; 
when it finally occurred to him that most modern law is statutory, his fur-
ther claim that statutes should display the same unity was risibly implau-
sible. 
A current school of administrative law scholarship called New Pub-
lic Governance has focused on these features of the modern regulatory 
process and proposed a major re-conceptualisation of the law in this area. 
Instead of issuing commands in an effort to control the regulated firm’s 
practices – so-called “command and control regulation” – New Public 
Governance suggests that the agency should engage in a cooperative pro-
cess that tailors its interventions to the specifics of the situation it con-
fronts. Some firms will respond only to threats, but many others will 
comply voluntarily if given certain incentives, or if provided with exper-
tise that would otherwise be difficult for them to acquire. This image of 
the regulator-as-friend may seem fatuous or insincere, but that is because 
command and control regulation is intrinsically adversarial. If, instead, a 
goal has been established, either by the legislature or the agency, then it 
seems entirely plausible that the agency could work cooperatively with 
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the firm to achieve that goal. Thus, the change described above, that is, 
moving from specified procedures to specified results, encourages and 
supports the change that is being described here, that is, from generalised 
rules to particularised interactions. 
5.3. From Regularity to Supervision 
A particularised system of law, where State agents treat individual firms, 
small groups of firms, and individuals differently, in response to the spe-
cifics of their situation, naturally raises concerns about fairness. Giving a 
State agent authority to craft particularized treatment of a single entity, 
whether enterprise or individual, would seem to invite discriminatory or 
oppressive behaviour. Several leading critics of the modern regulatory 
State, notably Frederick Hayek and Theodore Lowi, have correctly identi-
fied this feature of modern governance and then used it as the basis for 
their condemnation. Their claim is that modern regulation violates the rule 
of law. This is absolutely true if one uses the medieval definition of law. 
According to the re-conceptualisation that is presently occurring, howev-
er, this particularised treatment not only does not violate the law, it is law 
– the law of the future.  
When they are not simply using their arguments to express an a 
priori distaste for modernity, Hayek, Lowi and other critics seem to base 
their criticism on concerns about the fairness of governmental action. But 
generality, regularity and other features of pre-modern law that they pro-
pound are not the equivalent of fairness, as we understand that concept. 
Rather, they are proxies for fairness. As everyone knows, the rigid appli-
cation of a rule can be as unfair as discriminatory treatment based on per-
sonal animus. In fact, it can be the same thing if the agent applying the 
rule is aware of the rule’s effect upon the enterprise or individual in ques-
tion. A uniform poll tax discriminates against the poor; a uniform literacy 
test for voting discriminates against those who have been denied access to 
education. 
Pre-modern government needed to rely on this proxy for fairness 
since it lacked an administrative hierarchy that could deploy alternative 
mechanisms. Local governance, not only in the Middle Ages but often as 
late as the eighteenth century, was in the hands of landowners who were 
insulated from central government control by the idea that the area they 
governed was their private property. As central government developed, it 
relied on an analogous means of authorising officials to exercise its au-
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thority over specific subjects. In return for payment (rather than for loyal-
ty, as in the Middle Ages), it granted them a property right in their office, 
which provided them an equivalent autonomy. This is not to assert that 
pre-modern society was non-hierarchical of course. It was extremely hier-
archical, but the hierarchy was established socially, not by the govern-
ment. As such, it served as a further insulation from government supervi-
sion; a low status employee of the central government would have diffi-
culty disciplining a noble landowner or even the purchaser of an im-
portant office. Moreover, these two forms of private property insulation 
tended to reinforce each other; noblemen often purchased offices, and 
purchasing an office often conferred noble status, as in France’s noblesse 
de la robe. 
Modern government, as Weber observed, is characterised by offi-
cially created hierarchies, which means that each official not only receives 
orders and instructions from a superior, but is monitored, or supervised, 
by that superior. A government structured in this way does not need to re-
ly on regularity as a proxy for fairness; rather, it can use supervision to 
prevent its employees from acting on the basis of personal animus, preju-
dice, or sheer ill will. Supervision, of course, is itself a more particularised 
approach that enables the supervisor to assess each subordinate’s behav-
iour, rather than relying on general rules that can be too readily manipu-
lated at the “street level.” These administrative hierarchies are defined in 
exclusively governmental terms and are independent of the remaining so-
cial hierarchies. It would be virtually inconceivable for a modern US Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration inspector to resist discipli-
nary action by his superior on the ground that he came from a wealthier or 
more distinguished family than the supervisor. 
Supervision, of course, will only achieve fairness if it is designed to 
implement general principles that constitute this value. That is not an ex-
ception to the nature of modern law, but an essential feature of it. Just as 
statutes will not be desirable unless they are designed to implement desir-
able policies, supervision will not be desirable unless it is designed to im-
plement desirable values. Both policies and values are determined, in 
modern government, by democratic decision-making. Indeed, these are 
probably the only things than can be effectively determined by that pro-
cess. Voters cannot possibly be knowledgeable about specific statutes, 
and they cannot possibly control specific governmental practices; appeals 
to them on the basis of such specifics tend to be anecdotal rabble rousing 
 Obstructing Law’s Future with Conceptions from Its Past 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 427 
and scandal mongering that a fully mature democracy will hopefully 
avoid. Modern democratic government, where voters choose leaders ra-
ther than policies or practices, is designed to direct their choices to these 
more general issues. In the case of governmental fairness, the voters de-
cide on general principles, sometimes directly and sometimes through 
adoption of a constitution, and then those principles are implemented 
through a complex, well-developed administrative hierarchy that no long-
er need rely on proxies for fairness like the regularity of law. 
6. Conclusion 
General principles, as just noted, are not absent from modern administra-
tive government. They are, in fact the basic choices that the voters make, 
choices that constitute the essence of the modern democratic process. But 
these principles are not law. Law is an instrumentality of governance, a 
means by which the voters’ basic choices are implemented in our com-
plex, technical society. The idea that law must be procedural, generalised 
and regular is a product of pre-modern European ideology. It served its 
purpose when government’s main goal was to establish control and main-
tain civil order, but it no longer applies when that goal has been essential-
ly achieved, and the voter now requires government to manage economic 
and social systems that have grown past the ambit of tradition. The law of 
the future will be result-oriented, particularised and supervised. It will, in 
other words, be re-conceived to serve the purposes of the modern State. 
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6.2. 
______ 
35Law and Policy: A Long (and Bright) Way to Go 
Mauro Zamboni* 
The relations of law to politics are one of the major difficulties con-
fronting today’s legal actors, including, naturally here, legal schol-
ars. While legal actors are educated to believe that law and politics 
are two distinct worlds, when faced with real issues, legal actors are 
forced to deal with the very responsibility of choosing a political 
course for an entire community. If one considers the policy of law 
as the transformational space of law-making, that is, the space in 
which the values or ideas produced inside the political arena are 
transformed into legal categories and concepts, the major purpose 
of this contribution will be to look at the way forward with respect 
to the relations between law and policy, and in particular on how 
this transformational (or policy) space can help legal actors con-
front the challenges presented by the (not so) future world, for ex-
ample, globalisation. 
1. Introduction 
The relations of law to politics are one of the major difficulties confront-
ing today’s legal actors, including legal scholars. Though with some dif-
ferences (for example as to the legal system, legal actor or legal area un-
der investigation), one can say without much objection that, in general, 
legal actors are educated in the belief that law and politics are two distinct 
worlds. Lawyers should somehow avoid (at least explicitly) political is-
sues as much as possible. However, when faced with real issues, legal ac-
tors not only realise that they are forced to deal with politics, but also that, 
occasionally, the very responsibility of choosing a political course for an 
entire community will fall on their shoulders.  
In particular, if one considers the policy of law as the transforma-
tional space of law-making, the space in which the values or ideas pro-
duced inside the political arena are transformed into legal categories and 
concepts, the majority of contemporary legal actors tend to interpret this 
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space as mirroring the general dilemma currently faced by the law. On 
one side, due to the high degree of politicisation of the legal phenomenon, 
legal actors are forced to give the transformational moment a central posi-
tion in their visions of the law and its creation. For example, every lawyer 
or judge recognises that the right of individual private property is not a 
natural and neutral product of the legal system, but instead, a product of 
liberal political ideology. On the other side, because of the accelerating 
tendency towards a more specialised law, most legal actors tend to leave 
any further focus as to this moment at the periphery of their attention. For 
example, many legal actors in their everyday work operate based on the 
idea that the essence of the concept of property rights does not lie in any 
political or moral ideology, identifying it instead simply as the legal pos-
sibility to do or not to do something with their property. 
Since the major purpose of this contribution is to look at the way 
forward with respect to the relations between law and policy, the focus 
here is on how this transformational (or policy) space can help legal actors 
confront the challenges presented by the (not so) future world, for exam-
ple, globalisation. Before sketching a potential development of the future 
relations between law and policy, and its implications for legal actors, it is 
necessary to offer some clarifications as to the terminology used in this 
think piece. The policy of law is defined as a space that can be opened up 
in the law-making activity between the formation of ideas in the political 
world (politics of law), where political is intended in a very broad mean-
ing (for example, the lobbying of economic actors), and the impact of the 
newly-made law on the surrounding non-legal environments (legal out-
comes). In this space, values entrenched in political decisions (political 
inputs) are transformed into law, having an effect on the existing legal or-
der (legal outputs). For example, political parties give the mandate of 
transforming their equality ideal between men and women (political in-
put) into legal proposals to their legal staff or an external legal think-tank. 
The latter, after searching among the available legal tools, drafts a new 
statute realising in legal language the ideal of equality. The legal tool used 
by legal actors for realising equality between the sexes in the job market 
can be a legally compulsory system of quotas. The draft written by the 
lawyers of the political parties then becomes a statute that modifies both 
the legal duties of the employers and the legal rights to which women ap-
plying for jobs are entitled (legal outputs). 
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The policy of law is then a web of conversional processes and deci-
sions located inside the legal arena. They are directed at transforming the 
ideas produced in the political arena (political inputs) into concepts and 
categories directly relevant to the legal world (legal outputs). In contem-
porary law-making, this space of the policy of law is mainly the domain 
for the work and reasoning of the actors belonging to the legal world (for 
example, lawyers working for the legislature or ‘activist’ justices). How-
ever, the borders of the policy of law as so defined, often tend to cross in-
to the spaces in which decisions about values are taken (politics of law) 
and where the law becomes a socially relevant phenomenon (legal out-
comes). For example, in the policy process, law-makers can prefer to in-
corporate in a statute a legal category of a compulsory quota system, in-
stead of employing a taxation legal tool in the form of tax-deductions 
available to employers hiring women. This choice can be made because 
either the legal actors are aware of the political sensitivity when it comes 
to the ideals that should inspire taxation law, or they have witnessed suc-
cessful outcomes in reality of a previous similar compulsory quota system 
in fighting discrimination, for example, against disabled persons. 
2. The Policy of Law: Some Work to Be Done on the Outside  
The centrality of the transformational process, defined as the policy of 
law, is evidently necessary in order for legal actors to better understand 
certain phenomena that heavily affect the legal world today and, in partic-
ular, the law-making processes. If one considers major developments af-
fecting contemporary legal work as well as thought, for example, globali-
sation, the importance of such a vision of the law-making process clearly 
emerges not only in helping to explain larger events. This vision of the 
law-making process can also offer solutions to certain problems that 
sometimes accompany such contemporary phenomena into the legal 
world.  
2.1. The Policy of Law and Globalisation 
The phenomenon of globalisation from a legal perspective can be defined 
as the circulation of legal models (that is, legal categories and concepts) in 
a way that has rendered many different aspects of the different national 
legal systems homogeneous, in particular, with respect to such issues as 
human rights, capital punishment and innumerable commercial issues. 
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Once globalisation is defined in these terms, the fundamental con-
tribution that a policy of law perspective can bring to the understanding of 
the phenomenon becomes evident, in particular by taking the legal actors’ 
perspectives on the matter. The circulation of legal models receives a 
form of sanction, either ex ante or ex post, by the national or international 
legal actors. Legislative bodies, judges, arbitrators and lawyers become 
the central (although not exclusive) figures in this law-making process, al-
lowing for the transformation of global legal categories and concepts into 
legal categories and concepts with a legal status in their own (internation-
al, supranational, transnational, or national) communities. One example is 
the increasing role played by national labour courts in the face of the de-
clining importance of union membership as the principal route for em-
ployees to enforce their fundamental “floor of rights”, as recognised at an 
international level. 
In addition to this function of increasing the understanding of the 
process of globalisation, a policy of law perspective can also help to solve 
certain problems connected thereto. Far from being a developmental and 
linear phenomenon in general, globalisation also raises many issues and 
problems in the legal world. One is the difficulty encountered by many 
global legal categories and concepts in actually having a concrete effect 
on the daily life of the receiving community. Take, for example, Russia, 
where many typically capitalistic economic legal tools failed to actually 
implement a capitalistic mind-set in the business communities of tradi-
tionally non-capitalistic origin, attempting to take on many of the features 
characterising Western legal systems. 
This “malfunction” of the phenomenon of globalisation can partial-
ly be explained by looking into its policy of law. First, it is necessary to 
distinguish, within the phenomenon of globalisation, between the globali-
sation of the ‘policy of law’ and the globalisation of the ‘politics of law’. 
By the globalisation of the policy of law is meant that there is presently a 
tendency by which the same legal categories and concepts are received in 
many national and international legal orders. In other words, legal actors 
around the world tend to use the same kind of legal tools: for example, the 
legal category of ‘limited financial liability’ as a quality attached to the 
legal position of a shareholder. Not necessarily corresponding to this gen-
eral tendency is an underpinning general globalisation of the politics of 
law, which is not necessarily the fact that various national and interna-
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tional communities similarly share the same values underlying these glob-
al legal categories and concepts.  
The relatively centralised and authoritative features of contempo-
rary law-making processes usually facilitate the adoption of a legal system 
of global legal categories. Few members of a drafting committee, for ex-
ample, impulsively decide to embrace and impose upon an entire national 
community a foreign legal category, such as limited financial liability for 
shareholders. The introduction of new “foreign” values into a community 
is more difficult as the value-making process lacks authoritative force 
and, often, the centralised character typical for the legal phenomenon. In 
other words, at least in the Western legal systems, changes of the law (for 
example, a new legal category) can usually be expected with a (more or 
less) blind “acceptance” (although not necessarily endorsed) by the mem-
bers of a community, while changes in the community’s values are often 
the result of long, fragmented and complex processes. 
These structural differences exist between the legal politics and the 
policy of law of globalisation. For example, the value underlying the 
adoption of a limited financial liability for shareholders in the receiving 
country cannot actually be the one promoting a flux of new financial re-
sources into new economic activities, but rather the one promoting sheer 
financial speculation. By identifying the possibility of such gaps between 
the policy and the politics moments of legal globalisation, the policy of 
law analyst, namely, the legal professional figure with the specific task of 
investigating the transformational space and suggesting possible legal 
strategies, can play a central role. He or she can recommend that more at-
tention be paid to the intentions of the political and social arenas (legal 
inputs) underlying the adoption of a law-making process suggested and/or 
promoted by globalising forces (for example, the World Trade Organiza-
tion).  
Even if one assumes that the globalisation of legal categories (poli-
cy of law) mirrors a parallel and simultaneous globalisation of the under-
pinning values (legal politics), the observation of the phenomenon from 
the standpoint of the transformational moment can help to explain and 
solve some of the failures of the process of globalisation. The non-legal 
arenas can present favourable and encouraging conditions for the ac-
ceptance of new legal categories and concepts. Political, social and eco-
nomic actors can all agree on a true globalised politics of law; for in-
stance, they can promote and sustain the necessity of transforming the 
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idea of encouraging risk-taking in new economic activities, into the global 
legal category of limited financial responsibility for shareholders. In other 
words, the environment around the legal world is ready and sympathetic 
to the outcomes of a certain law-making process. 
Despite these favourable conditions, globalisation processes can fail 
in actually implementing certain values or ideas when using global legal 
categories. This can happen because of the central role played by the legal 
world and its actors in the policy of law processes, directed at transform-
ing certain values into legal categories. The legal world can for several 
reasons reject such categories by stopping the production of any policy of 
law output. For example, the judges of a country, educated according to a 
communitarian legal tradition, can consistently and generally maintain the 
legal irrelevancy of a new category of limited financial liability for certain 
economic enterprises. 
Moreover, the circulation of legal models can also be stopped by 
conditions peculiar to the receiving legal system. When legal actors trans-
form global legal categories into binding categories for the community, 
the law-making process produces some legal outputs due to the shape of 
the legal order. Such outputs can be rendered impotent within the non-
legal arenas (no legal outcomes). For example, the receiving legal order 
perhaps lacks mechanisms of legal protection for those financial institu-
tions supplying credit to newly established enterprises with limited finan-
cial liability. 
It is precisely within this type of impasse that an articulated 
knowledge of the policy of law space can intervene and offer a contribu-
tion. Focusing mainly on the legal actors and their transformational role, 
the policy of law analyst can point out blockages in the process of intro-
ducing new legal categories into a legal order. If the globalisation of the 
legal system has stopped, for example, before the production of legal in-
puts, then the solution should start with re-educating the legal actors. Re-
forming teaching in law faculties, compulsory continuing legal education 
courses for judges, and sabbaticals abroad for legal consultants working 
for the legislature, are some possible ways of re-invigorating and recom-
mencing the law-making process. 
In contrast, if there are ineffective legal outputs, that is, they do not 
produce any outcomes outside the legal arena, then the solutions should 
probably be sought in more traditional directions: more attention should 
be given to the simultaneous reform of the surrounding legal areas and 
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there should be longer periods of transition in which both the old and the 
new legal categories are accommodated. 
3. The Policy of Law: Some Work to Be Done on the Inside 
As to the policy of law and its future, the challenges for legal actors do 
not only concern how to confront this transformational space of the law-
making with the “outside”, that is, with the changing environments sur-
rounding the law and its actors. They also face challenges as to the ways 
to understand and structure the ‘inside’ of the policy of law, that is, as to 
the main tools at the disposal of the legal actors with respect to the pro-
cesses and decisions transforming political inputs into legal categories. In 
particular, the most urgent efforts should be made in the direction of an-
swering two major questions following the recognition of the existence of 
a transformational moment in the law-making process: How does the pol-
icy of law work? Why should legal actors choose one legal category in-
stead of the other? 
3.1.  How Does the Policy of Law Work? 
In answering the first question, legal actors must realise that any adapta-
tion of the policy of law to the changing external conditions will, at the 
same time, have to operate on its inside, by identifying the specific modal-
ities through which the transformational processes take place. In particu-
lar, legal actors need to acquire a specific knowledge as to the mecha-
nisms through which the political, economic, cultural or religious values 
become legal categories and concepts. This knowledge will have to be de-
veloped along two major converging lines of work. 
First, an investigation of the modes of working of a policy process 
needs to take, as a central point of observation, the perspective of the legal 
actors, the latter playing a leading (although not exclusive) part in such 
processes of transformation of political inputs into legal outputs. In par-
ticular, Max Weber’s distinction between a formal and a substantive legal 
rationality should be invoked. With it, a line can be drawn between actors 
working from within the legal system, whose coherence or consequentiali-
ty they are to preserve, and those social and political actors that, although 
active in the law-making process, strive for goals external to the internal 
logic of the legal system (for example the realisation of a certain political 
ideology or the improvement of the efficiency of an economic system). 
 The Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II 
Law of the Future Series No. 1 (2012) – page 436 
For example, when confronted with the legal dilemma as to which legal 
category in taxation law can better realise the value of encouraging small 
enterprises, the legislative drafter (a legal actor) will choose or build the 
new statutory provisions according to criteria such as the ‘fitting’ of the 
new legal construction into the already existing legal regulation of the 
whole taxation system (formal legal rationality). In contrast, politicians or 
the representatives of small enterprises will propose or evaluate the new 
statutory provisions with criteria that are beyond (and somehow disre-
gard) the system of taxation law as a whole. In choosing which legislative 
path to take, these non-legal actors are instead more focused on substan-
tive criteria located outside the legal world, and are aiming at creating a 
regulation that can produce a result in the political world (for example, 
politicians may want to change taxation law in order to increase their sup-
port among the population) or in the economic world (for example, the 
representatives of small enterprises may wish to change taxation law in 
such a way that the small enterprises end up paying less taxes). 
By drawing this line, however, legal actors will always have to keep 
in mind the relative nature of this distinction between legal and non-legal 
institutional actors (as well as their goals). Considering the vast variety of 
guises a legal actor can assume, it is often unclear where the latter ends 
and the social or political actor begins. One example of this diffuseness is 
in-house corporate attorneys: these are actors, educated in legal reasoning 
and hired as legal experts, who are in a position where, as part of their job 
(and under strong pressures and influences by employers), they are often 
required to somehow “mould”, or even disregard, the basic dogmas of le-
gal thinking in contracts law in order to fulfil some economic values (for 
example, the maximisation of short-term profits). Moreover, legal actors 
themselves (judges in primis), even when embracing as unique value as 
the maintenance of the internal logic of the legal system, are often carriers 
of messages of political nature: messages that are likely to surface, in par-
ticular, in the presence of hard cases. Even the most obedient judge with 
respect to the letter of the positive law must sometimes “go beyond the 
law” and rely on his or her ideological background. 
There is a second major process legal actors will have to address in 
the near future in order to answer the question of how the policy of law 
works. This starts from the channels through which, in the law-making 
process, communications occur among the different actors. In particular, a 
future model explaining the policy of law should include a deep investiga-
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tion of the legal language. As pointed out by movements such as post-
modernism or feminist legal theory, however, in order to fully understand 
the point of passage from political to legal languages, it is necessary to 
substitute the concept of legal language with the broader concept of “legal 
discourse”. A potential model of the policy of law needs to focus on the 
legal discourse since: 
[…] the concept of legal discourse is a methodology for the 
reading of legal texts, which places the communicative or 
rhetorical functions of law within their institutional and so-
cio-linguistic contexts.
1
 
Legal discourses then allow legal actors to better investigate the 
policy process by placing the legal phenomenon in the centre of its web of 
relations with the other non/legal arenas (for example, political, economic, 
and social). This focus on the idea of “discourse” does not absolutely 
mean that it is impossible to individuate the different standpoints of the 
different agencies participating in the discourse, that is, the “contribution” 
each law-making actor gives to the discourse is ignored. The use of the 
idea of ‘discourse’ simply implicates that the final product, the new legal 
category, has to be seen as the result of a constant and continuous interact-
ing of different forces, different ideologies and different legal cultures. 
For example, when looking at the introduction in a national law-
making process of a hypothetical legal category considering the right to a 
marital divorce as a “human right”, one should always take into consid-
eration the fundamental fact that in the international organisation’s law-
making process, consideration has already been given to the (possible or 
factual) proposals and criticisms coming from the national States mem-
bers, local communities, religious organisations and grassroots organisa-
tions. Since sometimes many of the latter do not consider “live-in partner-
ships” (or same-sex partnerships) equal to marriage, already in the actual 
creation of the right to divorce, the international organisation will most 
likely limit its sphere of application to “marriages” in order to prevent 
problems that might arise in the application of the legal category to other 
types of partnerships.  
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3.2. Why Should Legal Actors Choose One Legal Category Instead 
of the Other? 
The centrality of the legal discourse for any future model of the policy 
process, then, introduces the viable paths legal actors must consider in or-
der to answer the second question: what should the motives driving legal 
actors in the choice (or construction) of a legal category be? Since the pol-
icy process is positioned inside the legal world, but has strong relations 
with the political and social dimensions of the legal phenomenon, it seems 
reasonable to expect that legal actors, while in this transformational space, 
would go beyond the mere consideration of the legal reasoning along 
which the law-making develops. 
If the values or ideas behind a certain legal category are the starting 
point in understanding a policy of law process, and if a central role in 
such a process is played by the legal discourse, then it seems sound to ex-
pect that a normative approach to the process (that is, aiming at what 
ought to be done) will also sieve through the different moral, political, so-
cial, economic and cultural aspects underlying the legal reasoning. The 
legal actors will have to refrain from their ‘purely legal’ attitude and take 
a step into the world of moral, political, economic or cultural reasoning 
because, for example, the law-maker (either as a legislator, scholar or 
judge) must always reason and arguably rationalise his or her choices in 
terms of finding the correct legal category for a certain value. The law-
making authority will transform a value into law, trying to be as faithful 
as possible to some criteria to which the authority itself (and hopefully the 
addressees) attributes an a priori validity, that is, a value-status. These cri-
teria, as available to legal actors, can be of different natures, economic 
(for example, the economic efficiency of the legal order), formal legal cri-
teria (for example, the consistency and logic of the legal order) or stricto 
sensu political criteria (for example, the idea of democracy). Regardless 
of the kind of criteria the law-making agencies opt for, they are all per-
ceived and used by the legislator, judge, or scholar as axioms in their 
work, that is, as assumed-to-be lights guiding the work of law-makers. 
Legal actors should therefore be willing to penetrate and expose the 
axioms underpinning the law-maker’s choices in favour of one or the oth-
er legal category. The illumination of such economic, formalistic or moral 
axioms will be necessary not only for a better understanding of the pro-
cess of the policy of law. The descent into the value-roots will also be 
necessary when evaluating the results of the policy process, that is, both 
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the legal inputs and its outcomes upon the community. Only by first open-
ly recognising the political, moral, social or economic original back-
grounds of the legal categories and concepts made or used in the law-
making process, will legal actors be able to proceed in evaluating whether 
the expected effects have been realised or, to put it in famous terminolo-
gy, whether the law in books has become the law in action. 
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6.3. 
______ 
36Law School of the Future: 
Centre of Cutting-Edge Practice? 
Clark D. Cunningham* 
To meet the challenge of the rapidly changing future of law and to 
play a vital role in creating the law of the future, law schools must 
move beyond the delivery of static knowledge through classroom 
instruction and become centres of cutting-edge legal practice. The 
origins of modern medical education provide encouraging evidence 
that such a transformation is both needed and feasible. At the end of 
the nineteenth century, the curriculum at most North American 
medical schools consisted entirely of lectures, provided by part-
time practitioners to supplement their income. There was no patient 
contact or laboratory experience. Schools varied widely in quality, 
as did the competence of their graduates. Then, within a matter of 
decades, all was changed through the widespread adoption of a 
powerful new model of education: the teaching hospital staffed by 
physician-scientists. 
1. Introduction 
The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL), working 
from a foundation of 49 thought-provoking essays published in 2011 as 
the volume, The Law of the Future and the Future of the Law, has devel-
oped the Law Scenarios to 2030 as an instrument to help key decision-
makers in the legal systems of the world work towards preparing for an 
uncertain future. These scenarios predict with some confidence a number 
of trends that will challenge existing legal systems over the next twenty 
years, including rising population; greater scarcity of food, water and fos-
sil fuels; heightened security concerns; expanding economic globalisation; 
and increased access to information. However, the scenarios imagine 
quite different responses to such trends. For example, in terms of govern-
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ance, one possibility is a robust global legal order with its own authorita-
tive rules and institutions, while yet another plausible future is a retreat 
from global constitutionalism as legal borders thicken and State-made law 
dominates.  
In planning for a future that we feel certain will be radically differ-
ent from the present, but lacking certainty about the direction the future 
will take, those responsible for shaping legal education can best spend 
their energy altering the current institutional structure rather than ferment-
ing by speculation new courses to be poured into the cracked and rigid 
vessels of today. A law school serves society in at least two ways: (1) its 
current staff can be a resource of knowledge and expertise for addressing 
immediate societal issues, and (2) its graduates will design and operate an 
evolving legal system over the course of their professional careers. There-
fore, two questions should guide the analysis: (1) is the law school as an 
institution a useful resource for the current needs of the real world, and (2) 
are the current graduates of the law school being prepared to be effective 
lawyers and innovative actors in the legal system in response to changes 
that take place over their own professional life span? 
2. Drawing Inspiration from Medical Education  
This essay is deeply informed by the work of the Carnegie Foundation for 
the Advancement of Teaching, founded in 1905 by the philanthropist An-
drew Carnegie. Over the past century this organisation has prompted 
many important changes in higher education. In the last decade a major 
initiative of the Foundation has been the Preparation for the Professions 
Program, which has overseen a series of multi-year comparative studies of 
the education of the clergy, engineers, lawyers, doctors, and nurses.  
The Foundation’s report on American law schools, “Educating 
Lawyers” (2007), has been widely discussed in both the profession and 
academia, largely because of its unfavourable comparison of the process 
of preparation for the American legal profession with the educational pro-
grammes of the other professions it studied, notably medicine. “Educating 
Physicians”, the Foundation’s final report, was published in 2010 and, 
along with Learning to Heal by Kenneth Ludmerer, provide the basis for 
much of the following information about the distinctive features of medi-
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cal education that the Carnegie Foundation would have law schools emu-
late.1  
2.1. The Twentieth Century Revolution in Medical Education 
A century ago, in 1910, the Carnegie Foundation issued a blistering cri-
tique of the medical education, known as “The Flexner Report”, named 
after its author, Abraham Flexner. Flexner found that because scientific 
progress had greatly increased the physician’s diagnostic and remedial re-
sources, medical education had a different function to perform. However, 
according to Flexner, it had taken medical schools upward of half a centu-
ry to wake up to that fact. The gap between what was known and what 
was taught had become unacceptably wide. But how could medical 
schools, at the turn of the twentieth century, cope with the onslaught of 
new information and contend with the realisation that scientific 
knowledge is not fixed? Flexner advocated what he considered to be the 
only viable approach: to redesign medical education so that it had a pro-
cedural rather than substantive emphasis. The new objective of medical 
education should be to produce problem-solvers and critical thinkers who 
knew how to find out and evaluate information for themselves. “Though 
medicine can be learned, it cannot be taught”, wrote Flexner. “Active par-
ticipation in doing things is therefore the fundamental note of medical 
teaching”.  
The critical question was, then, what kind of institutional structure 
would facilitate this new educational method? Flexner proposed a new 
model: a four-year post-graduate programme built around faculty supervi-
sion of both patient care and laboratory investigation. The keystone of this 
new structure was the university-based teaching hospital, staffed by ‘phy-
sician-scientists’ who were competent both in the research laboratory and 
at the hospital bedside. Flexner asserted that no distinction should be 
made between research and practice, saying that “the [hospital ward] and 
the laboratory are [...] from the standpoints of investigation, treatment and 
education, inextricably intertwined”. Remarkably, within twenty years, 
Flexner’s proposed standard became the universal model for medical edu-
cation both in the United States and Canada. 
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  This chapter also draws from the history of the Johns Hopkins medical school provid-
ed on the school’s website. An expanded version of this chapter with full attribution 
to sources is available at www.teachinglegalethics.org. 
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2.2. The Teaching Hospital as the Premier Provider of Health Care 
Flexner pointed to the example of Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 
which had brought to America the scientific approach to medicine devel-
oped by German universities. Throughout the nineteenth century and into 
the twentieth, hospitals were generally reluctant to host anything more 
than nominal educational activities. However, Hopkins owned its own 
hospital and the medical school made all staff appointments. As a result 
the hospital at Hopkins achieved international eminence by combining pa-
tient care with path-breaking scientific research. 
By 1910 the Johns Hopkins medical school was less than 20 years 
old, but had already demonstrated the viability of Flexner’s proposal. 
Hopkins combined rigorous training in small classes and at patients’ bed-
sides with an emphasis on research that was then rapidly applied to im-
proved patient care. Teachers and students worked collaboratively on both 
patient care and research. The exemplar of this approach was the famous 
surgeon and teacher William Osler, who summed up the integration of 
scholarship and practice by saying: “He who studies medicine without 
books sails an uncharted sea, but he who studies medicine without pa-
tients does not go to sea at all”. 
As the Hopkins model was replicated elsewhere, a new consensus 
developed, held by both medical educators and hospital officials, that ed-
ucation and research improved the care of patients. The presence of stu-
dents ensured that every detail of patient care would receive attention and 
served as an intellectual prod to the faculty, stimulating thorough study 
and discussion, and benefiting not only the immediate patient but also 
other patients should something new be discovered. The intellectual ex-
citement of teaching hospitals attracted the most accomplished physicians 
to the staff. The most up-to-date information on the management of dis-
eases was to be found in university hospitals, where the search for the 
cause, mechanisms, and cure of human afflictions was being actively pur-
sued. Thus medical schools were continually improving medical practice 
through their success in discovering new knowledge and translating that 
knowledge into everyday medical care.  
2.3. The Teaching Hospital as the School for Adaptable Experts 
Incorporating a teaching hospital into the modern medical school not only 
makes the school immediately relevant to current society, the members of 
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which turn to its hospitals and outpatient centres for the best and most in-
novative health care, but also produces graduates who are adaptable ex-
perts rather than mere recipients of static knowledge.  
For the central experiences of medical education, the student does 
not sit passively gazing at the solitary teacher, but rather works actively 
next to her teacher and fellow health care providers, while all focus on the 
patient. By the end of four years of American medical school, a typical 
student has conducted 500 physical examinations, made 300 clinical notes 
on hospitalised patients, assisted in the delivery of 10 to 30 babies, and 
probably attended at least one death of someone for whom the student has 
provided care. 
Actual practice becomes the primary site for producing both 
knowledge and skill because the compelling real-life situation provides 
the motivation for understanding the patient’s condition from many per-
spectives, prompts curiosity for more knowledge, and reinforces the de-
sire for improving patient care which is the defining characteristic of the 
physician’s identity. As not mere didactic instructors, but rather collabora-
tors with students in this shared enterprise, teachers are constantly calling 
for higher performance from themselves as well as the students, and, criti-
cally, exemplifying their own initiative and resilience in the face of disap-
pointment and failure.  
According to the authors of “Educating Physicians”, becoming an 
expert requires not only efficiency in a core set of competencies but also 
the capacity to expand those competencies and the ability to innovate. 
Thus an educational programme fails if it produces professionals who per-
form routine work skilfully but fail to see new possibilities or greater 
complexity in their daily practice. Such skilled professionals may be ex-
perienced but are not truly experts because they do not engage in 
knowledge building through inquiry and improvement of the field in 
which they work. Experts have the ability to respond flexibly to varied 
situations, to modify existing practices and develop new practices to im-
prove performance, and to cross conventional domain boundaries to ex-
plore new perspectives and develop novel solutions to persistent prob-
lems. Experts are highly aware of the limits and uncertainty of their 
knowledge. They recognise their interpretations as provisional rather than 
conclusive, their questions are open rather than closed, and they actively 
pursue more complete understanding rather than assuming that they al-
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ready know the most important things and, thus, become indifferent to 
what more remains to be learned.  
Medical school ideally integrates formal and experiential 
knowledge longitudinally over the four-year span of the curriculum, 
matching what the student needs to learn next with the opportunities pre-
sented by practice at the teaching hospital. The student learns how to 
make increasingly high-stakes decisions under close supervision that as-
sures both effective education and safe patient care. Space is created in 
which the student can develop professional judgement in determining how 
much help she needs, and how to get it, in order to deal with a clinical 
problem, establishing the foundation for becoming an expert. Medical ed-
ucation is thus progressive, developmental, participatory and situated. 
3. A Path Not Taken 
In 1916, only a few years after the publication of the Flexner Report, the 
New York State Bar adopted a resolution that “every law school shall 
make earnest clinic work [...] a part of its curriculum for its full course”. 
William V. Rowe, the author of that resolution, had earlier prepared a 
memorandum for Columbia University asserting that the “radical changes 
in the conditions of legal practice have now made adequate provision for 
clinical training and experience the most essential part of legal education” 
and that the “chief immediate duty [...] is to develop for law students the 
same comprehensive and exceptional clinical opportunities which [...] 
[are] open to medical students”. To create such opportunities, Rowe rec-
ommended that Columbia acquire part or all of a prominent New York 
law practice and move it to the university campus, where it would be “a 
large office organization, with a very general practice, and with no re-
strictions upon the kind, value, or amount of business”. Columbia would 
thus immerse its students in a practice superior even to the most prestig-
ious private firms, a clinical experience that would be “the principal me-
dium of instruction in all years for all subjects”.  
Rowe’s ardour and impatience could easily be imagined as ex-
pressed today:  
We have had enough of mere debate and the time is now ripe 
for action [...] Why [the legal profession has] for so many 
years lagged behind all other professions [...] in providing 
systematic and experienced clinical and practical instruction 
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[...] all laymen and nearly all lawyers find [...] utterly impos-
sible to understand. 
Rowe’s recommendations fell on deaf ears, as did a report to the 
University of Chicago eighteen years later by the distinguished legal 
scholar and later federal judge, Jerome Frank. “Our law schools must 
learn from our medical schools”, he wrote. “The parallel cannot be carried 
too far”. He too proposed a legal clinic in every law school that would 
function as a leading law practice: “The law school clinics would not con-
fine their activities [to legal aid] [...] They could take on important work 
for governmental agencies [...]”. The professional work that they would 
do would include virtually every kind of service rendered by law offices. 
Such clinics, he believed, would attract exceptional lawyers, capable of 
becoming brilliant law teachers, who would not otherwise give up prac-
tice for what he termed “the elaborate futilities” of conventional law 
school teaching. The students produced by such education would be the 
very opposite of “mere technicians”; instead, they would have acquired “a 
rich and well-rounded culture in the practice of law”, as well as encour-
agement to see that an important part of their professional future “is to 
press for improvements in the judicial process and for social and econom-
ic change”. 
4. The Suitability of Present Law School Structure for the Future 
Although some of the Foundation’s recommendations relate to distinctive 
features of American legal education, the central critiques of its report are 
relevant to legal education around the world. The Foundation begins with 
the premise that the “central goal of professional schools must be to form 
practitioners who are aware of what it takes to become competent in their 
chosen domain and to equip them with the reflective capacity and motiva-
tion to pursue genuine expertise”. However, the Foundation found at best 
‘casual attention’ at most law schools to teaching students how to use le-
gal thinking in the complexity of actual law practice. The result is to pro-
long and reinforce the habits of thinking like students. 
It is true that around the world law schools are adding elective 
courses involving real client representation during the academic law de-
gree, and in many common law countries, though not the US, universities 
are becoming major providers of post-graduate professional training. 
However, such clinics and professional training programmes are, unlike 
the teaching hospital, not viewed by the profession or the public as the 
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primary site where the standards of legal practice and the structure of the 
legal system are being constantly challenged and improved to meet the 
changing needs of society. 2  The teaching hospital serves the medical 
school both as a window and a door into the real world, making it both a 
vital resource for current societal needs and a dynamic site for empower-
ing students to take responsibility for their own learning and for applying 
their ever-growing expertise to real-life problems. Could Rowe and Frank, 
writing in the early twentieth century, have been right that law schools 
could change their structure to create an equivalent of the teaching hospi-
tal? 
5. The Best Law Schools of the Future 
The transformation of legal education ought to be much easier than the 
task undertaken by medical educators a century ago, because law schools 
could become centres of cutting-edge legal practice without needing to 
make the kind of massive infrastructure investment represented by the 
teaching hospital. With library and information technology resources al-
ready in place, the typical law school would only need to provide addi-
tional working space and support staff to become a world-class centre of 
legal services if it enabled legal scholars to extend their work into practice 
settings and provided a site for practitioners to engage in scholarly cri-
tique and research to inform and improve their practice. 
The cost of teaching in a way other than a system of solitary teach-
ers facing large classrooms of students is almost always raised as a con-
clusive argument against even considering moving law schools towards 
the model of medical education. But medical education faced and over-
came the same cynicism. In 1871, a distinguished professor of medicine at 
Harvard said that no successful medical school was willing to risk the 
large receipts produced by large classroom instruction by attempting “a 
more thorough education”. In 1910, Flexner responded, “[p]ublic interest 
must be paramount and when the public interest, professional ideals and 
sound educational procedure concur in the recommendation of the same 
policy, the time is surely ripe for decisive action”. By 1920 it was clear 
that the distinguished Harvard academic was wrong and Flexner was 
right. 
                                                   
2
 The Development of Standardized Client Assessment, available at www.teachingleg 
alethics.org, last accessed on 20 August 2012. 
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The Carnegie Foundation’s study does not end with its troubling 
description of the limits of modern legal education; its report also asserts 
the conviction that “this is a propitious moment for uniting in a single ed-
ucational framework formal knowledge and experience of practice”. 
What is needed far more than additional financial resources is a new 
vision of what legal education can and should be. The Future of Law Pro-
ject, by moving our eyes away from the comforting certainty of the past to 
expand our gaze out and beyond the limiting horizon of the immediate, 
may do much to develop such a vision. 
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37The Future of European Legal Education 
Miguel Poiares Maduro* 
Law is changing. Is European legal education addressing this 
change? This piece starts by highlighting a tension between law as 
legal practice and law as science and how that has impacted on the 
character of legal education. It then proceeds to review the prob-
lems with current legal education and the challenges that the 
changes taking place in the character of law bring to it. While doing 
this, the piece highlights how those challenges can become an op-
portunity to reform legal education. 
Law is changing. Legal rules increasingly originate from different sources 
of political and normative authority: State, European and international le-
gal sources. Lawyers increasingly need to operate in the context of a plu-
rality of jurisdictions and legal sources. The market for legal services is 
also increasingly regionally and even globally integrated. At the same 
time, the social functions of law have progressively expanded and law has 
increasingly become a space for the resolution of social conflicts that the 
political process is incapable or unwilling to deal with.  
Is European legal education addressing these changes? Moreover, is 
it ready to cope with the challenges they bring to the teaching and learn-
ing of law?  
One has a reason to be sceptical, not least because these questions 
in themselves are surprisingly understudied. The justification for this may 
be found in the ambiguity surrounding the character of legal education. 
This ambiguity is visible in how legal scholars have dealt with legal edu-
cation: on the one hand, we do not “authorise” any other social scientists 
to research the study of law (the presumption being that legal education 
cannot be understood or questioned by non-lawyers); on the other hand, 
we tend to focus exclusively on what law itself is and consider issues of 
education as unworthy of the attention of legal scholars. In other words, 
while we treat legal education as a subject outside the province of legal 
science, we do not recognise anyone else’s right to address it. As a conse-
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quence, legal education is a “no man’s land”; it is a subject that is prac-
tised but not often reflected upon. Apart from the usual curricular dis-
putes, centred on the relative importance of our different legal subjects or 
their disciplinary borders, there is not much attention paid to how we 
teach the law and what ought to be the ultimate purpose of legal educa-
tion.  
The ambiguity of legal education reflects, in part, a larger ambigui-
ty about the character of law as science. Is law a technical expertise or a 
science? Europe’s doctrinal tradition of legal dogmatics has addressed this 
ambiguity by merging the two: law is the science of legal practice. Law 
becomes a science by organising and systematising the legal materials of 
a particular legal system. In this perspective, law is a science because it 
produces an organised body of knowledge that determines the practice of 
law in a particular legal order. It is for this reason that, in Europe, we nev-
er really faced the tensions that have dominated American law schools: 
the divide between the conception of law schools as professional or aca-
demic schools, or the permanent tension between legal scholarship and 
legal teaching. It is the existence (or assumption) of these tensions that, 
perhaps, explains why there is a much more developed American tradition 
of thinking and debating about legal education. The origin has to be traced 
back to the “Langdell revolution”. Langdell was the first non-judge made 
Professor and Dean at Harvard Law School in the late nineteenth century. 
He considered that a good law professor had first and foremost to be a 
good professor, and his case-study method has forever shaped American 
legal education. The “Langdell revolution” has acquired such a central 
role in the narrative of the emergence of American law schools and their 
distinctiveness that it created a culture favourable to a constant question-
ing of the nature of legal education and of different legal methodologies: 
how one teaches is as important as what one teaches. However, this has 
not helped to resolve the tensions mentioned above. There is often a pro-
found divide on how law is taught and thought of in the United States. 
The dominant conception of the law in legal scholarship is not really re-
flected in the way in which the law is usually taught.  
To a certain extent, the US and Europe have found two opposite 
ways of accommodating the ambiguity of legal teaching and legal science. 
Americans have distinguished legal teaching from legal scholarship. The 
first is about the knowledge of legal materials and the teaching of the ar-
gumentative narratives made possible by them, and to be used in courts. 
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The second is actually, predominantly, about questioning the social reality 
of those argumentative narratives, the underlying structures that shape 
them, as well as about what law ought to be. On the other hand, Europe-
ans merged legal teaching and legal scholarship by, as mentioned, con-
ceiving legal science as the science of legal practice. This is reflected in 
many other aspects of these academic communities. Notice, for example, 
how textbooks or treatises are considered minor (or even negatively per-
ceived) works of scholarship in the US, while in Europe they often remain 
the pinnacle of a legal scholar’s career.  
There are problems with both approaches. Here I am concentrating 
on the European case and, particularly, on its impact on legal education. 
How can law be a science if it does not critically reflect on its own as-
sumptions and methodological choices? It may fit the notion of science as 
a body of knowledge but not the scientific attitude of testing and question-
ing, not only of that body of knowledge but of how it is constructed. 
Moreover, doctrinal law is under-theorised: it mirrors reality but does not 
explain it. There is no science without theory (a hypothesis with both ex-
planatory and predictive power of similarities and differences) and meth-
odology (a reflective and critical approach to the study of the materials) 
and doctrinal approaches are, for the most part, a simple reproduction of 
the text of legal materials developed in a systematic, but largely uncritical 
and purely empiricist, way. Different outcomes based on the same textual 
legal materials are usually simply treated as inconsistencies and left unex-
plained. When social outcomes do not correspond to what “constitutes” 
the law, as doctrinally presented, the problem is treated as one of en-
forcement, outside the realm of the law. Law is shrunk so as to fit the 
dominant conception of legal science. 
This has, at least, five negative consequences. First, a lot of what 
actually determines legal outcomes is simply left unstudied (in particular, 
systemic aspects that determine, aside from existent legal materials, for 
example, what courts do). This leads to bad legal scholarship, legal prac-
tice and law-making. Second, the nature of the relationship established be-
tween law and practice and its reflection in legal education is such that le-
gal scholarship has become, itself, too advocacy-oriented. Third, in many 
instances, it has even become perfectly acceptable for legal scholarship to 
be a by-product of legal practice (legal opinions and legal advocacy). 
Fourth, legal education has become both misleading and socially perverse. 
It is misleading because it hides from students all the institutional varia-
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bles that determine what the law is beyond the text of the existing legal 
materials. It is socially perverse because not only does that disconnect be-
tween what the law is and what is taught about it induces a cynical atti-
tude in the practice of law, but it will also lead to a de-contextualised in-
terpretation and application of the law. In other words, the disconnect will 
extend to the relationship between law and its social context of applica-
tion. Fifth, if legal scholarship will resist embracing context, law will in-
creasingly be dominated by other social sciences. These will put forward 
competing narratives of the law focusing on what legal scholarship does 
not explain. Though this challenge may be beneficial for law and legal 
scholarship, it risks, if not embraced by lawyers, simply aggravating the 
disconnect between law and its social context. 
My argument is, however, that the current changes in the character 
of law offer us an opportunity to address some of these problems and re-
think the nature of legal scholarship and legal education. In here, I want to 
focus on how they require, and may trigger, positive changes in legal edu-
cation, addressing not only recent changes in the law, but also the deeper 
problems of legal education that I have highlighted. 
The Europeanisation of legal education will be a natural conse-
quence of the Europeanisation of the law. Such Europeanisation is meas-
urable by the extent to which the European Union has become a primary 
source of law for its member States. Although this is certainly difficult to 
measure and there are no official statistics, most estimations indicate that 
the EU is responsible for at least fifty per cent of all new legislation appli-
cable in the European States. This Europeanisation of the law is already 
visible at the level of litigation. Every year, there are over two hundred 
references from different national courts to the European Court of Justice 
on questions of validity and interpretation of EU law and, indirectly, on 
the compatibility of national law with EU rules. This number is, however, 
only a drop in the ocean of EU law-related litigation. Firstly, there are an 
even higher number of cases where EU law is pleaded directly before the 
two European Jurisdictions (the General Court and the European Court of 
Justice). Secondly, and most importantly, the (unfortunately) few existing 
studies measuring EU law litigation before national courts tend to estab-
lish that the cases referred to the European Court of Justice do not amount 
to more than five per cent of the cases in which EU law is invoked before 
those national courts.  
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Furthermore, EU law-related litigation will continue to grow, as a 
consequence of the expansion in the scope of application of EU law but, 
most importantly, of the increased familiarity with it of all relevant legal 
actors (lawyers, judges, et cetera). The learning process of EU law is far 
from being concluded and the expectation is that it will tend to permeate 
almost all areas of litigation. An overview of the subject-matters already 
addressed in recent cases brought before the European Court of Justice 
underscores this point. Alongside the core areas of EU law (internal mar-
ket, competition and international trade), one finds subjects such as family 
law, contracts, sports law, tax law, consumer law, company law, environ-
mental law, intellectual property, labour and social law, and even criminal 
law.  
These developments must be reflected in the teaching of the law. It 
will not be sufficient, however, to increase the importance attached to EU 
law in the curricula of European law schools. A first step will be to “Eu-
ropeanise” the teaching of the other legal subjects. It is no longer possible 
to teach contracts or consumer law, for example, without teaching EU 
law. However, simply to account for EU law sources would not be suffi-
cient. In fact, EU law does not simply bring with it new rules. Such rules 
can only be properly interpreted and applied in the light of the particular 
nature of its system of law, its general principles of law and its own meth-
ods of interpretation. Legal subjects must not simply be taught in the light 
of a new body of rules; they must be taught in a different way, taking into 
account the legal culture of the EU legal order as well as the integration of 
national and EU legal orders.  
To this, we must add the challenge arising from the increased multi-
national character of the cases in which lawyers are called on to assist. 
This creates a context in which judges and lawyers must learn to operate 
in a complex web of rules arising from their own legal order but also from 
other national legal orders and the EU legal order. This is also a natural 
consequence of increased economic integration and its legal implications, 
such as the fact that companies are being set up and operate in different 
States and contracts as well as other legal instruments must be drafted in 
light of their connection to different legal orders. As a consequence, a 
growing number of legal actors (in courts, just as outside courts and even 
in the legislative process) need to operate in a context involving different 
legal sources, multiple jurisdictions and diverse legal cultures. They must 
be comfortable “travelling” between different legal orders, so as to avoid 
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the perils of some form of legal jet lag. This phenomenon will also in-
crease cross-fertilisation of legal concepts and miscegenation of legal cul-
tures. This is so for two reasons: first, the growing transnational character 
of economic litigation and legal services means that lawyers tend to circu-
late legal arguments and legal strategies among different legal orders; and, 
second, the circulation of legal ideas through networks of academics, law-
yers and judges also entails a miscegenation of legal cultures.1 
Though this challenge is particularly visible and important at the 
level of European integration, it also takes place at a global level. In-
creased global economic and social integration will promote some of the 
same phenomena at the global level, even if in a more mitigated form and 
without amounting to the formidable impact of the European integration. 
These changes are bound to challenge not only the content of the 
law but also how it needs to be taught. This context of legal pluralism and 
legal miscegenation requires different hermeneutics and the interaction 
between legal cultures, which is triggered by the Europeanisation of the 
law, will confront each national legal culture with many of its unarticulat-
ed assumptions. Change in what you study is often the fastest way to 
break path-dependencies on how you study.  
A second trend of relevance to the future of European legal educa-
tion relates to contemporary changes in the market for legal services. The 
practice of law is increasingly international, and law firms reflect that. 
Law firms have reacted to the Europeanisation and globalisation of law by 
becoming European and global themselves. Top law firms have expanded 
into other States and have merged with law firms from those States, either 
acquiring them or established cross-national partnerships. An increased 
percentage of top law firms have lawyers from multiple nationalities, and 
their revenue is increasingly of foreign origin. This is favoured by, but not 
dependent on, the liberalisation of cross-border legal services that has tak-
en place in Europe and is currently being promoted by the WTO at the 
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global level. A survey conducted by the magazine The European Lawyer 
on the European legal landscape gave an interesting, albeit tentative, per-
ception of the recent developments in the European legal market. There 
are a moderate but growing number of multi-national law firms operating 
in a variety of European States. The tendency is for law firms to become 
increasingly European, following the patterns of economic and social in-
tegration. There is an even broader and already well-established tendency 
to create partnerships between law firms of different States at the Europe-
an level. Networks continue to be the most disseminated form of interna-
tionalisation, but the so-called “organic internationalisation”2 is increas-
ingly gaining ground, and even leading to the emergence of truly global 
law firms. Another emerging tendency is for European law firms to fore-
see market opportunities in emerging markets (such as Russia, China or 
India). All law firms, even middle-sized ones, stress the increasingly in-
ternational character of their work.  
Another important development has been the growth of in-house 
lawyers3 and, related to this, but not exclusively, the relative decrease of 
litigation as part of a lawyer’s work. To this, one must also add the in-
creased role of arbitration and other non-judicial forms of dispute resolu-
tion that lawyers are required to engage with. All require new legal and 
non-legal tools from lawyers and present them with challenges for which 
European legal education has hardly begun to prepare them. 
Studies on the sociology and history of the legal profession have 
highlighted that the precise role of the legal profession is historically con-
tingent, and that that role also impacts on the style of lawyering.4 It is in-
evitable that the changes in the structure and character of the market for 
legal services will affect the recruitment policies for lawyers and the legal 
                                                   
2
 According to Glenn Morgan and Sigrid Quack this refers to “firms that have gradually 
developed their own overseas offices through a mix of methods”. See Glenn Morgan 
and Sigrid Quack, “Institutional Legacies and Firm Dynamics: The Growth and Inter-
nationalization of UK and German Law Firms”, in Organization Studies, 2008, vol. 
26, no. 12, p. 1775. See also W. Calkoen, “The European Perspective”, in Jens Drol-
shammer and Michael Pfeifer (eds.), The Internationalization of Legal Practice, 2001, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, p. 144. 
3
 See, for example, Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, “Corporate Counsel and the 
Elite Law Firm”, in Stamford Law Review, 1984–1985, vol. 37, p. 277.
 
 
4
 See Lawrence Friedman, “Lawyers in Cross-Cultural Perspective”, in Richard L. Abel 
and Philip S.C. Lewis (eds.), Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories, Beard 
Books, 1989, p. 8. 
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training expected of them. This is already visible. Another survey by The 
European Lawyer notes that there is increased competition in the recruit-
ment process for top lawyers, with firms recruiting at an increasingly ear-
ly stage and hiring external consultants to help them in the recruitment 
process. They also look for lawyers with international training, preferring 
people with diverse and multi-national training. It appears that it has be-
come common practice for business law firms to require a foreign law de-
gree as part of the entry requirements for young lawyers.5 However, this is 
not exclusive of law firms: international legal masters are now a usual re-
quirement to access legal jobs at international organisations and, increas-
ingly, for in-house positions at large companies. It is also increasingly 
common for law firms to offer, encourage and even require their lawyers 
to spend some time practising or training in another State. At the moment, 
the tendency in Europe is for two markets to co-exist, one composed of 
the top-tier, large scale, elite law firms that are increasingly European (or 
even truly global); the other is that of small, often family based, local law 
firms.  
Elite legal education will match the needs of the first type of law 
firms. I do not envisage, however, nor do I wish for, a legal education that 
will be simply formatted to fit the professional and specialised immediate 
needs of those law firms. Instead, the challenge must be met by embracing 
law beyond the confines to which doctrine has circumscribed it. Only the 
opening up of legal education will prepare students for the opening up of 
law. Paradoxically, the need to adapt to changes in legal practice may re-
quire a stronger theorisation of law in legal education. That is, the right 
theorisation of law; one that is not a mere abstraction from legal practice 
but genuinely engages with the institutions and processes that shape that 
practice beyond simply the textual legal materials. It is only by truly un-
derstanding the “mechanics” of law that students will be able to make 
sense of and adapt to the constant changes in the law and the different le-
gal cultures in which they will be required to practise it. Even from a 
purely advocacy perspective, the move from systematising to understand-
ing the law is much more effective for the purposes of constructing differ-
ent possible legal narratives that can be successfully put forward before 
courts and other legally relevant actors. 
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 Morgan and Quack, 2008, p. 1772, see supra note 2. 
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A third important development is the increased centrality of law in 
contemporary societies. This is a product of the expansion of regulation 
into new social domains (both as an instrument of the State where the 
State was not present before or to actually replace the State where it used 
to provide services and now simply regulates). However, it is also a prod-
uct of the increased judicialisation of social and political conflicts. The 
current nature of the political process often entails that political pluralism 
is reflected in conflicting normative preferences being entrenched in 
strong bargaining positions that make it particularly difficult to reach a 
clear normative agreement in the legal rules. Such rules are bound to lead, 
intentionally or not, to a delegation to courts of the final decisions on 
those issues. This is not necessarily negative: a political community may 
legitimately decide to exclude certain issues from the “passions” of the 
political process and “delegate” them to more insulated institutions. Simi-
larly, political communities can decide to agree on very broad principles 
without articulating solutions to the conflicts which will necessarily occur 
in the practical application of such principles. This may be so as to pre-
vent collective action problems. We trust on the long-term advantage of 
committing to a judicial concretisation of such principles with its univer-
sal potential, while reducing the transaction and information costs in-
volved in reaching particularly difficult decisions. This makes agreement 
possible on delicate and controversial political questions by politically de-
ferring its practical effects to a judicial solution to be derived from a uni-
versally agreed principle.  
Despite this a paradox is created. As stated, pluralism increases the 
centrality of law and courts, and often leads to the delegation to them of 
decisions of high political and social sensitivity. However, this same con-
text tends both to increase the contestability of judicial decisions and ri-
gidify their outcomes (because the political process is less capable of 
overcoming them). The only way to deal with such a paradox is by chang-
ing our understanding of the role that the law and courts play in a demo-
cratic political community. This requires an upgrading of the legal soft-
ware of judges and lawyers, particularly with respect to legal reasoning. It 
will also bring new questions to the classrooms, questions for which doc-
trinal law is in no position to provide a satisfactory answer.  
The fourth relevant trend allows us to relate the challenges to legal 
education arising from changes in the character of law to the changes tak-
ing place in the market for legal education. There is an emerging Europe-
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an and global market for legal education. Top American Law Schools 
have already for some time been developing strategies to meet the de-
mand for global legal education.6 They have specifically tailored their 
LLM programmes to fit such search for global legal education (NYU has 
taken this to a different level by setting up a Global Law School). That re-
flects itself in their faculty and course offerings but, most notably, in the 
composition of their student bodies which is, at the LLM level, over-
whelmingly (if not exclusively) composed of foreign students. The num-
ber of international students at US law schools increased five-fold be-
tween 1980 and 2000 and the number of LLMs being offered increased 
from a few dozen in the early 1990s to over 100 between 2003 and 2004.7 
Some American Law Schools have also, de facto, created franchises of 
their law degrees at foreign universities and, in some cases, are even con-
sidering opening foreign branches.  
Some European law schools are also embracing the path of interna-
tionalisation. UK law schools are clearly attracting a high number of for-
eign students to their degrees (particularly at master level). Their faculty 
is also increasingly international. In the rest of Europe, one also finds a 
few examples of law schools that, at least on paper, appear to be embrac-
ing such internationalisation. Overall, however, the internationalisation of 
European law schools has been rather limited, often focusing on student 
exchanges in the context of the Erasmus programme. Their teaching of 
law continues to be largely insulated from the changes highlighted above. 
Their faculty, student body, courses offerings and teaching methods re-
flect this circumstance.  
Still, things are starting to change. One first step has been the de-
velopment of joint degrees. We are now also witnessing the emergence of 
a real European market for LLMs. More than one hundred European law 
schools now offer some form of LLMs open to foreign students. Only a 
few of these, however, are truly international in character. The interna-
tional character is mostly visible in the adoption of English as the lan-
guage of instruction, and in the increased offer of EU law subjects. With 
the exception of Germany and France, English is the dominant language. 
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Law schools offering these programmes are attracting an increasing num-
ber of foreign students (around fifty per cent of their LLM student body). 
The large majority comes from other European States, but other relevant 
markets are Asia, the US and Latin America. Within Europe, students 
from former Eastern European countries are among the most mobile. Eu-
ropean LLM programmes are thus an undisputed trend and, to a large ex-
tent, they simply answer to a market demand. In the Netherlands, one of 
the few European States with a large offering of law degrees aimed at in-
ternational students (particularly European), the number of foreign stu-
dents undertaking a master’s degree in law was already over eight hun-
dred in the academic year of 2002–2003.8 The main example remains, 
however, the United Kingdom as it attracts a substantial number of for-
eign students to its legal programmes.9 
However, as the European Law Faculties Association noted in a 
declaration entitled “For a European Space of Legal Education”:  
If European legal education wants to compete with the high-
ly successful US-American system of education for lawyers, 
a number of additional and more courageous steps have to be 
taken.  
One of these steps will entail a clear division between the objectives 
to be achieved by legal education at the bachelor’s and master’s levels. 
The proposal of ELFA, at this stage, is to focus bachelor training on na-
tional law while the master’s should offer a European and international 
legal education. I agree that this is a necessary development, but I would 
add that the pressures arising from the mobility of students and lawyers, 
the developments in the mutual-recognition of law degrees in Europe and 
the informal harmonisation of legal studies inherent in the Bologna decla-
ration would promote such steps. In reality, the “two degree” model 
(bachelor’s and master’s) of legal education inherent in the Bologna pro-
cess perfectly fits the current market demand for a two-fold legal educa-
tion: national and European (or international). The expectation, in the 
short term, is for students to continue to do their bachelor’s legal studies 
in their home State. However, at the master’s level increased competition 
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 Source: CBS, mentioned in the EURODATA Project. 
9
 Unfortunately, there do not seem to be easily available data specific to law schools. In 
total there were 100,357 foreign students attending law, social sciences and business 
degrees in the UK in 2002–2003. Source: EUROSTAT, mentioned in the EURODA-
TA Project. 
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will emerge among European law schools. Students, particularly the best 
ones, will look round Europe for the best European and international legal 
education. It may be possible, at least in the short term, for law schools to 
continue to go on as usual at the level of the bachelor’s degrees; however, 
at the master’s level a European market will emerge. Formal or informal 
European rankings will follow, and are in fact starting to appear regarding 
the different master’s programmes and law schools. 10  The European 
market for legal education at the master’s level will increasingly look like 
the American legal education market. 
The trends highlighted constitute a major challenge for European 
law schools and legal education. The law to be taught is different. The 
role played by the law is also different. Even the profile of the lawyer de-
manded by the market is different. Moreover, European law schools will 
increasingly be competing in a European market. Answering these trends 
requires more than simply opening up the traditional national degrees to 
foreign students. It requires a complete restructuring of legal education 
and even law schools. A European and international law degree can only 
be properly developed where there is a law school with a European and 
international culture. It will not be enough to Europeanise or globalise le-
gal curricula. It is the teaching of law itself that must change. This pre-
sents an opportunity to rethink the legal methodologies and pedagogical 
approaches currently employed in European legal education. However, 
they must remain legal. Simply adding to the study of doctrinal law the 
study of other legally relevant social disciplines may do more harm than 
good if the right link is not established with law. The focus should always 
be on law and the departure point must be the existing legal sources. What 
is needed is for lawyers to be equipped with a new set of social, critical 
and analytical tools in order to really understand law and make use of its 
legal sources. That is the challenge. 
Furthermore, a truly innovative, European and international legal 
education can only take place in a truly European and international con-
text. This requires a diverse and multinational community of learning with 
a diverse, international faculty and student body. Only the law schools 
that will take these challenges seriously will succeed in the future of legal 
education. 
                                                   
10
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38Whither the Future of Law?  
Concluding Remarks 
Jan M. Smits* 
This concluding chapter draws a picture of the future of law 
that is based upon the preceding contributions and upon the 
views of the author. It identifies three main functions of the 
law – rule- and decision-making, enforcement, and dispute 
resolution – and asks how these functions are affected by 
economic globalisation and technological development. One 
of the main shifts identified is the one from dispute resolu-
tion to dispute avoidance: under the influence of declining 
national laws, and in the absence of a meaningful global law, 
private actors turn to alternative mechanisms such as reputa-
tional networks to order their relationships. 
1. Introduction  
In 1930, John Maynard Keynes published a short essay entitled Economic 
Possibilities for our Grandchildren. Perhaps the greatest economist of the 
twentieth century asked what economic life would be like around 2030. 
Next to surprisingly accurate predictions about future income levels, it is 
not too audacious to assume that Keynes will be proved wrong when it 
comes to his view of future working hours (he predicted a 15-hour work-
ing week in 2030) and people’s mentality towards money (“the love of 
money as a possession – as distinguished from the love of money as a 
means to the enjoyments and realities of life, will be recognised for what 
it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity”). The think pieces collected in this 
volume follow Keynes’ example in reflecting upon what the world will 
look like in the future, but differ in two important respects. First, the con-
tributions relate to the law, arguably to a lesser extent subject to change 
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over time than the economy, and second, their horizon is not a hundred 
years, but only two to three decades. This makes the exercise carried out 
in this volume not only less speculative than Keynes’ work, but also more 
exciting. It is likely that more than one think piece accurately describes 
future law. 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to draw a picture of the future 
of law that is partly based upon the preceding contributions, and partly 
upon my own views of what course the law is likely to take in an age of 
ever-accelerating globalisation and technological progress. The goal is 
explicitly not to summarise all of the contributions, or to make reference 
to all individual authors, but rather to provide the reader with an analysis 
that cuts through the respective substantive legal fields addressed in this 
volume. This approach is justified because fields such as intellectual 
property law, corporate law, environmental law, trade law, competition 
law, cyberlaw, procedural law, human rights, health law and international 
law, to name the most important fields discussed in this book, all face 
identical problems of rule-making, of identifying the right substantive le-
gal norms, of enforcement and of solving conflicts. 
This crosscutting approach sets the agenda for this contribution. It 
identifies three main functions of the law – rule- and decision-making, en-
forcement, and dispute resolution – and asks in the three following sec-
tions not only how these functions are affected by globalisation and tech-
nological development, but also what alternatives exist. One can describe 
this as a functional approach. I assume that the law fulfils certain func-
tions including the three just mentioned, and that one of the main chal-
lenges in thinking about the future is how these functions can also be sat-
isfied, whether in a legal or non-legal way, in a globalising and technolog-
ically progressing society. 
There is one methodological problem that deserves separate atten-
tion. The think pieces in this volume focus almost entirely on either find-
ing new solutions in cases where the traditional national rules no longer 
function properly, as in private international law, where a jurisdictional 
approach is no longer in line with today’s borderless reality, or on identi-
fying a legal solution to a new problem, as in case of whether robots 
should have human rights obligations. In both cases, the natural tendency 
of lawyers is to overstress the importance of the law. However, it is likely 
that the problem-solving power of the law, in essence still largely of na-
tional origin, becomes less important in cases where a problem is no long-
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er purely national. In case of a truly new problem, it also remains to be 
seen what the role of the law could be in solving it. Anyone writing about 
the law of the future should therefore take into account that the law’s 
functions can easily change as a result of changes in society as a whole. 
This may well explain why many of the contributions in this vol-
ume do not take up the grand societal challenges that the world is facing 
today. HiiL’s Law Scenarios to 2030 predict a rising population, greater 
scarcity of food, water and natural resources, including oil and gas, in-
creasing security concerns and exposure to more, and not necessarily bet-
ter, information. These trends come next to ‘older’ concerns about contin-
uing rivalry among ethnic and religious groups, failed States, war, mass 
atrocities, nuclear proliferation, poor enforcement of human rights stand-
ards, the ineffectiveness of international law, including the adverse effects 
of big power politics in the United Nations, and too little attention for so-
cial justice. Added to these must be relatively new challenges such as 
global warming, the global financial crisis, the effects of the Arab Spring 
on the rights of minorities and on peace in the Middle East, and the 
changing balance of economic and political power in the world. The au-
thors of the present book leave these challenges, incidentally largely in-
fluenced by a Western view of the world, almost completely aside – and 
probably rightly so. The law can only play a very limited role in address-
ing them. 
2. Rule- and Decision-Making 
If anything becomes clear from reading the contributions to this volume, it 
is that the Westphalian idea of States exclusively setting the norms for the 
people on their territory is no longer adequate. This is not only true as a 
description in view of the rise of international norms and of private regu-
lation; it is also true at the normative level. As more and more problems 
can no longer be appropriately dealt with by national law, they need to be 
addressed in a different way. There are two fundamentally different ways 
to do this and both are represented in the present book. 
The first alternative is to keep up the hope that what can no longer 
be done by way of national law, such as norm setting in a legitimate and 
effective way, could be done in a similar way at the European or global 
level. This leads to a belief in a global legal order and in the creation of 
international courts as effectively taking over the role of national judiciar-
ies. This testifies of a continuing belief in the power of law and in official 
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institutions being able to set rules and govern the world in much the same 
way as national institutions have done in the last two centuries. A promi-
nent example of such global constitutionalism is Frank Vibert’s plea for a 
coherent system for the judicial review of rule-making by international 
bodies. 
The second alternative is to find functional equivalents outside of 
the law for the traditional national rules and institutions. This requires a 
different way of thinking. Instead of claiming that effective rule setting, or 
any other task of the State such as providing legal certainty or creating a 
framework for business transactions, should be provided by new interna-
tional institutions, one seeks the solution in devices that can play a similar 
role without a need for the State or State-like organisations to intervene. 
This latter way of reasoning is of course informed by the reality that it is 
not easy at all to solve problems by way of international law-making. In 
some fields, such as Corporate Social Responsibility, this second alterna-
tive is already very much reality as a result of the activities of private ac-
tors. However, in areas that belong even more clearly to the public realm, 
it is more difficult to leave behind our old conceptions of State-made law, 
precisely because we feel that in public matters decision-making should 
take place through broad participation of the citizens or at least of national 
parliaments. An enlightening example is offered by Albert Lin: global 
warming might be addressed by geo-engineering technologies that enable 
us to choose a climate for the planet, but prospects of finding an accepta-
ble answer to the question as to who should ‘control the thermostat’ are 
slim. 
It would in my view be wrong to argue against the rise of the se-
cond alternative. It is the logical consequence of the changing role of law 
through globalisation. Globalisation requires solutions that national law 
cannot offer and therefore the vacuum is filled in different ways. Howev-
er, this is not all. Just as important for the future of law is its potential at 
the national level. Here too, the role of law is due to change. Edward Ru-
bin rightly observes that “the law of the future will bring the long-overdue 
demise of [the] pre-modern conception of law”. Law as a set of State 
commands for human conduct will make place for law as an instrument of 
modern administrative governance, leading to a shift from democratic 
procedures to results, from generality to particularisation and from regu-
larity to supervision. Rubin thus provides the theoretical framework to 
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what others see occurring in their respective fields, including banking and 
corporate law, environmental law and competition law. 
An interesting question is whether we can also predict anything 
about the future substantive course that the law will or should take. Re-
markably, most contributions focus on questions of legitimacy, transpar-
ency and effectiveness of rule-making and not so much on the substance 
of future rules. This neutral approach can be easily explained. Any type of 
global law necessarily reflects diverging views of what is right. Notions 
of what the rule of law and fundamental rights entail already differ con-
siderably in today’s world and it is not likely that this will change in the 
future. In particular, if the law is to play a role in the process of economic 
and political development of widely diverging countries, as many contri-
butions at least implicitly assume, it is essential to take this diversity into 
account. This explains why not many authors are in favour of the outright 
unification of laws, which presumes a view of only one ‘right’ substantive 
rule. Rather, the authors argue for recognition of diversity. As diverse 
views of what is right are probably best reflected by national laws, this al-
so means that national laws remain important, shifting the question to 
how to coordinate these laws among each other. 
3.  Enforcement 
The second traditional function of the State is that it facilitates the en-
forcement of the applicable law. In a Westphalian view, the State has a 
monopoly on both the drafting of substantive rules and the enforcement of 
these rules through the national courts. While the first monopoly is rapid-
ly eroding, as we just saw, the second one still largely exists: except for 
some exceptional cases, of which the various international criminal courts 
are the most important examples, the enforcement of law is still in the 
hands of national institutions. This is quite logical. Today’s problems may 
be increasingly global, but our institutions are not. Private actors and oth-
er international rule-setters thus still need to rely on the teeth of national 
courts to enable their addressees to claim their rights. 
This age-old jurisdictional approach makes enforcement complicat-
ed and therefore expensive, a problem that is felt in particular in cross-
border cases. This is true not only for data protection laws, as Lokke 
Moerel convincingly shows, but also in many other fields including con-
sumer law. It leads businesses to favour private enforcement and private 
regulation wherever possible and prompts future customers to better as-
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sess the risk of default by the other party before even entering into the 
transaction (see further below, section 4). A crosscutting analysis of the 
think pieces confirms that litigation in the national courts is usually seen 
as unproductive, as Martijn Scheltema aptly describes for the field of 
Corporate Social Responsibility. 
This finding also explains why, even in the case of new legislative 
instruments that allow cross-border collective redress in a national court, 
most parties still prefer alternatives to litigation. Arbitration and media-
tion are among these, but they are in the end also dependent on the State 
courts when it comes to the enforcement of the arbitral award or the me-
diation agreement. It does therefore not come as a surprise that, in a recent 
study, Thomas Dietz concludes that a territorially fragmented global legal 
order, as we have at present with separate State legal systems, is problem-
atic in a global economy. As was already seen when rule-making was dis-
cussed, the appropriate remedy can be found in two directions. One could 
adapt the existing rules of private international law, for example by 
broadening the international jurisdiction of national courts and by enhanc-
ing mutual recognition. As this requires each individual State to change 
its own laws, this is not likely to happen. The alternative is that practice 
finds its own ways and seeks to avoid recourse to the law by assessing a 
party’s reputation ex ante (see below, section 4). 
4. Dispute Resolution and the Shift from Ex Post to Ex Ante 
Many of the contributions could start – and some of them in fact do – with 
the observation that despite the globalisation of trade, of environmental 
concerns, of competition among companies, there is no such thing as an 
effective global trade law, consumer sales law, environmental law or 
competition law. This absence is felt in particular when it comes to dis-
pute resolution. This is likely to lead to two shifts, the contours of which 
are already clearly visible today. 
First, there is a shift from State courts towards forms of private jus-
tice. Private actors not only set rules, but also increasingly take care of the 
State function of providing access to an effective resolution of disputes. 
As we saw before, this includes arbitration, mediation and other forms of 
ADR. If we look at the provision of dispute resolution as a process of 
competition, in which State courts compete with other providers of prob-
lem solving devices, it seems that State courts are in decline. At the same 
time, State courts do take measures to remain competitive. While Western 
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jurisdictions try to attract foreign parties to their courts, even issuing bro-
chures, a prominent example being the English Law Society’s leaflet, 
England and Wales: The Jurisdiction of Choice, Benjamin Odoki pro-
vides a nice example of how technology can help in enabling access to 
justice for people from distant areas. His vision of virtual courts for 
Uganda is worth following in many other parts of the world. It reinforces 
the point made by Maurits Barendrecht that we are in need of more inno-
vative types of civil justice, also to keep State courts competitive. 
The second shift is in my view even more important, at least for the 
area of private law. This is the shift from dispute resolution to dispute 
avoidance, so from ex post to ex ante dealing with potential disputes. If 
national law is no longer in demand and global law does not exist, private 
actors turn to other mechanisms to order their relationships. It is no sur-
prise that social networks play an important role in this alternative order-
ing process. David Charny wrote in 1990, “One key to effective reputa-
tional controls is a system for transmitting relevant information to market 
participants. […] Collective reputational enforcement should work well 
[…] in markets limited to small numbers, homogenous groups of individ-
uals who are in frequent contact and thus can share relevant information. 
These markets are, of course, relatively rare. Conversely mass markets 
based on reputational bonds are feasible only with technology that con-
veys information cheaply to a large group of transactors […]”. 
The most interesting aspect of this view is that what was still im-
possible in 1990 has become possible today. Due to the rise of the inter-
net, reputational networks need no longer be based on close social con-
tacts. Perfect strangers are often able to assess the reliability of other par-
ties through websites that rank their previous behaviour. If one of the 
main functions of law is to create trust among people who do not know 
each other, it may well be that new technologies allow people to replace 
the law with new types of reputational networks. This fits in with Jim Da-
tor’s observation that order does not need law. His point that order can al-
so exist through personal contact, and that law only becomes important in 
a political society sanctioned by organised force, seems to imply that a 
global order can exist without law as long as other methods of creating 
trust are in existence. In my own words, Facebook may be much more 
important for the future of law than any official statute or treaty. 
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5. Changing Roles of Legal Actors and the Importance of Legal 
Education 
The functional approach adopted in this contribution sheds some light on 
how the role of national law, and of law in general, is likely to change in 
the coming twenty years. All actors involved in the legal process will 
have to get used to new roles. National legislatures have to accept that 
they are becoming just one other lawgiver and have to compete with oth-
ers in setting effective rules for their citizens. Courts are likely to be in-
creasingly called upon to fill the gaps that national legislatures cannot 
provide rules for. However, probably the most important change will lie 
in the rise of private actors, private regulation, private enforcement and 
above all a shift away from the law itself towards reputational networks 
will fundamentally change the regulatory power of law. 
One group of legal actors was not yet mentioned, although their role 
is vital in addressing the challenges future law faces: law professors. Until 
now, most law professors have shown only little interest in changing the 
way in which they teach the law. As long as teaching focuses on learning 
the (doctrinal) law of national jurisdictions only, students will not grasp 
any of the trends identified in this collection of think pieces. There is a 
dire need to teach the law in a different way, not only by paying attention 
to rules flowing from other sources than the official ones, but also by 
showing alternative solutions outside of the law. Both Clark Cunning-
ham’s and Miguel Maduro’s contribution show that the transformation 
towards such a more societally relevant curriculum is needed and possi-
ble. 
One final remark is in place. While the effects of globalisation are 
often lamented, a majority of the contributions to this volume are optimis-
tic about the law of the future. This may be due to the problem-solving 
approach of lawyers in general: no matter what the problem is, they are 
trained to find a solution for it. This makes it appropriate to end with a 
quote by economist Joseph Stiglitz. In his book Making Globalization 
Work, he quotes his wife, asking him “You have complained enough 
about globalisation. What would you do about it?” This is a question to 
which lawyers have an answer. 
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